Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003028
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/62050/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F. Ahmad, instructed by Hanson Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) made an anonymity order on the grounds that the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighed the principle of open justice. I have not been asked to set that order aside and I agree that it should continue, for the reasons given by the FTT.
2. The appellant is accepted to be a citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity, born in April 1999. He arrived in the UK in September 2022 and claimed asylum on arrival. He says he is at real risk of persecution in Iran for reasons of his political opinion. He says that before leaving Iran, he twice helped his father smuggle leaflets for the Komala Party, a Kurdish political party, into Iran from Iraq. On the second occasion, they were encountered by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), who fired on them. The appellant escaped, but his father was captured. The appellant was afraid to return home, and the next day his uncle confirmed to him that the IRGC had searched the family home and made threats against him. He fled the country.
3. The appellant also says that since arriving in the UK, he has expressed his anti-regime, pro-Kurdish political opinions through attending demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy and posting content on his Facebook page.
4. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim. The decision-maker accepted the appellant’s identity, nationality and ethnicity and that he had exited Iran illegally. However, they rejected the appellant’s account of the events leading up to his departure from Iran as vague, implausible and internally inconsistent. They further found that the appellant’s evidence of his political activities in the UK did not establish the scope of those activities, the appellant’s role in the protests he attended or whether his activities had come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
5. The appellant appealed. In a decision promulgated on 7 April 2026, the FTT dismissed his appeal. The FTT did not find the appellant’s account of events in Iran to be credible. As to his political activity in the UK, it was not high profile enough to have attracted the attention of the Iranian authorities. Nor was it genuinely motivated, such that the appellant could be expected to delete his Facebook account and to conceal his UK-based political activities from the authorities on return to Iran.
The grounds of appeal
6. The appellant raises five grounds of appeal. They are drafted in unidiomatic English and some are very difficult to understand. I am grateful to Mr Ahmad for helping to clarify them at the hearing before me.
Ground 1: The FTTJ misdirects himself as to fact
7. The appellant criticises three paragraphs of the FTT’s decision:
“29. I will first deal with the events that the Appellant says happened in Iran. The Appellant assisted his Dad with activities for the Komala on two occasions. They were not otherwise politically active in Iran and were not independently undertaking any activities in support of the Komala Party. They say they became a supporter in 2020, assisted their Dad on the first occasion in approximately 2021 and the second occasion in 2022, which was the incident that led to them fleeing Iran. They are not certain of their father’s role with/for the Komala Party, other than that he was a member and did not see the contents of the boxes to know what the material was that was being moved. They do not know if there was anything in the family home to connect them to the Komala Party. This lack of detail and minimal direct involvement with the Komala Party undermines the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that they are of adverse interest to the Iranian Authorities. […]
30. Despite expressing concern for their Dad and family in Iran, they have made no attempt to contact any of their family since leaving Iran. They have made various assumptions about the fate of their Dad and only know about the threats to their Mum and sister through their Uncle. They suspect that their Dad gave their name under torture to the Iranian authorities but they do not know this and do not actually know that their father has been captured and tortured. This speculation and these uncorroborated assumptions mean that I cannot attach much weight to the Appellant’s account of events post the incident that led them to flee Iran. […]
32. Mr Main [appellant’s counsel before the FTT] submitted that any lack of detail or inconsistency in the Appellant’s account was due to the Respondent failing to properly explore the claim. I do not accept that this is a sufficient explanation. If the Appellant felt that their claim had not been properly explored by the Respondent, they have had ample opportunity to provide further detail, with assistance, by way of witness statement or in other forms of writing during the claim and subsequent appeal.”
8. I note that although the FTT refers to the appellant throughout the decision as “they”, there is nothing to indicate that the appellant is non-binary.
9. The appellant says with regard to [29] that there is no logical connection between the appellant’s lack of detail about his father’s activities and the credibility of his claim to be at risk from the Iranian authorities.
10. With regard to [30], in his written grounds, the appellant faults the FTT for not taking into account that the appellant might put his family at risk by contacting them, and for not considering what is said at [14.8.1] of the respondent’s CPIN. This would appear to be referring to Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups, Version 5.0 (October 2025). Paragraph 14.8.1 details the ways in which the close family members of Kurdish political activists may be targeted by the Iranian regime. At the hearing before me, Mr Ahmad also relied on [14.2.2], which states that the authorities intercept phone calls of individuals of adverse interest and track social media usage.
11. With regard to [32], the appellant complains that “the Appellant cannot be expected to know that there is a flaw and secondly that the information he gave was enough, it is the duty of the Respondent to seek further information.”
Ground Two: The FTTJ erred in considering plausibility
12. At [31] of the decision, the FTT agreed with the respondent that it was not plausible that the appellant would have been able to escape the IRGC on foot, given that he said that there were five or six of them and that they had been standing on a hill only 10 metres away and shooting at him and his father indiscriminately. It also noted that the appellant had given “varying accounts” of how long it had taken him to reach his uncle’s home. The appellant says that this plausibility finding was speculative and thus inconsistent with the guidance given in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037.
Ground Three: The FTTJ erred in considering sur place activities
13. Under this ground, the appellant challenges the FTT’s consideration of the evidence of his sur place activities. Multiple complaints are jumbled together, and again it is not easy to understand what is being said. I consider that the submissions made under this ground are:
(i) The FTT erred at [36] in considering whether the appellant was the author of the posts on his Facebook page, because this was irrelevant to risk: “even copying and pasting posts are risky”;
(ii) At [38], the FTT recorded that the appellant had provided a transcript of a short speech he had made on a Kurdish channel and claimed to have received a threat over Facebook from someone in Istanbul a few days later. The FTT gave reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence of the threat, due to its timing and the lack of key details in the screenshot the appellant had adduced. The appellant complains that the FTT erred by failing to take into account Para. 339K of the Immigration Rules, and also by failing to consider the risk arising from the speech more generally; and
(iii) At [39], the FTT erred in concluding that the appellant was not high profile and therefore not at risk, based on the number of likes on his Facebook page and the inconsistency in his evidence about how many demonstrations he had attended.
Ground four: The FTTJ made assumptions and wants corroboration
14. The appellant complains that the FTT erred in rejecting his claim that a previous Facebook account was hacked because “there is no evidence of this”. The FTT should have taken into account the respondent’s CPIN, Social media, surveillance and sur places activities, which found that Facebook accounts have been hacked. There was no basis for the FTT to accept the respondent’s suggestion that the appellant did not have control over his Facebook account.
Ground five: The FTTJ fails to consider any CG case or relevant case law authority
15. The FTT failed to consider any country guidance caselaw or any other caselaw in the decision. This was an “automatic error of law”.
16. There was no Rule 24 response.
The hearing
17. At the hearing before me, I had sight of a 938-page bundle prepared by the appellant. I heard helpful submissions from both representatives, which I have taken into account in making my decision.
Legal Framework
18. There are four country guidance cases potentially relevant to this appeal:
(i) SB (risk on return, illegal exit) [2009] UKAIT 53;
(ii) BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) [2011] UKUT 36;
(iii) HB (Kurds) (CG) [2018] UKUT 430; and
(iv) XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023.
19. The FTT referred to none of them. However, it is well-established that judges sitting in the FTT must be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically and it should be assumed they have been followed, unless the contrary is clear from the language of the decision. See: ECO v BB & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 97 at [56].
20. I have also reminded myself that an appellate court should avoid “island-hopping”: Fage v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5.
Discussion
21. The appellant’s grounds of appeal are of variable cogency, and I do not consider it necessary or proportionate to give my reasons for rejecting most of them. I find, however, that the FTT did err by failing to take into account the country guidance, and that this error infected both its credibility findings about events in Iran and its finding that the appellant would not be at risk on return due to his sur place activity.
22. I begin with HB (Kurds) because it is most directly relevant to this appellant, who is accepted to be of Kurdish ethnicity. The relevant headnotes are:
“(2) Kurds in Iran face discrimination. However, the evidence does not support a contention that such discrimination is, in general, at such a level as to amount to persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(3) Since 2016 the Iranian authorities have become increasingly suspicious of, and sensitive to, Kurdish political activity. Those of Kurdish ethnicity are thus regarded with even greater suspicion than hitherto and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran.
(4) However, the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport, and even if combined with illegal exit, does not create a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
(5) Kurdish ethnicity is nevertheless a risk factor which, when combined with other factors, may create a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Being a risk factor it means that Kurdish ethnicity is a factor of particular significance when assessing risk. Those “other factors” will include the matters identified in paragraphs (6)-(9) below.
[…]
(7) Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.
[…]
(9) Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as, by way of example only, mere possession of leaflets espousing or supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Each case however, depends on its own facts and an assessment will need to be made as to the nature of the material possessed and how it would be likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities in the context of the foregoing guidance.
(10) The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.”
23. BA (Iran) considered the Iranian authorities’ likely treatment of returnees who had participated in protests outside Iran following the disputed June 2009 election. It also set out guidance about how to assess the authorities’ likely response to sur place political activity more generally. This includes:
“[4] The following are relevant factors to be considered when assessing risk on return having regard to sur place activities:
(i) Nature of sur place activity
• Theme of demonstrations – what do the demonstrators want (e.g. reform of the regime through to its violent overthrow); how will they be characterised by the regime?
• Role in demonstrations and political profile – can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime> [sic]
• Extent of participation – has the person attended one or two demonstrations or is he a regular participant?
• Publicity attracted – has a demonstration attracted media coverage in the United Kingdom or the home country; nature of that publicity (quality of images; outlets where stories appear etc)?
(ii) Identification risk
• Surveillance of demonstrators – assuming the regime aims to identify demonstrators against it how does it do so, through, filming them, having agents who mingle in the crowd, reviewing images/recordings of demonstrations etc?
• Regime’s capacity to identify individuals – does the regime have advanced technology (e.g. for facial recognition); does it allocate human resources to fit names to faces in the crowd?
(iii) Factors triggering inquiry/action on return
• Profile – is the person known as a committed opponent or someone with a significant political profile; does he fall within a category which the regime regards as especially objectionable?
• Immigration history – how did the person leave the country (illegally; type of visa); where has the person been when abroad; is the timing and method of return more likely to lead to inquiry and/or being detained for more than a short period and ill-treated (overstayer; forced return)?
(iv) Consequences of identification
• Is there differentiation between demonstrators depending on the level of their political profile adverse to the regime?
(v) Identification risk on return
• Matching identification to person – if a person is identified is that information systematically stored and used; are border posts geared to the task?”
24. This guidance does not set out a general rule that only high-profile protesters or those who organise or run demonstrations are at risk. This is clear form the fourth consideration identified, which is whether or not the regime differentiates between demonstrators depending on their profile. In cases involving pro-Kurdish demonstrators, the first consideration is highly relevant, which is the theme of the demonstrations that a person has participated in, and how they are characterised by the regime. HB (Kurds) directly informs the analysis of both of these issues.
25. In his grounds of appeal, the appellant complains that certain aspects of XX (PJAK) were overlooked as well. These are that internet searches might be carried out by the Iranian authorities when the appellant applies for an Emergency Travel Document, and that deletion of the account would not eliminate any risk arising from his Facebook posts, because data may remain available for a certain period thereafter. The appellant does not rely on any aspect of SB having been overlooked, so I say no more about it.
26. The first point in the decision at which the FTT failed to apply the country guidance is in its reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of events in Iran. The finding that the appellant’s “minimal direct involvement with the Komala Party undermines the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that they [by which I understand the FTT to mean he] are of adverse interest to the Iranian Authorities” is directly contrary to headnote [9] of HB (Kurds). I have taken into account that FTT decisions should not be subjected to strict textual scrutiny, and I have considered whether the FTT meant to say that the lack of detail in the appellant’s account undermined its credibility. I find that the FTT did intend to say that, and it is a legitimate credibility concern. However, I find that the FTT did also intend to say that it was not credible that the Iranian authorities would have had an adverse interest in the appellant, given that his involvement in Kurdish politics was “minimal”.
27. As to the appellant’s failure to contact his family, the FTT’s point was not that this damaged his credibility - a finding which would have been questionable given the country evidence that this might put them at risk. It was that in the absence of any further information, the appellant’s evidence was limited and speculative. That was a reasonable observation to make.
28. In assessing the materiality of the error with regard to the Iranian authorities’ interest in “minimal” activity, I have considered the appellant’s challenge to the rejection of his account of his escape from the IRGC. I have taken into account that this is primarily an implausibility finding, and that the concept of “plausibility” must be applied with a degree of caution, and always in the context of the other evidence: KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) [28]. Inferences concerning plausibility must be based in the evidence, rather than on conjecture or speculation, and it is essential to take into account the context of the country and the culture in which the events described are said to have occurred. See: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 2016 at [63]; Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223; and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 [27-30]. This does not mean, however, that a decision-maker cannot make reasonable findings based on “implausibilities, common sense and rationality”: MAH (Egypt) at [63].
29. Some of the FTT’s concerns about this aspect of the appellant’s account involve a legitimate application of common sense, such as that the appellant and his father were significantly outnumbered and their attackers were relatively close by. Although the FTT does not say this, it would be legitimate to proceed on the assumption that members of the IRGC are well-armed and easily capable of hitting a target that is only ten metres away. Whether being above the appellant on a hill gave them a good vantage point would depend very much on the nature of the landscape. However, I consider from the language of the decision that the appellant was asked about this in his oral evidence, and the appellant does not say otherwise in his grounds. It was open to the FTT to consider his explanation insufficient. The FTT also noted that the appellant had given an inconsistent account about how long it took him to reach his uncle’s house. On balance, I am satisfied that it was open to the FTT to reject this aspect of the appellant’s account for the reasons it gave.
30. However, it is trite law that credibility must be assessed in the round. This makes it inherently difficult to find that an error in credibility assessment was not material. In this case, there were only three reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of events in Iran. The first was that his knowledge of his father’s political activities was vague. The second was the finding that the Iranian authorities would not have been interested in him, which I have found to be inconsistent with the country guidance. The third was that his account of his escape was implausible. At [24], the FTT specifically confirmed that there were no other material inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence. In this context, I cannot conclude that the error as to the unlikeliness of the authorities having an interest in the appellant was immaterial.
31. Any error as to whether the appellant had come to the attention of the authorities prior to his departure from Iran would obviously have infected the assessment of whether the authorities would have been interested in his sur place activities.
32. Moreover, the failure to take into account the country guidance is also apparent in the FTT’s assessment of whether the appellant’s sur place activities would have come to the attention of the authorities.
33. The FTT’s findings on the demonstrations the appellant attended in the UK are set out at [39]:
“The Respondent’s case is that the Appellant is not high profile enough to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities […] the Appellant says they have not seen any media at the demonstrations, They describe their participation as chanting and repeating. They have not said that they play a role in terms of organising or running the demonstrations. They have provided contradicting information about the amount of demonstrations attended, even in the same paragraph of their witness statement where they say they attended five demonstrations but list 13 dates. I agree that the Appellant’s political activity is not high profile and not receiving the kind of attention online that may draw them to the attention of the Iranian authorities.”
34. Here, the FTT appears to have assumed that only those who organise and run the demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy are of adverse interest to the regime. The assessment called for by BA (Iran) is far more complicated than that. The assumption that Kurdish activists who are not “high profile” do not draw the attention of the Iranian authorities is inconsistent with what is said in HB (Kurds).
35. I consider that any error in overlooking XX (PJAK) is unlikely to have been material. In his submissions, Mr Ahmad relied on [35] and [36] of the decision and stated that the FTT should have taken into account the risk to the appellant arising out of that fact that some of his online activity could be discoverable up to 90 days after he had closed his Facebook account. Mr Ahmad was relying here on the evidence of one of the witnesses before the FTT, but he ignores the conclusion the Upper Tribunal drew after considering all of the evidence. This is that “the timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.” [Headnote 6]. Moreover, the appellant’s Facebook evidence consisted of a series of screenshots and clearly failed to comply with the guidance at headnote [7] and [8] of XX (PJAK). Had the FTT followed the guidance in XX(PJAK), this would have undermined, rather than strengthened, the appellant’s evidence.
36. Nonetheless, I consider that the FTT’s failure to follow HB(Kurds) and BA is evident in its reasoning and was material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. This requires the decision to be set aside. As the first error identified relates the FTT’s credibility assessment, I consider that the decision must be set aside in its entirety.
37. The parties agreed that if I were to set the decision aside, remittal to the FTT would be appropriate. Taking into account the extensive fact-finding that will be required and the guidance set out in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 159, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, I agree.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 7 April 2026 is set aside in its entirety. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 September 2026