Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003050
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63814/2024
LP/00206/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar of Counsel, instructed by Sarker Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26th August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh, appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) to dismiss her appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The decision of the Judge was sent to the parties on 26th February 2026.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order. I was not invited to set that order aside. I maintain the anonymity order in view of the fact it is accepted there were threats to the appellant, and to protect the interests of her minor child who is dependent upon this claim. I am satisfied these interests outweigh the public interest in identifying the appellant.
Background
3. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom (‘the UK’) on 13th January 2023 as a visitor with her husband. The appellant made a protection claim on 13th February 2023. The appellant’s protection claim was advanced on the basis that her paternal cousin JA had made numerous marriage proposals to her. Following her refusal of those proposals, JA began to threaten her with violence, rape, and acid attacks. The appellant claimed JA was affiliated with the previous Awami League administration, but had, since 2024, aligned himself with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
4. The appellant married in 2020, but the harassment from JA continued even after the marriage and the appellant’s travel to the UK. The appellant’s father had sought help from the authorities on a number of occasions, having had issues with JA’s family since 2011. The authorities had not assisted because of JA’s political connections. The appellant’s husband believed she was actually in a relationship with JA, and their marriage broke down. The appellant had given birth to a child in the UK and is now a single mother.
5. The respondent refused the claim of the appellant with her husband and her daughter as dependents on that claim. The respondent accepted the appellant’s claim came within the scope of the Refugee Convention, as the appellant was a member of a Particular Social Group. Her identity and Bangladeshi nationality were accepted, as was the previous harassment from JA. It was not accepted that JA had threatened to kill the appellant.
6. The respondent highlighted a number of credibility issues, but asserted that even if credible, the appellant could avail herself of the protection of the authorities or could relocate internally to Dhaka or Chittagong. The appellant’s private and family life were considered, as were the best interests of her child who was at the time of the refusal decision, less than a year old.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appeal came before the Judge sitting at the Hatton Cross hearing centre on 23rd February 2026. The appellant was represented by a solicitor, and there was no appearance for the respondent. The appellant, assisted by a Bengali Sylheti interpreter, adopted her witness statement. The Judge heard submissions from the appellant’s representative and reserved his decision at the end of the hearing.
8. By his decision, the Judge dismissed the appeal on protection and human rights grounds. The Judge did not accept the credibility of the appellant’s claim to have received threats to kill from JA or to otherwise be at risk of harm. The Judge noted the appellant’s intention to return home following her visit to the UK [18], her ability to ‘live peaceably’ with her husband for 2 and a half years only 15 minutes away from JA and had also failed to provide ‘independent’ evidence of JA’s profile.
9. The Judge also considered the appellant’s failure to mention difficulties in Bangladesh in her screening interview, found her evidence on JA’s change of political affiliation to be ‘incredible, superficial, highly convenient and contrived’, and the timing of the appellant’s awareness she could no longer return to Bangladesh, as well as the absence of a statement from her mother-in-law who had told her not to return.
10. The appellant was staying with a ‘cousin’ (this is a mistake of fact which will be addressed below), but had failed to provide evidence from him, had not provided translated evidence pertaining to her brother’s asylum claim in France, and whilst she had provided a Court document from Bangladesh, it was said to be irrelevant to the claim. Evidence from the appellant’s father was said to be self-serving. The Judge concluded the appellant was not a credible or reliable witness, that she faced no risk on return to Bangladesh, and accordingly was not in need of protection nor did she need to relocate internally. Her Article 8 ECHR was also considered and dismissed.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appeal sought permission to appeal on three grounds. First, it was submitted the Judge had adopted the respondent’s reasoning within the refusal decision with no independent analysis. It was further asserted the Judge had mistakenly referred to the person with whom the appellant was living as her cousin, when he was not related to her at all. Secondly, the Judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that a Court document provided did not ‘appear to be of any relevance’ to her claim, despite it appearing to corroborate the dispute between her family and JA’s. Thirdly, the Judge had failed to take into account the circumstances within which the screening interview was conducted when holding an omission of detail against her.
12. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Stevenson on all grounds. It was however observed that the assertion that the Judge was ‘rubber-stamping’ the respondent’s decision in ground one was not sustainable. It was considered arguable that the Judge had not made explicit findings on the appellant’s evidence within her witness statement. The third ground was framed slightly differently to the way it was pleaded, with Judge Stevenson highlighting the appellant’s reference to threats in Bangladesh contrary to what was found.
13. It is on this basis the hearing came before me sitting at Field House.
Submissions
14. Mr Badar, with his usual concision, relied on the grounds settled for the appellant. Highlighting ground three, Mr Badar submitted it was clear the Judge had erred when considering the evidence, the appellant gave in the screening interview. At 4.1 of the screening interview, in answer to a question asked by the interviewer, the appellant confirmed she had been threatened by JA in Bangladesh before she came to the UK. The Judge’s finding at [20], that ‘she did not make any reference to any difficulties in Bangladesh at the time of screening’ therefore could not be sustained because it ran contrary to the evidence before the Judge.
15. Ground two focused on the Judge’s treatment of the Court document the appellant had provided from Bangladesh. This document, from a Magistrates’ Court in Bangladesh, referred to a dispute between the appellant’s father and another member of his family. This document was plainly capable, Mr Badar said, of corroborating the appellant’s claim that her family had been involved in disputes with JA’s family. The Judge had erred in two ways, first, he had said the appellant had ‘failed to produce any of the documents’ relating to the Court cases, which was untrue because this document was in fact relating to the disputes. Further, the Judge did not consider the document to be of ‘any relevance’, but did not explain why that was, given the document dealt with the background of the disputes between JA’s family and the appellant’s.
16. As far as the first ground was concerned, Mr Badar did not, with any force, advance the point made in the grounds about the Judge ‘rubber-stamping’ the respondent’s decision. His focus instead was on the Judge’s mistake in referring to the person with whom the appellant lived as her cousin, when in fact his own letter stated he had no familial link to the appellant, and met her through his wife. Mr Badar submitted that this was a factor the Judge had drawn an adverse inference from when assessing credibility.
17. For the respondent, Ms Everett resisted the appeal. She submitted that ground one, whilst it was accepted the Judge did err, did not disclose a material error of law. Whilst the Judge had made a mistake in referring to the person providing the appellant with accommodation as her cousin, nothing turned on this. The Judge did not detail any adverse inference as a result, he simply referred to an absence of evidence from that person, which was factually correct in circumstances where a letter had been provided, but there was no formal witness statement or oral evidence called from him.
18. Ground two was ‘neither here nor there’. The Judge rightly identified that the court document did not go to the heart of the claim. It was, at best, evidence of interaction between the appellant’s family and the authorities. The document did not refer to the appellant, and in those circumstances the Judge was entitled to find the document was of ‘no relevance’ when considering the claim advanced on JA threatening to kill the appellant.
19. Ms Everett did accept that ground three disclosed an error, but not a material one. The Judge considered a number of points in the appellant’s evidence which told against her credibility. It was not challenged for example, that the appellant had lived 15 minutes away from JA for 2 and a half years, and yet had not come to any harm. The Judge had rejected the credibility of the account for reasons other than the appellant’s failure to disclose threats in her screening interview.
20. In reply, Mr Badar relied on the cumulative effect of the errors pleaded and submitted that the Judge had referred to the omission from the screening interview as something ‘entirely incredible. In view of the forceful language used, clearly the Judge’s error in this respect was material. The decision was littered with a lack of adequate reasons, and whilst it would have been open to the Judge for example, to reject the reliability of the Court document, he was obligated to provide reasons for doing so.
21. As to disposal, Mr Badar submitted this was a case which ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Ms Everett did not express a strong view either way.
Analysis and Findings
Ground One
22. Looking at ground one, I do not consider it establishes a material error of law. As observed by Judge Stevenson in the grant of permission, whilst there are similarities between the decision and the refusal decision, these are followed by observations on the points not within the refusal decision. The appellant in the grounds produces a table comparing paragraphs of the Judge’s decision with the refusal decision. The fact there is a difference in the length of all three examples is an immediate indication that they have not been reproduced verbatim.
23. All three of the paragraphs relied on in the grounds contain the Judge’s findings on the points made by the respondent. Looking at [18] for example, after noting the respondent’s reference to the appellant living ‘peacefully for 2½ years in Bangladesh’, the Judge states ‘this is a major feature which undermines the entirety of the Appellant’s claim’. That is, contrary to the grounds, an expression of an ‘independent judicial assessment’ of the claim.
24. The second point in ground one is the Judge’s mischaracterisation of the person providing the appellant with accommodation as her cousin. The decision indicates the Judge had read the evidence from this person. The Judge refers at [24] to the statement ‘regarding him accommodating the Appellant and her daughter due to the separation from her husband’. Further, at [28], says ‘her cousin in the UK has provided a letter to this effect but has not provided any formal witness statement’.
25. I find this is a mistake of fact. The letter itself expressly says ‘I would like to clarify that prior to her arrival, I did not know Ms [A] personally, nor do I have any familial or prior relationship with her’. In view of this statement, it is unclear how the Judge came to refer to this person three times in the decision as the appellant’s cousin. Whilst that is an error, I do not find it is one which is material.
26. I do not accept Mr Badar's submission that the error was material because the Judge drew an adverse inference from the absence of evidence from this person. At [24], the Judge observes:
‘The Appellant’s cousin in the UK has provided a statement regarding him accommodating the Appellant and her daughter due to the separation from her husband. He has not attended to give evidence nor provided a formal witness statement. He has not exposed himself to cross-examination. Neither has the cousin provided any evidence regarding the claimed difficulties which the Appellant had in Bangladesh’.
27. At [28], the Judge stated:
‘The Appellant states that her husband, who was initially dependent on her claim, is now separated from her. There is no credible evidence of this. The Appellant’s own evidence cannot be relied upon. Her cousin in the UK has provided a letter to this effect but has not provided any formal witness statement’.
28. I asked Mr Badar which part of these paragraphs, save for the reference to the ‘cousin’, were factually incorrect. He candidly accepted the Judge had accurately described the evidence and its deficiencies. He also accepted that the Judge did not refer to any adverse inference he had drawn. I find that the Judge’s mischaracterisation of the relationship between the appellant and her friend made no material difference to the outcome of the appeal. It follows that I dismiss ground one.
Ground Two
29. In considering this ground, I remind myself of the authority relied on by the appellant in her grounds and referred to by Mr Badar in submissions. In MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641, this Tribunal held:
‘If a tribunal finds oral evidence to be implausible, incredible or unreliable or a document to be worth no weight whatsoever, it is necessary to say so in the determination and for such findings to be supported by reasons. A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons’.
30. In the instant appeal, the appellant relied on a Court document which, when taken at its highest, corroborated the appellant’s claim that her family and JA’s family had a history of acrimony since at least 2011. The appellant’s father is clearly named as one of the parties in the document, and the contents of the document are broadly consistent with the appellant’s evidence in her witness statement, that her father had been attacked by JA’s family previously, and that there had been land disputes leading to court cases in the past.
31. The Judge’s reference to the document is less than perspicuous. The consideration of the document is limited to [26]:
‘The Appellant relies on a single Court document from a Magistrates’ Court in Bangladesh. At interview she said that her family had been involved in numerous Court cases since 2011 with her cousin’s family in Bangladesh but has failed to produce any of the documents. The one Magistrates’ Court document she has produced does not appear to be of any relevance in the context of this appeal’.
32. There are two difficulties with this finding. First, it is not correct that the appellant had ‘failed to produce any of the documents’ relating to the numerous Court cases since 2011. The document the Judge was considering was a document relating to these proceedings. Looking at the document which had been provided, it was of relevance to the claim that there had been animosity between the two families.
33. The assertion in the grounds, i.e. that the Judge did not provide adequate reasons for concluding the document was irrelevant, is established. The Judge did not disclose whether he considered the document reliable nor whether the events it detailed were accepted to have taken place and further did not detail whether he found this corroborated or undermined with the appellant’s claim. I find the Judge failed to discharge the duty upon the Tribunal outlined in MK.
34. I have considered, as Ms Everett submitted, whether the fact the appellant is not mentioned in the document, and that it was not germane to her claim to have been threatened by JA, means the failure to give reasons in this respect was immaterial. As Mr Badar submitted, the document was claimed to be from an official source, and it corroborated events relied on by the appellant, and was indicative of at least a subjective fear of JA and his family, and their ability to act with impunity. In those circumstances, I find I cannot be sure that the outcome of the appeal would inevitably have been the same had the document been properly assessed by the Judge.
Ground Three
35. The manner in which this ground was advanced by the appellant was that essentially, the Judge failed to consider the circumstances within which the screening interview was conducted when dealing with a putative failure of the appellant to mention a point she later disclosed.
36. The point specifically highlighted was the appellant’s failure to mention ‘at the time of screening’ any difficulties in Bangladesh. It was said to be ‘entirely incredible that she would not disclose this if the subsequent claimed events were true in any way’. As Mr Badar submitted, this point clearly played a dominant role in the Judge’s mind when considering the appellant’s credibility.
37. The problem, however, is that it was entirely inaccurate for the Judge to say the appellant had not disclosed difficulties in Bangladesh in her screening interview. At 4.1 of the interview, the appellant was asked a series of questions about what would happen if she returned to Bangladesh. She mentioned being threatened by JA. One of the follow up questions was ‘did this person also threaten you in Bangladesh before you came?’, to which the appellant said ‘yes’. The appellant was then asked about evidence of information from her mother-in-law.
38. It was Judge Stevenson, when granting permission, who identified the real issue in this ground. It was not that the Judge failed to take into account the circumstances in which the interview was conducted, it was that he reached a finding contrary to the content of the interview, and found this was ‘entirely incredible’.
39. As to materiality, I remind myself of the need for anxious scrutiny to be applied in protection claims. The Judge was obligated, as recently reiterated by the Court of Appeal at [28] of AM & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 159, to consider the credibility of the claim ‘in the round’. The grounds evince two instances where the Judge made findings which were contrary to the evidence before him. I am satisfied there was a failure on the part of the Judge to take into account material evidence, and to provide adequate reasons for his findings, errors which tainted his credibility assessment.
Disposal
40. I have considered what is said in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement, AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). The Judge’s credibility assessment was flawed and infected the entirety of his findings. The appeal will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined de novo.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside, with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing before any Judge except the Judge who initially determined the appeal.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27th August 2026