Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003097
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00735/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

15th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOWARTH

Between

YS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. J. Gazzain, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms. M. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Egypt born in 1971. He appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
Anonymity Order
2. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the appellant. On the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The Appellant claims that the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to recruit him, he refused to join them and they made threats against him which caused him to flee Egypt. He fears he would be killed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood if he were returned to Egypt.
4. The Secretary of State accepted the Appellant’s nationality and identity but refused the Appellant’s claim because she did not accept the Appellant’s account regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts to recruit him; finding his account to be lacking in detail, inconsistent and implausible. Furthermore, even if the material facts of the Appellant’s account had been accepted, the Secretary of State did not agree that the Appellant would be at risk on return given that by 2025 the Muslim Brotherhood lacked political power in Egypt.
Matters in issue before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The following matters were in issue before the First-tier Tribunal:
a. Whether the Appellant was a vulnerable witness;
b. Whether the Appellant was at risk on return to Egypt on account of his political opinion so as to entitle him to recognition as a refugee, or to humanitarian protection, on the basis of his claim that the Muslim Brotherhood had attempted to recruit him;
c. Whether the Respondent’s decision was in breach of Article 8 ECHR or Article 3 ECHR.
The First-tier Tribunal Findings
6. The First-tier Tribunal judge (“the judge”) rejected the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision. The Judge concluded that the Appellant was not a vulnerable witness [20]. The judge did not find the Appellant to be a credible witness and rejected his account because of a lack of detail and inconsistency [26]. The judge concluded that: the Appellant would not face a real risk of persecution on return to Egypt, it was unnecessary to consider internal relocation or sufficiency of state protection [30-31] and the Appellant was not entitled to a grant of leave on humanitarian protection grounds [32]. The judge did not find that the Appellant’s removal to Egypt would result in either a breach of his Article 3 ECHR rights on medical grounds [33] or his Article 8 ECHR right to private life [44].
Grounds of Appeal
7. Permission to appeal was granted on six grounds. Ground 1 was the principal ground, pursuant to which the Appellant submitted the judge had materially erred in law by failing to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness pursuant to the “Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance” (“the Guidance Note”) and AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 (“AM Afghanistan”). The Appellant argued that the failure to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness had resulted in procedural unfairness and had materially ‘infected’ the judge’s credibility assessment.
8. Neither Ground 2 (relating to the standard of proof), nor Ground 6 (relating to Article 3 ECHR and the Appellant’s health) were pursued by Mr. Gazzain at the hearing before the Upper Tribunal. However, Grounds 3 – 5 were maintained. Pursuant to Ground 3, the Appellant submitted that the Judge’s treatment of a document provided by the Appellant, which purported to be a conviction and sentencing decision from an Egyptian Court in respect of the Appellant, was irrational and legally inadequate. In Ground 4, the Appellant submitted the judge had made a speculative finding in relation to sufficiency of state protection and ought also to have considered whether the Appellant would be at risk from the Egyptian authorities. Pursuant to Ground 5, the Appellant advanced an argument that the judge had erred in considering section 8 delay.
Grounds of Appeal: Discussion and Findings
Ground 1:
9. In the recent judgment of Khan v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 148, the Court of Appeal referred to the very wide definition of a vulnerable witness under the Guidance Note. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, Mr Gazzain submitted that the Appellant fell within the definition by pointing to footnote 2 of the Guidance Note which, as well as setting out the various categories of persons who qualify as vulnerable witnesses, states “some individuals are vulnerable because of what has happened to them e.g. they are victims of trafficking or have sustained serious harm or torture or are suffering from PTSD”.
10. The Appellant was the victim of a serious assault at work in October 2024 [14]. The assault resulted in the Appellant sustaining fractured nasal bones and subdural haematoma [14]. It led to him experiencing daily nightmares, interrupted sleep, hearing voices at night and suicidal thoughts. A diagnosis of PTSD is noted in his GP records, dated 24 January 2024 and on the same date he was admitted into hospital “with intentional overdose with suicidal ideation”[14-15]. The Appellant’s GP records record a diagnosis of depression in January 2025, when he was prescribed Sertraline, with the dose was increased from February 2025 following low mood and continued suicidal ideation [14 - 16]. However, by the time of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, there was neither any medical evidence, nor any evidence from the Appellant to suggest the physical or mental health problems which had resulted from the October 2024 assault were ongoing. In his oral evidence the Appellant had said he was not taking any medication [16]. The most recent GP report was dated 13 January 2026 referred to the Appellant having knee pain in November 2025 and diabetic hyperglycaemia in October 2025 [16]. The judge recorded the last reference in the GP records to depression, low mood and suicidal ideation was in February 2025, some 11 months before the hearing [16].
11. The judge did not make a determination at the hearing itself about whether the Appellant was a vulnerable witness but rather reserved making a finding on the issue for the written Decision. The question of vulnerability was nevertheless discussed with the parties at the beginning of the hearing. The judge considered whether any adaptations should be made in the procedure before the Tribunal and decided “breaks in evidence could be sought as necessary” and questions to the Appellant “should be clear and simple” and the Appellant’s legal representative had confirmed that “no other specific adaptations were sought at the hearing”[4]. Although the written grounds indicated the failure to identify the Appellant as a vulnerable witness had resulted in procedural unfairness, this point was not advanced by Mr Gazzain in the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, who did not take issue with any aspects of the procedure in the First-tier Tribunal hearing. I do not find that any procedural unfairness arose at the hearing.
12. The more significant question in this appeal is whether the judge erred in finding that the Appellant was not a vulnerable witness at the date of his asylum interview and if so the implications of any error for the First-tier Tribunal Decision. The Appellant’s substantive asylum interview took place on 30 January 2025. This was less than a week after the Appellant had been admitted into hospital after attempting suicide. The judge clearly had this chronology and the medical history in mind but found the Appellant’s interview did not need to be assessed on the basis the Appellant was a vulnerable witness. The judge’s reasons were as follows: there was no expert medical evidence to suggest he had not been fit to be interviewed [19] or that his mental health had had an impact on the interview [14 and 17] and the Appellant had confirmed he had been feeling well enough to be interviewed [18]. Nevertheless, in view of the wide definition of a vulnerable witness in the Guidance Note, I accept Mr. Gazzain’s submission that the evidence given by the Appellant in his interview ought to have been assessed on the basis the Appellant was a vulnerable witness because he had been the victim of a serious assault only days before the interview and his GP records referred to a diagnosis of PTSD around this time.
13. In Khan, the Court of Appeal explained that an error of law in relation to the application of the Guidance Document “may” but does not always result in a material error of law [47] and at [48] that:
“A failure to take one of the steps set out in the Guidance Note does not necessarily mean that the First-tier Tribunal has erred in law and does not, of itself, mean that the decision is legally flawed. Rather, the question will be whether the First-tier Tribunal has acted in a way which means that the appeal has not been fairly and justly dealt with or, to put it more simply, whether there has been procedural unfairness which materially affects the decision”.
14. Further, I note paragraph 3 of the Guidance Note provides the following guidance:
“The consequences of such vulnerability differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole”.
15. Then paragraph 14 of the Guidance Note provides:
“Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellants compared to those who are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity”.
16. I am mindful that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal who, unlike the Upper-tier Tribunal considering whether there has been an error of law, will have had the benefit of hearing the entirety of the evidence: Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, Underhill LJ, at [50], referring to Lord Hamblem in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 [2022] 1 WLR 3784. Ms. Nolan, for the Respondent also referred to the recent case, MN Vietnam 2026 EWCA Civ 485 at [35], in which the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of the appellate tribunal considering the judge’s decision as a whole and in context.
17. Looking at the judge’s decision in this appeal, for the reasons set out below, I do not conclude that the judge’s finding in relation to vulnerability impacted upon the fairness of the Decision when it is read as a whole and in context. First, the evidence given by the Appellant in his asylum interview was only one part of the overall evidence in the case, which also included the Appellant’s witness statement and his oral evidence. One of the primary reasons given by the judge for the adverse credibility finding was the lack of detail provided by the Appellant about the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts to recruit him, his alleged reporting of the same to a police informant and subsequent threats he said were made against him [24]. The judge had the benefit of considering all the evidence and hearing from the Appellant in person but concluded the Appellant failed to provide a detailed account either in his witness statement or his testimony. Even if the evidence the Appellant gave in his asylum interview were disregarded on the basis that he was a vulnerable witness, this would be incapable of altering the judge’s findings about the absence of detail in his witness statement and his oral evidence.
18. Second, in addition to the “lack of detail”, the judge rejected the credibility of the appellant’s account because of both “international and external inconsistencies” [26]. The “external inconsistency” related to the judge’s rejection of the explanation the Appellant had given for not reporting the Muslim Brotherhood’s alleged actions in relation to him to the official police in Egypt. The judge rejected his assertion that the police could not be trusted as contrary to the country background evidence which had been before the Tribunal [25]. The judge’s finding on this issue was not challenged at the error of law hearing and it is unaffected by the judge’s finding in relation to the Appellant’s vulnerability.
19. Regarding “internal inconsistences” two are referred to in the judge’s reasons at [24]. The judge referred to the Appellant providing different dates regarding when the attempts had been made to recruit him into the Muslim Brotherhood. In his witness statement the Appellant had said he received “persistent and coercive recruitment attempts between 2011 and 2014”, whereas in his asylum interview he had said that recruitment attempts were only in 2014, then in his oral evidence he said that recruitment attempts were only in 2014 but he joined demonstrations in 2011. The judge was “not satisfied that the inconsistency has been adequately explained” [24]. Given there was a significant discrepancy between the Appellant’s witness statement and his oral evidence on this issue, I do find that either excluding, or making an allowance for the Appellant’s vulnerable state at the date of the interview, could have made a difference to the judge’s finding on this feature of the evidence.
20. The second “internal inconsistency” referred to by the judge, relates to the Appellant stating that he left Egypt in October or November 2014 in his asylum interview but October 2014 in his oral evidence. The judge recorded the Appellant’s explanation for the difference was “that there was a misunderstanding with the interpreter in his asylum interview” which had not been “registered at the time” [24]. Had the judge regarded the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, an adjustment may well have been made for the Appellant not registering the misunderstanding during the interview. However, as this inconsistency is only one amongst several ostensibly more significant reasons the judge gave for rejecting the Appellant’s credibility, the others being the lack of detail, the “external inconsistency” and another “internal inconsistency”, I cannot conclude that a different assessment on this matter could have altered the finding in respect of credibility.
21. In view of the above, I do not find that Ground 1 gives rise to a material error of law.
Grounds 3:
22. Ground 3 relates to the judge’s treatment of a document provided by the Appellant, which purported to be a decision from an Egyptian Court from 2017, finding someone with the Appellant’s name to have been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and sentencing him, alongside a number of other persons, to 20 years in prison. In his witness statement, all the Appellant says about this document is that he “was accused by the Muslim Brotherhood of being a member of them and reporting them after I disagreed with them over fees. A fabricated sentence was issued against me in 2017, sentencing me to 20 years in prison”. It was not suggested to me at the hearing before the Upper Tribunal that the Appellant gave any further evidence in relation to the court proceedings in Egypt and purported conviction and sentence, and nothing is recorded in the First-tier Tribunal Decision about any further detail being provided in the Appellant’s oral evidence. Before the First-tier Tribunal the court document was said to support the Appellant’s case about the Muslim Brotherhood’s interest in him and therefore the risk to him from the Muslim Brotherhood upon return to Egypt.
23. Ground 3 is premised on the judge failing to assess the document in accordance with the principles in Tanveer Ahmed (Pakistan) [2002] UKAIT 00439. Mr Gazzain submitted that the judge had rejected the document primarily because the Appellant had not referred to it in his asylum interview and that it was unclear what the judge had meant in saying “limited weight” had been attached to the document. However, I find that the judge assessed the document in accordance with the guidance in Tanveer Ahmed by considering its reliability in light of when the document was provided and the Appellant’s explanation for failing to provide it at an earlier stage. The judge recorded the Appellant provided the document 3 months after the asylum claim was made and a month after the asylum interview and noted the Appellant had not referred to the conviction, nor that he had further documentation to provide in his substantive asylum interview [28]. The judge assessed the Appellant’s failure to provide the document at an earlier stage as unpersuasive, and recorded that the reasons given primarily related to issues with the interpreter as the interview, although he also referred to his having a “mental problem” at the interview [28]. Moreover, as Ms. Nolan submitted, para [28] indicates that the judge assessed the document “with regard to all the circumstances”. The document therefore fell for consideration in the context of the case as a whole, which included the judge’s finding that the Appellant had failed to provide a detailed account about the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in relation to him. It is striking that, save for producing the document and the single paragraph in his witness statement, the Appellant did not give any detailed evidence about the circumstances relating to this document. I do therefore find the judge’s treatment of the document to have been irrational or legally inadequate, particularly when the Decision is read as a whole and in context.
Ground 4:
24. There was some overlap between Grounds 3 and 4 but the crux of Ground 4 was that the judge had failed to consider the risk which might arise to the Appellant from the Egyptian state itself, as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, in light of the Egyptian court document. I note that it was not suggested to me at the hearing that this was a “Robinson obvious” point. I do not find the judge to have erred by not assessing the potential risk to the Appellant from the Egyptian authorities. First, this was not raised as an issue in the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal judge; it was neither included in the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument before the First-tier Tribunal, nor contained in the list of issues identified in the Decision [10]. Second, I have not found the judge to have erred in the assessment of this document according to Tanveer Ahmed principles. Third, there is a striking lack of evidence from the Appellant about the circumstances surrounding the purported conviction and sentence. The Appellant did not suggest either in his witness statement, nor in his oral testimony that he would be at risk from the Egyptian state. Therefore, I do not find that either Ground 3 or Ground 4 in as far as the overlap, give rise to a material error of law.
Ground 5:
25. Pursuant to Ground 5, the Appellant advanced an argument that the judge failed to properly consider the issue of section 8 delay as damaging the Appellant’s credibility. However, I find this Ground to be a simple disagreement with the judge’s decision on this matter and that an argument in relation to there being an error of law is not established. The judge has given reasons for making an adverse credibility finding on account of the Appellant’s nine year delay in claiming asylum at [29] which are neither inadequate, unreasonable or irrational.
26. I therefore reject all of the Grounds of appeal and uphold the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge.

Notice of Decision
1. The decision of First-tier Tribunal judge Robinson, dated 2 February 2026, does not contain an error of law. The error of law appeal is dismissed and the First-tier Tribunal decision is upheld.

K. Howarth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 October 2026