Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003116 & UI-2026- 003117
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/01258/2024
HU/01255/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st September of 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

HG and AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rashid, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 15th September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Owens against the decision of First-tier Tribunal, dated 21 April 2026, dismissing the appellants’ appeals against the refusal of their human rights claim.
2. The appellants’ human rights claims arose out of an application for entry clearance dated 14 February 2024, in which the appellants sought to join their brother, Gebre Goitom, (‘the sponsor’).
Factual Background
3. The appellants are nationals of Eritrea. The 1st Appellant is now aged 22yr and the 2nd Appellant is now aged 17yrs. They left Eritrea in November 2023 and made the entry clearance applications from Uganda.
4. The sponsor is now aged 23 years. He was granted protection status in the United Kingdom and was granted a UK travel document valid from 10 January 2023 until 16 June 2027.
The Respondent’s decision
5. In decisions dated 18 June 2024 the respondent refused the appellants’ applications.
6. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant met paragraph CNP.3.1 of the Immigration Rules.
7. The respondent noted that the appellants had provided a DNA report which states that they are full siblings of the sponsor but considered that no account could be taken of this evidence as the appellants had not provided satisfactory evidence of the collection process to show the DNA samples were securely collected before being sent to a DNA testing laboratory, as it was said that the appellants had not provided a copy of a photographic document for themselves to enable officials to confirm their identity. Given this the decision maker was not satisfied that they were related to the sponsor as claimed.
8. Further, in the alternative the respondent was not satisfied that the appellants had demonstrated that they had an existing, genuine family relationship with the sponsor or that there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made their exclusion from the UK undesirable.
9. The respondent also concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances in the appellants’ case which would render refusal a breach of Article 8 ECHR because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellants, a relevant child or other family member.
10. The respondent considered the appellant did not fall for a grant of entry clearance outside the Immigration Rules because there were no compassionate factors in the appellants’ case.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
11. The appeal came before the First Tier Judge on 27 March 2026 by way of a hybrid hearing. The appellant was represented by Mr Rashid and the respondent was represented by Mr Ahmed. The parties agreed that the issues were narrowed and that the issue was whether the Appellants had established that they and the sponsor were biologically related as full siblings.
12. The sponsor was called to give evidence, and he was cross-examined and the Judge heard submissions from both representatives.
13. At paragraph 22, the Judge outlined the DNA evidence relied upon by the Appellants (as set out within the respondent’s first tier bundle at pages 199-205 of the composite bundle) and noted that it was from Eurofins Medigenomix Forensik GmbH and that the report confirmed that the appellants were full siblings of the sponsor. At paragraph 22 the Judge made a finding that he accepted that the laboratory was properly accredited, which was not disputed by the respondent and found that, taken in isolation, the scientific methodology and statistical conclusions strongly support the claimed relationship. The Judge noted that the respondent did not challenge the conclusions of the report but that the respondent’s concerns related to the collection and identification process. The Judge outlined that the question for them was whether they could be satisfied that the DNA samples attributed to the appellants were in fact taken from them.
14. The Judge made the following conclusions at paragraphs 19-20:
“[19] Central to the chain of custody is the declaration said to have been completed by the doctor/sampler in Uganda. I find this document is critical to establishing identity of the Appellant’s at the point of collection.
[20] The Appellant’s relied on a sampler statement from a surgery in Uganda; however, I am unable to place reliance on that due to the sampler’s declaration. The copy before me, in particular the sampler declaration was of such a poor quality that it is largely illegible. As a result, I cannot read or properly assess what was certified and on what basis, nor could I assess what procedures were followed and what samples had been taken from the Appellant’s. There was no witness statement from the doctor/sampler clarifying the process followed. Therefore, I am not satisfied whether the safeguards described in the DNA report were in fact applied during the sampling process for the Appellant’s. I also note there is no signed confirmation that the photographs taken at the time of collection represent a true likeness of the Appellant’s sampled. Again, there is no witness statement from the doctor/sampler in Uganda explaining the identification of the Appellant’s and the secure sealing of the samples. Therefore, I find this weakens the evidential link between the Appellant’s and the biological material tested.”
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
15. The appellant sought permission to appeal on five grounds. The First-tier Tribunal refused the appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
16. On 01 July 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Owens granted permission on all grounds. No Rule 24 response was provided.
17. I heard submissions from Mr Rashid of Counsel for the appellant and Ms Lecointe, a senior Home Office Presenting Officer for the respondent.
18. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
19. I am satisfied that the Judge accepted that the report was provided by Eurofins Medigenomix Forensik GmbH, DNA Legal, an accredited company, and that the respondent did not challenge the conclusions of the report but rather the collection of the DNA samples. I find that the Judge erred in law through limiting his consideration of the sampling process to the sampler statements, of which he did not have a clear copy of. Having looked at the sampler statements for both appellants, as was in the respondent’s bundle of documents before the First-Tier tribunal, it is noted that the sampler declaration forms are legal forms of DNA Legal of Eurofins Medigenomix Forensik GmbH, as confirmed by the copyright at the bottom of the sampler statements. Part 4 of the Sampler Declaration for each appellant has been signed and dated by a named sampler and a stamp has been applied over the signature of the sampler. The same signature and stamp appear on the identification documents for each appellant, namely their Asylum Seeker Certificates. The Judge states that they were not able to read the sampler declaration and whilst it is not the clearest of documents, it is legible as a sampler declaration confirming that the sampler has identified the participant from the photographs provided in Part 2, confirmation that the sampler is not related to the participant, and contains a statement of truth from the sampler.
20. The aforementioned form is a form provided by DNA Legal and at page 1 of the DNA report the accredited company provides clear information as to the chain of custody and the process for identification of test participants. At page 2 of the report, DNA Legal refers to the participant information forms completed by an independent sampler which were attached to the report. Whilst a Judge is under no requirement to set out every stage of their reasoning process or to refer to every piece of evidence within the bundles or heard at the hearing, there is nothing within the judgment to confirm that the Judge has considered these important parts of the DNA report which form part of the DNA and are highly relevant to the weight to be attached to the report and the conclusions set out therein. In light of the clear process set out by DNA Legal and the use of signed and stamped Sampler declaration forms and signed and stamped identification evidence of the participants as certified as having been seen by the sampler, I find that it is difficult to understand what else the Judge expected to see or why the Judge expected to see further documents such as statements from the sampler or from the appellants themselves. All of this information is within the sample statement as attached to the DNA report and forms part of the DNA report.
21. Accordingly, I find that the Judge erred in the findings made relating to the DNA report and the finding that the absence of signed confirmation of photographic likeliness or lack of explanatory statement explaining the sampling process from the doctor in Uganda undermines the weight that can be safely attached to the DNA report. I am satisfied that the DNA report covers the process and that the sampler statement confirms the steps that were taken to identify the participant and that the form had been signed and stamped by a sampler in Uganda. In light of the process followed by the accredited company, I do not accept that there is any additional requirement for the appellants or the sampler in Uganda to have provided witness statements on the DNA sampling process and the Judge made a material error of law in finding that there was a material gap in the evidential picture relating to the DNA samples and whether they came from the appellants.
22. I also note that at paragraph 23 the Judge states that ‘the strength of the scientific conclusion cannot cure uncertainty as to the provenance of the underlying samples.’ Whilst I note that the Judge thereafter within the same paragraph goes on to refer to the test of the balance of probabilities on making a cumulative assessment, I find that the Judge erred in law by applying a higher standard of requiring certainty of the provenance of the underlying samples as reflected in the wording at the start of paragraph 23 and in the reference to a lack of witness statements from the sampler in Uganda and the appellants on the aforesaid issue.
Disposal
23. For the reasons given above the Judge made material errors of law. Accordingly I set aside the determination. No findings are preserved.
24. In submissions Mr Rashid submitted that if the matter were to be set aside then the matter could be re-decided within the Upper Tribunal without a further hearing as the issue about the DNA evidence was the only issue between the parties. Ms Lecointe agreed with this submission and asked me to remake the decision if indeed it were to be set aside.
25. On deciding the substantive issue of the appeal, I accept that the appellants have provided a DNA report from an accredited company and that the conclusions of the report have demonstrated that the appellants are full siblings of the sponsor. In these circumstances and in light of there being no other issue between the parties, the respondent having accepted at the first tier tribunal that the issue regarding financial circumstances was not relevant and Ms Lecointe accepting that there was no issue other than that of the DNA evidence and whether the appellants could prove that they were related, I allow the appellants’ appeals and find that they are full siblings of the sponsor. Their applications ought to have been allowed under paragraph CNP 3.1 at the time that the decision was made and they met the requirements of the Immigration Rules applicable at the time of the decision.
26. Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s decision in TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, the fact that the appellants satisfy the Immigration Rules is positively determinative of the article 8 claim. This is because there is no public interest in refusal of leave for the appellants to join their sibling in the UK. I am satisfied that the appellants and sponsor have a qualifying family life together and that the decision is disproportionate and unlawful as they met the requirements of the Immigration Rules at the time of the refusal decision and their applications ought to have been allowed.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law.

I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and remake the decision.

Re-made decision: The appeal of the appellants is allowed.

S. Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 September 2026