Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003148
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/62070/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

AH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. E. Stuart King, instructed by Rahman and Co. Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr. J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Fist-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity order because the appellant has claimed asylum and it considered that the importance of facilitating the discharge of the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighed the principle of open justice in the circumstances of this case. I have not been asked to set that order aside and I agree that it should continue.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born in April 2006. He entered the UK on a student visa in October 2022 and claimed asylum in February 2023. In summary, he said he feared serious harm in Pakistan from members of a family (the “F” family for the purposes of this decision). His family and the Fs have been involved in a long-running land dispute. The two families also supported rival political parties: the Fs supported the Pakistan Muslim Leage-Nawaz (PML-N), while his family supported the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party.
3. The appellant says that in January 2021, members of the F family shot and killed his cousin, but the police took no action. Then in January 2022, the family attacked members of the appellant’s family, beating them and threatening to kill them. The appellant’s parents began to worry about his safety and make plans for him to leave for the UK. The F family’s attacks escalated after the PML-N returned to power in April 2022. In February 2023, the appellant’s father’s cousin was shot and killed by members of the F family, and the appellant’s father was a witness to the crime. The F family then made several threats against the appellant’s father and his family, leading the appellant to claim asylum in the UK. In June 2023, the appellant’s father was arrested on false charges of being involved in riots that followed the arrest of the PTI’s leader Imran Khan. He was released, but in February 2024, he was abducted from a PTI rally.
4. On 18 April 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. The decision-maker accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality and that he supported the PTI but rejected his account of the dispute with the Fs on credibility grounds. The appellant appealed and, in a decision dated 20 April 2026, the FtT dismissed his appeal.
The grounds of appeal
5. The appellant raises four grounds of appeal:
(i) The FtT made multiple errors in its consideration of the documentary evidence;
(ii) The FtT noted that the appellant had said at his substantive interview that he had been arrested after his cousin’s murder in January 2021. The FtT found that this undermined his credibility because it was inconsistent with the rest of his evidence, in which he had never mentioned an arrest. It rejected the appellant’s explanation for the inconsistency, which was that there had been an error in interpretation. The appellant submits that this was irrational when the inconsistency is read in context, and that the FtT also erred by failing to take into account his age at the time of his interview;
(iii) The FtT found that the appellant’s claims as to the Fs’ influence were inconsistent with the fact that the PTI was in power between August 2018 and April 2022; this ignored the country evidence before it about the limited influence of national political parties at the local level, as set out in the respondent’s CPIN, Pakistan: Political parties and affiliation (May 2023); and
(iv) The FtT’s findings on state protection and internal relocation were infected by the other three errors.
6. The FtT judge who granted permission to appeal found that grounds two and three were arguable and that ground four was parasitic on the other grounds. He did not consider ground one arguable, but in accordance Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150, he granted permission on all grounds.
7. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response but did not address ground one in light of the terms of the grant of permission.
8. Ms King confirmed at the hearing before me that she was pursuing ground one, as she was entitled to do.
The Hearing
9. The appellant’s solicitors failed to upload a bundle for the error of law hearing in accordance with directions, but Ms King was able to provide one on the morning of the hearing. Mr Nappey and I had both had access to the key documents through the MyHMCTS portal prior to the hearing and the hearing was therefore able to proceed with only a short delay.
10. I heard submissions from both representatives, for which I am grateful, and which I have taken into account in making my decision.
Legal framework
11. In deciding whether the FtT erred in the ways the appellant claims, I have been guided by the well-established principles of appellate restraint. Many of these were recently summarised in ECO v BB & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 97 at [56]:
(i) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently;
(ii) Where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account;
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out;
(iv) The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference;
(v) Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so;
(vi) Reasons will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.: Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2](6); and
12. I have also reminded myself that an appellate court should avoid “island-hopping”: Fage v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5.
13. Three other sets of legal principles have shaped my decision. The first is that it is for the appellant to show that a document on which they seek to rely can be relied on, but the decision-maker must look at all the evidence in the round when deciding whether reliance can properly be placed on a particular document. See: Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 at [38].
14. The second concerns the role of plausibility in credibility assessment. The concept of “plausibility” must be applied with a degree of caution, and always in the context of the other evidence: KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) [28]. Inferences concerning plausibility must be based in the evidence, rather than on conjecture or speculation, and it is essential to take into account the context of the country and the culture in which the events described are said to have occurred. See: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 2016 at [63]; Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223; and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 [27-30]. This does not mean, however, that a decision-maker cannot make reasonable findings based on “implausibilities, common sense and rationality”: MAH (Egypt) at [63].
15. Finally, the parties are required to identify the principle controversial issues in the appeal, and the evidence on which they rely. See: AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370, endorsing Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163
Ground One: Errors in approach to police and legal documents
16. The appellant’s first ground of appeal is that the FtT erred in its approach to his documentary evidence. Contrary to what is indicated in the title of this ground, the appellant challenges the FtT’s approach to all of the Pakistani documents, including those said to emanate from the PTI.
17. In his written grounds, the appellant identifies the following errors:
(i) The FtT failed to consider the documents holistically, and instead “seized on minor discrepancies” that were not adequate reasons for rejecting the documents as a whole;
(ii) Several of the FtT’s reasons for rejecting the documents were based on assertions of implausibility that had no basis in the evidence before the tribunal;
(iii) It was irrational for the FtT to place weight on minor typographical errors;
(iv) The FtT failed to take into account the multiple features of the documents that were positive indications of their reliability. These included stamps, seals and signatures and annotations on the court documents;
(v) The FtT failed to read the documents together; and
(vi) The FtT failed to put sufficient weight on the many documents with which it did not find any specific fault.
18. I list the documents in the order in which they appeared in the appellant’s bundles before the FtT:
(i) A First Information Report (“FIR”) dated 2 January 2022;
(ii) An FIR dated 14 January 2021;
(iii) An FIR dated 7 February 2023;
(iv) A police-issued document dated 2 March 2023 headed “Complainant copy”;
(v) A typed statement by the appellant’s father addressed to the SHO (Station House Officer) of the local police station; the document is undated but appears to have been written in early 2023;
(vi) A letter from the PTI District President, dated 11 February 2020, confirming that the appellant’s father was the president of the party at the local union council level;
(vii) Eleven photographs of the appellant’s father at what appear top be pro-PTI gatherings;
(viii) A letter from his mother’s lawyer, dated 19 April 2025;
(ix) A “Notification” on PTI-headed paper dated 6 March 2025, confirming the appellant’s father’s role in the party;
(x) A petition filed in court by his mother, seeking to compel the SHO to register a criminal case regarding her husband’s disappearance, dated 30 January 2025;
(xi) A “pre-arrest bail petition” lodged on behalf of the applicant’s father on 9 January 2025;
(xii) An application for a grant of post-arrest bail to the appellant’s father, dated 10 February 2024;
(xiii) An FIR dated 25 November 2024; and
(xiv) A police-issued document headed “Supplementary External Report”, dated 25 November 2024.
19. At the hearing before me, Ms King took me through each of these documents in turn and commented on how the FtT had treated it. It would be disproportionate to reproduce all of her submissions here. Some I found persuasive, others less so. I consider it sufficient to focus on the submissions that were material to my decision.
20. I disagree with Ms King’s broad submission that the FtT erred in rejecting the reliability of all of the documents because of the perceived unreliability of some of them. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed, the reliability of each document must be assessed in the round, together with all of the other evidence. It is entirely rational to consider that if a significant number of individual documents are unreliable, this undermines the appellant’s general credibility and the credibility of the remaining documents.
21. For this reason, as I expressed at the hearing, I consider that the appellant’s first ground of appeal cannot succeed unless a significant proportion of the FtT’s findings about the reliability of the individual documents were flawed.
22. I do not consider that there is any irrationality, per se, in finding that documents purporting to be official court pleadings are undermined by typographical errors. Although typographical errors routinely occur in to varying degrees even in this jurisdiction, it is for the decision-maker to assess the nature of the typographical error in the context of the document as a whole and decide what weight to put on it.
23. I do consider, however, that a significant number of the FtT’s findings about the appellant’s documents were flawed.
24. I find that the FtT fell into three types of error.
25. Most simply, several of the FtT’s criticisms of the documents were inconsistent with the content of the document:
(i) At [26], the FtT raised a number of criticisms of the letter from the District President of the PTI (document (vi) above). These included that “the phone number at the bottom right-hand side is different from the top left-hand side.” This was an irrational criticism, as the two numbers are clearly identified as different: the number on the top left is the mobile number of the author, and the number on the bottom right is the number of the PTI office; and
(ii) At [27], the FtT described the “Notification” from the PTI of 6 March 2025 (document (ix)) as stating that “the appellant’s father is the president of Pakistan.” This is a clear error. The letter states that the appellant’s father is “President of Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) of Union Council No.” [number and location given].
26. I further find that some of the FtT’s reasons for rejecting several of the appellant’s other documents are based on implausibility findings that have no basis in the evidence:
(i) At [40], the FtT finds that the reliability of the “Complainant copy” (document (iv) is “seriously undermined” because it records that the “incident” complained of was “threats of serious consequences” but does not state “who made the threats and when, the nature and/or what the consequences could be”. This document is the only one of its kind in the bundle. It is clearly not an FIR but a receipt confirming submission of a complaint and recording basic details, standard response targets for a range of different offences, etc. It is entirely unclear on what basis the FtT concluded that a receipt of this kind should normally contain the details of the offence, the name of the offender, etc. It is relevant here that the receipt is followed by a typed statement addressed to the SHO by the appellant’s father, setting out the details of the incident (document (v)), such that the missing details were on file with the police in a different document;
(ii) At [43], the FtT found that it is “difficult to accept” that the appellant’s father would have petitioned for pre-arrest bail or that the state prosecutor would have opposed his petition, given that he had not yet been named in an FIR, and that this “seriously undermines” the veracity of document (xi). It is relevant here that the document in question recognises that the appellant’s father was not named in the FIR and records that his petition was based on the fear that he would nonetheless be implicated in the offence. The document records that the petition was granted on the grounds that the “possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out”. The FtT’s strongly worded implausibility finding is made without any reference to evidence of Pakistani criminal procedure that would suggest that a Pakistani court would not rule in this way;
(iii) At [46], the FtT attaches little weight to document (xiv) because it refers to a “Mr ASJ” but it is “unclear who ‘MR ASJ’ is and why all capitals have been used”. However, documents (xi) and (x) are signed by the same man, who gives his title as “Additional Sessions Judge” and “ASJ”, respectively. Other documents refer to various officials by their initials, such as “Mr SHO” and “Learned ADPP”. Here, too, the FtT has reached an implausibility finding without reference to the country context (or the totality of the documents before it);
(iv) At [47], the FtT considered document (viii). Among its reasons for attaching little weight to the documents were that the advocate “has not provided any information that a complaint has been made to escalate his concerns with the head of the police for their inaction.” It is unclear how the FtT knows that the proper avenue for a complaint of inaction by an SHO (who is the officer in charge of the local police station) is a complaint made to the “head of police”, rather than a petition to the local court.
27. Thirdly, I consider that the FtT has erred by not considering the documents in the round, to the extent that some of the documents are clearly linked to each other and their reliability cannot rationally be assessed separately. I note in this regard what I have said above at [26](i) and [26](iii).
28. I have carefully considered the fact that the FtT gave many other reasons for rejecting the documents that were reasonably open to it. In considering whether the errors I have identified were nonetheless material, I have placed them in the context of the FtT’s adverse credibility findings as a whole. There are three reasons for my conclusion that these errors were material. The first is that credibility must always be assessed in the round, such that it is inherently difficult apply a “blue pencil” to an adverse credibility assessment. The second is that the FtT clearly put considerable weight on the issues with the appellant’s documents in reaching its overall conclusion on credibility; this is what it says at [58]. The third is that there were a significant number of documents with which the FtT did not find fault, such that without these errors, the balance could tip towards accepting the overall reliability of the documents.
Ground two
29. As pointed out by Ms King, the appellant at no point said that he had been arrested, other than in answer to question 133 of his substantive interview, “Can you tell me what particular incident led to you leaving Pakistan?” The appellant answered with a long paragraph, describing his life between the murder of his cousin in January 2021 through his departure for the UK in October 2022. The first few sentences were:
“So when I was arrested in 2021 after the murder of Junaid. I was attacked and beaten up by those [F] lads so I left school and ran away due to being fearful so my family then decided that I was to go to school anymore. They also stopped school for my siblings as well, they weren't attending school.”
30. Nothing in this answer describes what happened when the appellant was arrested, which is surprising if that is what he actually said had happened. Nor did the interviewer ask him any questions about this or – crucially – put the significant inconsistency with his SEF statement to him during the interview. It was raised for the first time in the refusal decision, and the appellant responded in his appeal statement, saying he must have been misunderstood. The FtT rejected this explanation on the grounds that “the appellant had an opportunity to correct the Interview Record before the decision was issued.” At the time of his interview, the appellant was 17 years old. The FtT accepted the medical evidence indicating that he suffers from anxiety, depression and stress and has a history of self-harm. I consider that the appellant’s age and mental il health should have been taken into account when considering whether the appellant’s credibility was damaged by his failure to correct an inconsistency in his interview record that had never been drawn to his attention.
Ground Three
31. Ground three is not made out. As was confirmed at the hearing before me, the appellant did not rely on the CPIN on Political parties and affiliation before the FtT and it was not in the appellant’s bundle. I note that it was not even in his bundle for his UT appeal, which was a serious oversight as he seeks to rely on it. This is particularly so because it is no longer easily accessible on line, having been replaced. Although the respondent did rely on this CPIN in the refusal letter, it was for the entirely different issue of whether membership in the PTI would put the appellant at risk of state persecution. The FtT cannot be expected to scrutinise the entirety of every country report before it to identify points that one of the parties might have made but did not. See: Lata and AL.
Ground four
32. Ms King and Mr Nappey were in agreement that if the FtT’s adverse credibility assessment were set aside, the findings on state protection and internal relocation could not stand.
33. For these reasons, I consider that the FtT’s decision rested in part on errors of law and must be set aside. As the errors were with regard to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility, the decision must be set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved.
34. The parties agreed that if I were to set the decision aside, remittal to the FtT would be appropriate. Taking into account the extensive fact-finding that will be required and the guidance set out in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 159, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, I agree.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision dated 20 April 2026 is set aside in its entirety and is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all issues, before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 September 2026