Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-003198
PA/53029/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

On 8th of September 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

ZB
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 27 August 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, Counsel
(instructed by Marveloaks Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appealed with permission granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle on 2 July 2026 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Norris who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of her international protection claim. The decision and reasons was promulgated on 21 March 2026.

2. The Appellant’s case was summarised by Judge Norris as follows:

“(a) The Appellant is a 29-year-old citizen of Honduras. She was a lawyer in her home country, and claims to have been working in a firm, Medina y Asociados, known for representing gang members from MS13 in criminal defence work and practising other areas of law. She says that in November 2021, her boss Mr Medina told her he was receiving death threats by test from Barrio 181, a rival gang; the following month he was killed by the gang while out in his car.
(b) In or around March 2022, the Appellant began to receive threats herself from M 18. She decided to come to the UK. On 25 July she flew from Honduras to El Salvador, and from there to Madrid before finally arriving in the UK on a visit visa the following day. She says that on 31 August 2022, another colleague was killed by Barrio 18.
(c) The Appellant claimed asylum six months later (26 January 2023), when her visa expired.

3. Judge Norris continued: “The Respondent accepts that the Appellant worked as a lawyer in Honduras but does not accept the other material facts of her claim, notably that she was of adverse interest to Barrio 18. The Respondent also accepts that being targeted by Barrio 18 for non-compliance with gang demands would reach the threshold for membership of a particular social group [PSG], and thus would constitute a Convention reason. The Respondent further concedes that if the Tribunal finds for the Appellant in relation to the material facts on which she relies, there would not be sufficient protection from persecution in Honduras and the Appellant could not reasonably be expected to relocate internally.

4. “The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) On the balance of probabilities does the Appellant fear persecution as a member of a PSG (a woman and/or a person who has failed to comply with the demands of a criminal gang in Honduras)?
(b) If so, is it reasonably likely that the Appellant would be persecuted for her membership of that PSG?
(c) Alternatively, does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Honduras and thus qualify for humanitarian protection?”

5. Judge Norris found that the Appellant’s account of events in Honduras, and what had occurred since she arrived in the United Kingdom, generally lacked supporting evidence and was riddled throughout with inconsistencies in key matters, such as her workplace, the threats she claimed to have received, her documents, and section 8 delay factors. Judge Norris found that the Appellant’s claims were not proven, even to the lower standard.

6. Permission to appeal was sought in the First-tier Tribunal but was refused by Judge Byrne on 29 May 2026. The application was renewed, successfully, in the UT. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle’s grant of permission to appeal dated 2 July 2026 was in the following terms:

“There are three grounds of appeal

(i) Unfairness resulting from departure from a concession made by the respondent;
(ii) Failure to take relevant considerations into account
(iii) Error by considering irrelevant matters

“It is arguable that in the subparagraphs of [17(a)] of the decision the FtTJ analyses matters which were not in dispute and which the Appellant did not have fair notice of. The first ground of appeal raises an arguable error of law, which arguably breathes life into the second and third grounds of appeal. Permission to appeal is granted on all three grounds of appeal.”

7. The Respondent filed a rule 24 notice dated 9 July 2026 which opposed the appeal on all grounds raised. It was submitted inter alia that the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed herself appropriately.

8. “[As to] Ground 1, unfairness, the challenge is that the FTT Judge proceeded on an unfair basis by ‘re-opening’ a concession of the SSHD that the Appellant worked as a lawyer in Honduras. There are multiple references to the concession of the SSHD within the decision and [17] itself. It is noteworthy however, that the SSHD did not accept her account that she faced threats from Barrio 18 because of her employment and role at the law firm she claimed to work at. The RFRL did not explicitly accept that the Appellant worked at the law firm claimed at the material time. In making the concession, it is clear from the Home Office bundle that the decision maker had sight of a number of professional certificates relating to qualifications.

9. “The FTT Judge asked questions in clarification [17vii-x] as she was entitled to do, as to the Appellant’s employment and her experience as a legally qualified person. At the end of [17] the FTT Judge comments that there are no reliable documents to show that the Appellant worked at Medina y Asociados at the material time when the threats began. This was material to the central element of her claim to have received threats from Barrio 18. There is no element of unfairness in this regard, given the concession did not extend to her claimed position of employment at that firm. Had it done so, it would have said so. The challenge is one based on assumption as to the extent to which the concession applied.

10. “Ground 2, failing to take into account material matters, is premised on the findings made at [17] as not being applicable, where the FTTJ finds there is no evidence of her working at the firm at the material times of when Mr Medina was killed or when the threats against her began. There is clear reference to the death of Mr Medina at [17a], [17b (ii) (vii)] and [17d (vi)] – the relevance of it was clearly noted. It is submitted that the core part of the claim is not in relation to the deaths of claimed former colleagues, but of specific interest in the Appellant herself from the gang. In effect, the challenge is one arguing that the FTTJ should have considered the point as being more worthy of consideration and weight. It is submitted that this has the characteristics of disagreement and ‘island hopping’ around the evidence as mentioned in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.

11. “[As to] Ground 3, considering irrelevant matters, The FTTJ did not conclude on credibility with the emphasis on the absence of threat to family members as described in the grounds. Rather, the FTTJ made note of the absence of threats at [17b(x)] using the term ‘Further’ being indicative of it being a supplementary finding. The fact that the bulk of the well-reasoned credibility findings are not challenged further adds support to this point. It is reasonable to consider that a gang could use pressure and make threats to family members in an attempt to locate a target or place indirect pressure on a target. The grounds argue it was a factor that should be placed at best a ‘neutral factor’ is indicative of an argument of weight. There is nothing irrational in the FTTJ’s approach.”

Submissions

12. Mr West for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal for which permission to appeal had been granted. As to ground 1, in summary Judge Norris had departed from the concession made in the reasons for refusal letter that the Appellant was a lawyer in Honduras. The Judge had impermissibly reopened the issue and hence impugned the Appellant’s credibility. The Appellant had been taken unawares which was unfair. That infected the whole of the Judge’s adverse credibility findings.

13. As to ground 2, the Judge had failed to take account of one or more material matters. The death of the Appellant’s work colleague had not been taken into account. This was the sur place element of the Appellant’s claim which explained why she sought asylum when she did. This ground stood independently from ground 1.

14. As to ground 3, having regard to irrelevant matters, the Judge had mistakenly found inconsistency over the lack of threats to the Appellant’s family. That was not the Appellant’s case. The threats were solely against her.

15. The decision was unfairly reached and was erroneous in law. The decision should be set aside and the appeal reheard before another judge in the First-tier Tribunal.

16. Ms Nolan for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 notice and submitted that there was no material error of law, merely disagreement with a decision properly open to the Judge. There had been no procedural unfairness. The reasons for refusal letter’s concession had predated the evidence subsequently served by the Appellant. The review had taken further credibility points and so the Appellant was well aware that her claims were not accepted. In any event the Judge had not strayed beyond the Respondent’s concession, which in any event was made in the context of a general adverse credibility assessment. The Judge’s questions had given the Appellant the opportunity to respond to the Judge’s concerns, as had been recorded in the decision. The Judge had not found that the Appellant was not a lawyer.

17. As to ground 2, the Judge had expressly referred to the death of the Appellant’s colleague. The Judge was clearly aware of the elements of the Appellant’s case and of the threats which she claimed to have received. The Appellant’s skeleton argument had raised no sur place risk points.

18. As to ground 3, the Judge had not taken irrelevant matters into account. The inconsistencies found had been identified and enumerated. It was not a major factor in the Judge’s reasoning but it had been open to her.

19. In reply Mr West reiterated the points he made earlier. The Judge had gone behind the concession. The Judge should have given weight to the Appellant’s documents.

No material error of law finding

20. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by any of the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellant. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision are based on misapprehensions and a failure to read the meticulous decision and reasons as a whole.

21. The Tribunal accepts Ms Nolan’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent. The rule 24 notice is accurate. Ground 1 was plainly the only ground which Deputy UTJ Doyle considered might be arguably material. The Tribunal considers that there was no unfairness in the conduct of the hearing nor in the Judge’s treatment of the evidence. The Judge gave full credit to the Respondent’s concession that the Appellant had been a lawyer in Honduras, which indeed is mentioned twice in the decision. But the scope of that concession was narrow, by no means a wholesale acceptance of the Appellant’s claims about her legal career and related events in Honduras. The concession was not expanded in the Respondent’s review, served after the Appellant had filed her witness statement and other evidence. The Respondent firmly maintained adverse credibility and consequent refusal. There was no question of the Appellant’s being taken by surprise, having assumed that her claims were accepted and being lulled into a false sense of security, as Mr West suggested.

22. Importantly, the Judge raised her concerns in specific and clear questions to the Appellant, affording the Appellant a full opportunity to respond. That demonstrated a scrupulous concern for fairness, as well as an open mind.

23. Given that there was no procedural unfairness, it is not easy to see anything in grounds 2 or 3. The very experienced Judge examined the whole of the evidence in detail, and set out well reasoned and comprehensive findings in [17]. That level detail helps demonstrate that all of the evidence was considered in the round, in accordance with the Judge’s self directions. The Judge set out the agreed issues and her findings on those issues, in accordance with Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC). The country background evidence was not in dispute and the Judge drew appropriate inferences from the country background materials when examining the evidence.

24. The Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged. The onwards appeal is dismissed. The anonymity direction is maintained.

The Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant without her express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION

The appeal is dismissed

The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 3 September 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell