UI-2026-003202
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003202
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/64771/2023
LP/12047/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
30th October 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
Between
OQ
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Nadeem, instructed by Allison Wells Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J. Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 21 October 2026
By Cloud Video Platform
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) made an anonymity direction on the grounds that the importance of the UK discharging its obligations towards refugees and asylum-seekers outweighed the public interest in open justice. I have not been asked to set that order aside and I agree that it should continue.
2. The appellant is accepted to be a citizen of Iraq born in the autumn of 1997. He says that he left Iraq in June 2015, at the age of 17. Before arriving in the UK, he claimed asylum in both Belgium and Germany, but those claims were unsuccessful. He arrived in the UK on 10 June 2020 and claimed asylum on the following day. The appellant says that he is at real risk of persecution because he is a gay man. There was also a suggestion that the appellant is an atheist, but he did not pursue a protection claim on this basis before the FtT.
3. In a decision dated 27 November 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. She accepted that the appellant was a citizen of Iraq but rejected his account of his sexual identity and lack of religious belief on credibility grounds.
The challenged decision
4. The appellant appealed to the FtT and his appeal was heard on 30 April 2026. In a decision dated 1 May 2026, the FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal. It accepted that if the appellant were a gay man as he claimed, his appeal would fall to be allowed: [11]. The FtT then assessed that claim in two stages.
5. First, under the heading “Facts”, the FtT made a series of observations about the evidence:
(i) The appellant’s date of birth was in October 1997, and “he had accepted in oral evidence that that he had previously told the United Kingdom authorities that he was a minor when he was not. His explanation was that he had been advised or pushed by others to say that he was under 18.”: [25]
(ii) The appellant had claimed asylum in Belgium and Germany before arriving in the UK and he had denied this in his screening interview “until challenged by reference to fingerprint evidence. His explanation was that he was scared, confused and influenced by others.”: [26]
(iii) The respondent had not provided the documentary foundation for her allegation that the appellant had claimed to be a Kuwaiti Bidoon in his German asylum claim, and although the appellant’s evidence on this point was “confused”, the FtT placed light weight on the allegation: [27];
(iv) The appellant had failed to claim asylum in France, and had said that this was because he preferred to come to the UK. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 applied to this conduct, “subject to considering his explanation and the evidence as a whole”;
(v) The appellant had given inconsistent accounts about whether his first same-sex relationship had been with his neighbour or his cousin. “In oral evidence, he said the person was his cousin, the son of his uncle, and that he had described him as a neighbour because he felt shame.”: [29];
(vi) There was “an inconsistency” between the appellant’s evidence and the contents of a letter of support by Victor Iringere, the Director of Out in Coventry Ltd, who had given evidence at the hearing. The letter recorded the appellant as saying that his same-sex relationship in Iraq had begun when he was 14, but in his oral evidence the appellant “placed the relevant incident when he was 16 or 17. His explanation was that he had been confused when speaking to Mr Iringere and had wanted the interview to finish.”: [30];
(vii) The appellant’s account had been that his uncle had detained him after seeing him having sex with his neighbour/cousin. Mr Iringere’s letter, however, recorded that his uncle had detained him after seeing him “socialising with people of questionable character”. “The Appellant’s oral evidence was that these were connected matters”: [31];
(viii) “that the Appellant previously said in interview that he had contact with his uncle in about 2018 while he was in Germany. In oral evidence, he denied that he had any such contact. His explanation was that he had given the earlier answer because he was scared, and that his cousin being the uncle's child had made him feel guilty and ashamed.”: [32];
(ix) The appellant claimed to have had a partner in Germany with whom he had remained in contact via WhatsApp after coming to the UK, but he had provided no evidence of this. He said he had lost his phone but had some photographs. He had not provided the photographs, and his explanation for this was that “he had been scared, did not know what to expect and was unsure whether he should send them”.: [33]
(x) There were three letters of support from people who had not attended the hearing. Two letters expressed the belief that the appellant was gay. They were brief and contained little detail about the basis of the belief. A third letter was useful as background evidence about Iraqi culture but not as evidence of the appellant’s sexual identity: [35]-[36]
(xi) “I accept that Victor Iringere is involved with Out in Coventry Ltd, an organisation supporting LGBT asylum seekers and refugees. I accept that he has spent time with the Appellant, used interpreter assistance when discussing the Appellant’s account, and believes the Appellant to be gay. I also accept that Mr Iringere gave his evidence honestly. His evidence remains based substantially on what the Appellant told him and on his own impression after spending time with him.”: [37]
6. The next section of the determination is entitled “Determination of the issues”. The FtT began by reminding itself of the “lower standard of proof”, the difficulty of proving sexuality because it is “intensely personal” and not capable of documentary proof, that “a person from a conservative society may find it difficult to discuss sexuality, particularly where the account involves family shame”, and that the appeal should not be dismissed because the appellant had not attended LGBT events or had a partner in the UK: [39]
7. In the following paragraphs, the FtT assessed the impact of the findings it had already made on the appellant’s credibility. I set out in full the paragraphs that are relevant to the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal:
“41. I have considered the Appellant's explanation that shame led him to describe his cousin as a neighbour. I accept that the explanation is possible. It does not, however, explain the wider pattern of difficulty in the evidence. The change from neighbour to cousin is material because it concerns the core event said to have led to the Appellant's fear. There are further material inconsistencies about the timing of the relationship, the identity of the person involved, the reason for the uncle's detention of the Appellant, and the supporting evidence that should have been available from the claimed German relationship.
42. The Appellant's evidence about whether he remained in contact in 2018 with the uncle he says would kill him is also significant. His explanation in oral evidence was that he had given the earlier answer because he was scared, and because his cousin was the uncle's child, and that this had made him feel guilty and ashamed. I do not find that explanation persuasive. The natural answer of a person genuinely fearing his uncle, when asked when he had last had contact with his family, would be to deny contact, not to volunteer that he had been in contact with that uncle as recently as two years previously.
43. The admitted falsehoods about previous asylum claims and age are also significant. The Appellant did not merely make a peripheral mistake. He denied previous asylum claims in Europe until challenged, and he accepted that he had claimed to be a minor when he was not. I treat that conduct as damaging to credibility under section 8 and as relevant to credibility more generally. I have considered his explanation that he was frightened, confused and influenced by others. I accept that fear and bad advice may explain some poor decisions. I do not accept that they adequately explain repeated false answers on important immigration matters. […]
45. I have considered Mr Iringere's evidence carefully. It is the strongest supporting evidence for the Appellant. I accept that he has spent considerable time with the Appellant over the past year, that he has used interpreter assistance from members of his organisation in his discussions with the Appellant, and that he believes the Appellant to be gay. I accept that he gave his evidence honestly. However, Mr Iringere was not a witness to events in Iraq or Germany, and his evidence is necessarily based substantially on what the Appellant has told him. His letter also records matters which sit uneasily with the Appellant's other accounts, particularly the age at which the first relationship is said to have begun, and the reason why the uncle is said to have detained the Appellant. When this was put to him in cross-examination, Mr Iringere stood by his belief that the Appellant had been truthful with him. I give his evidence weight, but not sufficient weight to overcome the cumulative difficulties in the Appellant's own evidence.”
8. At [44], the FtT drew adverse credibility inferences from the appellant’s failure to provide evidence of his claimed relationship in Germany, and at [46] it gave reasons for placing little weight on the letters of support from witnesses who had not attended the hearing. There has been no challenge to those findings.
9. At [47], the FtT announced its conclusion. This was that the appellant had not established, to the lower standard of proof, that he was a gay man. The conclusion was said to rest on the “cumulative effect of the Appellant’s admitted falsehoods, material inconsistencies in the core account, inadequate explanations for those inconsistencies, the absence of supporting evidence which he said existed, and the limited weight I can place on the supporting witness evidence.”
10. The FtT then set out why it would have found the appellant to be at real risk if it had accepted his claimed sexual identity ([48]-[49]), and why it would not have found that the appellant would be at risk as an atheist, had that ground of claim been pursued before it: [50]-[53]. The remainder of the decision dismisses the appellant’s claim on humanitarian protection, article 3 and article 8 grounds. No challenge has been brought to these sections of the FtT’s reasoning, and I say no more about them.
The grounds of appeal
11. The appellant raises five grounds of appeal. They are
(i) Failure to assess the evidence in the round (the Mibanga error), including failure to engage with corroborative and explanatory evidence;
(ii) Mistake of Material Fact/Mischaracterisation (the “Feared Uncle” Finding);
(iii) Impermissible Plausibility/Speculation;
(iv) Failure to Take into Account Material Evidence: Consistent Basis of Previous Claims; and
(v) Procedural Unfairness: Failure to Treat the Appellant as a Vulnerable Witness
12. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response, opposing the appeal on all grounds.
The hearing
13. At the hearing before me, I had sight of the appellant’s 297-page bundle of and the respondent’s Rule 24 response.
14. The hearing was conducted by CVP, and I am satisfied that I and the representatives were able to communicate fully throughout.
15. At the outset of the hearing, I drew Mr Nadeem’s attention to the fact that under Ground Four, it had been asserted that a counsel’s note of the proceedings below was attached. I had been unable to locate that counsel’s note in the papers before me. Mr Nadeem accepted that it was not before me and confirmed that he did not seek to rely on any evidence concerning what transpired at the FtT hearing.
16. I heard submissions from both representatives, which I have taken into account in making my decision. They are recorded in the record of proceedings and I will not rehearse them in full here. I will refer to them as necessary in the discussion below.
Discussion
Ground One
17. Under this heading, the appellant makes three distinct submissions. The first is that the FtT erred by first forming an adverse view of the appellant’s evidence at [41]-[44] and then turning to the supporting evidence to consider whether it was sufficient to outweigh that adverse view.
18. If the FtT had proceeded in this way, it would clearly have been contrary to the well-established principles articulated in Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 at [24]:
“a fact-finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto. […] What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant's evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence.”
19. However, in applying Mibanga, it is important to remember what is said at HH (medical evidence; effect of Mibanga) Ethiopia [2005] UKAIT 00164 at [21]:
“The Tribunal considers that there is a danger of Mibanga being misunderstood. The judgments in that case are not intended to place judicial fact-finders in a form of forensic straightjacket. In particular, the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as laying down any rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact-finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. To take Wilson J's "cake" analogy, all its ingredients cannot be thrown together into the bowl simultaneously. One has to start somewhere.”
20. The focus of the appellant’s complaint is the treatment of Mr Iringere’s evidence. The appellant asserts that the FtT assessed the appellant’s account “in isolation” before turning to the supporting evidence at [45]-[46]. He stresses the wording of the last sentence of [45]: “I give his [Mr Iringere’s] evidence weight, but not sufficient weight to overcome the cumulative difficulties in the Appellant's own evidence.”
21. I find that the appellant here has engaged in impermissible island-hopping and has taken this sentence out of the context of the decision as a whole. See: Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at [114]. As is clear from the outline of the decision set out above, the FtT considered Mr Iringere’s evidence alongside all of the other evidence in the “Facts” section of the determination. At this stage, the FtT identified what it considered the material evidence going to credibility. It had not yet formed a view as to the appellant’s credibility, however. This is clear from the structure of the paragraphs, most of which contain both the FtT’s concern and the appellant’s explanation.
22. This means that when the FtT begins its “Determination of the issues”, Mr Iringere’s evidence has already been considered. That evidence is then taken into account again at [41], where the FtT found that there was a material inconsistency about the timing of the appellant’s relationship with his neighbour/cousin. This inconsistency, as recorded above, was between the appellant’s account in oral evidence and the account he is recorded as having given to Mr Iringere. Mr Iringere’s evidence is thus clearly integrated into the assessment of the appellant’s credibility. It is not an afterthought.
23. As to the fact that the positive aspects of Mr Iringere’s evidence appear only at [45], after a number of negative credibility findings, I consider that this is not evidence of a “Mibanga” error but of a balancing exercise, in which the matters telling against the appellant’s credibility are weighed against those telling in favour of it. Mr Iringere’s evidence comes at the end because it is the strongest evidence in the appellant’s favour. It is followed by the only other evidence in his favour, which is the statements of support from three people who did not attend the hearing.
24. There is no error of law in the FtT setting out first the matters adverse to an appellant’s credibility and then the matters that are positive. As noted in HH, a tribunal has to start somewhere. Nor is there any error in reaching separate findings about specific aspects of the evidence before drawing all those findings together. This is precisely the approach endorsed in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 11. Sedley LJ summarised that approach in SR (Iran) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 460:
“8. […] it was the AIT’s task, first, to discard any evidence judged to be of no value at all: […] For the rest, the AIT had to take each element of evidence into account for what it was worth. Some of the evidence was worth a good deal to the appellant […] Some of it, in the AIT’s judgment, was less compelling […]
9. There is nothing wrong with the differential levels of proof or disproof of primary facts found by the tribunal. … The law does not demand, at least in this field, that each finding of fact, whatever its degree of certainty or uncertainty, be fitted into a single matrix of risk. The fact-finder's task is, to the extent made possible by the evidence, to find facts, and some facts are more certain than others.”
25. The appellant makes two further submissions under Ground One that are based on the contents of Mr Iringere’s statement, rather than on the structure of the FtT’s reasoning. The first is that the FtT erred by treating the statement as inconsistent with the appellant’s account, rather than corroborating it. The FtT noted, at [29], that the appellant had described the person with whom he had sexual relations in Iraq first as a neighbour and then later as a cousin. It noted the appellant’s explanation, which was that he had not disclosed that the man was his cousin because he felt shame about this [29], and accepted at [41] that this was “possible”. However, it found that that this “does not […] explain the wider pattern of difficulty in the evidence”.
26. The appellant submits that the FtT erred by not putting weight on [7] of Mr Iringere’s statement, in which he had written:
“[The appellant] confided in me that he had not disclosed the fact that the neighbour he had mentioned in his interviews with the Home Office was also his cousin and the son of his uncle due to fear of being judged negatively for having a relationship with his cousin.”
27. Mr Nadeem put considerable weight in his submissions on the fact that this corroborated what the appellant said in his oral evidence, and that this letter was written more than a year before the hearing. The implication was that this change in the appellant’s evidence should not have been held against him, because it long predated the hearing.
28. It is trite law that decision-makers are not required to refer expressly to each item of evidence before them. In this instance, the inconsistency about a core aspect of the claim remains regardless of whether it first arose when the appellant was speaking to Mr Iringere or only at the hearing. The consistency of the oral evidence with what the appellant told Mr Iringere was therefore not material to the FtT’s concern. In addition, the FtT did not entirely reject the appellant’s explanation for this delayed disclosure. On the contrary, it accepted that the explanation “might be possible”. Given that the consistency of the oral evidence with Mr Irnigere’s letter could not cure the inconsistency with what was said at the interview, and that the FtT took into account the appellant’s explanation for the inconsistency and put some weight on it, the fact that the appellant had said the same thing to Mr Iringere was not so material that the FtT was required to mention it.
29. Finally, the appellant submits that the FtT made a material mistake of fact when it described Mr Iringere’s statement as inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence about when the relationship began. This submission is contrary to the evidence. Mr Iringere said that the relationship began when the appellant was 14, but at question 56 of the appellant’s first interview on 19 October 2023, he stated that he first became aware of his sexual identity in around 2014 and at questions 14 and 15 of his second interview, he clearly and repeatedly said that this was as a result of sexual experimentation with his neighbour in 2013.
30. For these reasons, Ground One is not made out.
Ground Two
31. Ground Two is that the FtT made a material mistake of fact when it found that the appellant had said at his substantive interview of 19 October 2023 that he had been in contact with the uncle he fears in 2018. The appellant relies on the following series of questions:
“33. Question
Do you have any family still living in Iraq?
33. Response
Yes my uncle
IO: Is that the only family members that you have still living in Iraq?
Applicant: No I have other uncles living in Iraq but in different area
[…]
38. Question.
[…] Are you still in contact with any of your uncles who are living in Iraq?
38. Response
No currently no
IO: Is there a reason for this?
Applicant: I didn’t want to contact them
39. Question
When was the last time that you had contact with them?
39. Response
Approximately in 2018 before leaving Germany.”
32. The FtT understood the answer to question 39 as referring to contact with the uncle the appellant feared. It is arguable that this would have been an error if it had done so based on the interview record alone, because it is right that the appellant was answering a series of questions about his contact with “any of your uncles”. However, it is clear from [32] of the decision that the FtT’s undestanding was not based on the interview record alone. Paragraph [32] records that it was put to the appellant that he had said at his interview that he had been in contact with “his uncle” in 2018, and it is clear in the context of the multiple other references to the appellant’s uncle in the determination that the uncle being referred to is the uncle the appellant said he feared. The appellant responded by denying that he had been in contact with his uncle but accepting that he had said otherwise at his interview. He explained his “earlier answer” as a consequence of his fear and shame about having had sex with that uncle’s child. He did not explain that his earlier answer was referring to a different uncle. I therefore conclude that it was entirely reasonable for the FtT to have considered that the appellant had said at his interview that he had been in contact with the uncle he feared. The appellant himself had accepted this in his oral evidence.
33. Mr Nadeem conceded at the hearing before me that what is recorded at [32] is a complete answer to Ground Two. He confessed that he had not read that paragraph of the decision.
Ground Three
34. Ground three critiques the FtT’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation for having said at his interview that he had been in contact with his uncle in 2018. It is submitted that the FtT relied here on its own view of what “the natural answer of a person genuinely fearing his uncle” would be and thus fell into the error identified at Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 and HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 [27-30]. I disagree. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 2016 at [62]-[63], the Court of Appeal emphasised that decision-makers are “entitled to make findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality”, but not on conjecture or speculation. The FtT’s finding was not based in speculation. The FtT correctly noted that the appellant’s fear of his uncle was at the core of his claim. It was a reasonable exercise of the FtT’s common sense to find, given that context, that it was implausible that he would have said he had been in contact with him if that was not true. It did not involve the FtT imposing assumptions based on the judge’s particular culture and experience.
35. Ground Three is not made out.
Ground Four
36. The appellant submits that the FtT erred because it found that the appellant’s previous asylum claims in Belgium and Germany weighed against him but “did not engage with the evidence — elicited at the hearing through his own clarifying questions — that the basis of those previous claims was the same as the present claim”. There are multiple problems with this submission. In the first place, the FtT did not find the appellant’s credibility damaged by that fact of his previous asylum claims. It found his credibility damaged by his denial of those claims until confronted with fingerprint evidence. The basis of the claims was irrelevant here. Secondly, there is nothing before me to show that the appellant did confirm the basis of his previous claim in his evidence below. The grounds contain an “Evidential note” in which it is asserted that “This ground rests on the hearing record (the advocate’s attendance note of the Judge’s clarifying questions), which is filed in support”. However, as Mr Nadeem conceded, there was no such record before me. The only note of the appellant’s evidence about his German asylum claim before is that contained within the decision. This is that his evidence was “confused” but he maintained that he had said he was Iraqi, and not that he was a Kuwaiti Bidoon.
37. Ground Four is not made out.
Ground Five
38. Mr Nadeem did not pursue Ground Five before me. He was right not do so. There is no record that the appellant’s representative asked for him to be treated as a vulnerable witness, and it appears to be accepted in the grounds that he did not. Nor was the appellant’s mental ill health raised in the skeleton argument below or in the appellant’s appeal statement. The FtT noted the appellant’s explanations in his oral evidence for various credibility concerns that were put to him, and these were based on fear, shame and poor advice, not on mental ill health. Although I recognise that the FtT’s decision does not rehearse the submissions that were made before it, there is nothing to suggest that it was raised in submissions either. The FtT nonetheless considered for itself, at [15], whether the medical evidence could explain the appellant’s inconsistencies. It was reasonably open to it to conclude, given the very limited nature of that evidence, that it did not.
39. Ground Five is not made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal of 1 May 2026 contained no errors of law and is upheld. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026