UI-2026-003203
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003203
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00859/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O'BRIEN
Between
OLUCHI NGOZICHUKWU B NWAOBASI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: In Person
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 21 September 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT), sitting at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 27 February 2026, in which it dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of her human rights claim, made principally on the basis of her relationship with three children.
2. The Appellant, who has represented herself throughout, drafted her own grounds, which can be summarised thus. The FtT failed properly to assess her relationship with her children and the best interests of those children. Permission was given by the FtT in a decision dated 11 June 2026.
3. In its decision, the FtT considered the evidence in some detail. However, it failed to remind itself of the mandatory considerations which must be taken into account by the Tribunal when assessing a human rights claim, which are to be found in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Of particular relevance when an individual is relying on a relationship with a child, and these are British citizen children, section 117B(6) says:
“In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person’s removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b) it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.”
4. Section 117D(1) provides that a qualifying child means a person who is under the age of 18 and who is a British citizen or who has lived in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of seven years or more. The Appellant’s eldest child meets the definition of qualifying child under both of these heads. She is a British citizen who has lived in the United Kingdom for her entire life. She was 10 years old at the date of the hearing. It has not been suggested by the respondent that it would be reasonable for her to leave the United Kingdom.
5. The mere fact that the FtT does not mention a statutory provision is neither here nor there, provided that the FtT has applied the statutory provision.
6. The problem in this case is that the terms “parental responsibility” and “parental relationship” are not necessarily interchangeable. Despite Ms Ahmed’s best efforts, I am afraid I am not persuaded that the FtT has gone very much beyond accepting the legal status of the eldest child as a child for whom the father has parental responsibility. Instead, I find that it has not gone on to consider whether that legal status necessarily displaced the Appellant’s own relationship with the child.
7. Ms Ahmed submitted that it can be inferred from [13], that the Judge had considered and rejected the suggestion that the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with the eldest child. That paragraph reads in full:
‘I note that the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument states that the Appellant is currently in receipt of Universal Credit and that her circumstances are such that she has applied for leave under the Parent route and seeks to have access to her children. Significantly, it is said, that her former partner has provided a letter confirming that the eldest child is a British citizen “and requires the ongoing presence of her mother” (at §20). That, however, falls far short of any suggestion that she plays any role in the life of her children, still less having any parental responsibility for them. I do not accept that in the circumstances, there are compelling family and personal reasons to allow this appeal. I note moreover, that there is an allegation of her having abandoned her children which the Appellant, on the facts before me, has not been able to dislodge. The fact of the matter is that such relationship as she has, or intends to have with her three children, can be maintained from overseas from her country, given the nature of the relationship that has being highlighted in the refusal letter, which she has enjoyed with her three children.’
8. The final sentence of that paragraph acknowledges the possibility of there being a genuine and subsisting parental relationship between the appellant and her children.
9. The key factual issue in this case, which is whether the public interest requires the removal of the Appellant, turns principally on the subsidiary factual issue of whether there is a genuine and subsisting parental relationship between her and her elder child. The FtT has failed to resolve that issue or, alternatively, has failed to give adequate reasons for resolving the issue against the appellant.
10. It follows that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and must be set aside.
11. The error strikes at the heart of the decision and so I am satisfied, in particular given that the Appellant is acting in person, that the matter should go back to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.
Judge O'Brien
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026