Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-003206
UI-2026-003207
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/00540/2025
HU/00541/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

ODUNOLA ESTHER ADEBESHIN
ISRAEL OMOTADE OGOOLUWA OLUWASEYIFU TAWOSE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: No appearance
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge S Taylor, promulgated on 29 April 2026, dismissing their appeals against the respondent’s decisions 19 March 2025 to refuse them leave to remain on human rights grounds.
Background
2. The first appellant is a national of Nigeria born in 1973. Her immigration history is difficult to ascertain from the chronology provided by the respondent in her First-tier Tribunal bundle. For example, it says that she applied for entry clearance as a visitor on 7 February 2020 and that she was issued with a visa on 18 February 2020 valid until 21 March 2021, although it is unusual to see a visit visa issued for 13 months. The respondent’s chronology then says that the first appellant entered the United Kingdom on 27 May 2021, but that cannot be right if the visa expired on 21 March 2021. The chronology provided by the appellants in their skeleton argument merely states that the first appellant entered the United Kingdom in 2021. In any event, the first appellant overstayed and, on 24 May 2024, she applied for leave to remain for compassionate and compelling reasons on the basis of her family life with her daughter, Omotola Tawose Akerele, who is a British citizen born on 4 December 2021.
3. On 12 November 2024, the first appellant applied for leave to remain on behalf of her son, the second appellant, who was born on 26 April of that year. The second appellant is also a Nigerian national.
The respondent’s decisions
4. The respondent refused the appellants’ applications for leave to remain by decisions dated 19 March 2025. In reaching those decisions, the respondent noted that the first appellant had provided no evidence to demonstrate that the children’s fathers played any role in their lives. The respondent further considered that, although both children had lived in the United Kingdom throughout their lives, they remained very young and could reasonably be expected to return to Nigeria, where they would be able to integrate and continue their family life with their mother. As for the first appellant, the respondent observed that she had spent the vast majority of her life in Nigeria and could reasonably be expected to re-establish her private life there upon return. The respondent concluded that the appellants did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules on either family life or private life grounds and that there were no exceptional or compelling circumstances warranting a grant of leave to remain outside the Rules.
5. The appellants were granted rights of appeal against those decisions.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellants requested that their appeals be determined on the papers. In a decision dated 20 December 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Shiner dismissed the appeals. However, that decision was subsequently set aside by Resident Judge Froom on 12 February 2026, apparently because Judge Shiner had been unaware that the appellants had filed documents in support of their appeals. The appeals were then reallocated to Judge Taylor on 20 April 2026 for redetermination.
7. In a decision promulgated on 29 April 2026, Judge Taylor also dismissed the appeals. It is apparent from [8] that Judge Taylor was unaware of the reasons why Judge Shiner’s decision had been set aside. At [9], Judge Taylor stated that the appellants had failed to comply with directions requiring them to file evidence in support of their appeals. At [10], he found that the first appellant was an overstayer and did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. At [11], he found that the first appellant had provided no evidence to explain why it would be unreasonable to expect her British child to leave the United Kingdom. Later in the same paragraph, he observed that the first appellant had failed to explain what she contended were the exceptional or compassionate circumstances of her case. At [12], the judge further found that the first appellant had failed to demonstrate, for the purposes of s.117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”), that it would be unreasonable to expect her British citizen daughter to leave the United Kingdom. He noted that there was very little evidence concerning the daughter’s circumstances in this country. At [14], the judge concluded that the first appellant had failed to establish either that it would be unreasonable for her British citizen daughter to leave the United Kingdom or that there would be very significant obstacles to her reintegration into life in Nigeria. The judge also expressed doubt as to whether the first appellant had established a private life in the United Kingdom at all, given that she had no leave to remain. In any event, he found that little weight could be attached to any private life established at a time when she was unlawfully present in the United Kingdom: see s.117B(4)(a) of the 2002 Act. Judge Taylor further noted that the first appellant had stated (in her application for leave to remain) that she wished to claim benefits, which he considered indicated that she would not be financially independent, contrary to s.117B(3). In conclusion, he found that the public interest favoured the appellants’ removal to Nigeria and that such removal would not interfere with their family life.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellants were granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Ruddick on 14 July 2026. Judge Ruddick referred to the appellants raising only one ground of appeal: that the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal were procedurally unfair because Judge Taylor had erred in finding that they had failed to submit any evidence in support of their appeals.
9. In fact, as Mr Simpson acknowledged, the appellants have raised seven grounds of appeal:
(1) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is tainted by procedural unfairness because the appellants had submitted a skeleton argument in support of their appeals.
(2) The judge failed to give adequate reasons and failed to engage with the skeleton argument.
(3) The judge erred in law by concluding that it was reasonable for the first appellant’s British citizen child to leave the United Kingdom.
(4) The judge failed to properly assess the best interests of the first appellants’ children by failing to consider her children’s lives in the United Kingdom, the implications of removal and the reality of location.
(5) The judge failed to properly assess the first appellant’s daughter’s British citizenship and give it appropriate weight.
(6) The judge came to a legally incorrect conclusion in finding that the appellants’ removal would not interfere with their family life.
(7) The judge came to irrational findings based on an incomplete understanding of the appellants’ case due to his failure to consider their skeleton argument. This included the judge’s findings that the appellants had provided “no explanation” or “reasons” as to why they should not be removed.
The hearing
10. The appellants did not attend the hearing and were not represented. I confirmed that the notice of hearing had been correctly emailed to the first appellant’s email address at 11:27 on 16 September 2026. The first appellant did not provide a telephone number on her appeal form and, consequently, the Tribunal had no way to call her. No application for an adjournment had been made. Taking into account all these factors, including the fact that the appellants asked for their appeals before the First-tier Tribunal to be considered on the papers, which might also explain their failure to attend the hearing before me, I concluded that the appellants had fair notice of the appeal, and that it was in accordance with the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.
11. I therefore heard submissions from Mr Simpson. He submitted that although the appellants’ appeal skeleton argument (“ASA”) may not have been before Judge Taylor, any error arising from that omission was not material. He argued that the substance of the ASA was replicated in the appellants’ grounds of appeal, to which the judge made repeated reference, and that the ASA did not advance any materially different case concerning paragraph EX.1 of Appendix FM to the Rules, the children’s best interests, or the proportionality assessment. He therefore submitted that there was no procedural unfairness because the relevant arguments were nevertheless before the judge. As to the first appellant’s witness statement, Mr Simpson noted that there was no evidence that it had been served on the respondent and that, in any event, it appeared incomplete. It was therefore unlikely that the judge would have attached much weight to it, even if it had been before him. In relation to the remaining grounds, he submitted that the judge had adequately considered the children’s best interests, including the British citizenship of the daughter, and that no material error of law had been established in the judge’s conclusions in respect of their private and family lives in the United Kingdom.
12. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Legal framework
13. Of particular relevance to the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of the appellants’ Article 8 claims was s.117B of the 2002 Act, which prescribes the public interest considerations to be taken into account when assessing whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8:
“117B Article 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases
(1)  The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
(2)  It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b)  are better able to integrate into society.
(3)  It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b)  are better able to integrate into society.
(4)  Little weight should be given to—
(a) a private life, or
(b) a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5)  Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
(6)  In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a) the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b)  it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.”
Discussion
Grounds 1, 2 and 7: Failure to consider the skeleton argument
14. Mr Simpson proceeded on the basis that the appellants had filed their skeleton argument with the First-tier Tribunal before Judge Taylor’s decision. It is not, however, immediately clear that they did so.
15. The key evidence appears to be an email chain at page 51 of the consolidated Upper Tribunal hearing bundle. At the top of the chain is an email, dated 22 June 2026, containing no message, sent from the email address “abbeywood84@outlook.com” (“Abbey Wood”) to the first appellant. Three documents are attached: “Skeleton Argument – Miss Odunola Adebeshin2025.pdf”, “Life Events ID.pdf”, and “SuppDocs1 2.pdf”. Beneath that is an email sent by Abbey Wood to an administrative officer in the First-tier Tribunal Correspondence Team, copied to the Presenting Officers Unit, at 09:40 on 4 December 2025. It reads:
“Dear Sirs,
Please see attached as directed by the Tribunal in relation to the pending appeal. Witness statements to follow momentarily.
Regards,
The Appellant”
16. Abbey Wood’s email is followed by the email to which it was replying, namely an email from the administrative officer sent at 10:24 on 25 November 2025, which appears to have attached directions. Those directions are not before me.
17. The emails to and from the administrative officer do not identify the documents attached to them. Nevertheless, viewing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Abbey Wood’s email of 4 December 2025 attached the skeleton argument together with the “Life Events ID” and “SuppDocs1 2” documents. As I explain below, however, there is no evidence before me that the witness statements (in fact, it appears to have been a single witness statement) were subsequently served on the First-tier Tribunal.
18. (I should pause to note that it is unclear who “Abbey Wood” is. I assume that is a reference to the area of London rather than being a person’s name. The grounds of appeal do not explain who sent the email. It is reasonably clear that Abbey Wood is not the first appellant, because she has a separate email address and Abbey Wood evidently had to email her copies of the documents that had been served on the First-tier Tribunal on her behalf. One may therefore infer that Abbey Wood was assisting the appellants with their appeals. As there is no indication that Abbey Wood was an authorised provider of immigration services, it is to be hoped that he or she was neither providing immigration advice nor charging for any assistance given to the appellants.)
19. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that Judge Taylor was mistaken in stating at [11] that the appellants had failed to provide an ASA. The question is whether that mistake resulted in any unfairness. Mr Simpson submitted that it did not because the ASA advanced substantially the same matters as those raised in the appellants’ grounds of appeal, which appear at page 235 of the Upper Tribunal bundle. Those grounds contend that the respondent’s decisions: (i) were not in accordance with the Immigration Rules; (ii) unlawfully discriminated against the appellants; (iii) were incompatible with the appellants’ Article 8 rights; (iv) were not in accordance with the law, in particular s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and s.82 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022; and (v) were flawed because the respondent ought to have exercised her discretion differently under Appendix FM.
20. The ASA, by contrast, identifies three principal issues for determination: (i) whether the respondent failed to treat the best interests of the first appellant’s children as a primary consideration; (ii) whether the decisions constituted a disproportionate interference with the first appellant’s and her children’s right to respect for family life under Article 8; and (iii) whether there were compelling compassionate circumstances justifying a grant of leave outside the Rules. Those matters are then repackaged as four grounds which are drafted more in the style of a judicial review challenge than a statutory appeal, where the Tribunal’s task is to determine for itself whether the decisions were lawful and compatible with the appellants’ ECHR rights.
21. In substance, therefore, the ASA refined the original grounds of appeal. Having read Judge Taylor’s decision, I am satisfied that he addressed each of the core issues raised in the ASA, because he addressed the matters raised in the grounds of appeal. In particular, he concluded that it was in the children’s best interests to return to Nigeria with the first appellant, that there would be no interference with family life because the family would remain together, and that any interference with private life would be proportionate: see [9]-[14].
22. Moreover, although the ASA is more detailed than the grounds of appeal, it adds little of real substance. Some points are plainly misconceived. For example, paragraph 15 criticises the respondent for failing to consider the consequences of separating the children from their mother, notwithstanding that the respondent had found that they could return to Nigeria together. The ASA also contains references to well-known legal principles, such as the framework set out in Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27, and advances matters falling outside the scope of the Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction, including complaints about the respondent’s exercise of discretion outside the Rules and allegations that the respondent unreasonably failed properly to evaluate the documentary evidence.
23. In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that any unfairness arose from Judge Taylor determining the appeal without sight of the ASA. He was aware of the grounds upon which the appellants challenged the respondent’s decisions; he addressed the central issues identified in the ASA; and the ASA contained nothing which, on balance, would realistically have led him to reach a different conclusion on the facts.
Grounds 3 to 5: Assessment of the first appellant’s children
24. I deal with these grounds together because they all challenge findings made by Judge Taylor in relation to the first appellant’s two children.
25. As already explained, in refusing the first appellant leave to remain, the respondent noted that no evidence had been provided to show that either child’s father played any role in their lives. It is apparent from the material before me that no such evidence was provided to the First-tier Tribunal either. Indeed, the evidence appears to have been that the fathers played no role in the children’s lives: see [13].
26. At [11], Judge Taylor found that the first appellant had not provided any evidence to show either that it would be unreasonable for her British citizen daughter to leave the United Kingdom or that it would be contrary to her best interests to do so. Although the judge accepted that the daughter was a “qualifying child” within the meaning of s.117D(1) of the 2002 Act, he was correct to recognise that, for the purposes of s.117B(6), the first appellant was still required to demonstrate that it would not be reasonable to expect her daughter to leave the United Kingdom. Given the limited evidence regarding the daughter’s circumstances, it was inevitable that the judge would conclude that the first appellant had failed to establish that s.117B(6)(b) was engaged: see [12]. Contrary to what is asserted in the grounds of appeal, the judge did not take into account the first appellant’s immigration history and status when considering whether s.117B(6)(b) was engaged.
27. Furthermore, as the judge applied the correct statutory test when considering whether a British citizen child could reasonably be expected to leave the United Kingdom with a non-British parent, there is little merit in the appellants’ contention that he failed to give appropriate weight to the daughter’s British citizenship as part of the Article 8 assessment.
28. Finally, it is clear that Judge Taylor treated the children’s best interests as a primary consideration: see [10], [11] and [14]. It is trite that the best interests of the child are not a trump card capable of outweighing all other considerations. Given their young ages, the fact that their fathers played no role in their lives, and the limited evidence concerning their private life ties to the United Kingdom, the judge was plainly entitled to conclude that their best interests lay in remaining with their mother and accompanying her to Nigeria.
Ground 6: Interference with family life
29. I can deal with this ground briefly. Having found that the first appellant could return to Nigeria with her two children, it inevitably followed that there would be no interference with their family life as a unit. Nor was it argued on behalf of the appellants that either the first appellant or the children enjoyed family life with any other person in the United Kingdom, including either of the children’s fathers.
The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal
30. Although none of the seven grounds of appeal expressly alleges that Judge Taylor failed to consider evidence filed by the appellants, this was the basis upon which Judge Ruddick granted permission to appeal. I therefore address the issue briefly.
31. As explained earlier in this decision, although Mr Simpson confirmed that a witness statement was served on the Presenting Officers Unit, there is no evidence that the appellants filed it with the First-tier Tribunal. Nevertheless, Mr Simpson submitted, and I accept, that even if the witness statement had been before Judge Taylor, it is unlikely that it would have affected the outcome of the appeal. As Mr Simpson pointed out, the witness statement, which appears at page 79 of the consolidated Upper Tribunal bundle, is incomplete. It appears to have been prepared by Abbey Wood and is evidently based on a template, as demonstrated by the numerous incomplete square-bracketed sections directing the first appellant to provide information such as her address, her children’s initials and dates of birth, her nationality, and information concerning the children’s fathers. The statement contains only broad and general assertions regarding the first appellant’s private life and support network in the United Kingdom and the circumstances of her children. It is plainly a document to which a judge, properly directing themself, could attach little weight. In any event, most of the matters raised in the witness statement were already accepted by the respondent or were apparent from the existing evidence before the judge (for example, that the first appellant’s daughter is British and that the first appellant has sole responsibility for her).
32. As for the documentary evidence, it is impossible to know precisely what was contained within the files entitled “Life Events ID.pdf” and “SuppDocs1 2.pdf”. However, the documents before me include a letter of support from the first appellant’s church describing her as a “reliable and dependable person” and “a vital member of our church community”; NHS correspondence from 2023 inviting her to attend appointments relating to her pregnancy; the children’s birth certificates; a letter dated 5 October 2022 inviting the first appellant to bring her daughter to her first developmental review; a letter from the appellants’ GP confirming their registration with the practice; and copies of the passports of the first appellant and her daughter. As Mr Simpson submitted, a number of these documents were already contained within the respondent’s bundle before the First-tier Tribunal. In any event, whether considered individually or collectively, they fall well short of establishing that it would be disproportionate to expect the first appellant to return to Nigeria with her children.
33. It is therefore unclear whether Judge Taylor made no express reference to these documents because he regarded them as having little probative value in relation to the issues before him, or because he had not seen them. In either event, the documents were plainly incapable of altering the outcome of the appeals by demonstrating that the appellants met the requirements for success under Article 8.
Conclusion
34. For the reasons given above, none of the grounds of appeal are made out. Judge Taylor was entitled to dismiss the appellants’ appeals for the reasons that he gave.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law. Accordingly, that decision shall stand.
The appellants’ appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13th October 2026