Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-003210
[PA/68286/2023, LP/12376/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

[L S]
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 27 August 2026

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Mannon, Counsel
(instructed by MBM Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Ms A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appealed with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan on 26 June 2026 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge L K Gibbs who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of her Article 8 ECHR private and family life claim. The decision and reasons was promulgated on 3 December 2025.
2. The Appellant is a national of The Philippines, born on 4 October 1989. The Appellant left The Philippines on 27 August 2018, entered the United Kingdom on a visit visa and remained without leave. She claimed asylum on 26 October 2020, which was refused on 7 December 2023. At the First-tier Tribunal appeal hearing counsel informed the Judge that the Appellant was no longer pursuing her protection claim. The appeal was entirely based on Article 8 ECHR. The Appellant has a five year old son, born in the United Kingdom to an Albanian asylum seeker with whom she is in a relationship.
3. After reviewing the evidence the Appellant presented, Judge Gibbs reached the following findings:
“7. It is not disputed that the Appellant has established private and family life in the United Kingdom. The question for me therefore is whether the decision to remove her is disproportionate and will result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her, her son or her partner.

Best interests of the child
8. In my assessment of the issue of proportionality I remind myself that the best interests of the appellant’s son are a primary consideration for me, although they are not determinative.
9. He is five years of age. He was born in the UK. The evidence before me is that since birth he has lived with both parents. I am satisfied that as a matter of common sense it is in the child’s best interests to continue to live in this family unit. Whether it needs to be in the United Kingdom however is not as clear cut.
10. I find that whilst the appellant[‘s son] was born in the United Kingdom he is very young, and therefore adaptable. He has just started Year 1 at primary school and is likely to have made friends, but not established strong social ties given his age. Equally with regards to cultural ties I find that he is being brought up in a dual national household, and that given his young age his attention is more firmly placed on his family unit rather than the country in which he is living. Moving to either the Philippines or Albani[a] will also enable him to build contact with his extended family. Balanced against this however is the evidence before me that the appellant’s son requires additional support in support and that this is in place for him at his primary school. I also accept that he will not speak a high level of Tagalog or Albanian given that the first language in the home is English.
11. Taking the evidence as a whole I find that the best interests of the appellant’s son are met by remaining in his current family unit. This is far more important to him than the country in which he lives in my view and I am satisfied that his best interests do not require that this unit remains in the UK.
12. The appellant no longer claims to be at risk on return to the Philippines. She accepts that she has parents, a sister and nephews /nieces in the country. The appellant also accepted in cross examination that English is spoken in The Philippines and her son could attend school there. The reason that she wants to be able to remain in the United Kingdom is because this will be better for her son, and she can’t imagine starting from scratch. I am not however satisfied that this is a fair reflection of the situation awaiting the appellant on her return. I am satisfied that she has lived for the majority of her life in the Philippines and has family who can assist her on return. There is no reason that she will not be able to find work, and equally her partner can accompany her and their son to continue their family life there.
13. It is clear to me that the appellant wants her son to be able to remain in the UK because she believes that his life will be better here rather than in The Philippines or Albania. Her partner believes the same. I understand that. However, I am not persuaded that there is evidence that this would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences. Even the Independent Social Worker report does not make this claim, stating only that the appellant’s son “will meet his best potential with his development and education, whilst he is in the care of both of his parents in the UK, whilst also attending his current school.”
14. I must place significant weight on the appellant’s failure to meet the Immigration Rules as weighing in the public interest in her removal. I also find that she has sought to evade immigration control by waiting two years to claim asylum and her decision to abandon this claim at the appeal hearing makes me doubt the honesty of this claim in the first place. Although the appellant speaks English and is not claiming public funds these are at most neutral factors. She established her private life and her relationship with her partner whilst she was at best of precarious immigration status, as was he. Further, the appellant’s son is not a qualifying child.
15. I am satisfied that there is significant public weight in maintaining immigration control and consequently I am satisfied that the appellant’s removal is proportionate.”
4. Judge O’Callaghan’s grant of permission to appeal was in the following terms:
“1. The appellant seeks permission to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her human rights (article 8 ECHR) appeal. She withdrew her protection appeal at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. Though a matter for the Judge at the error of law hearing, I consider the independent social worker report to be unhelpful. It regular engages in speculation. I note there was no critical engagement with assertions made by the appellant, for example, “I could never get support in The Philippines”, though she has family at home.
3. Two grounds of appeal are advanced: (i) a lack of adequate reasoning, and (ii) a failure to weigh evidence in the round.
4. This is a matter where the First-tier Tribunal may well have been aided by noting the guidance in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) and requiring the parties to define and narrow the issues in dispute at the outset of the hearing. The parties’ position as to the parents relocating to Albania or The Philippines could have usefully been recorded at the outset.
5. Being mindful of the applicable test, I conclude that both grounds are arguable. Ultimately, it is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal did not adequately consider matters in favour of the appellant thereby adversely impacting its proportionality assessment.
6. However, the appellant should be aware that she is required to establish materiality at the error of law hearing.
7. The partner’s position, as advanced by his witness statement dated 20 April 2025, is that he cannot relocate to The Philippines, a country that is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. He provides no reason as to why he cannot relocate and nor does the ASA dated 14 May 2024. The First-tier Tribunal decision does not record any reason being provided. No provision under Filipino law was identified by the appellant as prohibiting her partner from joining her in The Philippines as her partner and the father of her child, a Filipino citizen. Nor was there any identification of Filipino law preventing her partner from working in the country. As there was no reliance on adverse foreign law proved by expert evidence filed in this matter, the First-tier Tribunal, and this Tribunal, can properly proceed on the basis of their being no relevant legislative bar: Hussein (Status of Passports: Foreign Law: Tanzania) [2020] UKUT 250 (IAC).
8. The same evidential difficulty may ultimately arise when considering materiality in respect of the provision of child development care in The Philippines. The speculation by the independent social worker in the section of the report cited at para. 7 of the grounds of appeal may be suggestive that she is not expert on such provision: Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 6, at [43]-[44].
9. As it is addressed in both the partner’s witness statement and the independent social work report relied upon by the appellant, I note the references to the appellant’s partner working six days a week as a builder in circumstances where he is, on his own evidence, seeking asylum in this country and no evidence appears to have been filed confirming his lawful ability to work in this country.”
5. The Respondent filed a rule 24 notice dated 13 July 2026 which opposed the appeal on all grounds raised:
“As to ground 1, although the judge’s reasons at [10] are brief, she described factors which favour his living in The Philippines or Albania such as access to his extended family and the ability of his parents to call on those relatives for support. She acknowledged that the appellant’s son receives additional educational support and an inference can be drawn that this either will not be available in The Philippines or will not be available to the same standard. Whilst she does not use the word reasonable, it is clear she has undertaken a reasonableness analysis, balancing the factors which weigh for and against removal. The complaint is one of form rather than one of substance. At [11] the judge found that the appellant’s child’s best interests are served by remaining in the existing family unit. The child’s focus is likely to be his immediate family, and his best interest do not require that the unit remains in the UK. Repeated reference was made in the grounds to the child’s additional development needs and the difficulty replicating existing educational and developmental support available to the child in the UK.
6. “It is clear from the judge’s reasoning that she has informed herself about the possible risk to the child’s best interests. The alleged error relates to the brevity of the judge’s consideration of the detail of the independent social worker report. This is an attempt to paint the appellant’s son’s circumstances in the bleakest light possible. By suggesting that the evidence about the child’s educational needs has not been properly considered, the grounds attempt to relitigate the case below and argue for a different outcome. The possibility of a different court reaching a different decision on the same facts does not demonstrate an error of law. There was no suggestion in the section quoted from the independent social worker report that there would be a complete absence of support for the appellant’s son. That he will have less support available to him in the UK and that it would be to his advantage to remain here does not demonstrate his best interests will be compromised to such an extent that there would be a disproportionate breach of Article 8.”
Submissions
7. Mr Mannan for the Appellant joined the appeal via a CVP link which functioned adequately. Counsel relied on the grounds of appeal for which permission to appeal had been granted. The key issue in the appeal, following withdrawal of the asylum claim, was the best interests of the Appellant’s son. This had not been addressed adequately by the Judge. The Judge had failed to consider the supplementary bundle and had not dealt with the substance of the independent social worker’s report. (Counsel read extracts from the report.) This was the first ground of appeal, lack of adequate reasoning.
8. Referring to the second ground, failure to deal with evidence in the round, counsel submitted that the Judge should have made a clear finding of where the best interests of the child indicated he should live. The Judge had not done so. The decision was deficient and should be set aside. The appeal should be reheard before another First-tier Tribunal Judge.
9. Ms Nolan for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 notice (see above) and submitted that there was no material error of law, merely disagreement with a decision properly open to the Judge. As to ground 1, the best interests of the child had been adequately considered and proper reasons given. Ground 2 had no substance. It was obvious that the Appellant, and her son could return to The Philippines, and that her partner could accompany them. The Judge had referred to the independent social worker’s report. The decision should be read as a whole. There was no error of law and the appeal should be dismissed.
10. In reply Mr Mannan reiterated the points he made earlier. The child’s best interests were served by remaining in the United Kingdom. The Judge had conflated best interests of the child with family togetherness, which was an error of law. Relocation to The Philippines was not in the child’s best interests.
No material error of law finding
11. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by any of the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellant. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision amount to no more than disagreement with properly reasoned decision of an experienced judge.
12. It has to be said that on its face this was never a promising Article 8 ECHR appeal. As Judge Gibbs recorded, a wholly misconceived if not hopeless asylum appeal was pursued by the Appellant to the doors of the court. It was only withdrawn at the start of the hearing. The bulk of the evidence served on the Appellant’s behalf related to the asylum appeal, wasting the Tribunal’s time and causing wasted preparation for the Respondent. The Appellant’s skeleton argument devoted just one paragraph (see [20]) to the child’s best interests. Complaining that the Judge’s decision was in effect superficial hardly reflects the manner in which the Article 8 ECHR appeal was presented, which fell far short of complying with the overriding objective of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2008 and the President’s 2024 Practice Direction.
13. It also has to be said that the lengthy grant of permission to appeal is difficult to follow. It points out a number of serious deficiencies in the evidence for the appeal, and can only be described as a lukewarm grant. The basis on which permission to appeal was granted is expressed in general if not somewhat vague terms.
14. The focus of the Appellant’s revised case, as Mr Mannan accepted, was the best interests of the Appellant’s young son. In effect Mr Mannan sought to reopen and reargue the case, impermissibly, although the Tribunal indulged the exercise because the result served to underline the fact that the Judge’s decision took all relevant matters into account and provided clear and concise reasons which were open to her on the evidence. The extract from the Judge’s decision set out above shows that the Judge had considered the supplementary bundle. It was no part of the Judge’s function to decide where the Appellant’s son should live, since it was not in dispute that he should continue to live with his mother. It was for the mother to decide whether he should live in The Philippines where she has the right to reside, or in Albania if her Albanian partner could obtain permission for her to reside there. (No evidence to the contrary was produced.)
15. The Judge explained why access to the United Kingdom’s educational system for the Appellant’s son was not a trump card: see ZH (Tanzania) [2011] UKSC 4. The Judge carefully balanced the private interest against the public interest. Her conclusion in favour of the public interest was hardly surprising, given the poor immigration history of the Appellant and the absence of settled status of her partner. There was no information about his asylum claim.
16. The Tribunal accepts Ms Nolan’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent, and agrees with the rule 24 notice. There was no flaw in the Judge’s assessment of proportionality and the very experienced Judge’s concise, well-focussed and balanced findings were open to her.
17. The Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged. The onwards appeal is dismissed. The anonymity direction is maintained.
The Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant without her express consent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed
The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 3 September 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell