Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003225
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52005/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

RK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Faryl, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 13 March 2026 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 02 October 2024 to refuse his asylum protection claim.

Background

2. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He claims to be a bisexual man and claims that he had a relationship with a man in Iraq and that this relationship was discovered by his family in Iraq. He left Iraq by plane to Turkey on 05 September 2021, then travelled through Greece and France. He entered the United Kingdom on 18 September 2024 and claimed asylum.

The Respondent’s decision
3. In a decision dated 02 October 2024 the respondent refused the protection claim and human rights claim.
4. The respondent considered the evidence and did not accept that the appellant was bisexual or that he had had a relationship with a man in Iraq or that he has suffered persecution as a result of his claimed bisexuality. The key parts of his claim were not accepted and therefore it was not accepted that he had a well founded fear of persecution in Iraq.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed and the appeal came before the Judge for full hearing on 12 March 2026. The appellant was represented by Mr Rashid of Counsel and the respondent was represented by Mrs Zahib, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter and he was cross-examined.
6. The First-Tier tribunal dismissed the appeal. At paragraph 18 of the First Tier decision, the Judge confirmed that there were aspects of the appellant’s claim which he found to be unreliable and therefore that he did not accept that he was bisexual as he claims. At paragraphs 19 – 31, the Judge sets out multiple reasons why he did not find the appellant’s account to be credible and at paragraph 32 the Judge confirms that when he looks at matters in the round, that the concerns raised in his decision significantly undermine the appellant’s claim to be bisexual. The Judge rejects that he is bisexual as claimed whether this is considered on the balance of probabilities or on whether there is a reasonable likelihood of him being a bisexual man.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on two grounds, (1) error in making ‘superficial and erroneous findings’ and in relying upon ‘stereotypical assumptions regarding the expression of sexual orientation’ and (2) failure to take into consideration any country reports or objective material in assessing the appeal.
8. In May 2026, the First-tier refused permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The appellant made an out of time application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. On 06 July 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst extended time for the application and granted permission to appeal on both grounds.
The UT appeal hearing
9. At the hearing on 15 September 2026 there was no composite bundle and Ms Faryl had not been provided with the grounds of appeal or with decision under appeal by her solicitor. I emailed all of the relevant documents to Ms Faryl and we adjourned for a short period for Ms Faryl to consider the documents and to prepare her submissions. On reconvening, Ms Faryl was in a position to proceed with the appeal hearing.
10. I heard submissions from Ms Faryl for the appellant and Ms Lecointe, a senior Presenting Officer for the respondent. I have not set these out in full but have referred to them below in making my decision.
11. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
12. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, it is helpful to remind myself of the principles set out within the case law and in particular at paragraph 26 of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. I remind myself that the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal and that where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account. Further, when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out, as recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51].
13. Further, I remind myself that an appeal court should assume, unless it detects an express or implicit misdirection of law, that the specialist tribunal knows and has applied the relevant law as set out in Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
Ground 2
14. Ms Faryl accepted in her submissions that Ground 2 could not be made out. I asked Ms Faryl to take me to any part of the decision wherein it is arguable that the Judge was not aware of the risk to homosexuals in Iraq or had not had consideration of the objective evidence concerning treatment of LGBTQ individuals in Iraq as I had not been able to identify where Ground 2 related to. Ms Faryl accepted that there was nothing within the decision to demonstrate a failure to take into consideration any objective evidence as claimed in Ground 2. At paragraph 9 of the decision, the Judge notes that the respondent accepted that the appellant could not obtain adequate protection in Iraq if the material facts of his claim were to be made out and Ms Faryl accepted that this was determinative of the issue regarding risk to homosexuals in Iraq. Further, on reading the decision as a whole, I do not accept the appellant has shown that any of the findings made were on the basis of not taking into consideration the country reports or objective material.
Ground 1
15. I have considered with care the submissions made by Ms Faryl with regards to Ground 1 but I am not satisfied that the Ground relating to an error of law in making erroneous findings or relying upon stereotypical assumptions has been made out.
16. At paragraph 22 of the decision, the Judge found;
“Whilst I acknowledge that the appellant would not be able to control his feelings or who is in, in light of the appellant's own belief that he could be killed for being bisexual, I find it implausible that the appellant would wear clothes in the way that he describes, and which, on his own account did suggest that he was gay/bisexual because of the insults he received.”
This paragraph must not be read in isolation and I find that it is a concluding paragraph to paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 wherein the Judge refers to the appellant’s own evidence during his interviews and in his witness statement as to him dressing differently to other men in Iraq, wearing tight or fitted clothes and that people would call him, amongst other things, a homosexual because of the clothes he wore.
17. I find that paragraph 22 is not the Judge applying any stereotypical assumptions regarding the expression of sexual orientation but is the Judge’s assessment of the credibility/reliability of the appellant’s own account of wearing clothes in the way he had described in light of his own belief that he could be killed for being bisexual and in light of his own evidence of the insults that he had received because of the clothes that he wore. The Judge was entitled to assess the evidence regarding the clothing in light of the appellant’s evidence regarding his belief of the dangers of being bisexual and whether it is likely that he did indeed wear such clothing if he been called a homosexual or insulted which was the appellant’s evidence. On carrying out the assessment it is clear that the Judge did not find his account plausible and clear reasons are provided.
18. Paragraph 22 does not make findings as to whether ripped jeans are objectively indicative of homosexuality as referred to within the grounds of appeal. It is not clear as to what stereotypical assumptions are alleged as there are no such findings about clothing per se but rather paragraph 22 is an assessment of the appellant’s own account in light of his own evidence about the reaction of others to his claimed clothing. I find that there is no error of law in the finding of implausibility of the appellant’s account which was clearly reasoned and based on an assessment of the appellant’s own account and evidence rather than any claimed stereotypical assumptions.
19. In any event, even if there were an error of law in the findings at paragraph 22 (which I do not accept have been proved), it would not be a material error of law. Paragraphs 23-31 set out multiple other well-reasoned findings as to why the appellant’s account of being bisexual was not accepted by the Judge. Given the extent of the other reasons provided as to why his claim to be bisexual was not accepted (of which there is no challenge by the appellant by way of appeal to the UT), I am not able to find that any claimed erroneous findings at paragraph 22 would have made a material difference to the decision or that any such claimed error was a material error. At paragraph 32 the Judge makes clear that he has considered all of the matters in the round and on doing so he did not accept that he is a bisexual man whether on the balance of probabilities or on the test of there being a reasonable likelihood of him being bisexual. This was an assessment for the Judge to make and clear detailed reasons have been provided as to why the evidence was not accepted as demonstrating that the appellant was bisexual as he claimed.
20. I am not satisfied that there is any proved material error of law within paragraph 22 of the decision or in the assessment of the evidence carried out by the Judge.
21. I am satisfied that Grounds 1 and 2 are no more than a disagreement with the decision made by the Judge relating to the assessment of the protection claim.
22. Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld.

Judge Rodger

Judge Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 17 September 2026