Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003232
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57418/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

NUR IKAR AWEYS
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R de Mello, instructed by Kingswood Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The hearing was conducted by CVP pursuant to a notice of hearing dated 18 August 2026. There were no issues with the parties’ connections.

2. The relevant documents were confirmed to be those contained in the composite bundle. In addition, the Appellant sought to rely on a witness statement dated 17 September 2026. This had not been seen by Mr Tan. On receipt of the statement, he raised no objection to the statement being taken into account. The purpose of the statement was said to be to clarify aspects of the chronology prior to the Appellant coming to the UK. Mr Tan confirmed that no issue was taken in relation to that chronology, and in those circumstances, the statement has been admitted.

3. The Appellant was born on 15 January 1996. He is a citizen of Somalia. He came to the UK
in February 2013, aged 17 with leave to enter. He made a subsequent in-country application and then an asylum application, both of which were refused and his appeals against refusal were dismissed.

4. The Appellant then made an application for leave to remain on the basis of his private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) on 6 October 2022.

5. This was refused by letter dated 10 June 2024. The Respondent stated that the Appellant does not qualify for leave to remain under the appendix PL to the Immigration Rules of for leave outside the Immigration Rules on the basis of exceptional circumstances.

6. An appeal came before First tier Tribunal Judge Parkes (“the Judge”) sitting at Birmingham on 7 April 2026.

7. The appellant’s witness statement before the Judge is dated 2 April 2026. At [20-22] of the statement the Appellant sets out his case as to why it would be impossible for him to leave the UK without facing significant hardship. He makes reference to the fact that he had never lived in Somalia as an adult, and the lack of support networks for him there in terms of accommodation, finance and emotional support. He also sets out his fears about instability and security concerns in Somalia.

8. The appeal was dismissed by a decision dated 28 April 2026.

9. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce on 8 July 2026. This hearing is to determine whether there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

10. There is no challenge to the Judge’s statement of the issues to be determined contained in [2] – [4] of the decision. The grounds of appeal relate to the Judge’s application and analysis of the criteria.

The grounds of appeal

11. Ground 1 asserts that the Judge erred in failing to “lead” further evidence from the Appellant as to relocation being a realistic or safe option. The thrust of this ground of appeal, as amplified in oral submissions, is that the Appellant had advanced in his witness evidence the basis for his subjective view that relocation to Somalia would entail significant risk and hardship. Mr de Mello oral submission was that, “thin as it was”, the Judge was required to deal with the issues advanced by the Appellant as to hardship and had not done so. This ground was amplified in oral submissions on the basis that [17] of the Judge’s decision shows a lack of anxious scrutiny when looked at in the context of the Appellants deep anxiety about return, recorded at [16]. It is argued that the Judge should have asked about hardship, capacity to cope and participate in life and ability to operate on day-to-day basis, as well as about his resources to build in a reasonable timeframe ordinary human relationship, and that none of that analysis was undertaken.

12. There is overlap between this ground and the reasons challenge contained in Ground 4.

13. Within Ground 1, at paragraph 17 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, it is asserted that “If the learned judge was concerned that relocation was permissible and that this was relevant, he should have invited the appellant and his representative to provide further documentary or oral evidence on that”. Mr de Mello, properly in my view, did not pursue that point, accepting that there is no analysis of the information that the Judge should have directed, and without which it was an alleged error of law to proceed.

14. There is no ground 2.

15. Ground 3 is a reasons challenge, alleging that there was inadequacy of reasoning.

16. Ground 4 alleges that the Judge’s decision was wrong.

Analysis

17. In relation to Ground 1, I am not satisfied that there was an error of law on the basis of the Judge’s failure to “lead” or to direct further evidence from the Appellant regarding the perceived hardship he would experience on relocation to Somalia. The burden of proof lies with the Appellant, who is required to adduce the evidence upon which he proposes to rely. The Judge is not required to identify or propose means to address evidential deficits. The Appellant relies on the authority of Cao v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] UKSC 32. That case primarily concerns duties upon the First-tier Tribunal as the result of s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigraton Act 2009 “duty regarding the welfare of children”. Paragraph 46 of the judgment states that:

If in the course of an appeal it finds that it does not have the information necessary to do that properly [determine the best interests of the child], it is required to exercise its powers under rule 4(3)(d) to ensure that additional material bearing on that question is obtained and brought before it.

18. The principle that there may be some scope for an inquisitorial approach may not be limited to cases involving children, noting that para.46 states that, “powers to take on an inquisitorial role to some degree and acquire further information where that is appropriate” are “…likely to be particularly apt when considering the interests of children” (but not necessarily limited to such cases). However, there is an important qualification at para.47:

Having said this, however, where an appeal is brought to the FTT, as here, by a parent seeking to rely on the best interests of their child in order to say that the child’s removal from the United Kingdom would be in breach of their Convention rights, the burden is on the appellant to make good that case and in ordinary circumstances the FTT will be entitled to assume that the parent has adduced all the relevant evidence which is sought to be relied upon which bears on that issue. It is not incumbent on the FTT to cast about, or to order inquiries to be made, to see whether any evidence has been omitted or overlooked. That is especially so where the parent and child are represented by a lawyer, as the respondent was in this case. [my emphasis].

19. The Appellant was represented by solicitors. The burden was upon him to make good his case. The Judge accepted that, subjectively, the Appellant was “deeply apprehensive” [16] about return. The Appellant’s argument under this ground is in reality that the Judge should have directed evidence (it is unclear what evidence) to show the objective foundation for that subjective apprehension.

20. I do not consider there to be an error of law on the basis of the Judge having failed to adopt a more inquisitorial role, or to direct further evidence about the impact upon the Appellant of relocation to Somalia.

21. Ground 3 concerns the adequacy of the Judge’s reasons. The grant of permission to appeal is somewhat supportive of this ground, noting it to be arguable that the Judge should have addressed in greater detail what practical obstacles the Appellant might face in trying to re-establish himself in Somalia within a reasonable time scale.

22. The Judge’s reasoning can be found at [9-11] and [15-17]. The argument on the Appellant’s behalf is that there is insufficient reasoning.

23. The adequacy of reasoning is to considered in the context of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (at paragraph 2) which states that:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

24. The Appellant’s submission is summarised as being that the Appellant’s account of why there were very significant obstacles to reintegration, and why it would be would be disproportionate to require him to relocate, required more by way of reasoning to address it.

25. On analysis, the Appellant’s account is limited to the account contained in his witness statement of 2 April 2026, and in relation to the hardship he would experience in Somalia, para. 20 of that statement. There is no challenge to the Judge’s approach to the required analysis being that set out in Ackom [2025] UKCA Civ 537.

26. The Judge’s reasoning addresses the issues the Appellant raised, looked at from the perspective of a broad evaluation of all relevant circumstances, and having regard to the Volpi principles (above). In addition to acknowledging the Appellant’s deep apprehension, the Judge took into account the time he has spent in the UK, and the basis upon which he came to the UK, his language abilities, his having previously relocated (to Ethiopia, and to the UK), his qualifications, his ability to keep out of trouble despite disadvantages, the limited contact he has with his brothers, and the fact that the concerns he held about security and stability in Somalia have been overtaken by events, and in any event were considered in the course of his unsuccessful asylum claim. These are all referenced in the decision and can be seen to have informed the conclusion.

27. I do not consider the reasoning to be inadequate when looking at the decision as a whole. The Appellant’s account of his reasons for being apprehensive was acknowledged by Mr de Mello to be “thin” and against that backdrop, the Judge’s reasoning is sufficient. There is no material error of law in relation to the reasons given for the decision.

28. Ground 4 does not identify an error of law but amounts to a disagreement with the decision of the Judge. I am not satisfied that the Judge was “plainly wrong” so as to warrant interference with the Judge’s role as primary fact finder.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 September 2026