Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003239
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52553/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

R O
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms F Shaw, instructed by Kreston Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms K Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Turkey born in 1984. She appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Tozzi (the judge) dated 3 April 2026 dismissing her appeal against the refusal of her protection claim on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
2. The appellant entered the UK on 23 June 2023 and claimed asylum. Her application was refused on 10 January 2025 because the respondent did not accept that the appellant was Kurdish or that she was wanted by the authorities due to her political activities on behalf of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP).
3. It is the appellant’s case that she is Kurdish and a supporter of the HDP. She was detained twice, in March and May 2023, for two days on each occasion. She was accused of being a PKK sympathiser. After her release from detention, she came to the UK travelling by lorry and by boat. The appellant married a British citizen in April 2024.
Judge’s decision
4. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), the judge concluded the appellant was not to be treated as a vulnerable witness. The judge found that the appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity but she did not accept the appellant faced discrimination in Turkey because of her ethnicity. The appellant had not encountered any problems with the authorities before her claimed detention in 2023.
5. The judge found there were significant inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and she was not a credible witness. She gave a different account in her substantive interview (AIR) to that in her screening interview (AIR) and she provided limited and inconsistent detail about her activities for the HDP. The judge found that there was no expert report to support the appellant’s claim to have suffered psychological distress and found that her recall of events was not impaired by reasons of her mental health.
6. The judge concluded that the appellant had failed to establish she was a supporter of the HDP or that she would be perceived to be a supporter of the PKK. The judge did not accept the appellant had been detained or that she was of interest to the authorities. In the alternative, the judge considered the risk factors in IA (Risk-Guidelines-Separatists) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034 and concluded that the appellant’s profile is such that she would not be of interest to the authorities on return. The judge found the appellant’s removal would not breach Article 8.
Grant of permission
7. Permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins on 1 July 2026 on the grounds that it was arguable the judge erred in law in failing to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness which was relevant to the judge’s credibility assessment; failing to appreciate the background evidence about the changing name of the HDP in assessing the appellant’s credibility; failing to consider the risk factors in IK (Returnees-Records-IFK) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312; failing to give adequate reasons; and failing to consider the best interests of the children. Permission was also granted on the ground that the judge’s finding on proportionality was irrational.
Submissions
8. Ms Shaw relied on the grounds and submitted there was evidence before the judge that the appellant had been referred for counselling in August 2024, she had two recent miscarriages, she raised mental health issues in her AIR and she described her traumatic journey to the UK. The appellant was cross-examined at length and referenced her poor mental health in answer to her first four questions. The judge failed to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 on vulnerable witnesses (Guidance Note). Ms Shaw submitted the judge’s credibility findings were unsafe because the judge had failed to take into account the appellant’s vulnerability.
9. Ms Shaw submitted the appellant would be identified as a Kurd on return and the evidence in the three CPIN’s demonstrated that this was sufficient to put her at risk because she would be perceived to have links with the HDP and PKK. The appellant would be returning as a failed asylum seeker on an emergency travel document. It was apparent from IK that she would be questioned and she could not be expected to lie about her sur place activities in the UK. Her Kurdish ethnicity in and of itself was sufficient to put her at risk.
10. Ms Shaw submitted that the judge failed to consider the evidence in the CPIN that the BDP had changed its name to the HDP in concluding at [26] that the appellant’s evidence of her involvement with the HDP was not credible.
11. Ms Khan relied on the rule 24 response and submitted the judge noted all of the evidence relied on by the appellant of her vulnerability and made allowances when assessing her evidence. There was no medical evidence of the appellant’s poor mental health save for the appellant’s assertion. On the appellant’s own evidence, she had not reported her poor mental health to her doctor. Applying SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 00398 (IAC), the judge’s reasoning at [6] was open to her on the evidence before her.
12. Ms Khan relied on Khan v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 148 at [37] and submitted the purpose of the Guidance Note was to enable the appellant to effectively participate in the proceedings. The grounds did not challenge the judge’s findings on the basis that the evidence was not properly considered or the proceedings were unfair. There was no suggestion that the cross-examination was improper and the judge’s credibility findings were open to her on the evidence before her.
13. Ms Khan submitted the weight to be attached to the CPIN’s was a matter for the judge. The judge considered the link between the appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity and the HDP/PKK and found that, even if she accepted the appellant was a supporter of the HDP, her involvement was at a low-level and would not put her at risk of persecution. The judge considered all the evidence in the round and the risk factors in IA.
14. Ms Khan submitted the judge considered the CPIN at [26] and acknowledged the appellant’s submission about the change in name of the HDP. It was open to the judge to find the HDP was founded in 2012, but in any event, this point was not material to the judge’s overall adverse credibility finding. The appellant’s sur place activity and Kurdish ethnicity were insufficient to put the appellant at risk on return. On the evidence in the CPIN’s, it was open to the judge to conclude that the appellant would be of no interest to the authorities.
Conclusions and reasons
15. Ground 1 submits that the judge’s reasoning at [6] was inadequate and disclosed a failure to properly apply the Guidance Note. I am not persuaded by Ms Shaw’s submission that, given the evidence of the appellant’s poor mental health, which was before the judge, she erred in law in failing to apply the Guidance Note for the following reasons.
16. At [6] the judge found:
“Ms Shaw invited me to find that the appellant is a vulnerable witness. However, whilst I have seen a short letter from Derman mental health team dated 8 August 2024 stating that the appellant was referred for eight sessions of counselling, there were no medical records to support this and little detail in the statements addressing the current state of the appellant’s mental health. Further, I note a discrepancy within the asylum interview as to whether or not treatment was sought. Overall having regard to this evidence and to the Presidential Guidance, I determined the appellant was not to be treated as a vulnerable witness. However, I reminded Ms Simpson of the requirement to put questions fairly and recorded that no questions would be put about earlier miscarriages.”
17. I find that the judge considered the referral letter and the appellant’s evidence in the AIR. The judge took into account the evidence of the appellant’s miscarriages and prevented cross-examination on that issue. It is not suggested that the cross-examination was improper or that the appellant’s evidence was impaired as a result of any failure to have been offered a break. The appellant was represented by Ms Shaw who was unable to identify which subparagraphs of [10.2] of the Guidance Note the judge failed to apply. The purpose of the Guidance Note is to ensure that the appellant is able to effectively participate in proceedings and to ensure that her evidence is properly and fairly considered.
18. It is apparent from [3] of the Guidance Note that it is a matter for the judge to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence, taking into account the evidence as a whole. In this case the judge considered all the matters referred to by Ms Shaw in her submissions and the judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not to be treated as a vulnerable witness was open to her on the evidence. The judge was entitled to take into account a lack of medical evidence as to the state of the appellant’s current mental health.
19. In any event, the judge made allowances for the appellant’s vulnerabilities by restricting cross-examination and she took into account the appellant’s traumatic journey to the UK when assessing credibility at [25]. The judge considered the numerous inconsistencies in the appellant’s account at [23] to [30] and concluded at [33]:
“Considering everything in the round, taking the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence set out above, the limited and inconsistent detail provided about her activities for the HDP, I find that her credibility is damaged. I note the appellant claimed to have suffered psychological distress but there was no expert report or objective assessment and I am not persuaded the appellant’s mental health has impaired her recall of events. Overall, I am not persuaded that the appellant is a credible witness.”
20. I find there is no material error of law as alleged in ground 1 because the evidence before the judge was insufficient to show that the appellant was a vulnerable witness and in any event the judge conducted the hearing in accordance with the Guidance Note. The judge’s finding that the appellant’s mental health had not impaired the appellant’s ability to recall events was open to her on the evidence before her. There was no error of law in the judge’s credibility assessment.
21. Ground 2 submits the judge’s finding that the appellant would not be identified as Kurdish was flawed because there was evidence before the judge that she could be identified through her clothing and she had worn a Kurdish headscarf at the Newroz event in the UK. Ms Shaw did not address me on this ground. At [22], the judge stated:
“However, the appellant gave no evidence about facing discrimination in Turkey because of her ethnicity, on her account she had pursued school to end of primary and had managed to secure work. She conceded at hearing that there were no particular features that enabled third parties to identify her ethnicity.”
22. This ground has no merit. There was no evidence before me to show that the appellant had not accepted she could not be identified as Kurdish when asked about whether she faced discrimination in Turkey. The judge accepted the appellant wore a Turkish headscarf at the Newroz event in the UK and did not exclude this factor when assessing risk on return. In any event, this finding was not material to the judge’s conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk because of her Kurdish ethnicity. Ms Shaw’s submission that Kurdish ethnicity, in and of itself, was sufficient to put the appellant at risk because the authorities would perceive her as supporting the HDP/PKK was not supported by the three CPIN’s upon which she relied or the country guidance.
23. Ground 3 submits the judge misapplied Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 and placed significant and determinative weight on the appellant’s failure to mention her support of the HDP and two detentions in 2023 at her screening interview. This ground is misconceived. Contrary to the written grounds, the judge took into account the nature and context of the screening interview, the appellant’s traumatic journey to the UK and her state of mind.
24. At [25] the judge found:
“I have taken into account that the screening interview is a preliminary fact-gathering exercise and is not designed to elicit a full account of the protection claim. However, the inconsistencies between the accounts are stark and the failure to make any mention of the HDP and two detentions on arrival is significant. In cross-examination, the appellant claimed she had not mentioned her support for he HDP and detentions as she was fearful and unsure of the process. The appellant claimed she had been in the face of death at the time of her screening interview. I recognise that at this time she would have felt tired and distressed. However, there has been no suggestion that there were any communication problems, the questions were straightforward, the appellant was able to detail fear because of her ethnicity and explained she had been fingerprinted for a passport. In my view it beggars’ belief that she would have forgotten to say she had been detained and tortured due to political beliefs, especially given the proximity with which she claimed the last detention had taken place (20 May 2023). I find that these are matters which the claimant could reasonably have been expected to raise at the screening: Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 at [24]–[27]. Her failure to raise these matters, undermines the reliability of her account.”
25. The grounds at [10] rely on two authorities to support the proposition that the judge’s failure to engage with relevant factors and the disproportionate reliance placed on the screening interview omissions amounts to a material error of law: R (on the application of AM (Somalia)) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1 and HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. There is nothing before me to demonstrate why these cases are relevant to this appeal. The first is a deportation case and the second case is a very unusual case on its facts. Neither case assists the appellant in demonstrating an error of law as alleged in ground 3.
26. Ground 4 (i) submits the judge made a “factual misdirection on the history of the HDP” in rejecting the appellant’s account of a long standing affiliation with the HDP. This ground amounts to a disagreement with the judge’s findings at [26]. The judge took into account Ms Shaw’s submission that the HDP had changed its name over the years and assessed the appellant’s evidence in the context of the CPIN. The judge’s interpretation of the CPIN, that the HDP was founded in 2012, was one which was open to her on the evidence. At 9.1.3 the CPIN states:
“The People’s Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, HDP, in Kurdish Partiya Demokratîk a Gelan) is the latest of the Kurdish-focused parties created in Turkey since the beginning of the 1970s: HEP [Halkin Emek Partisi – People’s Labor Party], DEP [Demokrasi Partisi – Democracy Party], ÖZDEP [Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi – Freedom and Democracy Party], HADEP [Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – People’s Democracy Party], DEHAP [Demokratik Halk Partisi – Democratic People’s Party], DTP [Demokratik Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party], BDP [Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi – Peace and Democracy Party], HDP. However, contrary to its predecessors the HDP was not created to succeed a party banned by the Constitutional Court. Formally founded in 2012, it is the political branch of a union of left-wing political organisations, the People’s Democratic Congress. It gradually replaced the BDP before the former disappeared in 2014.”
27. At [26], the judge found:
“The appellant gave a hazy account about becoming involved with the HDP. At asylum interview she claimed she had sympathy for the HDP, she supported them and had an affinity as she was growing up. At hearing she claimed her parents would speak about the HDP in her presence when she was young. However, the appellant was aged 39 years on arrival to the UK and would have been 28 years when the HDP was founded in 2012. I found her account of having been affiliated to the party since a young age to be fabricated. Ms Shaw attempted to address this point in submissions, by saying the HDP had simply changed names over the years. I do not accept that submission. First that was not the appellant’s evidence, she only spoke about the HDP and no questions were asked about this in re-examination. Second, the CPIN is clear that the HDP was a new party. It was not created to succeed a banned party, it was the political branch of the left-wing political organisation the People’s Democratic Congress being formally founded in 2012 and active from October 2013, gradually replacing the BDP which disappeared in 2014 (CPIN 9.1.2 and 9.1.3).
28. The allegation of procedural unfairness is not appropriate given the appellant was represented and not re-examined. There is no obligation on the judge to put her reasoning to the appellant as alleged at 12(c) of the written grounds. This point was not taken in oral submissions.
29. Ground 4(ii) submits the judge failed to give adequate reasons for why the appellant’s profile would not attract the attention of the authorities on return to Turkey. Contrary to Ms Shaw’s submission, the evidence in the three CPIN’s was insufficient to show the appellant would be at risk because of her Kurdish ethnicity. The judge considered the appellant’s claim in the alternative and gave adequate reasons for why her Kurdish ethnicity, low level HDP involvement, illegal exit and sur place activity would not put the appellant at risk on return as a failed asylum seeker. There was no misapplication of IA or IK.
30. At [36] the judge concluded:
“I have taken into account the objective evidence at 3.1.11 and 9.4 CPIN, which reported that the government believed there is a link between the PKK and HDP. However, I balance that against the 3.1.1 that being a member or supporter of the HDP alone is not likely to result in a person facing persecution, risk depends on a person’s profile and activities, which I find in the alternative were low level. I have considered the factors in IA. The appellant is Kurdish, but on her account was integrated into Turkish society and had faced no problems from the authorities over the years. She was not a member of the HDP or HDP youth wing, merely claimed to be a supporter. She undertook skeletal activities, namely, attending two meetings and distribution of leaflets 4-5 times over an 11 year period. I am not persuaded the appellant has proved it is likely that there is a causal connection between detention and departure from Turkey, on her account nothing happened after her release on each occasion. In her most recent evidence, the appellant stated that her parents do not attend any political meetings or demonstrations. There is no suggestion in her evidence that her family have any wider political background. The appellant has failed to establish any evidence of political activity in the UK, save for attendance at one Newroz event. Therefore, even in the alternative, I am not persuaded that the appellant’s profile is such that she would be of interest to the authorities on return and I therefore find that she has failed to establish that she has a genuine fear of persecution because of her political beliefs.”
31. Ground 5 submits the judge failed to consider the best interests of the children. Ms Shaw was unable to identify matters which the judge had failed to take into account which were capable of leading to a different conclusion. The children live with their mother and visit their father once a week. Their best interests are to remain in the UK. There was no material error in the judge’s consideration of the best interests of the children.
32. Ground 6 submits the proportionality assessment is irrational. There is no merit in this ground. The appellant came to the UK illegally and formed a relationship with a British citizen of Kurdish ethnicity who accepted he could return to Turkey. There were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK. The appellant came to the UK in 2023. Given the judge rejected her claim, there were no very significant obstacles to integration. The judge’s finding that the appellant’s removal to Turkey would not breach Article 8 was open to her on the evidence before her and she gave cogent reasons for coming to this conclusion at [39] to [45].
33. I conclude there is no material error of law in the judge’s decision dated 3 April 2026 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2026