The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-003271
UI-2026-003272, UI-2026-003273
UI-2026-003274, UI-2026-003275

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/00612/2024
PA/00865/2024, PA/00866/2024
PA/00869/2024, PA/00870/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of November 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

DHW
DLH
DDH
DRH
DH
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs T Srindran, instructed through Direct Access
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 19 October 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appeal, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals against the respondent’s decision to refuse their asylum and human rights claims.
2. The appellants are mother, father and their three children, born on 8 May 1991, 25 January 1986, 29 September 2017, 7 May 2020 and 3 February 2022 respectively. They are citizens of Sri Lanka. The first appellant came to the UK on 13 July 2009 as a 17 year old child, with entry clearance as a visitor valid until 4 January 2009. Her father submitted an asylum claim with her as his dependent. The claim was refused on 22 December 2010 as were further submissions made by him on 20 July 2011. The appellant submitted an application for an EEA residence permit on 21 July 2015 which was refused on 18 December 2015, and her appeal against that decision was dismissed on 16 January 2017, following which she became appeal rights exhausted.
3. The appellant remained in the UK and married her husband, the second appellant, in 2015. On 8 May 2020 the appellant made an asylum claim in her own name, with her husband and two children as her dependants. She was interviewed about her claim on 17 June 2023, by which time there was a third child also dependent upon her claim. The appellant also relied upon her family and private life in the UK and on health grounds, in relation to her second son’s medical condition (congenital heart defect and butterfly vertebrae) and her own depression.
4. The appellant’s claim was refused on 18 December 2023. The respondent did not accept that the appellant and her dependants were at risk on return to Sri Lanka and did not accept that their removal to Sri Lanka would breach their human rights. The respondent considered that there was medical treatment available in Sri Lanka for the appellant and for her son.
5. The appellants all lodged notices of appeal against the respondent’s decision and the appeals were linked and heard together in the First tier Tribunal on 27 January 2026.
6. At the hearing the appellants no longer pursued the asylum claim but only the Article 8 aspect of the appeal. The judge noted that it was agreed that the immigration rules were not met on family life grounds. Although the appellant’s eldest child DDH had, by the time of the hearing, been continuously resident in the UK for over seven years, a separate application had been made under the immigration rules for leave to remain on that basis (which Mrs Srindran explained had been refused on the basis of the FTT’s decision and an appeal was pending). For the purposes of the appeal before the judge in terms of the immigration rules it was noted that the children had not lived in the UK for seven years at the time the application was made. As for the private life rules, the judge considered whether there were very significant obstacles to integration in Sri Lanka, since that was the basis of the claim being pursued by the appellants. The judge noted that the first appellant relied upon the fact that she had left Sri Lanka when still a child and that she no longer had family or social connections to Sri Lanka, that she had lived in the UK for 15 years and would be homeless if she returned to Sri Lanka, that her son had significant medical problems and was receiving treatment in the UK, and that she herself had suffered from mental health issues in the past.
7. The judge was not satisfied that the first and second appellants no longer spoke Tamil and considered that both had spent their formative years in Sri Lanka and would be able to re-establish their lives there. The judge was not satisfied that the first and second appellants would be unable to work in Sri Lanka or would be homeless and without support, but noted that both were educated and had work experience and considered that they would be able to find employment there. She noted the evidence of financial support from friends in the UK and considered that there was no reason why that could not continue to Sri Lanka. The judge noted that the first appellant had had significant mental health issues in the past and had overdosed on medication on occasions, but noted the lack of evidence of her current mental health status and considered there to be insufficient evidence to conclude that her mental health would deteriorate if she returned to Sri Lanka. She considered that the first appellant would continue to focus on her children which would assist her in terms of her mental health, and was not satisfied that medical treatment would be unavailable for her mental health and her physical conditions if required in Sri Lanka. The judge concluded that the appellants had failed to show that they would face very significant obstacles on return to Sri Lanka.
8. The judge went on to consider Article 8 outside the rules. She considered that the three children could learn Tamil if they returned to Sri Lanka. With regard to the eldest child, the judge considered there to be no evidence of any significant ties to the wider community outside the immediate family and that, whilst moving to Sri Lanka would involve a degree of disruption for him, she concluded that he would be able to adapt to life in Sri Lanka. She found that it was in his best interests to remain with his family unit and that the first and second appellants would continue to protect and promote his best interests on return to Sri Lanka. With regard to the middle child DRH, the judge considered his significant medical conditions. She noted that he had a butterfly vertebra which was not an issue for him currently, that he had congenital severe pulmonary valve stenosis for which he remained under the follow-up at the cardiology clinic, and that he had hypospadias (repaired) with ongoing abnormal urethral anatomy for which he remained under the care of a paediatric urologist at Alder Hey hospital due to ongoing issues with difficulty passing urine and had had a vesicostomy and needed to wear nappies as a result. She noted that there would potentially need to be a further operation following the closing of the abdomen opening. However the judge observed that she had not been provided with any evidence to suggest the medical treatment required by DRH would not be available or accessible in Sri Lanka and that she had not been presented with any evidence to suggest that DRH would not be able to attend school in Sri Lanka, nor any evidence that teachers in Sri Lanka would not be able to assist him as teachers in the UK had been doing, during school hours. She noted that there was no suggestion that a specialist assistant was required, nor that there was a particularly significant connection between DRH and the person[s] assisting him during school hours, and that there was no other evidence of any other specific support in terms of caring for DRH, outside of the immediate family unit and his medical team and the school assisting him changing his pads. The judge concluded that, whilst it may be preferable for DRH to remain in the UK and continue his treatment and education here, there was insufficient evidence for her to find that it was in his best interests to remain in the UK. With regard to DH, the judge considered that she was of an age when her emotional needs could only be met within the context of her family unit and that she would have the support of both parents to help her adapt to life in Sri Lanka.
9. The judge considered section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in relation to DDH and was not satisfied that it was unreasonable to expect DDH to leave the UK. She found that the immigration rules were not met as at the date of hearing and that the factors in favour of the appellants did not outweigh the public interest in removal. She concluded that the scales fell on the side of the public interest and that the decision was proportionate, that the decision did not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences and that it did not breach Article 8. She accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 27 January 2026.
10. The appellants sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal. The application was renewed before the Upper Tribunal on three grounds. Firstly, that the judge had misdirected herself as to the relevant threshold to be applied when considering s117B(6) NIAA 2002, and had made contradictory findings as to whether DDH was a qualifying child. Secondly, that the judge had failed properly to apply the statutory test under s117B(6) and/or failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusion that it would be reasonable to expect DDH to leave the UK. Thirdly, that the judge had failed to consider the impact of disruption to DRH’s specialist treatment on his welfare and best interests.
11. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal but was granted upon a renewed application in the Upper Tribunal on all grounds, on the basis that: “In particular, it is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself, or made contradictory findings, in relation to the s117B(6) threshold, and that that was material to the outcome of the appeal.”
12. The matter then came before me for a hearing. The respondent produced a rule 24 response opposing the appeal and the appellant then produced a rule 25 response together with a rule 15(2A) application for the admission of further evidence in the event that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside and the decision was to be re-made.
13. Both parties made submissions.
14. Mrs Srindran relied on the renewed grounds and the rule 25 response. With regard to ground one, she submitted that the judge had made contradictory findings, as she found at [86] that none of the children was a ‘qualifying child’, yet she had previously found DDH to be a qualifying child. Mrs Srindran accepted that there was a typographical error but submitted that there was a wider issue as the judge had erred in her consideration of the relevant test, framing the Article 8 assessment by reference to ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’ rather than ‘reasonableness’ under section 117B(6). She submitted that, reading the decision as a whole, there was a material concern as to whether the test was properly applied. As for ground two, Mrs Srindran relied on the case of KO (Nigeria) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53 with regard to the significance of the seven years’ residence in the UK, and the case of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 with regard to the fact-sensitive assessment that was required in the case of children, and submitted that the judge had failed to apply the correct considerations to the ‘reasonableness’ test in relation to DDH. She submitted that the judge had failed to give proper reasons for concluding that it would be not be unreasonable for DDH to leave the UK. With regard to ground three, Mrs Srindran submitted that the judge’s assessment in relation to DRH was materially influenced by the absence of evidence that medical treatment was unavailable in Sri Lanka and that his school care could not be replicated in Sri Lanka, but she failed to consider the appellant’s oral evidence in regard to how DRH’s daily requirements and emotional needs were being met in the UK and she failed to consider future surgical management. She submitted that the judge accordingly failed properly to evaluate DRH’s best interests and welfare.
15. Mr Hulme submitted that there was no material error of law in ground one and that the assertion made was one of form and style rather than substance. He submitted that the judge had considered the correct provisions. The judge was required to consider the ‘unduly harsh’ question for all three children, and had separately considered the ‘reasonableness’ test for the second child, directing herself properly at [82] and [83] and then making clear findings in that regard at [85]. He submitted that on a fair reading, [86] contained a typographical error given that the judge clearly treated DDH as a qualifying child at [81] and [87]. The judge had then taken those findings forward to make findings on the ‘unduly harsh’ question. The judge had therefore properly identified and applied the two separate tests and there was no intertwining of the tests amounting to a material error of law. Mr Hulme submitted that ground two was a disagreement with the judge’s findings as she had considered all relevant circumstances at [85] and had reached a conclusion which was open to her. As for ground three, there was again no material error of law. The judge had considered the best interests of DRH from [62] and had taken account of various issues such as language, DRH’s medical condition and appropriate medical treatment in Sri Lanka. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds, the judge’s assessment was not confined to health issues but also considered DRH’s ability to attend school in Sri Lanka. The judge brought together all relevant considerations at [71] and [72] including DRH’s emotional needs and considered the disruption to his medical treatment. All key factors were considered.
16. Mrs Srindran reiterated the points previously made.
Analysis
17. I do not find there to be any merit in the grounds. The judge’s decision is a detailed and comprehensive one including a full assessment of all the evidence and with careful consideration given to the circumstances of each of the children.
18. I agree with Mr Hulme that the issue taken with the judge’s consideration of ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’ and ‘reasonableness’ is simply a matter of form over substance. The judge’s decision could arguably have been better expressed without the heading between [78] and [79] referring to ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’. However it is entirely clear that the judge was fully cognisant of the ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’ and ‘reasonableness’ tests being separate and distinct. They were expressed as separate issues at [55] of the judge’s decision in her introduction to the section on Article 8 outside the immigration rules. In the following paragraphs, from [56] to [78], the judge considered the best interests of all three children before then going on, at [80], to conduct a specific and separate assessment for the one qualifying child DDH under section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act. The judge set out the test in s117B(6) at [80]; at [81] she made a finding that DDH was a ‘qualifying child’; at [ 82] she explained the distinct and separate consideration of ‘reasonableness’; at [83] she explained what was meant by ‘reasonableness’; and at [85] she carried out the reasonableness test in relation to DDH. She made absolutely clear at [87] that section 117B(6) and reasonableness was a separate and free -standing matter. In the circumstances there is no basis for the assertion in the first ground that the judge conflated the different tests or that there was uncertainty as to which legal framework she applied. In so far as the ground takes issue with the judge’s finding at [86] it is clear that the finding contained a typographical error and that the judge simply omitted the word “other” before “children”. There was no contradiction in the judge’s findings and neither was the finding an indication of any wider concerns, as there were no wider concerns for the reasons already given. Ground one does not identify any material error in the judge’s decision.
19. As for ground two, there is nothing inconsistent in the judge’s findings with the decisions in KO (Nigeria) and HA (Iraq). The judge undertook a child-centred and child-sensitive assessment when considering whether it would be reasonable to expect DDH to leave the UK. It is not the case, as the grounds appear to suggest, that the judge restricted her consideration to DDH’s parents’ ability to assist him in adapting to life in Sri Lanka. Rather, the judge considered the entirety of DDH’s circumstances in the UK, the disruption to his life by leaving the UK and the impact upon him of such disruption. She took into account the fact he was born in the UK and she considered his length of residence in the UK, the fact that he had attended school here and had made friends and progressed in his education, and she considered his emotional needs. She considered how all of those matters would be affected by moving to Sri Lanka and gave cogent reasons for finding that he would be able to integrate into life in Sri Lanka, noting that there was little evidence of any wider community ties outside of school and outside his family. The judge reached a conclusion which was fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her. I agree with the respondent that this is essentially a disagreement with the judge’s assessment of the reasonableness issue under s117B(6) in relation to DDH and that the grounds do not identify any error of law in that assessment.
20. The third ground seeks to challenge the judge’s assessment of DRH’s best interests. In so far as the grounds assert that the judge confined her assessment to the existence of healthcare facilities in Sri Lanka, it is clear that that was not the case. The judge considered the entirety of DRH’s circumstances in the UK and had careful regard to the impact upon him of having to leave the UK and move to Sri Lanka, in terms of language, medical treatment, education, relationships with teachers and medical professionals, friendships and care needs. She undertook a detailed assessment of all those issues over several paragraphs, from [62] to [72]. Not only did she consider DRH’s age, medical conditions and the care he required, but she also specifically considered the impact upon him of the disruption to that specialist ongoing treatment both in terms of medical treatment and the care and assistance he received at school. She noted at [69] that there was no evidence of any other specific support in terms of caring for DRH outside of the immediate family, his medical team and the school, and at [71] she gave reasons why she considered that that support would be available, and could be replicated, in Sri Lanka. Mrs Srindran criticised the judge’s reliance upon the absence of evidence that treatment was not available in Sri Lanka and that school care could not be replicated in Sri Lanka, and submitted that she had failed to take account of the first appellant’s oral evidence which made up for the absence of such evidence. However the judge plainly did take account of the first appellant’s oral evidence, specifically referring to it at [65] and [66]. Mrs Srindran also submitted that the judge failed to recognise the arrangements for DRH’s future surgical management, but again that is not the case as the judge specifically considered that matter at [65]. The judge clearly and plainly undertook a full and holistic assessment of DRH’s welfare and, as Mr Hulme submitted, it is difficult to see what else was required of her. All key factors were considered by the judge and in the circumstances I do not find the third ground to be made out.
21. For all these reasons the grounds have not been made out. The judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s claim on the basis that she did and for the reasons fully and properly given. The decision that she reached was one which was fully and properly open to her on the evidence before her.
Notice of Decision
22. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.
Anonymity Order
The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.


Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 October 2026