Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003294
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54143/2024
LP/03508/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

GM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Alex Burrett, instructed by Law Lane Solicitors
For the Respondent: Kevin Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Anonymity was ordered by the First-tier Tribunal and that order shall remain in force because the appellant is an asylum seeker and the need to protect him outweighs the presumption in favour of open justice.
2. The appellant appeals with the permission of Judge Meyler against the decision of Judge Manyarara. By that decision, which was issued on 14 April 2026, Judge Manyarara (“the judge” dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant is a Georgian national who was born on 27 August 1981. He entered the United Kingdom by plane on 27 September 2020. He held entry clearance as a Tier 5 worker. His leave expired in 2021 and he overstayed. He claimed asylum in August 2022.
4. The appellant stated that he was at risk in Georgia on account of his membership of the United National Movement (“UNM”) Party, of which he had been a member since 2005. He had started having problems when the government changed in 2011 and the Georgian Dream Party (“GDP”) took power. He had been threatened and he was attacked in 2007, 2012 and 2020. People had been to his house after he had come to the United Kingdom.
5. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a Georgian national and that he was a member of the UNM. She did not accept that he had suffered adverse attention from the government or the mafia.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
6. The judge heard the appeal at Taylor House on 20 March 2026. The appellant was represented by Mr Gajjar of counsel. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer. The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant and submissions from the representatives before reserving her decision.
7. In her reserved decision, the judge did not accept that the appellant had “a political profile that would have caused his involvement with the UNM to have taken on a great importance in the eyes of the GDP”: [78]. She did not accept that he had a subjective fear of returning to Georgia. In the alternative, she concluded that the appellant could obtain a sufficiency of protection from the rogue actors who were said to be threatening him: [102]. In the second alternative, the judge concluded that the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate to another part of Georgia: [110]. The judge did not accept, having considered the question inside and outside the Immigration Rules, that the appellant’s removal would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998: [127].
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. Grounds of appeal were settled by trial counsel on 27 April 2026. It was said that the judge had failed to have regard to material matters, had reached irrational conclusions, and had gone beyond the parameters of the refusal letter in considering domestic protection and internal relocation. Judge Meyler considered each of the four grounds to be arguable.
9. I heard admirably concise submissions from Mr Burrett and Mr Ojo, to whom I am grateful for their economy.
10. Mr Burrett had filed a skeleton argument rather late in the day. Mr Ojo had seen the skeleton and had no objection to it being admitted. Mr Burrett relied on that document and submitted that the core issue in the case was the extent of the appellant’s profile. Whilst the judge had made some findings, she had not considered various facets of the case, for example whether the appellant had organised elections. It was striking that the judge did not set out, let alone make findings upon, such matters. The judge had speculated on certain matters impermissibly, including the perception of the appellant by the ruling party. The judge’s approach to the documents was tainted by her failure to make properly reasoned findings on the appellant’s role and activities. Internal relocation and sufficiency of protection should not have come into the equation because they had not been relied upon in the respondent’s decision. The judge’s decision was a detailed one but was inadequate in substance.
11. Mr Ojo submitted that the decision could have been better expressed but that “it just about does the job” when set against what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48. The judge was plainly aware of the appellant’s claims as she had set them out. What she had said at [77] of her decision demonstrated that she was aware of what had been said at [5] of the appellant’s witness statement and in response to question 20 of the interview, for example. It was asserted in the grounds that the judge had found the appellant’s claim to be implausible without setting his account in the context of the background evidence but that was not a proper reflection of the reasoning at [77]-[79]. The judge had cited HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 and QC [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC) at [32] and [36]. She had made reference to the background material at [95]. It was possible to infer from those findings that the judge had rejected the extent of the appellant’s profile. The appellant had claimed that he was particularly influential but the documents did not support that account. A significant credibility point arose from the timing of the hospital records, as the judge had noted at [79]. Other documents also failed to substantiate the appellant’s claim, as the judge had found at [81] in particular. The judge had been required to consider sufficiency of protection and internal relocation because of the “belt and braces” approach suggested in JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC).
12. Mr Burrett replied briefly. He submitted that the respondent’s attempt to rely on inference “told its own story”. The reality was that there were key aspects of the appellant’s claim on which there were no clear findings. It was not clear, for example, whether the judge had accepted that the appellant had organised elections. The decision fell to be set aside as a whole.
13. I reserved my decision at the end of the submissions. I regret the delay in deciding the appeal, the responsibility for which is entirely my own.
Analysis
14. In considering the competing submissions, I have borne in mind throughout that the decision under challenge is that of a specialist judge of the FtT(IAC) who considered the evidence as a whole and who saw and heard the appellant give evidence. It is necessary in such circumstances to apply the principles of appellate restraint, the essentials of which were recently recalled by the Senior President of Tribunals and Holroyde LJ in QY (Vietnam) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 607. At [55] of his judgment, the SPT summarised those principles in this way:
It was also common ground that appeal courts should not interfere with judgments by trial judges just because the appellate court takes a different view of the facts. Findings of fact made by primary fact finders should not be set aside by the appellate court, unless the appellate court is bound to act. The trial judge should "give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties, and if need be [the appellate court] the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision", see Fage at paragraph 115. There is no duty to refer to every argument of counsel, and the mere fact that a judge does not mention a piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it, see Volpi at paragraph 57. These principles apply to the FTT and Upper Tribunal, see generally Terzaghi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm AR 461, particularly given that rights of appeal from the FTT to the Upper Tribunal are limited to errors of law. Findings of fact made by FTT judges should not readily be set aside.
15. Mr Burrett’s core submission is that the judge failed to make findings on relevant aspects of the evidence and, in particular, that she failed with any clarity to explain what it was that she accepted and rejected about the appellant’s account of his activities with the UNM. The appellant said at interview that he was a driver for the party, but he also stated that he was “the main person organising elections and all kinds of activities”. He also said that he had participated in “all kinds of events, protests, anything” and that he had collected people and taken them to the biggest protest in Tbilisi. He said that protest was in the winter of 2007. He had held big placards. He was not just a member; he was a “very active member”. At [5] of his statement for the FtT, the appellant described his role in these terms:
As stated throughout my asylum claim, I have been an active member of the United National Movement and I also worked as a delivery driver for the political group. My duties were not limited to just this, I helped the party financially and any other ways that have been possible, I was an active member in the political activities which were taking place in the United National Movement. I would frequently attend marches, protests and any meetings taking please. I pleased a key role in the organisation of any elections. My involvement in the United National Movement was important as I would not any planning needed and ensuring the events for the party would run smoothly.
16. At [42] of her decision, the judge made the following findings of fact:
I find that the appellant became a member of the UNM in 2005. He was a driver for the UNM and participated in events and demonstrations. The GDP, whom the appellant fears, won the election and took power of Georgia. The appellant left Georgia on his own documentation and left via the normal channels. He has a wife and children remaining in Georgia. He has not been involved in any political organisations in the United Kingdom, where he has worked.
17. At [75]-[86], the judge confronted the second question posed by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, as interpreted by Judge Bruce in JCK (Botswana): whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution on return to Georgia. In doing so, she made further findings of fact.
18. The judge accepted that the appellant had been consistent about his association with the UNM: [76]. She was concerned, however, that there was some inconsistency in the appellant’s account of his role in the party. The judge said that the importance of the appellant’s role was that it would “have a material bearing on the climate that the appellant could have been placed in prior to his departure from Georgia.” At [78], the judge said that she was satisfied that the appellant was a driver who was “also involved in some activism”. But she did not accept that his profile was such as to take on “great importance” in the eyes of the ruling party. She noted that the supporting evidence was not consistent as to his role. The judge was surprised by the assertion in one of the documents that the appellant “enjoys high authority in society”. The judge found that the appellant was “at best … an ordinary member of the UNM.” The judge went on to explain in the next four paragraphs why she did not accept that the documents relied upon by the appellant were capable of substantiating the appellant’s claim. The documents “do not take the appellant’s case any further”, the judge said at [80]. Then, at [83], she stated that she did not accept that the appellant had discharged the burden of showing that he had a subjective fear of return.
19. The judge’s decision is lengthy and replete with the citation of authority. On first reading, it seems to be a comprehensive dismissal of the appellant’s claim. On further examination, however, it is quite clear why Mr Ojo felt compelled to submit that it “just about does the job”.
20. Whilst I have been mindful of the approach required by the authorities cited by the Court of Appeal in QY (Vietnam), I have been unable to understand the precise basis on which the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. As Mr Burrett submitted, he had given an account of his activities in Georgia over fifteen years of UNM membership, but the judge failed to make adequate findings on those activities. It is not clear to me whether the judge accepted or rejected his evidence that he had been involved in numerous protests, that he had organised elections, and that he had driven others to the protests.
21. I have some sympathy with the judge in this regard because the appellant did not give a great deal of detail in his interview or his statement, but it was nevertheless incumbent on the judge to make clear what she accepted and rejected. In respect of the appellant’s past activities, there are no clear findings in that respect. The judge clearly accepted that the appellant had been a UNM member but she did not make clear what else, if anything she accepted. I accept Mr Burrett’s submission that Mr Ojo’s attempt to rely on inference is telling in this regard.
22. I also consider there to be no clear findings on the events which the appellant claims have befallen him in the past. The judge scrutinised the documents with a great deal of care and was seemingly assisted by a thorough and searching cross-examination from the Presenting Officer. As Mr Ojo submitted, the judge identified real problems with the documentary evidence, not least of which was the point she took at [79], which was that a police report suggested that the appellant’s mother had witnessed him being attacked at around 8pm, whereas the report of her hospitalisation following that attack showed that she had been admitted in the morning of the same day. The judge understandably felt unable to attach weight to these documents as substantiating the appellant’s claim but what did she make of those claims? It is not clear to me that she rejected the appellant’s account that he had been attacked on various occasions, and she also failed to make a clear finding about the appellant’s assertion that he had been subjected to a number of threats in the past. Clear findings about these matters were essential, not least because (as the judge noted at [46]) past persecution or threats thereof are regarded, absent good reason to the contrary, as a serious indication of future risk.
23. Whilst my principal concern is as to the clarity and extent of the judge’s findings as to past activities and past events. I also consider there to be merit in some of the points made by Mr Burrett about the findings which were made by the judge. I consider that she fell into error in the finding she reached about the likely behaviour of the ruling party in the aftermath of the elections. There are two difficulties.
24. Firstly, the judge identified no background material which supported the conclusion that the GDP would not have coerced the appellant to join their party after they had won the election. As Mr Burrett submitted, that was a finding as to the plausibility of the actions of a third party to which the caution expressed in authorities such as Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 applied. Whilst Mr Ojo was correct to note that the judge cited what was said by Neuberger LJ in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, she did not apply that approach to the finding which she went on to make about the likely behaviour of the opposing party.
25. Secondly, I also consider there to be merit in Mr Burrett’s submission that the judge misunderstood the motivation of the ruling party, which was seemingly to punish the appellant, rather than to attempt to poach him. In answer to question 53 of the interview, for example, the appellant seemed to suggest that he was attacked in 2020 and his home was then visited because he had refused to join the party.
26. I should make clear that I consider other points made in the grounds and by Mr Burrett in his skeleton argument to be unmeritorious. A good deal has been said about the sustainability of the judge’s finding that there was an inconsistency between the police report and the hospital records. The appellant has sought to file a statement in which he addresses the point, but nothing said in that statement or by Mr Burrett serves to undermine the judge’s analysis. The gravamen of Mr Burrett’s submission is that the time on the hospital record (09:40) does not necessarily mean that the appellant’s mother was admitted in the morning but that submission overlooks the fact that the author of the report was clearly using the 24 hour clock, as is clear from the subsequent reference in the same document to the appellant’s mother having been discharged (having passed away) at 21:35 on 6 June 2025. That point, and others which were made about the documentary evidence, were properly open to the judge on the evidence before her. The difficulty, however, is that she made other findings which were tainted by legal error and that she erred in failing to make clear findings on key aspects of the claim.
27. The judge went on to consider sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, but those findings cannot save the decision because they should never have been made. As Mr Gajjar observed in his fourth ground, and as Mr Burrett submitted, the refusal letter in this case did not rely on those arguments in the alternative; it was based on the rejection of much of what the appellant had said. It may be that the judge was wrongfooted by the rather Delphic way in which the respondent’s Review expressed her stance on these issues. At [3], the schedule of issues included “internal protection” and internal relocation but at [12] the respondent said this:
In the presence of adverse credibility as explored in issue (i), the R’s position is maintained as per the RFRL (para 21) dated 30 January 2024 and Respondent’s Review dated 31 October 2024, (RR1).
28. The judge went on to consider internal relocation and sufficiency of protection but she should not have done so in these circumstances. The principal controversial issues in the case revolved around the appellant’s credibility and it was not separately asserted that he would receive a sufficiency of protection to the Horvath standard, or that it would be safe and reasonable for him to relocate even if all that he said was true.
29. Ultimately, therefore, I accept that the decision is vitiated by legal error; that it cannot stand; and that it should be set aside as a whole and determined afresh. Critical issues of fact were left unresolved by the judge and the findings of fact which were made were tainted by errors of approach.
30. Given the scope of the enquiry which will be necessary, the proper course is for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed. The decision of the FtT is set aside as a whole. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be heard by a different judge.

Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 October 2026