Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-003324
UI-2026-003325
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/61567/2023
and HU/61565/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
and

RS
KS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Entry Clearance Officer: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer
For RS and KS Mr D Bazini, Counsel, instructed by AA Immigration Lawyers

Heard at Field House on 1 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. For the sake of continuity I shall refer to the parties as they stood before the First-tier Tribunal. Thus, the Entry Clearance Officer is “the respondent” and RS and KS are “the appellants” or “the first appellant” and “the second appellant” respectively.

2. The respondent appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Dobe (“the judge”) who, by a decision dated 27 March 2026, allowed the appellants’ linked appeals against the respondent’s decisions to refuse their human rights claims. Those claims were made on 24 July 2023 and the decisions are dated 20 September 2023.

3. The appellants are both citizens of Afghanistan. The first appellant is the mother of the second appellant. The second appellant has been at all material times a minor. The first appellant and the second appellant are respectively the mother and younger brother of the United Kingdom-based sponsor, OS, who himself is a refugee in this country (on the basis of a fear of the Taliban due to a refusal to their recruitment demands).

4. The human rights claims were made through applications for entry clearance, relying on Appendix ADR (in respect of the first appellant) and Appendix Child CNP (in respect of the second appellant).

The judge’s decision
5. The appeals came before the judge following remittal by the Upper Tribunal. The appellants’ case before the judge is clearly set out at [5]-[9]: it was contended that the appellants satisfied the relevant Immigration Rules (“the Rules”), with particular reference to ADR 5.1, 5.2 and, in the alternative, 7.1 (in respect of the first appellant) and CNP 3.1 and 3.2 and, in the alternative, 3.4 (in respect of the second appellant). Both also relied on Article 81.

6. The respondent had accepted the familial relationships between the appellants and OS, and that the financial and accommodation requirements under the Rules were satisfied: [11]. The remaining issues were in dispute: [13]-[15].

7. Having considered a variety of evidential sources, the judge made the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions:

(a) There was family life between the appellants and OS: [27], [29e], and [31];

(b) The first appellant suffered from a number of health conditions, both physical and mental: [26a] and [26b];

(c) The first appellant required long-term personal care to perform daily tasks: [26c];

(d) Appropriate care was not available or accessible in Afghanistan: [26d];

(e) ADR 5.1 and 5.2 were satisfied: [26d];

(f) Alternatively and in light of all the circumstances, including the country situation in Afghanistan and the appellants’ vulnerable position under the Taliban regime, there were exceptional circumstances in respect of the first appellant with reference to ADR 7.1: [27];

(g) By virtue of multiple factors, there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which would render the second appellant’s exclusion from United Kingdom undesirable and CNP 3.1 and 3.2 were satisfied: [29];

(h) Alternatively, CNP 3.4 was satisfied because refusal of the second appellant human rights claim would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences: [30];

(i) Finally, both the appellants succeeded under Article 8: [31].

The grounds of appeal
8. As noted in the First-tier Tribunal’s grant of permission, the respondent’s grounds are drafted under the familiar heading of “Making a material this direction in law/lack of adequate reasoning/giving weight to a material matters”. As I observed at the hearing, the respondent would do well to make better efforts to separate grounds of appeal under more appropriate distinct headings. This would aid the Tribunal’s consideration of challenges and quite possibly ensure better focus on the specific nature of any alleged errors of law.

9. I will deal with the grounds when setting out my reasons, below.

Rule 24
10. There is no rule 24 response from the appellants.

The hearing
11. Mr Ojo relied on the grounds as drafted. There was no application to amend. He realistically accepted that if the judge had not erred in his consideration of the Rules, the appellants’ appeals were properly allowed.

12. Mr Bazini submitted that there were no errors. Amongst other submissions, he emphasised certain findings that had not been challenged in the grounds.

13. At the end of the hearing I informed the parties that I would be dismissing the respondent’s appeal, with written reasons to follow.

Conclusions
14. I have approached this case with appropriate judicial caution. I should not interfere with the judge’s decision simply because it could have included greater detail or that another judge might have reached a different conclusion. I have read the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically. I have reminded myself of the need to focus on the way in which the respondent’s case was put at first-instance and to guard against the appeals before me functioning as a second bite of the cherry.

15. There is no challenge in the grounds to the judge’s finding that family life existed. Nor was any challenge attempted at the hearing before me. In any event, the judge made sustainable findings on the existence of life, having regard to the family’s history and the continuing strength of the relationship between the appellants and OS, despite the latter’s forced separation from them.

Paragraph 1 of the grounds
16. The first paragraph of the grounds relates to the medical evidence considered by the judge in respect of the first appellant, namely a letter from Dr Khaliqi. It is said that the judge failed to “properly consider the threshold required” by the Rules and that the judge engaged in “speculation” unsupported by “sufficient evidence” as regards the first appellant’s additions and the need for care.

17. There is no error here. At [26], the judge conducted what in my view was an eminently sustainable assessment of the evidence before him. He recognised that the medical evidence was “sparse” and that there was “a gap” in respect of details surrounding the doctor’s opinion on the need for care. The judge specifically addressed the respondent’s concern with the provenance of the letter and rationally concluded that in light of the situation in Afghanistan, the fact that it was sent through WhatsApp did not significantly undermine its reliability. The judge observed that there had been “no serious challenge” to the diagnoses set out in the letter and this onward appeal is not an opportunity for the respondent to re-argue her case. Applying the balance of probabilities, the judge was entitled to conclude that the letter was reliable as to the various conditions set out therein.

18. In terms of the need for care, the judge properly took a cumulative view of the multiple health conditions and their likely impact on her ability to perform daily tasks. Again noting the lack of detail in the medical letter, the judge was entitled to take account of the chronic nature of the conditions and, applying the balance abilities, find that long-term personal care was required.

19. Contrary to what is said in the grounds, the judge did not engage in impermissible speculation, nor did he fail to recognise any “threshold” at this stage of his decision.

Paragraph 2 of the grounds
20. The second aspect of the respondent’s challenge relates to the availability and accessibility of appropriate care in Afghanistan. It is said that the fact that neighbours had in the past provided some assistance, combined with the presence of KS and the absence of evidence to indicate that care was “completely unavailable” demonstrated that the judge had erred in concluding that such care was not available and/or accessible.

21. The respondent’s contention fails to recognise what the judge actually said. He addressed the issue of the neighbours and gave reasons why that source of support was not reliable, predictable, or continuously available: it depended on the goodwill of the individuals concerned, their presence in the vicinity and their personal priorities. In addition, reading the judge’s decision holistically, it is clear enough that the judge also had in mind what he had already said in relation to the country situation and the appellants’ circumstances. For example: KS’ minority and the difficulties he was facing; the extremely hostile environment in respect of women, generally and in relation to the provision of healthcare; and the adverse family history with the Taliban.

22. Mr Ojo sought to argue that the fact that the appellants had made a journey across the border to Iran in order to meet OS indicated that they could move around relatively freely, which in turn indicated that care could be obtained in Afghanistan. That submission was simply not open to him. First, it formed no part of the grounds. Second, as noted by Mr Bazini, the respondent’s case before the judge (as set out in her review) expressly stated that the first appellant could obtain care in Iran. That position was wholly unmeritorious: in the context of Afghanistan, it could not reasonably be said that a female Afghan citizen should be required to cross and re-cross a potentially very hostile international border in order to obtain appropriate care to perform daily tasks. The judge did not err in failing to specifically address that particularly weak point. Third, in any event the judge’s reasoning in support of his conclusion that appropriate care was not available and/or accessible within Afghanistan is sustainable, for the reasons I have previously given.

23. The judge did not err in law.

Paragraph 3 of the grounds
24. A passage from BritCits v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 368 is quoted ([59] of the judgment). It is not entirely clear to me what the passage is supposed to demonstrate as regards any alleged errors committed by the judge. It simply sets out the need for an individual to provide evidence that appropriate care is not available and/or accessible. However, for the reasons previously given the judge dealt with these matters in a sustainable manner. There is no error here.

Paragraph 4 of the grounds
25. It is said that the judge made contradictory findings. At [25] he found that the appellants might face “a degree of hardship” if not permitted to enter the United Kingdom, whilst later on he reach the conclusion that their exclusion would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.

26. When the judge’s decision is read sensibly and holistically, there is no error here. A forensic analysis of the specific terminology used can quite easily distract from the substance of a decision. It is quite clear from a sensible reading of the judge’s overall analysis and conclusions that he found the “degree of hardship” to be significant in nature. That finding was supported by legally adequate reasons and was set against the legally correct threshold contained within the Rules.

27. It is also said that the judge took a number of “irrelevant” matters into account, namely the prevailing in Afghanistan. Mr Ojo realistically accepted that this aspect of the grounds was misguided and he did not seek to suggest that the matters in question were precluded from consideration. Both ADR and CNP provide for a consideration of whether there were exceptional circumstances/unjustifiably harsh consequences, which in turn permitted the judge to consider all circumstances pertaining to the appellants and OS. The judge did not treat the appellants’ case as a “back door” protection claim. He properly considered the country situation as part and parcel of his assessment of the Rules, which in turn clearly informed his overall conclusion on Article 8.

28. There is no error here.

Paragraph 5 of the grounds
29. It is right that at [28] the judge referred to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and the best interests of children (here, KS). In truth, that is nothing more than an inadvertent and/or immaterial error. Section 55 does not apply to the welfare of children who are outside the United Kingdom. However, the “spirit” of that provision is relevant: Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f)) [2013] UKUT 88 (IAC). There is no material error here.

Paragraph 6 of the grounds
30. The final aspect of the grounds appears to contend that the judge failed to consider the position of RS and KS as a unit, as opposed to separate individuals. There is no merit to this. Whilst the judge considered their circumstances under separate sub- headings in his decision, this was a matter of structure rather than substance. Reading his decision sensibly and holistically, it is readily apparent that he did consider the appellants’ overall circumstances, including the fact that they were living together. Indeed, the judge quite properly recognised that certain factors relating to one appellant was likely to have an impact on the other.

Anonymity
31. The judge made an anonymity direction at first-instance on the basis of OS’ refugee status. In all the circumstances, it is appropriate to maintain that direction.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The Entry Clearance Officer’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 2 September 2026