The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003335
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62061/2023
LP/11729/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BOWLER

Between

CCD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C Robinson instructed by Coram Children’s Legal Centre
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of Judge Caskie of the First-tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) promulgated on 26 October 2025, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision made on 15 November 2023 to refuse his claim for protection. The decision had followed a hearing before Judge Caskie identified on the decision as having taken place on 25 September 2025. (As explained below there is some confusion as to when the hearing was.) The Appellant did not attend the hearing and the application before me concerns the fairness of proceeding in his absence.
Hybrid Hearing
2. At the request of the Respondent the hearing was conducted as a hybrid hearing. Ms Robinson and I were present in the hearing room. Mr Wain participated via CVP. I was satisfied that Mr Wain could fully participate in the hearing which was conducted by way of submissions only.
The Appellant’s ground of appeal
3. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on the ground that he was deprived of a fair hearing. In short, he had not received the notice of hearing. He had had his telephone confiscated by police and ceased to be represented in 2025. Without his telephone he could not access emails from the tribunal as a code was sent to his phone; and without a representative he could not obtain hearing information from the tribunal online portal. He had contacted the tribunal with a support worker to update them about his position but was not provided with a hearing date.
4. In support of his application the Appellant has provided a Witness Statement from his current solicitor explaining the circumstances of the Appellant being without representation last year, as well as confirmation of the circumstances concerning the loss of the Appellant’s telephone and the various problems caused by the Appellant being unable to access tribunal information from his email.
Grant of permission to appeal
5. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Woodcraft on 10 July 2026 noting that arguably the case should not have proceeded in the Appellant’s absence.
The Respondent’s response
6. In the Rule 24 response the Respondent asks that further enquiries are made as there is confusion as to whether the hearing in fact took place on 25 September 2026 or 30 September 2026. If the latter, then the Appellant had been sent the Notice of hearing.
7. At the hearing Mr Wain accepted the evidence of Ms Hussein explaining the problems the Appellant had faced last year in accessing information. It was not clear when the Notice of hearing was sent or to where. It was conceded that the Judge’s consideration of the Appellant’s non-attendance was limited.
My decision
8. My decision was given to the parties at the hearing as follows.
9. I could see from the online filing system that the Notice of hearing was uploaded on 23 September 2025 for a remote hearing by video on 30 September 2025. The Notice recognised that the Appellant had no legal representative at that time. The system shows that the Notice was emailed to the Appellant. However, the evidence of Ms Hossein has been accepted by the Respondent and it is clear therefore that any email sent to the Appellant would not have been accessible by him. I am therefore satisfied that the Appellant would not have been aware of the Notice of hearing. In addition, I see nothing on the system to show that any link was sent for the Appellant to join the hearing remotely.
10. Moreover the hearing is shown by the Judge’s decision to have taken place on 25 September 2025 and the Decision is written on the basis that it was in person, rather than a remote video hearing. The Judge waited for the Appellant to appear, but the Decision does not show that any steps were taken to check that the Notice of Hearing had in fact been sent to the Appellant. Even if the date on the Judge’s decision for the hearing was an error (so that it in fact took place on 30 September 2025 not 25 September 2025), a check of the system would have alerted the Judge to the likelihood of an issue with the Appellant being notified of the hearing, not least because this was apparently an in person hearing according to the Judge’s decision.
11. On the basis of the Judge’s decision as written by him the hearing was procedurally unfair. It did not satisfy the requirements of fairness set out in Nwaigwe adjournment(: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC); or indeed as encapsulated in the overriding objective which must be respected in all cases.
12. Given the nature of the error of law, the appeal will need to be remitted for a rehearing de novo.
Notice of Decision
13. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a procedural error which constituted an error of law. The decision is set aside.
14. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(b), to be heard before any judge aside from Judge Caskie.


T. Bowler

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


09/10/2026