Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003387
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56341/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

ARULANANTHAN PARASAKTHY
(NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Banks of Counsel, instructed by Abid Islam Abbott Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 30 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

INTRODUCTION

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro promulgated on 20 January 2026 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 15 May 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s Human Rights claim dated 12 September 2022.

BACKGROUND

2. On 5 April 2022 the Appellant and her husband entered the UK on valid visit visas with leave to remain until 31 September 2022. On 12 September 2022 the Appellant and her husband made an in-time application for leave to remain on the basis of their private life in the UK. Unfortunately, the Appellant’s husband passed away on 25 May 2024 in the United Kingdom where he is now buried.

3. The RFRL refused the Appellant’s application under Immigration Rule Appendix Private Life PL5 on the basis that the Appellant had not been in the UK for 20 years and because it was deemed that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Sri Lanka. The RFRL further considered the application outside the immigration, took into account the grandchildren’s best interests, but concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances that would render the Appellant’s removal disproportionate.

Findings of FTIJ O’Garro

4. At paragraph [13] the FTIJ confirmed that the issues before her were Appendix Private Life and Unjustifiably Harsh Consequences outside the rules. At [14] the FTIJ confirmed that the Appellant’s two daughters, her son-in-law and grandson adopted their witness statements and that their evidence had been taken into account. At [16] the FTIJ confirmed that she had considered all the documents on file when reaching her Decision.

5. In summary, the FTIJ at [21] accepted that the Appellant is 71 years old and has been diagnosed with “a range of chronic medical conditions including, type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, osteoporosis, and other age-related health illnesses.”

6. When considering very significant obstacles to integration, at [26] the FTIJ took into account the husband’s passing and the Appellant’s and her children’s case that the Appellant had no close family in Sri Lanka and would be left alone and isolated if returned. At [28] the FTIJ notes the Sponsor’s evidence that the Appellant and her husband had carers in Sri Lanka but that they were not reliable. However, at [29] the FTIJ finds “insufficient material before me to find that everyday tasks such as bathing, dressing, visiting the toilet and feeding herself cannot be done by the appellant herself. In fact, the sponsor in her oral evidence said that the appellant can perform personal tasks for herself.”

7. At paragraphs [30] – [32] the FTIJ finds no evidence before her that any required support would be unavailable or unaffordable and at [31] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant would be able to get all required medication in Sri Lanka because she was able to do so before entering the UK.

8. At [32] the FTIJ found herself unpersuaded that the Appellant would be without extended family and good friends in Sri Lanka. In so doing, the FTIJ rejected the finding in the Social Worker report that the Appellant would be isolated on return.

9. At [33] the FTIJ finds it reasonable for the Appellant’s children to find time to return to Sri Lanka to help the Appellant re-settle, including the Appellant’s eldest grandchild who will soon turn 18. At [34] the FTIJ find that the Appellant can apply for a visit visa to visit her husband’s grave.

10. At [35] the FTIJ accepts that the Appellant would feel anxiety about returning to Sri Lanka in the light of her health problems and loss of her husband but concludes at [36] that the immigration rules are not met because there would be no very significant obstacles to integration.

11. Turning to Article 8 outside the immigration rules at [37], at paragraphs [40] – [44] the FTIJ invokes the relevant authorities and finds,

I have looked very closely at the appellant’s relationship with her children and grandchildren. I am prepared to accept that due to the appellant’s ill health , the loss of her partner and the time she has now spent in the United Kingdom with her children, the relationship between the appellant and her children is more than the normal emotional ties between adult children and parent, and that the appellant’s children have been providing real, committed and effective support to her during the time she has been in the United Kingdom. For these reasons, I find that the appellant has a family life with her children, which will be interfered with if the appellant is removed.

12. At paragraph [46] the FTIJ then moves on to consider proportionality. For the purposes of the pleaded grounds before me, I find it appropriate to set out the salient parts of this consideration in full,

[47]. Before I determine if the respondent’s decision is proportionate, I must take into consideration, the best interest of any children the decision might affect, which of course relates to the appellant’s grandchildren. By Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, I have to consider the best interest of children when making decisions where they are involved. The appellant has 3 grandchildren whose ages are 17, 16 and 13. I find the grandchildren’s best interest is to be in the care of their parents and with the appellant’s removal, the grandchildren will remain being cared for by their parents which is in their best interest.

[48]. I now turn to the factors set out in section 117B […..]

49. The appellant does not meet the Immigration Rules for leave to remain in the United Kingdom. I find the appellant has not established that she would not have access to an appropriate level of care in Sri Lanka. I am satisfied that the appellant will have access to medical provisions in Sri Lanka. I am also satisfied that she can receive appropriate home care to assist with her daily needs including the administration of her medication which I accept is importation to keep her well. I find the appellant’s children can continue to financially maintain the appellant.

50. I have taken into account that the appellant’s removal will impact on the family life the appellant has established with her children, especially with her daughter Logini and her grandchildren, but as that family life has mainly come about because of the appellant’s decision to remain in the United Kingdom instead of returning to Sri Lanka, I can attach little weight to any family life developed when the appellant’s immigration status was precarious. In Rajendran (s117B - family life) [2016] UKUT 138 it was held that "precariousness" is a criterion of relevance to family life as well as private life cases and is an established part of article 8 jurisprudence.

51. I find that the emotional dependency between the appellant and her children and grandchildren, can continue albeit from a distance in the way it had existed when they had lived apart. I have been provided with no evidence which I accept, why the appellant cannot return to Sri Lanka. The appellant has provided no evidence that satisfies me that she will suffer ‘unjustifiably harsh’ consequences on return to Sri Lanka.

52. I find this appellant’s case centres around choice. The appellant and her family would prefer the appellant to be cared for by her family in the UK. However, as found in the case of Ribeli [2018] EWCA Civ 611 the appellant and her family are entitled to that choice, but the due weight must be given to the other side of the balance which is the maintenance of immigration control and the Immigration Rules. At this point I feel it is worth setting out an extract from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ribeli v Entry Clearance Officer, Pretoria [2018] EWCA Civ 611.

69. “The crucial point (and it is a powerful point as a matter of common sense as well as a matter of law) is that the Appellant's daughter could reasonably be expected to go back to South Africa to provide the emotional support her mother needs as well as to provide practical support. For example, if the concern is that the Appellant may be cared for in her home by people who may turn out not to be trustworthy, there is no reason why her daughter cannot live and work in South Africa to supervise the care arrangements made for her mother.

70. As the UT Judge observed, at the end of the day, what this case is about is the choice which Ms Steenkamp has exercised and wishes to be able to continue to exercise of living and working in a major international centre like London rather than in South Africa, which is her own country of origin. She is entitled to exercise that choice. But, in those circumstances, the UT cannot be faulted for having come to the conclusion that any interference with the Appellant's right to respect for family life conforms to the principle of proportionality.

71. This is especially so in a context where, as Mr Sheldon has sub mitted, "appropriate" or "due" weight must be given on the other side of the balance to the assessment by the Secretary of State and by Parliament (which has approved the Secretary of State's changes to the Immigration Rules) of what the public interest requires. Depending on the context the weight which is appropriate or due may be "considerable" weight:”.

53. The appellant not being able to show that there is any compelling reasons why she should be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom , I find that the public interest carries the most weight and therefore the decision of the respondent is proportionate.

Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal

13. On 9 July 2026 the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal the Decision if FTIJ O’Garro was granted by UTJ Loughran without restriction.

14. In two grounds of appeal settled by Cynthia Obatinuadeyo on behalf of Abbott Solicitors and dated 18 June 2026, the Appellant argues,

Ground I: Failure lawfully to assess the impact of removal on the grandchildren and misdirection in the Article 8 assessment

2. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant enjoys a subsisting family life with her children:

§§44 I find that the appellant has a family life with her children, which will be interfered with if the appellant is removed.

3. It further recognised the relevance of the grandchildren and the need to assess their best interests under s.55. However, having made those findings, the Tribunal failed to conduct a legally adequate assessment of the consequences of removal. The Appellant relied on written evidence from all three grandchildren, and oral family evidence was heard. There is, however, no engagement whatsoever with the substance of the grandchildren’s evidence in the determination. The complete omission of such evidence, in a case centrally concerned with their best interests, constitutes a failure to take into account material evidence.

4. The assessment of best interests is confined to the statement that:

§§47 “the grandchildren will remain being cared for by their parents which is in their best interest.”

5. That reasoning is legally inadequate. It fails to engage with the Tribunal’s own finding of emotional dependency and cohabiting family life and does not address the effect on the children of losing the Applicant’s daily presence within the household. It reduces the statutory duty under s.55 to a bare assertion, rather than an evaluative assessment.

6. The Tribunal further held that family life and emotional dependency “can continue albeit from a distance” and that contact can be maintained by “modern means of communication and visits”.

7. This discloses a material misdirection. As held in Omotunde (best interests - Zambrano applied - Razgar) Nigeria [2011] UKUT 247 (IAC), such forms of contact do not substitute for “the daily care, engagement and attendance” which constitute family life in the context of children. The Tribunal thereby failed to conduct the required real-world assessment of the impact of removal and impermissibly minimised the interference.

8. These errors are not matters of weight. They concern the failure to engage with material evidence and the application of an incorrect legal approach to the assessment of family life and best interests.

Ground II: Failure to engage with, and failure to give reasons for rejecting, expert evidence

9. The Applicant relied on detailed expert evidence addressing her vulnerability, dependency, and the impact of removal, including the effect on the grandchildren. That evidence was central to the proportionality assessment.

10. The Tribunal’s treatment of the expert evidence is confined to the statement:

§§32 “I do not accept that the appellant would be isolated as alluded to by the Independent Social Worker…”

11. No reasons are given for rejecting the expert’s conclusions. There is no engagement with the substance of the reports, the longitudinal assessment undertaken, or the detailed findings regarding the Applicant’s dependency and the family unit.

12. Further, the proportionality assessment at §§37–53 makes no reference to the expert evidence at all. The Tribunal therefore failed not merely to give adequate reasons, but to engage with material evidence central to the Article 8 evaluation.

13. Whilst a Tribunal is not bound to accept expert evidence (MS (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 941), it is required to give adequate reasons for rejecting it. The absence of such reasoning constitutes a material error of law.

14. These omissions go to the core of the assessment. The expert evidence addressed precisely those matters dependency, vulnerability, and impact on the grandchildren which the Tribunal was required to evaluate. Its effective exclusion from the reasoning vitiates the proportionality analysis.

15. In a rule 24 reply dated 5 August 2026, the SSHD argued that the grounds did not disclose any material errors of law as they were no more than a “mere disagreement”.

16. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.

ERROR OF LAW HEARING

Preliminary Matters
17. At the outset of the hearing the representatives confirmed that they both had the stitched Upper Tribunal hearing bundle before them consisting of 188 pages (“SB”).
18. I then heard submissions from Mr Banks followed by Ms Khan. Mr Banks then made further submissions in reply.
19. At the close of the hearing, I advised the parties that I would be reserving my Decision which would be promulgated in due course. I now set out my Decision and reasons as follows:

DISCUSSION
20. Given the overlap between the grounds of appeal insofar as they impugn the FTIJ’s approach to the impact of removal upon the grandchildren and the order in which Mr Banks advanced his case during submissions, I shall deal with ground 2 first.
Ground 2
Social Worker Report
21. At [10] of the grounds, the Appellant impugns the FTIJ’s consideration of the SW reports dated 5 October 2022 at SB [51], and 9 September 2025 at SB [63], on the basis that it is limited to a rejection of the report’s finding that the Appellant would be isolated on return, at [32] of the Decision.
22. The ground argues that the report also addressed vulnerability, dependence, the impact of removal and the effect on the grandchildren. As such argues the Appellant, no reasons are given for rejecting the expert’s conclusions on dependency and the family unit and the FTIJ failed to identify the report in the proportionality assessment.
23. It is undisputed that the FTIJ was aware of the SW reports, as evidenced by her findings at [32].
24. When considering whether the FTIJ erred by failing to take evidence into account or give adequate reasons I am mindful of the guidance in Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]
An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
[….]
Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
25. Equally, in HA (Iraq), RA (Iraq) and AA (Nigeria) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72], the Supreme Court found,

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope
26. I am further mindful of the guidance in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC) that,
The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder's overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome.
27. Accordingly, in the light of QC I asked Mr Banks whether - apart from the rejection of the SW’s isolation conclusion at [32] - the FTIJ made any findings that were contrary to the SW report, such that the FTIJ was required to explain why the SW report did not bring about a different outcome.
28. In reply, Mr Banks said the FTIJ had failed to take into account the findings on “assistance needs and feelings of affinity; the Judge simply finds that the Appellant can apply for a visa”. Mr Banks argued that whilst the FTIJ had regard to the children’s Best Interests, she had not considered the impact of removal upon the children in the proportionality assessment which was procedurally unfair.
29. First, I find it appropriate to summarise the findings in the 2025 SW report at SB [63]. In this regard, it is to be noted that Mr Banks did not address me on the 5 October 2022 report, which is now 4 years old and was drafted only 6 months after the Appellant entered the UK, at a time when the Appellant’s husband was still alive.
30. At [2.2] the SW confirms that the report was completed by reference to the earlier 2022 report, a letter of instruction, and interviews and observations of interactions between family members on 29 August 2025.
31. I find nothing in this report to suggest that the SW had access to any medical records.
32. At [3.0] the SW notes that the current family unit consists of the Appellant, her daughter, son-in-law and three grandchildren aged 17, 16 and 13 (at the date of the FTT hearing).
33. At [4.0] the SW assesses the impact on the Appellant if she were returned to Sri Lanka. The SW notes the bereavement and opines that this “is widely recognised as a major risk factor for mental health decline and that the Appellant’s well being is closely tied to the care and support provided by the daughter’s family in the UK”. The SW opines at [4.1.3] that the children may be able to organise private care services for the Appellant in Sri Lanka from the UK but critically finds that there are,
[…] significant concerns regarding her wellbeing. Mrs Arulananthan would likely experience social isolation, as she does not have immediate family or a close support network in Sri Lanka. This lack of daily companionship and emotional connection could lead to vulnerability and neglect.
34. The SW then finds that the bereavement combined with the stress of relocation could contribute to a decline in mental health:
“While remote support from her children could help maintain her livelihood in Sri Lanka, the risks of isolation, limited healthcare access, and emotional deterioration remain substantial.”
35. Again, the risk of isolation is a material consideration in this conclusion, along with a finding of a risk of limited access to healthcare. There is nothing in the report to suggest that the SW has any expertise in the provision of care in Sri Lanka.
36. At [5.0] the SW considers the “strength of family ties and intergenerational bonds”. The SW states that from his observations and interviews, the Appellant plays a vital role in the emotional and cultural lives of her grandchildren and that,
“Her removal from the household would not only disrupt her own wellbeing but also destabilise the emotional and developmental environment of her grandchildren. The children have expressed that her presence is integral to their daily routines, emotional security, and sense of belonging.”
37. At [6.0] the SW considers the “impact on the grandchildren” and finds that the grandchildren have lived continuously with the Appellant since 2021 - which I note is factually incorrect, the Appellant having entered the UK in May 2022. The SW finds the Appellant a central part of the family offering emotional stability, cultural continuity, and intergenerational support”, that the grief from her husband’s death has affected the entire family, and that sending the Appellant abroad now “could intensify the emotional strain, especially for the grandchildren”. The SW concludes that,
“Her removal from the household at this time would likely result in emotional distress for the grandchildren, disrupting their educational focus and social development. The stability she provides is crucial as they navigate the challenges of growing up and coping with grief. Any decision regarding her relocation should consider the broader emotional and developmental impact on the younger members of the family, whose wellbeing is closely tied to her continued presence in their lives.”
38. Turning then to the FTIJ’s findings. First, at [9] – [11] the FTIJ sets out the Appellant’s case in relation to health, care requirements, support in Sri Lanka, and physical and emotional support in the UK from her family,
9. The appellant has been diagnosed as suffering from a range of chronic medical conditions including severe spinal problems which restrict her mobility, type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, osteoporosis, and other age-related health illnesses. She has been prescribed medication for these illnesses. She cannot walk long distances or stand for prolonged periods. She is unable to cook, carry groceries, or attend medical appointments on her own. She also struggles with dressing, washing and general household activities. Her family members provide the assistance she needs daily. The appellant receives personal care and supervision in the UK that would not be available to her in Sri Lanka. Her daughter and her family ensure that all her needs are met.
10. The appellant has no close family members in Sri Lanka to provide the emotional care that she needs. Most of her siblings are deceased or living in Canada. Her husband’s siblings are also either deceased or are living in Canada. All nieces and nephews no longer live in Sri Lanka due to the war. She currently has no home in Sri Lanka as her home was destroyed when the conflict started in 2002 and she has been living in rented accommodation since.
11. The appellant is now totally physically and emotionally dependent on her children, in particular with her daughter Logini and her partner, with whom she lives. Her children provide her with financial and emotional support, and the appellant wants to remain in the United Kingdom as she requires continuing care and support. Separating the appellant from her children and grandchildren will have a negative impact on her mental and physical health.
39. When considering the Appellant’s case under the immigration rules in the context of very significant obstacles to integration, at [21] the FTIJ accepts the Appellant’s health diagnosis and at [29] – [35] makes findings on the extent of the Appellant’s care needs, available care and support in Sri Lanka, the husband’s death, and the effect of separation from the Appellant’s family in the UK.
40. In so doing the FTIJ finds at [28] that the Sponsor accepted that the Appellant had carers in Sri Lanka before entering the UK, albeit that she claimed they were not reliable. At [29] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant’s care requirements are not as claimed given the Sponsor’s concession that the Appellant can perform personal tasks herself. At [30] the FTIJ finds that care is both available and affordable on return, as the evidence before her is that the Sponsor can afford a nurse or carer. At [31] the FTIJ finds that medication is available on return because the Appellant had the same ailments before entering the UK. At [32] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant will have the support of extended family and friends on return and as such rejects the SW finding that the Appellant would be isolated. At [33] the FTIJ finds that it is reasonable for family members in the UK to return to Sri Lanka with the Appellant and assist her with re-settling on return. At [34] the FTIJ recognises the sadness engendered by the bereavement but finds that the Appellant can apply for visit visas to return to the UK to visit her husband’s grave. At [35] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant will suffer anxiety when returning given her ill-health, bereavement, and separation from her children and grandchildren.
41. The FTIJ then reminds herself at [35] of the elevated threshold implicit in the very significant obstacles test but finds at [36], by reference to the test in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 which she sets out in full at [23], that the immigration rules are not met.
42. The grounds before me do not challenge this conclusion under the rules and I find that the findings of fact at [28] – [35] are well reasoned and were open to the FTIJ on the evidence before her. Of particular note is the Sponsor’s evidence relating to the level of care required and the previous availability and affordability of care, along with the finding of available support from extended family and friends on return. These findings run contrary to the Appellant’s case advanced at [6] – [11] and the information before the SW. These findings of fact are not challenged in the grounds before me except insofar as it is argued that the FTIJ failed to have regard to the SW report.
43. When assessing Article 8 outside the rules, the FTIJ accepts family life at [44] and finds the Best Interests of the grandchildren are to remain with their parents in the UK at [47]. At [49] the FTIJ invokes her previous findings that the Appellant would have access to an appropriate level of care and medical provision on return and finds that the Appellant will have access to home care to assist her with her daily needs and that she will be financially maintained by her children. I find this reasoning discloses no errors of law in the light of the Sponsor’s evidence.
44. At [50] the FTIJ then expressly takes into account the impact of removal upon her family life “especially with her daughter Logini and her grandchildren”. However, the FTIJ quantifies this assessment in the proportionality assessment by taking into account that the current family life was contracted out of choice when the Appellant’s status was precarious. In short, the FTIJ found that she was presented with a fait accompli and accordingly gave the family life little weight.
45. In this regard, I am mindful of Jeunesse (app no.12738/10) at [114] which confirms that “where confronted with a fait accompli the removal of the non-national family member by the authorities would be incompatible with Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances”. The reference at [114] to exceptional circumstances was clarified by the Supreme Court in Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 at [56]: “the reference to exceptional circumstances in the European case law means that, in cases involving precarious family life, “something very compelling ... is required to outweigh the public interest”, applying a proportionality test.”
46. At [51] the FTIJ then takes into account the impact of removal upon the “emotional dependency between the Appellant and her children and grandchildren”, finds that communication can continue “in the way it had existed when they had lived apart” and finds this would not engender unjustifiably harsh consequences.
47. At [52] the FTIJ justifies this finding on the basis that the Appellant’s case “centres around [a] choice” made by the Appellant and her family to care for the Appellant in the UK. The FTIJ then sets out paragraphs from Ribeli [2018] EWCA Civ 611 to the effect that whilst the Appellant is entitled to exercise a choice, appropriate weight must be given to the public interest side of the scales.
48. As such, at [53] the FTIJ finds no “compelling reasons” to outweigh to the public interest.
49. Drawing these strands together, I am not satisfied that the FTIJ failed to take the SW report into account as I find no “compelling reasons” to suggest the same, nor am I satisfied that the FTIJ erred by failing to give reasons for allegedly rejecting the SW report.
50. It is undisputed that the FTIJ was clearly aware of the report when rejecting the SW finding at [32] that the Appellant would be isolated on return. The FTIJ found that the care requirements of the Appellant were not as originally claimed and that the Appellant would have extended family and good friends in Sri Lanka who can assist the Appellant with her re-integration which included emotional support. These findings of fact are not challenged by the Appellant. Accordingly, these finding strike at the heart of the SW assessment at [4.0] of the report and the effect of removal upon the Appellant. Equally, the level of required care finding goes to the substance of the dependency underpinning the family life enjoyed in the UK.
51. In terms of the FTIJ’s treatment of the impact of removal on the grandchildren in the light of the SW report, I find nothing in the FTIJ Decision contrary to the SW report’s findings, such that it could be said that the SW findings were rejected by the FTIJ.
52. The FTIJ accepted family life at [44], having “looked very closely at the Appellant’s relationship with her children and grandchildren”, and expressly took into account the impact of removal upon that family life with the grandchildren at [50]. However, the FTIJ found that the family life was contracted through choice when the Appellant was in the UK precariously and accordingly found it carried little weight. The Appellant does not challenge this finding of “little weight”.
53. At [51] the FTIJ expressly takes into account the impact of removal upon the emotional dependency enjoyed between the Appellant and her grandchildren but finds that it would not be unjustifiably harsh for long distance communication to continue as it did before the Appellant entered the UK. I find nothing in this paragraph to suggest a rejection of the degree of claimed emotional dependency and find it evident that the FTIJ considers this interference in the context of the little weight apportioned to the family life when weighed against the public interest.
54. I am reinforced in this view because at [52] – [53] the FTIJ makes clear that she is balancing the choice to contract family life in the UK (which she has found carries little weight) against the public interest and finds no compelling reasons to outweigh that public interest.
55. Whilst the FTIJ did not expressly set out the findings of the SW report when assessing the impact on the grandchildren, nonetheless I find that the FTIJ accepted the claimed impact of removal on the family life and emotional dependency but found that in all the circumstances the impact was insufficient to outweigh the public interest in circumstances where that family life carried little weight. It was not suggested to me that this conclusion was irrational in the light of the SW evidence.
56. As I find in my consideration of ground 2 further below, I am satisfied that the FTIJ had the Best Interests of the grandchildren in mind when conducting this assessment at [50] – [52].
57. Given the reference to the SW report at [32] and the findings at [50] – [52] I am not satisfied that the FTIJ was rejecting the SW report findings regarding the impact upon the grandchildren, nor do I find compelling reasons to suggest that such evidence was ignored. I find it implicit in these paragraphs that the FTIJ had due regard to the impact upon the grandchildren in the light of the evidence before her and made findings that were within a reasonable range of responses given the limited weight attached to the family life; the Sponsor’s evidence; and the weight afforded to the public interest.
Ground 2 Conclusion
58. Accordingly, I find that ground 2 discloses no material errors of law.

Ground 1
Best Interests of the Children
59. At paragraphs [4] and [5] of the grounds the Appellant argues that the Best Interests assessment at [47] of the Decision was “legally inadequate” because “it reduces the statutory duty under s.55 to a bare assertion, rather than an evaluative assessment”.
60. In CAO v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] UKSC 32, at [54] the Supreme Court clarified that the statutory duty that arises under s.55 applies directly to the SSHD and her officials not the Tribunal. The duty on the Tribunal under s.6 HRA is to decide an appeal in a way that is compatible with Convention Rights whilst treating the Best Interests of the child as a primary consideration,
Instead, the FTT is subject to a duty under section 6 of the HRA to decide an appeal in a way which is compatible with Convention rights, which in the case of a child relying on rights under article 8 requires it to treat the interests of the child as a primary consideration
[……..]
the relevant points to make here are that where the FTT determines an appeal it becomes the relevant decision-maker, superseding the Secretary of State, and if the FTT does not refer to or seek to apply section 55 in its own decision-making, it has not failed to act in accordance with the law so far as its own decision is concerned. Its legal duty is to comply with article 8, including by having regard to the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. If the FTT has done that and, as in the present case, has not committed any other error of law, then its decision (which becomes the relevant determinative decision affecting an appellant’s Convention rights) is “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of article 8(2) and cannot be impugned on the basis that it is not.
61. In terms of the FTT’s approach, I find that the FTIJ as an expert judge sitting in a specialist tribunal would have been aware that the Best Interests of the children were a primary consideration.
62. Following the finding of family life at [44], the FTIJ finds Razgar [2004] UKHL 27 questions three and four are met at [45] and then directs herself to the remaining issue of proportionality under Razgar question five at [46].
63. It is then self-evident at [47] that the FTIJ takes the Best Interests of the children as a primary consideration before reaching her conclusion on proportionality.
47. Before I determine if the respondent’s decision is proportionate, I must take into consideration, the best interest of any children the decision might affect, which of course relates to the appellant’s grandchildren. By Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, I have to consider the best interest of children when making decisions where they are involved. The appellant has 3 grandchildren whose ages are 17, 16 and 13. I find the grandchildren’s best interest is to be in the care of their parents and with the appellant’s removal, the grandchildren will remain being cared for by their parents which is in their best interest.
64. Whilst the FTIJ may arguably have expressed herself in clearer terms, in the light of [47] I find that the FTIJ had the Best Interests of the children in mind when considering the Appellant’s case that removal would interfere with the family life and emotional dependency between the Appellant and grandchildren at [50] – [52].
65. As considered above, I have accepted that it is implicit within this consideration at [50] – [52] that the FTIJ accepted the social worker evidence regarding the impact on the grandchildren in the proportionality assessment.
66. In response to questions from me Mr Banks did not suggest that the FTIJ should have found it in the grandchildren’s Best Interests to follow the Appellant to Sri Lanka; the real-world scenario to the Best Interests consideration being that the Appellant had no leave to remain in the UK.
67. Whilst the grounds further argue that the FTIJ failed to have regard to the grandchildren’s evidence, I find no compelling reasons to suggest that such evidence was ignored.
68. At paragraph [14] the FTIJ notes that the eldest grandchild adopted his witness statement when giving oral evidence and confirms that she has taken into account all of his evidence when reaching her Decision. At [16] the FTIJ then confirms “I take fully into consideration all the documents contained in the file, the oral evidence and the submissions […]”.
69. Whilst the FTIJ does not set out the contents of the witness statements of the three grandchildren, I find that they contain nothing contrary to the SW report and the accepted family life and emotional dependence taken into account at [50] – [52]. Further, there was no record of proceedings before me to suggest that anything additional was added to the oldest grandchild’s statement in oral evidence, nor did Mr Banks suggest the same.
70. In terms of the contents of these statements, at SB [42] the youngest grandchild’s statement describes feeling loved every day by the Appellant, being told stories, encouraged to do well at school, being greeted by the Appellant when she comes home from school and not imagining life without the Appellant because she is my “mentor, my comfort and my friend”.
71. At SB [45] the eldest grandchild states that the Appellant is central to his life, shaped his upbringing, cared and guided him, played a vital role in the family and that he cannot imagine life without her because it will cause emotional distress and a void in the family. The WS further suggests that the Appellant’s health is dependent upon her family in the UK.
72. At SB [48] the middle grandchild’s statement states that the Appellant is one of the most important people in her life; that she gives her love, comfort and encouragement in her studies; meets her when she returns home from school; provides guidance; “makes our house feel like a true home”; and that her removal “will cause me great sadness and affect me emotionally”. Akin to the eldest grandchild, the WS also claims that the Appellant’s health depends on being allowed to remain in the UK with her family.
73. As considered above, the FTIJ took into account the anxiety that will be suffered by the Appellant when she is separated from her family in the UK. The FTIJ further made sustainable findings regarding the level of care required by the Appellant in the light of the Sponsor’s evidence; the availability of home care and medication on return in the light of that previously received before entering the UK; the affordability of such care; and the availability of a support network on return. These findings squarely deal with the grandchildren’s evidence that the Appellant’s health is dependent upon care and support in the UK.
74. Given the FTIJ’s confirmation that all of the evidence has been considered and her acceptance that removal would impact the family life and emotional dependence between the grandchildren and the Appellant, I find no compelling reasons to suggest that these WSs were not taken into account by the FTIJ.
75. Fundamentally, the difficulty for the Appellant is that despite taking the effect of removal on the grandchildren into account, the FTIJ found that this was insufficient to outweigh the public interest in this case. It is not suggested in the grounds or in submissions that this conclusion is irrational in the light of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
76. As such, I am satisfied that the FTIJ had regard to all relevant considerations when setting out her conclusion on the children’s Best Interests of the grandchildren at [47] and I am satisfied that the FTIJ had in mind the grandchildren’s Best Interests as a primary consideration when conducting her proportionality assessment.
Electronic Communication
77. At paragraphs [6] – [7] of the grounds, the Appellant argues that the Tribunal materially misdirected itself when finding,
“that family life and emotional dependency “can continue albeit from a distance” and that contact can be maintained by “modern means of communication and visits””.
78. In this regard the Appellant relies upon Omotunde (best interests - Zambrano applied - Razgar) Nigeria [2011] UKUT 247 (IAC) as authority for the proposition that “such forms of contact do not substitute for “the daily care, engagement and attendance””.
79. I find this challenge without merit.
80. The FTIJ refers to the use of modern communication in two places in her Decision. First, in the specific context of the immigration rules at [36] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant’s family in the UK would not be a very significant obstacle to her integration in Sri Lanka because contact could be maintained through visits and electronic communication.
81. Second, at [51] in the FTIJ’s assessment outside the immigration rules, when considering the effect of removal on the emotional dependency between the Appellant, the children and grandchildren. In substance, the FTIJ balances the interference in the protected family life at [50] and the impact upon the emotional dependency between the Appellant and the grandchildren at [51] against the public interest, finding that it would not be unjustifiably harsh for the emotional dependency to continue at “a distance in the way it had existed when they had lived apart”. At [52] the FTIJ makes clear by reference to Ribeli that she has conducted this balancing exercise by weighing the Appellant’s “choice” of where to contract the family life against the public interest.
82. Accordingly, at [50] – [52] the FTIJ is conducting a balancing exercise by weighing long distance communication in her proportionality assessment, as is clear by the finding that such communication in the future would not result in “unjustifiably harsh consequences” at [51].
83. Turning then to Omotunde. Ground one’s reliance upon Omotunde is drawn from paragraph [28] which states,
28. […..] We reject the submission that family life hitherto enjoyed between an active parent and a small child could be appropriately maintained by telephone calls or other 'modern methods of communication' from Nigeria. We note that this Tribunal reached a similar conclusion in LD (Article 8- best interest of child) Zimbabwe [2010] UKUT 278 (IAC). Difficult as the issues in a case such as the present are to decide, their resolution is not assisted by wholly unrealistic suggestions such as this.
84. However, the Upper Tribunal qualified this reasoning at [29] in the following terms,
29. If it is justified to interfere with the right of respect for family life because of a contrary compelling public interest, so be it and the fact of electronic communication may provide some means of continued contact, but the internet and telephone calls do not substitute for the daily care, engagement and attendance on a young child that is the essence of family life in this context.
85. I find that the FTIJ did not find at [51] that family life “could be appropriately maintained” by long distance communication as contended in the grounds. On the contrary, consistently with paragraph [29] of Omotunde, the FTIJ was at pains at [50] – [52] to make clear that long distance communication was justified in the light of the competing public interest.
86. Further, when electronic communication was considered at [36], it was done within the context of whether the relationship with the children would amount to a very serious obstacle to the Appellant’s integration in Sri Lanka. As such, the FTIJ was not looking at the very different question of whether family life could be “adequately maintained” as considered at [28] of Omotunde.
87. Accordingly, I find no error in the FTIJ’s approach to electronic forms of communication.
Ground 1 Conclusion
88. Drawing together these findings, I find that ground 1 discloses no material errors of law.

ERROR OF LAW CONCLUSION

89. For the reasons above I am satisfied that the FTIJ took into account all material evidence and I am satisfied that the FTIJ has provided sufficient reasons to allow the Appellant to understand why she lost her appeal.

90. Accordingly, I find that the Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro does not disclose material errors of law and dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.

NOTICE OF DECISION

1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.

2. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 October 2026