Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003396
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53827/2024
LP/11964/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM

Between

M F
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Hasan, solicitor with Lexwin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of judge of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) G D Davidson (the judge), promulgated on 18 June 2026, dismissing an appeal against the respondent’s decision, dated 9 January 2024, refusing the appellant’s asylum claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Tajikistan and is Muslim. He lawfully entered the UK in March 2022. He claimed asylum on 31 August 2022.
3. The appellant’s asylum claim was premised on his fear of persecution by the Tajikistani authorities on account of his Islamic faith. The appellant claimed to have been arrested by state security forces in 2019 after leaving a mosque because he had a long beard. He was beaten with a plastic bottle of water, and his beard was half shaved off before he was released 8 or 9 hours later with a condition not to grow a long beard and to remain inside the mosque until the end of prayers (which the appellant did in any case). He was then detained in 2021 in a market and placed in the back of a minivan. His beard was forcibly shaved before he was released less than an hour later. The applicant left Tajikistan on a commercial flight using his own passport.
4. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been detained on the two occasions in 2019 and 2021. The respondent did not however consider that the appellant held a well-founded fear of persecution. Whilst the respondent accepted there was discrimination against Sunni Muslims in Tajikistan, the respondent was of the view that the nature of this discrimination was not sufficiently serious to amount to persecution under the Refugee Convention. The respondent noted also that there was no arrest warrant for the appellant and no indication that he was a person of interest, and that he would still be able to practice his religion.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC).
The First-tier Tribunal decision
6. The appeal was heard via a remote hearing on 9 April 2026. The judge heard oral evidence from the appellant via a Russian interpreter and recorded the submissions made by the representatives.
7. At [35] of his decision the judge noted the appellant’s claim during his asylum interview, conducted on 23 January 2024, that, as his 2019 detention was illegal and not authorised, no documentation was available to support this element of his claim. The appellant stated in answer to question 35 of his interview:
“I cannot provide any proof of detention or custody report. I got arrested against the law. I wish you could provide proof but I can’t.”
8. The appellant did however produce an official written report of his arrest for his appeal. He claimed that the official report was issued soon after his release in 2019. The judge surmised that the report would have been in his and his family’s possession for several years. The judge found this aspect of the appellant’s evidence contradictory and, whilst accepting that the detention occurred (because the respondent accepted it), the judge found the appellant had sent a fraudulent document to support an accepted event.
9. The judge also attached no weight to a short message on the appellant’s mobile phone from a friend. The judge stated:
“I find it’s been drafted to support his claim. The appellant could not recall when it been sent to him. He could give no explanation as to why this individual would have to tell the reader of the message that it was the appellant’s friend. I find it has clearly been prepared for the purposes of hearing and to bolster this appeal.”
10. The judge noted the appellant’s oral evidence that it was possible for him to practice his religion provided he stayed in the mosque until the end of prayers and did not have a long beard. The appellant stated that when he did not have a long beard in Tajikistan, he did not have any problems. The judge stated [16]:
“The appellant could be seen over the video link and had a beard of approximately 1-2 inches below his chin. He agreed that he was practising his faith in the United Kingdom without any issues. He agreed with the respondent’s assessment that he did not presently have a long beard.”
11. The judge noted that the appellant had family who continued to reside in Tajikistan and who experienced no issues practicing their faith, and that he had an uncle who had not grown a beard and who experienced no problems. The judge noted the security forces were not looking for the appellant and that he left Tajikistan on his own lawfully issued passport. The judge stated:
“The appellant accepts that he is free to practice his religion. The respondent acknowledges that the government have been enforcing a crackdown on what are seen as the adoption of fundamentalist Islamic cultural practices. There is no ban on religion. The respondent accepts that there is some discrimination. However, the threshold for a successful claim for asylum is not discrimination but persecution. The appellant would not be obliged to conceal his religious beliefs upon return. He accepts he has not had to conceal his religious beliefs and is freely able to practice his religion. He is a Sunni Muslim and it is not in dispute that this is the dominant religion of Tajikistan. For discrimination to amount to persecution there must be persistent and serious ill treatment without just cause. I do not find that the individual facts of this particular appeal reach this threshold. The appellant has been in the United Kingdom for four years. He has been free to do as he wishes. He has chosen to practice his faith and currently has a short beard. There is no indication that this would place him at any risk upon return. Whilst I accept therefore he has suffered some discrimination I do not find that the discrimination he has suffered amounted to persecutory ill-treatment nor would it in the future.”
12. The appeal was dismissed.
The appellant’s challenge, the grant of permission and the hearing before the Upper Tribunal.
13. The appellant seeks to challenge the FtT decision on 5 grounds.
i) The judge’s finding that the ‘official document’ supporting the appellant’s detention in 2019 was fraudulent was speculative and reached in a procedurally unfair manner. At most the judge’s rejection could have gone to the weight he attached to the document, but the judge essentially found that the appellant had been dishonest. The appellant was not given the opportunity of engaging with the judge’s concerns. This error was material as it affected the judge’s wider credibility assessment.
ii) The judge erred in law in concluding that the cumulative effect of the mistreatment suffered by the appellant (his arrest on two occasions, being beaten, having his beard forcibly shaved off, in the context of restrictions imposed on his religious freedom) was not sufficiently serious to amount to persecution.
iii) The judge misdirected himself by treating the appellant’s ability to avoid harm through compliance with state-imposed restrictions as an answer to the claim. The judge failed to apply the correct legal test set out in the Supreme Court decisions of HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 in respect of any modification of a person’s behaviour that involves a protected characteristic or the manifestation of a Refugee Convention reason.
iv) The judge failed to give adequate reasons for attaching no weight to the phone message, from the appellant’s friend, and there was no adequate engagement with the background country evidence insofar as it supported the appellant’s account (although this ground was not supported by any identification or particularisation of any relevant background evidence). The appellant further contends that the judge failed to engage in a holistic assessment of the evidence before him.
v) The judge erred by failing to properly assess the future risk to the appellant in light of his previous treatment by the Tajikistani authorities and the country evidence (again the relevant country evidence was not identified).
14. The appellant obtained permission to challenge the judge’s decision. In granting permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal Upper Tribunal Judge Neville stated:
“1. It was accepted by the Judge that on two occasions the appellant was subjected to illegal and unauthorised arrest by members of the Tajik authorities who were targeting perceived radical Islamic practices. His beard was forcibly shaved off and he was beaten, before being released on condition that he did not grow a long beard. It appears to have been further accepted that the appellant’s beard length would be similarly restricted if he were returned.
2. The reasons at [19] for dismissing the appeal are somewhat opaque, the Judge apparently treating the appellant’s wearing of a short beard in the UK as ruling out any religious persecution on return. Arguably that analysis was over-simplistic, the Judge instead being required to address why the appellant had done so, whether he would do so on return, and why, in accordance with the questions posed in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 at [35]. Depending on the answers, the issue would then arise as to whether the Secretary of State was right that requiring Muslims to wear short beards for fear of violence falls short of persecution.”
15. The respondent served a rule 24 Response which opposed each of the grounds of appeal and which was adopted by Ms Ahmed at the hearing. The appellant produced a skeleton argument in support of the appeal which was adopted by Mr Hasan at the hearing.
16. I have taken into account the submissions made by the parties at the hearing, and I will refer to those submissions insofar as they are relevant to my assessment of whether the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) erred in law.
Discussion
17. I must determine whether the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge made a legal mistake in his decision. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal judge to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge merely because the Upper Tribunal judge may have reached a different conclusion.
Ground 1
18. Although I find there is some merit in ground 1, I am not persuaded that any legal error is material. The respondent’s Review took issue with the reliability of the ‘official document’ for the same reasons given by the judge, and the respondent invited the judge to apply the principles in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 and attach only limited weight to the document given the expressed concerns as to its reliability. The judge arguably went further using the word ‘fraudulent’ and, on one view, approached the document on the basis that the appellant had been dishonest in producing it. The judge nevertheless does appear to have attached some weight to the document as he did not disregard it entirely but only placed “limited weight” on it. This approach is consistent with Tanveer Ahmed, and the judge was undoubtedly entitled to only attached limited weight for the reasons he gave at [15]. Any error of approach could not, in any event, have made any material difference to the ultimate central assessment the judge had to undertake, which was whether the appellant faced a real risk of persecution if returned to Tajikistan based on the accepted facts. A finding that the document was not genuine did not affected the accepted facts or the risk assessment that the judge had to make. The judge accepted that the two instances of detention occurred and the description given by the appellant of his treatment at the hands of the state authorities. The judge accepted the essential factual matrix advanced by the appellant. Any finding that the appellant had dishonestly produced a false document to support an event that was accepted to have happened did not materially impact on the risk assessment that was the central issue in the appeal.
Ground 2
19. The second ground asserts that the judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the treatment to which the appellant was subjected when he (the judge) determined that that treatment did not amount to persecution. I am not persuaded that this ground is made out. The judge was demonstrably aware of the treatment metered out to the appellant by the Tajik authorities. This is apparent from the judge’s record of the submissions ([12], [13]), and again in the section where he made his findings [15]. There is nothing in the decision, and in the judge’s conclusion at [15], to suggest that he failed to consider the treatment to which the appellant was subjected on a cumulative basis. The judge undertook an evaluative assessment of what happened to the appellant and concluded that this treatment, while discriminatory and deeply upsetting, did not amount to persecution. Another judge may have rationally reached a different conclusion having regard to the (albeit temporary) deprivation of the appellant’s liberty, the use of physical violence, and the use of coercion to shave his beard. But there has been no rationality challenge to this aspect of the judge’s decision, and I am not persuaded that the judge failed to consider the cumulative impact of the state’s treatment.
Ground 3
20. There is some merit in this ground to the extent that the judge ought to have applied the test set out in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 to determine whether requiring the appellant to have a short beard in order to avoid persecutory behaviour brought him within scope of the protections offered by the Refugee Convention. The judge however concluded that the treatment to which the appellant was subjected did not amount to persecution, which would have obviated the need to apply the HJ (Iran) test. But even if the judge had applied the test, I am not persuaded it could have led to any different conclusion. The issue of the length of the appellant’s beard was clearly raised during the FtT hearing (see [16]). The appellant had an opportunity in cross-examination or re-examination to proffer an explanation why he sported a short beard in the UK when there was no risk to him in so doing. No explanation was provided by the appellant, and no explanation was offered in submissions to the FtT judge. At the error of law hearing Mr Hasan accepted that the appellant had a short beard but submitted that he was entitled to choose the length of his beard. Mr Hasan accepted that the appellant could have chosen to have a long beard in the UK but invited me not to judge him on the current length of his beard but on what would happen to him if he returned to Tajikistan and chose to have a long beard.
21. I cannot accept Mr Hasan’s submissions. A person is not entitled to international protection simply because they want to enjoy the choice to have a long beard for religious reasons in circumstances where they have presented themselves as choosing to have a short beard when in a safe county. As Lord Hope stated in HJ (Iran) (at [35]), “… the fact that the applicant will not be able to do in the country of his nationality everything that he can do openly in the country whose protection he seeks is not the test. … the Convention was not directed to reforming the level of rights in the country of origin. So it would be wrong to approach the issue on the basis that the purpose of the Convention is to guarantee to an applicant who is gay that he can live as freely and as openly as a gay person as he would be able to do if he were not returned. It does not guarantee to everyone the human rights standards that are applied by the receiving country within its own territory. The focus throughout must be on what will happen in the country of origin”. Having a long beard is clearly not a characteristic that is fundamental to this particular appellant’s religious identity. Unlike the appellants in HJ (Iran) and RT (Zimbabwe) this appellant would not be required to modify his behaviour in a way that undermines or conflicts with the way in which he has manifested his religion beliefs whilst in a safe country. His presentation with a short beard at both the FtT hearing and the Upper Tribunal hearing is a powerful indicator of how he will conduct himself if returned to Tajikistan and strongly suggests that he would not sport a short beard because of any fear of persecution.
22. Had the FtT judge applied the approach established in HJ (Iran) he would have concluded that as the appellant is a Muslim and therefore has a characteristic that is protected by the Refugee Convention. The 2nd question is whether Muslims are liable to persecution in Tajikistan for practicing their religion. Whilst the respondent accepts there is discrimination, her view is that this discrimination is not sufficiently serious to cross the persecutory threshold. At the ‘error of law’ hearing Mr Hasan was (eventually) able to draw my attention to some articles in the appellant’s bundle prepared for the FtT hearing relating to the expulsion of Afghan refugees for refusing to shave their beards, the forcible shaving of nearly 13,000 men’s beards in 2015 in a region of Tajikistan, a ban on women wearing a hijab in educational institutions (but which essentially applies to all government departments), and a reference to the US State Department report of 2020 on religious freedom. None of the articles suggest that Muslims are otherwise prevented in any significant way from practicing their religion in Tajikistan, and one of the articles notes that 99% of the Tajik population is Muslim and that the majority are Sunni Muslims. The government’s actions appear to be an attempt to restrict perceived radical Islamic practices and preserve Tajik cultural integrity. Whilst these actions are to be deprecated, they do not in my judgment demonstrate that Muslims, in general, are subjected to persecution in Tajikistan. The judge was rationally entitled to find, in any event, that the treatment to which the appellant was subjected did not amount to persecution.
23. The next question in the HJ (Iran) test is what the appellant would actually do if returned to Tajikistan. His presentation on two occasions before the Tribunals with a short beard strongly militates against any finding that he would now choose to have a long beard for religious reasons. His presentations also inform any question as to why he would have a short beard. He has voluntary chosen to have a short beard in a safe country without any restrictions on beard length. I conclude that the appellant would not feel compelled to have a short beard for fear of ill-treatment, and that there would be no denial or suppression of any fundamental aspect of his identity if he was required to maintain a short beard only.
Ground 4
24. I take this ground briefly. At [17] the judge gave clear and cogent reasons for attaching no weight to the message from the appellant’s friend. The reasons (the appellant’s inability to recall when the message was sent to him, the lack of any explanation as to why the individual would have to tell the reader of the message that he was the appellant’s friend) were sufficient to entitle the judge to conclude that the message was prepared for the purpose of the asylum hearing. The challenge is essentially a disagreement with a factual finding reasonably open to the judge on the basis of the evidence before him and for the reasons given.
Ground 5
25. In light of the judge’s conclusion that the treatment suffered by the appellant in 2019 and 2021 was not persecution, and the judge’s acknowledgment that the appellant has now chosen to have a short beard, there is no merit in the contention that the judge failed to properly assess the issue of future risk. As the appellant had chosen to have a short beard, there was no basis for concluding that any ill-treatment in the past, which arose due to him having a longer beard, would be repeated. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds, the judge was entitled to place weight on the absence of any indication that the Tajik authorities were looking for him, and the fact that the appellant remained free to practice his religion.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision does NOT contain any material error of law requiring it to be set aside. The appeal is DISMISSED.

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 October 2026