Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003415

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50921/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

L1
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Did not attend
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 24 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Venezuela, born on 22 September 1955. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hanley (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 31 March 2026, dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim under Appendix ADR.
2. The Appellant applied for entry clearance as an adult dependent relative on 1 December 2024. The Respondent refused that application on 9 January 2025. The Respondent accepted that the relationship and financial requirements of Appendix Adult Dependent Relative were met, but did not accept that the Appellant satisfied the dependency requirements in ADR 5.1 and ADR 5.2.
3. The Judge determined the appeal on the papers. The Judge found that the Appellant did not require long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks and had not shown that appropriate assistance in Venezuela was unavailable or unaffordable. The Judge accepted the existence of Article 8 family life between the Appellant and his son, but concluded that the refusal of entry clearance was proportionate.
4. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal. On 24 June 2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge McQuillan granted permission on three grounds of appeal, namely
4.1 the Judge’s treatment of the medical, psychological and social evidence;
4.2 the Judge making speculative findings about the availability of alternative support; and
4.3 the Judge’s erroneous findings infected the Article 8 proportionality assessment.
Attendance and proceeding in the Appellant’s absence
5. Neither the Appellant nor his son and sponsor attended the hearing before me. The Respondent was represented by Mr Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer.
6. The Appellant resides in Venezuela. By an application dated 27 August 2026, he requested that his personal attendance at Field House be dispensed with and that the error of law hearing proceed in his absence. He confirmed that he continued to pursue the appeal and relied upon the written grounds, the rule 25 reply and the documents filed in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions.
7. On 4 September 2026, the Upper Tribunal informed the Appellant that he had not been under any obligation to attend and that his son could, if the Appellant wished, attend and put forward the Appellant’s case in his absence. Before the hearing commenced, enquiries were made concerning attendance. The sponsor communicated that he would not be attending and had confirmed that position in writing.
8. I was satisfied that notice of the hearing had been properly served upon both parties. The Appellant had expressly requested that the hearing proceed notwithstanding his absence.
9. I considered the overriding objective and rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the Appellant’s absence. Neither the Appellant nor the sponsor sought an adjournment, the Appellant had provided detailed written grounds and an extensive rule 25 reply. The issues had been clearly identified and the Appellant’s case was capable of being determined fairly by reference to those written submissions and the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal.
Rule 24 response
10. In the rule 24 response dated 14 July 2026, the Respondent opposed the appeal. The Respondent submitted that the Judge gave sustainable reasons for attaching limited weight to the psychological and social reports. Those reasons included the limited reference to wider medical evidence, a lack of detail concerning the psychologist’s professional standing, the absence of evidence that the recommended psychological treatment had been sought, and the absence of evidence that such treatment was unavailable or unaffordable.
11. The Respondent submitted that the Judge’s findings concerning neighbours, social contacts and the Appellant’s daughter were rooted in the evidence. The Judge had not found that a particular person would provide long-term care, rather the Judge found that the Appellant had not discharged the burden of establishing that assistance was unavailable or unaffordable.
12. The Respondent further submitted that the Article 8 assessment was structured, transparent and comprehensive. The Judge expressly considered the factors weighing on each side and concluded that the cumulative circumstances did not outweigh the public interest in maintaining immigration control.
Rule 15(2A) application
13. The Appellant made an application under rule 15(2A) to admit additional evidence, including a supplemental witness statement from the sponsor, updated country evidence, medication prices and evidence of household expenses.
14. The Appellant expressly stated in that application that the new evidence was not relied upon to establish an error of law. He relied upon it only in the event that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside and the appeal proceeded to remaking.
15. That was the correct procedural distinction. Whether the Judge erred in law must be determined by reference to the evidence and circumstances before it. The subsequent material cannot retrospectively establish an error of law. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the substantive admissibility or weight of that evidence unless the decision is set aside.
Rule 25 Reply
16. The Appellant responded in a detailed rule 25 reply dated 16 July 2026. He submitted that the Judge failed to engage with material parts of the psychological evidence, including severe depression, apparent suicidal ideation, self-neglect, disrupted eating, impaired daily functioning and the recommendation for daily support and medication monitoring.
17. The Appellant submitted that the social report followed a home visit and recorded that he lived alone in unsuitable conditions, lacked sufficient food and personal hygiene products, and required supervised medication and assistance with daily living. The Appellant contended that past access to cardiology treatment did not answer the question whether continuing personal care, psychological treatment, medication supervision and practical support were reasonably available.
18. The Appellant submitted that expressions of concern by neighbours were not evidence that neighbours were willing or able to provide long-term care. A historic private life or former professional status did not constitute a care plan and him having a daughter in Spain did not establish that in-country care was available in Venezuela.
19. The Appellant submitted that the Judge’s description of the proportionality assessment as finely balanced and determined by a narrow margin supported the materiality of the alleged errors.
Upper Tribunal Hearing
20. At the hearing, the Respondent relied upon the rule 24 response. Mr Tufan stated that the weight to be attached to the reports was a matter for the Judge and the Judge had considered the reports in detail, identified their shortcomings and reached conclusions that were reasonably open to him.
21. Mr Tufan submitted that there was an evidential gap concerning the possibility of obtaining paid or other practical assistance in Venezuela. There was no evidence addressing whether somebody could be engaged to assist with shopping, medication or other daily tasks, or what such assistance would cost.
22. I drew the Respondent’s attention to the social report at CB/106 and to paragraph 37 of the Judge’s decision. Mr Tufan accepted that the report did not demonstrate that the neighbours could provide continuing care. However, he maintained that the Judge’s references to neighbours and social contacts formed part of the evidential context and did not amount to a finding that the neighbours had undertaken responsibility for the Appellant’s care.
23. The Respondent submitted that if the Judge had not materially erred in respect of grounds 1 and 2, the proportionality assessment under ground 3 could not independently succeed.
Legal framework
24. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal summarised the restrictive approach to appellate interference with findings of fact. An appellate tribunal must not substitute its own assessment for that of the judge who determined the evidence. It must assume, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, that the judge took the whole of the evidence into account.
25. The same principles apply to evaluative judgments and to the weight afforded to evidence. The question is not whether the appellate tribunal would have given the evidence different weight. It is whether the decision discloses a material misdirection, failure to consider material evidence, irrationality, procedural unfairness or legally inadequate reasoning.
26. The need for appellate restraint does not remove the requirement for the losing party must be able to understand why the case was lost. A material failure to engage with evidence going to the central issue may amount to an error of law. The authorities demonstrate that it is necessary for there to be an assessment of the substance of the reasoning, rather than a search for minor infelicities of expression.
Expert evidence
27. Expert evidence is intended to assist the Tribunal on matters requiring specialist knowledge. It does not determine the ultimate factual or legal issues and does not bind the Tribunal. In HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal gave detailed guidance concerning psychiatric and other mental health evidence. The Tribunal remains responsible for evaluating the report alongside the other evidence. Matters relevant to weight may include the expert’s qualifications, the instructions received, the material considered, the methodology employed, consideration of alternative explanations, and whether the opinion trespasses upon matters reserved to the judicial fact-finder. A Tribunal must not disregard expert evidence without proper consideration. Equally, it is not required to accept an expert’s conclusions merely because they are expressed in professional terms. The weight attached to an opinion remains a matter for the fact-finder, provided the Tribunal has engaged with the material substance of the report and given adequate reasons for its conclusions.
Adequacy of reasons
28. In MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal emphasised that a party is entitled to know why the case has been lost. Where evidence central to the outcome is rejected or materially discounted, the Tribunal must give reasons sufficient to explain that conclusion. In Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that it is generally unnecessary for a judge to resolve every evidential conflict or refer to every piece of evidence. The decision must identify and resolve the principal controversial issues. The reasons must be adequate, but need not be elaborate.
Analysis and Conclusions
Ground 1: Treatment of the professional evidence
29. It is contended that the Judge improperly assessed the medical, psychological and social evidence and gave inadequate reasons for attaching little weight to the psychological and social reports.
30. The Judge stated at paragraph 34 that he had weighed and considered all the evidence in the round. That statement is not conclusive, but it provides the context in which the subsequent detailed findings are read.
31. At paragraph 35, the Judge made findings about the Appellant’s age, bereavement, family circumstances, cardiac history, medical treatment and medication. The Judge expressly found that the Appellant had suffered a significant bereavement. He considered the medical reports dated 1 October 2024 and 13 January 2025. He noted that the earlier report recorded no angina, dyspnoea or palpitations, whereas the later report referred to dyspnoea without identifying a clear timescale. The Judge gave less weight to that aspect of the later report because the chronology of the claimed deterioration was unclear. The Judge expressly stated that he had regard to the diagnoses and recommended treatment contained in both medical reports. He identified the medication prescribed and accepted that the Appellant had been treated over a significant period.
32. At paragraph 36, the Judge addressed the psychological report prepared by Dr Faltone. He accepted that it established that the Appellant was struggling with bereavement and had a clinically significant state of depression which appeared to have followed his wife’s death. He observed that there was limited reference to medical notes or other medical evidence, considered the recommendations to lack adequate particularisation, and noted the absence of evidence concerning whether professional psychological care had been obtained or was unavailable or unaffordable.
33. The Appellant is right in contending that the psychological report contained findings beyond the bare existence of bereavement and depression. It recorded disturbed eating, reduced self-care, sleep disturbance, diminished energy and interest, difficulties with attention and concentration, severe depression and apparent suicidal ideation. It recommended psychotherapeutic treatment, possible pharmacological treatment and a change in the Appellant’s social circumstances.
34. The Judge was not required rehearse every finding and it is possible that another judge might have ascribed greater significance to other matters. The question for me is whether the Judge’s treatment of the evidence disclosed a material error of law.
35. The decision must be read as a whole. The findings at paragraph 35 have already been referenced. At paragraph 36, the Judge accepted that the Appellant had a clinically significant state of depression which seems to have been brought on by the bereavement. At paragraph 48, the Judge considered the psychological and social evidence when examining the existence of family life. At paragraph 57, he placed the Appellant’s bereavement, depression and ill health on the Appellant’s side of the proportionality balance.
36. I therefore do not conclude that the Judge overlooked the substance of the psychological evidence. The Judge accepted its central diagnosis but did not accept that the report, viewed with the remaining evidence, established the functional dependency required by ADR 5.1 or the unavailability and unaffordability requirements in ADR 5.2.
37. The Judge was entitled to consider the evidential foundations and scope of the report. The report was prepared by a psychologist after an interview and psychological testing. It did not provide evidence about the practical availability, location, cost or accessibility of continuing psychological treatment or personal care in Venezuela. Those matters fell outside the report’s demonstrated evidential basis.
38. I accept the criticism that the Appellant levels at the Judge’s observation that the report gave insufficient information about professional standing of the psychologist. The report identified the author as a psychologist, provided a registration number, appeared on headed paper and described the tests administered. The report was not devoid of information about its authorship or methodology. However, the Judge properly considered the relationship between the report and the wider evidence, the absence of evidence concerning treatment arrangements, the generality of some recommendations, and whether the report established that the requirements of the Immigration Rules were met. The Judge did not reject the diagnosis of depression or substitute his own medical diagnosis. He assessed the legal and evidential significance of the professional findings when determining whether the requirements of ADR 5.1 and ADR 5.2 were established.
39. At paragraph 37, the Judge addressed the social report. The report recorded the Appellant’s living conditions, financial dependence, limited food and personal hygiene products, contact with neighbours, grief and the stated need for supervised medication and assistance with daily living. The Judge observed that the report was consistent with the Appellant having accessed cardiology treatment over several years. He considered that the report did not adequately explain why the Appellant required supervision to ensure compliance with treatment and dietary requirements. He accepted that life might be a struggle and that the report described cumulative factors adversely affecting the Appellant’s quality of life, but concluded that the high threshold under the Rules had not been met.
40. The Appellant contends that this reasoning failed to consider the reports cumulatively. I do not accept that submission. Paragraphs 35 to 37 address the medical, psychological and social material. The Judge expressly referred to weighing the evidence in the round and later incorporated accepted aspects of that evidence into the Article 8 assessment.
41. It would have been preferable for the Judge to have specifically addressed the relationship between the cardiac medication, the psychological findings about self-neglect, and the social report’s recommendation for supervision. However, the Judge’s reasoning is sufficiently clear. He accepted that the Appellant had chronic cardiac conditions requiring medication, had experienced a significant bereavement, suffered from depression, lived alone and encountered practical difficulties. The Judge was not satisfied that the evidence established that the Appellant required long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
42. At paragraph 39, the Judge considered the claimed need for assistance with medication, meals, medical appointments and basic personal needs. He found no significant suggestion that the Appellant could not dress himself or attend to his personal hygiene, and identified an absence of sufficient explanation as to why specific practical assistance could not be obtained.
43. At paragraphs 40 to 44, the Judge considered the Appellant’s access to medication, the absence of specific evidence about its cost, the substantial monthly remittances, the absence of a particularised breakdown of expenditure and the alleged unavailability of practical assistance.
44. Those findings demonstrate that the Judge did not treat the psychological and social reports as irrelevant. He weighed them against the other evidence and found that they did not discharge the burden of proof. The weight afforded to those reports was a matter for the Judge.
45. Whilst this ground 1 clearly identifies matters upon which another fact-finder might have reached a different conclusion, it does not establish that the conclusion reached was irrational, that material evidence was ignored, or that the Judge’s reasons were inadequate. There is therefore no material error of law in this regard.
Ground 2: Speculation concerning alternative support not made out.
46. The Appellant contends that the Judge speculated that the Appellant could obtain help from neighbours, retained a network of friends and associations, and might receive support from his daughter in Spain. At paragraph 37, the Judge stated:
“It is not at all clear in my judgement as to why the appellant “requires supervision to ensure adherence to his treatment and dietary regimen. The appellant clearly has neighbours, who he has contact with and who are referred to in the report.”
47. That was factually correct. The social report stated that several neighbours had been contacted and had expressed concern about the Appellant’s living conditions and sadness. The report therefore established the existence of neighbours with whom the Appellant had some interaction. The Judge did not state at paragraph 37 that those neighbours had agreed to provide long-term personal care. Nor did he find that expressions of concern were equivalent to a care arrangement.
48. At paragraph 43, the Judge concludes:
“I am not persuaded that the appellant is unable to obtain assistance in connection with the tasks that he now finds difficult, such as carrying shopping or preparing meals.”
49. At paragraph 44, the judge made the basis of his conclusion clear:
“The burden of proof is on the appellant, and I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that help is unavailable in Venezuela, nor that it is unaffordable.”
50. Read in context, these are conclusions about the sufficiency of the Appellant’s evidence. The Judge was not making a positive finding that an identified person had agreed to provide assistance. The conclusion reflected the Judge’s finding that the Appellant had not proved that such assistance was unavailable. That was an application of the burden of proof. The Judge therefore did not reverse the burden or require the Respondent to prove that a carer existed.
51. At paragraph 57(o), in the Article 8 balance, the Judge stated that the Appellant had lived in Venezuela throughout his life, had practised as a lawyer and could reasonably be expected to retain an accumulated private life and network of friendships and associations. The Judge was entitled to infer that a person who had lived and worked in the same country throughout his life was likely to have formed a private life and social associations there. That is not the same as finding that those associations could provide long-term personal care or respond to emergencies.

52. At paragraph 57(p), the Judge noted that the Appellant had a daughter living in Spain and that there was limited information about any support she provided [if any]. Again, the Judge did not find that the daughter could provide daily personal care in Venezuela. The Judge was entitled to identify the limited evidence about the wider family circumstances as part of the overall assessment. The limited state of the evidence concerning the daughter did not operate as positive proof that she could provide the care required.
53. The Appellant submits that the Judge converted the absence of an identified carer into proof that a carer probably existed. I do not consider that to be a proper reading of the decision. The Judge did not identify a specific person who would provide care. He found that the Appellant had not established that practical assistance was unavailable or unaffordable. The burden rested upon the Appellant to establish that proposition. The Judge had evidence that the sponsor sent approximately £520 each month to the Appellant. This was described that as a significant remittance in hard currency, particularly when compared with the evidence concerning the Appellant’s pension.
54. There was no particularised budget before the Judge showing how the remittances were spent. Further, there was no evidence before the Judge identifying the cost of paid practical assistance, explaining what enquiries had been made, or demonstrating that such assistance could not be obtained. The subsequent attempt to address medication and household costs through the rule 15(2A) application does not establish that the Judge erred on the evidence then available.
55. I do not consider that the Judge’s references to neighbours, social contacts and the daughter did not constitute material speculation. They formed part of the evidential background. The direct evidence established that neighbours had expressed concern and that the Appellant’s children lived abroad. There was no finding that the neighbours themselves could or would provide long-term care. However, the evidence did not establish that there was no paid or other reasonable assistance was available for tasks such as shopping, meal preparation or obtaining medication. The relevant finding was that the Appellant had not discharged the burden of proof in this regard.
56. There is therefore no material error of law in this regard.
Ground 3: Article 8 proportionality
57. Ground 3 is parasitic upon Grounds 1 and 2. It is evident that any errors under those grounds were capable of infecting the proportionality assessment.
58. The Judge accepted that the sponsor’s support was meaningful, real and effective and that the relationship went beyond the ordinary emotional ties between adult family members. The Judge therefore found that Article 8 family life existed.
59. The Judge accepted that refusal had consequences of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8. He then considered the lawfulness and legitimate aim of the interference and undertook a proportionality assessment.
60. At paragraph 57, the Judge expressly identified the considerations weighing in the Appellant’s favour and balanced them against the Respondent’s side. At paragraph 58, the Judge stated that the scales were finely balanced and that the balance fell in favour of the Respondent by a narrow margin. He concluded that the cumulative factors relied upon by the Appellant did not outweigh the public interest or establish unjustifiably harsh consequences.
61. The fact that the case was finely balanced does not itself establish legal error. It means that an error in the factual foundations of the balance might readily have been material. I therefore scrutinised Grounds 1 and 2 with that consideration in mind. For the reasons already given, the Judge’s treatment of the professional evidence was legally permissible and its findings concerning the availability of practical assistance did not amount to material speculation.
62. Therefore, I do not conclude that there was any erroneous factual foundation which infected the proportionality assessment. The Judge identified the material competing considerations, took account of the accepted medical and psychological circumstances and reached an evaluative conclusion which was reasonably open to him.
63. The Appellant’s submissions invite the Upper Tribunal to attach greater weight to the Appellant’s circumstances and less weight to the public interest. That would involve substituting a different proportionality assessment rather than identifying an error of law.
64. There is therefore no material error of law in this regard.
Conclusion
65. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal fail and are dismissed. As such the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hanley shall stand.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hanley shall stand.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 September 2026