Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003433
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67201/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jegede a solicitor
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and background
1. This is the appeal of AG, who has the benefit of an anonymity direction in this appeal. It was heard at Field House on Wednesday, 2 September 2026. The representative for the appellant is Mr Jegede, represented the appellant in the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. The respondent is represented by Ms Keerty, a Home Office Presenting Officer.
2. The appellant is a 27-year-old Albanian national from Shkodra in the north of Albania. She entered the United Kingdom in November 2022, claiming asylum and humanitarian protection on 17 November 2022. Her protection claim was based on her fear of harm from a man who trafficked and exploited her in Albania, known as “Kristjan”, and/or her fear of being re-trafficked if returned to Albania.
3. The Secretary of State accepted her nationality and accepted that she had been exploited in Albania. The Secretary of State rejected the claim that she was at risk on return and also argued that internal relocation would be a possible solution if she were to feel at risk in her home area.
4. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mascord on 30 March 2026, who dismissed the claim on all grounds on 12 April 2026. The appellant was given permission to appeal by Judge McQuillan, who identified three grounds. Ground one was that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the possibility of re-trafficking of the appellant upon return to Albania. Ground two was that the Judge had erred in consideration of AD and Others v Sweden (22283/21) and its application to the appellant’s circumstances when considering the availability of protection to the appellant in Albania. Ground three related to the Judge’s assessment of Article 8 ECHR and her alleged failure to attach proper weight and significance to the appellant’s mental health when taking a balance sheet approach.
5. The Judge granting permission considered that ground two demonstrated an arguable error of law. The appellant was an accepted victim of trafficking and therefore AD and Others v Sweden did not provide adequate guidance in relation to her case. It dealt with the generality of people in Albania rather than her specific circumstances. Whilst identifying ground two as the principal ground, permission to appeal was granted on all grounds.
6. The respondent, in the Rule 24 response, asserted that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had taken into account the risk of re-trafficking. The Judge had taken into account the full details of the appellant’s case, summarising that the appellant feared harm from traffickers and feared being re-trafficked. At [32] of her decision, the First-tier Tribunal had specifically referred to the risk of re-trafficking and had referred extensively to the leading Upper Tribunal case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC). The Judge nevertheless concluded that the appellant would not be at risk of re-trafficking due to her age, intelligence and resourcefulness.
7. As to ground two, the case of AD and Others v Sweden was considered as part of the overall assessment, noting that if the appellant had, as claimed, been known by the authorities, then she would be likely to receive the additional protection that she required. The First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of this issue was characterised by the respondent as being a finding that not all victims of trafficking would have a sufficiency of protection, but that the individual circumstances needed to be assessed. This is what had occurred in this case.
8. In relation to ground three, the respondent submitted that the claimant’s family life, relying on the support of her brother and sister-in-law, did not amount to strong family life. Furthermore, the appellant had strong family ties and support in Albania.
9. There was also a Rule 25 response from the appellant in reply to the Rule 24 response, pointing out minor errors in the grounds but also pointing out that TD and AD was the stronger authority, being a country guidance case, and it was not adequately considered by the Judge.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
10. Before me, in summary, Ms Keerthy pointed out that it is only really if the first ground gets off the ground that one has to consider the second ground. The first ground she described as being a sound conclusion that Kristjan, the appellant’s alleged trafficker in Albania, no longer posed a threat to the appellant. The issue had been dealt with at length at paragraphs 27 et cetera of the decision. The Judge had fully considered the risk potentially posed by this individual and his network at paragraphs 28 and 29.
11. The appellant had been in the United Kingdom since 2022. She had not received any threats from Kristjan who had had no further contact with her since her arrival. She confirmed in her oral evidence that her parents had not received contact from Kristjan since then and somewhat inconsistently said in an interview that “threats were made against girls’ families” (see paragraph 28 of the decision). The lack of any reported threats was sufficient for the Judge to conclude that she was no longer of interest to him or his network.
12. Ms Keerthy said that in the alternative, if she had to go on to deal with ground two, which is the ground which attacks the Judge’s excessive reliance on the case of AD and Others v Sweden, she submitted that the Judge had carried out a proper balancing exercise, referring to the leading House of Lords case of Horvath. TD and AD did not interfere with the country guidance which had been fully summarised. The Judge had looked at the degree of protection available to the appellant if she returned to her home area. She did not in fact deal with internal relocation because it was unnecessary for her to do so in the light of those findings.
13. Mr Jegede provided a full response in his oral and written submissions but essentially did not dispute that if ground one was unsuccessful ground two became academic.
Conclusion
14. Although his submissions are persuasive, I agree with Ms Keerthy that if ground one does not get off the ground, the attack on ground two is no longer sustainable. Reluctantly, as stated above, Mr Jegede had to accept this at the hearing.
15. Overall, this was a thorough and well-reasoned decision. There may have been difficulties in emphasis in relation to the case of AD and Others v Sweden and the Judge may be criticised for not making further reference to TD and AD. However, the findings in relation to ground one do appear to have been sufficiently strong to be sustainable. It may be, if ground two in isolation that there may have been an error of law but it was not material given the finding of ground one. Certainly, there is an argument that there was an error but it is unnecessary to reach a conclusion on this ground.
16. Ground three is not a separately sustainable ground of attack but, in any event, I do consider it something of a makeweight in this particular case. Article 8 does appears to have been fully assessed by the Judge.
17. For these reasons, I have found that there was no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I reach that conclusion with some hesitation, given the respondent’s finding that she had been trafficked. However, this was a careful decision to which the Judge gave anxious scrutiny.
18. Therefore, the appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The anonymity direction is maintained.

William Hanbury

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 September 2026