UI-2026-003463
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003463
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58675/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
2nd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
Between
Fengjuan Li
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Haywood, counsel instructed by Spencer West LLP
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 23 October 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their human rights appeal following a hearing which took place on 6 May 2026.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. I take into account the principle of open justice and see no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual and procedural background
3. The appellant is a national of China now aged fifty-three who entered the United Kingdom as a visitor in 2019. On 02 April 2024 the appellant made an application for further leave to remain as the unmarried partner of Mr Rishu Jiang. That application was refused by way of a decision dated 18 July 2024 and this is the decision under appeal. In short, the reasons provided by the respondent for refusing the claim included that the Eligibility Immigration Status and English Language Requirements were not met. Furthermore, the respondent accepted that the appellant’s relationship with her partner was genuine and subsisting such that it came within the exemption in EX.1 of Appendix FM to the Rules, however it was not accepted that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in China, in accordance with paragraph EX.2.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, it was agreed that the appellant and Mr Jiang were in a genuine and subsisting relationship. It was in dispute whether the appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with Mr Jiang’s children from a previous relationship, whether there was insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK and whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to her re-integration in China. The last issue in dispute was whether the refusal of the appellant’s human rights claim amounted to a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 rights. All four issues were decided in favour of the Secretary of State.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
The judge materially misdirected himself in law when considering whether the appellant and her partner (and family) faced ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to the continuation of family life together outside of the UK.
6. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
It is at least arguable that the judge may have conflated the insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK test contained in paragraph EX.1 and EX.2 of Appendix FM of the immigration rules and the Chikwamba principles (also see Alam v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 30) in circumstances where it was accepted that the appellant’s partner had regular contact with his children in the UK and that it would not be reasonable to expect the children to relocate to China.
7. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 6 August 2026, in which the appeal was opposed for the brief reasons provided.
The error of law hearing
8. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
10. It suffices to say that Ms McKenzie conceded that the First-tier Tribunal made the alleged error however, she argued that any error was not material because of the judge’s conclusion that the appellant could return to China to seek entry clearance.
11. I informed the parties that I was satisfied that the error was material and proceeded to remake the appeal, inviting further submissions. Neither representative had any new points to raise which had not already been made in their submissions going to error of law. At the end of the hearing, I announced that the appeal was allowed.
Analysis and Conclusions
12. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. I remind myself of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22, at [72].
13. Given the parties’ agreement as to the existence of the argued error, I can be brief. In short, the judge made a series of factual findings regarding the appellant’s family life with her partner which are encapsulated in paragraph [25] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision
I accept that the Sponsor sees his children regularly. He has also provided evidence of regular communication with them, and I accept that he remains involved in their upbringing. I further accept that the Sponsor is a British citizen who has established his own business in the UK. Taken together, I do not find that he can reasonably be expected to relocate permanently to China with the Appellant. To do so would, in practice, require him to sacrifice his established life in the UK, and would carry a risk of compromising his relationship with his minor children.
14. I should add that Ms McKenzie urged me to preserve those findings which were, understandably, not subject to any challenge on the appellant’s behalf.
15. Despite the above mentioned findings, the judge concluded that there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside of the UK because either the appellant could leave the United Kingdom temporarily to seek entry clearance or the sponsor could temporarily relocate [26-33]. Those considerations do not form part of the requirements under EX.1 and, in taking those matters into account while assessing insurmountable obstacles, the judge misdirected themselves.
16. Ex.1(b) of Appendix FM reads:
the applicant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, settled in the UK … and there are insurmountable obstacles to family life with that partner continuing outside the UK.’
17. EX.2 provides the definition of insurmountable obstacles in the following terms:
For the purposes of paragraph EX.1.(b) “insurmountable obstacles” means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner.
18. The error made by the judge is material given the findings at [25] as well as the judge’s correct understanding at [12] that the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the Rules would normally be determinative in terms of how the balance in the proportionality assessment should be struck. The said findings express clear acceptance that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in China, the country of proposed return. Those obstacles include the emotional and financial support the appellant’s partner provides for his three British minor children from a former relationship and who live with their mother. It is not in dispute that the children could not be expected to leave the UK.
19. As indicated above, having announced that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law, setting aside that decision and preserving all factual findings, Ms McKenzie had no further submissions to make. Indeed, neither did Mr Heywood.
20. The judge’s findings at [25] were that the appellant’s partner could not be expected to leave the United Kingdom to live in China with the appellant owing, primarily, to his subsisting parental relationship with his British citizen children as well as the business he runs in the United Kingdom. This finding demonstrates that the requirements of EX.1.b are met. In those circumstances, the appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is determinative of the appeal which is, accordingly, allowed.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside with all findings preserved.
The appeal is allowed.
T Kamara
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
26 October 2026