Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003468
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64671/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HUGHES

Between

NKM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. E. Atas, Counsel.
For the Respondent: Ms. S. McKenzie, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 15 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘The Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Hatton Cross on 27 February 2026, in which the Judge refused her protection and Human Rights appeal.

2. The Appellant is a citizen of Botswana who claims that she would be at risk of persecution on return as a victim of gender-based violence at the hands of an abusive former partner and by reason of her political opinion as a member of the Botswana Patriotic Front. The same factors, together with complex health issues, would present very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration on return.

3. The Respondent’s decision dated 24 November 2023 accepted the Appellant’s identity, but little else about her claim. In the event that the Appellant’s claim in relation to her former partner was found to be credible, any risk could be addressed by the sufficiency of state protection and internal relocation. Health care was available on return.

4. The Judge’s findings are set out from [18] of the decision under challenge leading to it being found at [32-43]:

32. I therefore find that the appellant was the victim of sexual assaults in Botswana on one occasion by her ex-partner on another occasion by two of her ex-partner’s friends. Both of these events happened in a relatively short period of time. Within two months of the sexual assault the appellant left Botswana. She left on her own passport. She left on a validly issued Visa. This would be a further indication that she was not of interest to the authorities. I accept that she went to a meeting of a newly formed political party. But I do not accept that she was an active member of this party who has come to the adverse attention of the authorities.

33. If I were wrong on the above conclusions regarding the appellant’s ex-partner and he does pose some localised threats to the appellant which the local police forces could not resolve I find that would be the option of internal relocation. Again the respondent’s CPIN notes:

5. Internal relocation
5.1.1 A woman is likely to be able to relocate to avoid persecution or serious harm from a non-state actor.
5.1.2 This is because in general there are parts of Botswana - such as Gaborone, Francistown or Maun - where it will be reasonable to expect a woman to relocate.

34. The appellant’s mother has various medical conditions for which she takes medication. The appellant’s son resides with her in Botswana.

35. The final issue for consideration is whether the appellant would face very significant obstacle should she return. For the reasons given above I have found that the appellant would be afforded a sufficiency of protection in her home area if required. However, my primary finding is that there would be no need for a sufficiency of protection to be considered. I do not accept that the appellant’s partner as any ongoing interest in the appellant. Their very brief relationship was about 6/7 years ago.

36. If the appellant returned to her family home she would therefore have the support of her mother and would be reunited with her son. This would make her reintegration that little bit easier.

37. There is an alternative position where the appellant could seek to internally relocate and re-establish herself. It would be a matter for her whether she wished to leave her son with her mother or have her son come and join her in a different part of the country. As the appellant has been the victim of a sexual assault I accept that she has a subjective fear of return. For the reasons given above I have found this not to be objectively well-founded. In considering her ability to reintegrate I bear in mind that she is vulnerable and a former victim of sexual assault. I also bear in mind that shortly after her arrival in the United Kingdom she entered into another relationship and had an abortion. The appellant was not therefore socially isolating or opposed to having further relationships.

38. The expert report (SuppB2 – 103, 105, 109) considers the possibility of return. At paragraph 71 the expert addresses “very significant obstacles”. The expert notes that Botswana experiences high levels of unemployment, limited welfare provision and a scarcity of affordable housing. Women returning alone, especially without reliable family support face considerable barriers to securing employment, accommodation and community integration. Individuals returning without financial resources, secure networks or robust mental health face increased risks of poverty, social isolation and destitution. These barriers are compounded by the stigma and discrimination, experienced by women who have separate and abusive partners who attempt to live independently without family support.

39. The GP records (SuppB2 – 11) note in 2021 that the appellant had fallen pregnant to a “long-term partner” but was “not ready for baby yet.” By March 2024 (SuppB2 – 26) the appellant describes her situation being better. She has obtained some temporary work but found it difficult to open a bank account. The appellant only arrived in United Kingdom in 2019 and by 2021 was in a “long term” relationship. It appears this relationship is no longer in existence as no mention of a partner was made in the hearing. The appellant had also managed to secure some temporary work with agencies. In Botswana the appellant used to be actively involved in her church and at the hearing confirmed that she frequently travelled to South Africa for various church activities (SB 200).

40. Regarding access to treatment in Botswana the respondent review notes: ‘It is highlighted that the A has submitted evidence of a prescription of Mirtazapine [SB Page 90], it is not clear that this prescription is ongoing or that the A requires long-term mental health treatment that would not be accessible to her as a citizen of Botswana. It is also highlighted that the A’s counselling concluded on 7 July 2025 [SB Page 112], there is no further evidence that confirms the A is currently undergoing counselling. The A has failed to produce evidence that suggests she is currently undergoing treatment for her mental health that would not be accessible to her on return to Botswana.’

41. The expert report at paragraph 50 (SuppB2 – 105) states that it is: “highly unlikely that she would be able to secure the level of treatment, regular therapeutic source or uninterrupted access to medication her clinical conditions requires. The capacity of Botswana’s mental health system to accommodate individuals with complex trauma and depressive disorders is extremely limited, and the appellant’s need for continued medication, structured therapy and stable follow-up care would intersect with systemic constraints that have been widely documented. The evidence indicates that ability to maintain psychological stability would be significantly compromised if required to rely on Botswana’s current mental health infrastructure.”

42. The appellant’s latest witness statement at paragraph 13 first here [sic] being placed on a waiting list for CBT.

43. Overall I find that the appellant may face some obstacles upon return but in combination I do not find these to be very significant obstacles. The appellant has employment experience. She has family in country. Her mother obtains medication through the state for her own health needs. Having considered the expert reports and country information referenced I find that the appellant would be able to return and reintegrate into Botswanan society. I therefore find there are no very significant obstacles to a possible return and reintegration.

5. In her application for permission to appeal the Judge’s decision, dated 19 March 2026, the Appellant alleges the Judge had erred in law as follows:

(i) The Judge failed to lawfully determine the proportionality of removal, in particular by failing to consider the disruption of the Appellant’s individualised treatment plan and the absence of any equivalent programme in Botswana.

(ii) The Judge failed to determine whether the Appellant was at risk of gender-based violence on return.

(iii) The Judge failed properly to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note, No 2 of 2010, and in particular failed to consider the extent to which the vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of any discrepancy or lack of clarity in the Appellant’s evidence.

6. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Stevenson on 29 June 2026, limited to ground 1.

7. A Rule 24 response was served on behalf of the Respondent on 17 July 2026, in which it was accepted that Ground 1 discloses a material error of law as follows:

4. The respondent accepts that the FTTJ materially erred by failing to conduct an Article 8 proportionality assessment. Although the original appeal skeleton argument dated 21 April 2024 did not include any submissions on Article 8 proportionality, nor any submissions on what is now included in the grounds of appeal, it is submitted that it is a ‘Robinson obvious’ point as per the exception in Lata v SSHD [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) that the FTTJ should have gone on to consider whether removal would have been a disproportionate interference with any Article 8 rights of the appellant.

5. The error is material because it is not clear what the FTTJ’s conclusions were over the credibility of the appellant’s mental ill-health, the ongoing treatment and whether any disruption or access to future treatment would create unjustifiably harsh consequences on return. The FTTJ summarised the respondent review at [40] concerning medication, followed by a summary of treatment options in Botswana from the expert report [41] and confirmation from the appellant’s evidence that she was receiving CBT treatment [42]. The FTTJ then failed to make findings on whether this evidence was accepted, whether treatment was needed and whether the impact of removal to Botswana on the appellant and her mental health issues would create ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’. This was required as part of the overall Article 8 assessment.

8. At the outset of the hearing before mw, Ms. Mckenzie, on behalf of the Respondent, accepted that a material error of law had been made by the Judge, for all of the reasons set out in grounds 1 and the Rule 24 response, and accordingly that the appeal was not resisted. I accept that.

9. The advocates agreed with me that the Judge’s findings at paragraphs [24], [25], [26], [28], [29], [32] and [34] should be preserved.

10. Applying AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. Each advocate submitted that the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, credibility and fact-finding remaining issues, and I am persuaded that is the correct course to adopt.

Anonymity

11. I maintain the anonymity direction previously made because of the highly sensitive nature of this claim.

Notice of Decision and Directions

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside for the reasons set out above with the findings of the Judge set out in paragraph 9 above preserved.

2. The remaking of the decision in this appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for re-hearing, the hearing being restricted to the Appellant’s Article 8 claim.

3. In the light of the current delays encountered in listing in the First-tier Tribunal I do not issue any directions as to the service and filing of further evidence; directions will be issued by the First-tier Tribunal in due course.

Leighton Hughes

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 October 2026