Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003475
UI-2026-002081
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65240/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

NF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Bahja, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Monday 24 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

BACKGROUND

1. I have before me two linked cross appeals from both parties, but for ease of reference have referred to the parties as they appeared in the First-tier Tribunal.

2. The respondent appeals with permission against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) promulgated on 10 February 2026, allowing the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds.

3. The appellant appeals with permission against the judge’s decision of the same date, in which her protection appeal against the respondent’s decision, dated 30 November 2023, was dismissed.

4. The appellant is a national of Albania. She claims to have arrived in the UK on 11 December 2020, accompanied by her husband (“P”), and their six children (now aged between seven and seventeen) and then claimed asylum on 21 December 2020. At the screening interview (SCR) and in her PIQ, the appellant said that the couple had left Albania in October 2020 due to a debt owed by P. They travelled first to Germany and then to Spain, where they contacted an agent to facilitate their arrival to the UK at Manchester airport, using false documents. She said that after their arrival at the airport, she and her husband and their six children lived with the agent in their apartment. She had last seen P the day before, but he had been held back by the agents, as he did not have the money to pay the agent for the false passports.

5. In November 2022 the appellant approached Hestia, a trafficking charity, and appears to have reported for the first time that she had been sexually exploited during the time she was kept at the accommodation with the agents. They made a referral to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) on her behalf.

6. The appellant’s substantive interview (AIR) was not until 5 April 2023, at which the appellant said her husband was missing since December 2020. She had not contacted any family in Albania to discuss this or seek any news of him. She no longer considered them to be in a relationship. She told the respondent she feared harm from the people P owed money to in Albania. As to her arrival in the UK, she said the family came by choice and she first met the agent in the UK at the airport. The family was taken to an apartment and the appellant was kept in a room with her six children, and at night taken to a different room. The appellant said she had no contact with P or the agents or the money lenders since this time.

7. On 29 September 2023 a positive conclusive grounds decision was made by the Competent Authority, and on 6 November 2023 a decision was made not to grant the appellant any trafficking leave, although I have not seen either decision or reasons for them.

8. On 30 November 2023 the respondent refused the appellant’s human rights and asylum claims.

9. The appellant appealed against the refusal decision on all grounds. It is of note that the appellant’s solicitors were in regular contact with the Tribunal up to the date of hearing and in evidence, ASAs and other communications, it was confirmed in several notifications that the factual position was largely unchanged and the appellant had only six child dependants.

10. On 7 November 2024 the respondent provided a review, maintaining the decision on the same grounds. In November 2025, the respondent uploaded a visa application form which had been submitted, for a skilled worker visa to work in construction, and court authority. The visa form related to an application for entry clearance to the UK, made by P, from Albania, on 25 June 2025. The respondent did not upload a new review, however. The visa form included the following information:

i) P described his relationship status as ‘separated’;
ii) P’s home address was given as an address in Tirana, owned by P, in which he had lived for 30 years;
iii) P declared his only family members in the UK as a brother;
iv) P declared his travel history in connection with the UK. He gave his previous arrival date in the UK as 23 January 2025, and said he had claimed asylum, on the basis he was trafficked to the UK by third parties, and that he had decided to return to Albania voluntarily on 11 February 2024;
v) P declared his previous travel history in the EU as having arrived in Slovenia in October 2020, where he was a ‘long term resident’, having lived there four years. Then having spent one day in transit through France in January 2025;

11. On the morning of hearing, on 20 January 2026, the judge recorded in the decision that the appellant had disclosed for the first time in the hearing that she had a seventh child, born in the UK in December 2024. The child’s birth certificate was required to be uploaded to the system during the hearing, but it was noted there was no supplementary statement addressing this new fact, the parentage of that child, or the information in the visa application form uploaded by the respondent two months previously. No father’s details were listed on the birth certificate.

12. The judge gave an indication to the parties at that hearing, that the visa form suggested that P was in the UK at the relevant time for the purposes of paternity, before the child’s birth. Since there was a psychiatric report addressing the appellant’s fitness to give oral evidence in connection with traumatic aspects of her exploitation experiences, and adjustments needed should she be required to give evidence, both representatives were given time to take instructions on this new evidence and matter and how they wished to proceed. On return to court, the presenting officer indicated there was consent for the child’s birth to be included in the factual matrix before the judge. However, the respondent’s position was recorded to be that “the respondent did not accept that the baby is illegitimate”.

13. For the appellant, it was said the appellant’s representative indicated she would not give oral evidence “as she had a migraine” [at 10]. There was no application for an adjournment so that she could give oral evidence on another occasion, or to provide a statement addressing the new information about the child’s parentage, the visa form and the respondent’s position at hearing about the legitimacy of that child.

First-tier Decision

14. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection grounds. As to the appellant’s fear of money lenders, this did not engage the Refugee Convention and the judge found the appellant was not at real risk of harm from P’s money lenders.

15. As to the risk of trafficking or re-trafficking in Albania and the Refugee Convention appeal, the judge found that while the appellant was accepted by the respondent to have been the victim of modern slavery in the UK or trafficking, she was not at risk of such treatment on return to Albania, having regard to the country information, expert report and the guidance and relevant factors to consider in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC). The appellant’s grounds set out below, engage with the specific sections of the decision relied on in the appeal before me.

16. As to the Article 8 appeal, the judge considered this as interpreted by the ‘very significant obstacles’ test, and found that the appellant would be returning to Albania with seven children as their sole carer, and it would be very unlikely she could obtain hostel accommodation or live with her in laws, and the older two children’s best interests required them to remain in the UK, and as such, the test was met.

Application for Permission to Appeal by the Respondent

17. The respondent applied on three grounds, in essence which were that the judge had failed to take into account their own relevant findings, when assessing what would be available to the appellant on return. Further, by conflating the best interests assessment with the very significant obstacles assessment, and treating the best interests of the children as paramount. There was no wider assessment of proportionality, and so the judge did not have regard to matters relevant to the public interest, which were to be balanced against the best interests of the children.

18. On 22 April 2026 permission was granted, on the basis all grounds were arguable.

Application for Permission to Appeal by the Appellant

19. The appellant applied for permission to appeal against the protection decision in an application covering some thirteen sections or paragraphs. Permission was granted on 29 June 2026, with the following comments:

“The grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to apply the country guidance case of TD and AD (trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 92. Whilst there is some consideration of the factors identified in TD and AD, it is arguable the judge did not give adequate consideration or reasons, given the findings on the appellant’s mental health, her subjective fears and her status as a previous victim of trafficking. The grounds are therefore arguable.”

The Hearing Before the Upper Tribunal

20. At the start of the hearing there was a preliminary matter, in relation to the appellant’s application under Rule 15(2A) to admit new evidence not before the First-tier. This comprised some extracts from a property rental site in Albania for six bedroom apartments, and a Wikipedia article about the Albanian economy. Mr Bahja submitted this evidence was relevant to any re-making appeal, but accepted there was no reason why it had not been available to the First-tier Tribunal with reasonable diligence. Mr Simpson opposed the admission of this new evidence. I refused the application, on the basis the principles in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, were not satisfied. The appellant’s representatives could not establish the evidence could not have been obtained at First-tier with due diligence. Further, the evidence did not establish any error of fact or error by the First-tier judge, who specifically had regard to the difficulties accommodating seven children on return. Thirdly, in my view there may be issues about reliability or independence of the sources of this evidence, such as Wikipedia and an unknown property site, in any event.

21. As to the respondent’s appeal, Mr Simpson indicated there had been a helpful discussion in advance of the hearing. Mr Bahja made brief submissions, to the extent that the appellant could not dispute that the judge had conflated the ‘very significant obstacles’ test under the Private Life Appendix for the appellant, with the assessment of the children’s circumstances, which were to be regarded separately in the context of ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’. That necessitated a balancing exercise, considering public interest factors against the private and family life considerations of the family, which included the relevance of best interest findings. The appellant accepted the force of the respondent’s submissions, which were that the judge had treated the children’s best interests as a paramount consideration under the very significant obstacles assessment applied to the appellant’s private life, without any regard to the proportionality assessment they were required to conduct. Mr Simpson submitted that the judge had also failed to have regard to their own findings that the appellant was likely in contact with P, the children were not illegitimate and the appellant would not be returning to face stigma, and so the best interests and very significant obstacles assessment was additionally flawed on that basis. I indicated I would allow the respondent’s appeal on the basis there was a material error of law in the Article 8 assessment.

22. In submissions for the appellant on the protection appeal, Mr Bahja submitted that the judge failed to have regard to the stigma that would be attached to the appellant on return as a result of her trafficking experiences. I asked for clarification on the appellant’s case on stigma as it appeared to be the appellant’s case that no one knew of her exploitation in the UK or in Albania and Mr Bahja acknowledged that was indeed her case. The judge had also accepted P’s family could not be expected to accommodate her and so many children on return at short notice and the difficulties obtaining accommodation. As to the relevant factors under TD and AD, many of these fell positively in favour of risk, and yet the judge dismissed the appeal. As to the judge’s findings that the appellant was likely still in contact with P and the seventh child was not illegitimate, the judge failed to have regard to P’s declaration on the form that they were ‘separated’. Mr Bahja said it was an irreversible inference the judge should have made, that P came to the UK with the appellant in December 2020 and then returned to Albania, and only returned to the UK in January 2025, which meant he could not possibly be the father of the seventh child. I queried whether this would not have been speculation, rather than an inference for the judge to draw, given the judge did not have any evidence to address the immigration history of P, save for what was in the visa form, or any evidence on the parentage of the last child. Mr Simpson said he could not produce anything from the respondent at this time on that asylum claim made by P or his declared immigration history in that asylum claim.

23. Mr Bahja submitted the only finding open to the judge was that P was not the father of the child, because he must have been in Albania until January 2025, from what P declared on the visa form, so could not have been in the UK at the date of the child’s birth and could not be the father of the child. As to the appellant not giving oral evidence at hearing to address these matters and the child’s parentage, it was submitted that was in reliance on the advice of her psychiatrist and should not be held against her.

24. Mr Bahja also submitted the judge failed to have regard to the relevance of the appellant’s home area or area of origin being in the north and the circumstances there. He submitted the factors tended in favour of risk on return and so the judge’s findings were infected by material errors and the decision should be set aside, but with some findings preserved, such as that the appellant could not be accommodated by P’s family, would be unlikely to access shelter accommodation and had no financial support from either family.

25. Mr Simpson said in response that there was no material error of law in the judge’s decision. He relied on the respondent’s Rule 24 response. He submitted that the factors in TD and AD were the focal point of the decision, and while the judge accepted a subjective fear, they did not find that fear to be well founded. As to the points raised in submissions for the appellant, the judge found that the seventh child was not established to be illegitimate and so there would be no perceived or actual stigma attached to the appellant on return, as her trafficking experiences in the UK were not known. As to home area and its relevance, the appellant was born in the north, but lived with family in other areas, including Tirana, and the judge made findings about P’s choice to return there and its relevance to risk. The appellant’s siblings also lived there. The appellant was in any event not trafficked in Albania and her traffickers were not present in the home area or any other area. As to the discrepancies in evidence raised at hearing, the appellant had not addressed these. Whilst it was acknowledged the psychiatrist advised against her giving evidence on traumatic exploitation experiences, they also made recommendations for adjustments for her to be able to give evidence if required, which could have been requested so she could give evidence on the other matters. As to paternity of the child, it was reasonable for the judge to find that given P was apparently able to come in and out of the UK illegally, and could have been in the UK at the relevant time. The appellant had claimed he arrived in December 2020 and so was present here, on her account, before the child’s birth, and there was no evidence on who the child’s father was, or to establish he was no longer in the UK in early 2024.

26. Mr Simpson submitted that if there was an error found in the judge’s decision on the protection appeal, it would not be possible to preserve findings, since they were interrelated, and to pick parts of some sentences and not others to be preserved, particularly only those which favoured the appellant’s case, would only make the assessment required at a future hearing more difficult.

27. I reserved my decision on the protection appeal.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

28. The headnote of TD and AD provides:

“d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.

e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in ‘heavy cases’ may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.

f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.

g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.

h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:

1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”

DISCUSSION

The Respondent’s Appeal

29. I will not address this appeal in detail, since both parties agree there is a material error of law in the judge’s findings and assessment. This is ultimately that when considering the aspect of the appeal under the ‘very significant obstacles’ test, the judge was required to consider those matters relevant to the appellant re-establishing her private life in Albania, and to have regard to earlier findings of fact in relation to circumstances on return. The judge conducted the best interest assessment of the children within this framework, rather than the assessment focusing on the appellant, and then treated those findings in relation to the children as being a weighty consideration. The judge did not have regard to their earlier findings of fact, and instead relied on contradictory findings, in that they then treated the appellant as a sole carer, without access to familial support or accommodation, who would face stigma on return as a known former victim of trafficking.

30. The judge then failed to conduct any detailed proportionality assessment, or to have regard to the public interest factors which they were required to consider, against the weight to be attached to the children’s best interests.

31. I therefore find the aspects of the judge’s decision on the Article 8 ECHR appeal, to be found at paragraphs 92 to 96, are infected by a material error of law and fall to be set aside in their entirety.

The Appellant’s Appeal

32. I must find firstly that there has been no challenge to the judge’s findings at paragraphs 33, 63 to 68, 78, and 82 to 83, which relate to the appellant having failed to establish risk on return as a result of P’s loan, or from her original traffickers. The judge found [at 68] that “there is no risk to her from her husband’s money lenders” and [at 70] that there was no link established between her status as a victim of trafficking and risk from money lenders. At 78 the judge found the appellant’s trafficking occurred in the UK and those responsible were only first contacted in Spain, and not in Albania.

33. The appellant’s case centres around the judge’s assessment of the risk factors set out above, and application of the guidance in TD and AD and I do find that the judge appropriately directed themselves at paragraph 71 to consider that guidance. The judge’s findings then centred around the factors identified above and the relevance to risk on return, availability of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The appellant’s ground [at (ii)] that the judge failed to apply the relevant country guidance is not borne out by the decision.

34. I also note the grounds assert [at (iii)] that having found the appellant had a subjective fear of re-trafficking on return, that “it was not open to the judge to conclude … ‘that the appellant has not demonstrated to the lower standard that she is at real risk of being re-trafficked’”, and that the appellant was therefore entitled to succeed in her appeal without more, because her subjective fear was accepted. I will not consider this ground in any depth, save to comment that it fundamentally fails to engage with the assessment required under the Refugee Convention, to establish not only subjective fear for a Convention reason, but also that the subjective fear is ‘well founded’. There is no error in law in a judge finding that subjective fear has been established to the relevant standard of proof, but going on to find against an appellant on the issue of whether there is risk on return, sufficiency of protection and an internal relocation alternative.

35. As to stigma and treatment of former victims of trafficking [at (i)] and the submission that the appellant would be treated adversely due to her status as a former victim of trafficking by P, their families and society, I note that the appellant in her first witness statement from 2023, said that she had no contact at all with her husband, who was separated from her before she was exploited by the agents on the first day [at 22 to 23], although I note that is a different account to that given by her at the SCR. The appellant’s case before the FtT, as accepted by Mr Bahja at hearing, was that she had never told any friends or family about her experiences and so her status and experiences as a victim of trafficking were not known. The judge found [at 68] that there was no evidence to demonstrate the appellant would be targeted on return as a former victim of trafficking. Further, it was found [at 74] that due to the credibility concerns raised at hearing, that the judge did “not accept that the appellant is not in contact with her husband”. Nor was it accepted that the child was in fact illegitimate [at 53]. The judge found the “appellant’s case is not that she would be returning as a shamed woman” [at 40] and so this factor did not weigh in favour of risk on return.

36. The judge gave detailed reasons for the above findings [at 40 to 53] and had regard to the appellant’s failure to notify the respondent or Tribunal about the birth of a seventh child in the UK for some thirteen months, until the eleventh hour, on the morning of the hearing of her asylum appeal. Also to the lack of any reference to her pregnancy in the psychiatric report, which assessment took place when the appellant would in all likelihood have known she was pregnant, but which made no mention of the appellant having reported her pregnancy, despite its relevance to the facts and issues the psychiatrist was required to consider. Further, to the lack of any updating statement about the child, to address the fact of the pregnancy, paternity and to address the visa form submitted by the respondent, which raised a number of discrepancies with the appellant’s own account of her own and her husband’s travel histories before arrival. That was particularly important as in the visa form, P asserted that he was actually in Slovenia, when the appellant said he was being held hostage by the agents in the UK in December 2020.

37. The judge went on to find that the reference to P’s arrival in January 2025, but voluntary departure in February 2024, was in all likelihood a date error, and that he in fact arrived earlier than his departure in February 2024.

38. The judge also had regard to the lack of any oral evidence from the appellant to address the credibility issues, raised at the start of the hearing. The judge did not accept the submission by the appellant’s representative that the respondent had made a specific concession that the appellant was a sole carer with no contact with P, in the decision, and that without a formal application to withdraw that concession, that factual matrix stood and so the appellant did not need to address the new evidence. The judge found there was no concession in the refusal letter, rather there was only a record of a factual assertion by the appellant as to the circumstances, in relation to which the respondent only had evidence that gave rise to a possible challenge to the asserted facts by the date of hearing, and so was entitled to raise this as a credibility point only at the point of becoming aware of the new evidence, at the hearing itself. Having been notified this was an issue at the start of the hearing, while the psychiatrist did recommend against the appellant giving evidence, particularly on traumatic experiences, the judge found it would still have been open to her to address these issues in other evidence, and when relying on the psychiatrist’s recommendations, it was not enough to raise only in submissions that the appellant could have given evidence after all, but had not done so, and therefore submit that no adverse inference could be drawn on the new evidence.

39. As to the remainder of the appellant’s grounds, at (iv to vi), these relate to the relevance of the factors under TD and AD to the assessment of risk of re-trafficking, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The judge made detailed findings about those and the weight to be attached to the medical evidence.

40. The appellant’s grounds mainly address the relevance of support network and accommodation (headnote 7). The judge found [at 74] that it would not be reasonable for them to accommodate a family of eight again ‘suddenly’, albeit without any finding on whether that would be reasonable with more notice. I note the appellant’s case is that the family of eight were in any event living with her in laws before she left Albania. It was found too that hostel space on any more than a ‘very temporary basis’ was not likely for such a large family [at 75] and that a large family might ‘draw attention and be readily identifiable’ in private accommodation, although the judge did not find such accommodation would not be available or affordable. It is unclear whether the judge found this factor to fall in favour of risk or not, given it was not accepted the appellant could not access support from siblings living in Tirana or have contact with P, also living in Tirana in his own house.

41. The judge also had regard to the visa form, which suggested that P had felt able to return to Albania safely, despite apparently being indebted to money lenders in Albania and to the agents who facilitated the appellant’s arrival in the UK. Further, that he had then lived in a house owned by him in Tirana since his return.

42. Having made those various findings, it is unclear to me what the judge’s view was, on which of those factors fell in favour of risk and which did not, but ultimately, the judge went on to find the appellant was not at risk on return. There is then, in the section of the decision relating to Article 8, reliance on factual circumstances when considering the very significant obstacles test. In that section of the decision the judge relied on a finding that the appellant would face stigma as an identifiable victim of trafficking and there would be suspicions about the paternity of the seventh child of the family. This is internally contradictory, given the judge earlier found they would not be so identifiable or face societal stigma and the child had not been established to be illegitimate and was conceived within marriage and in all likelihood when P was still in the UK. The judge also found that the appellant would be returning as a sole carer, without any support network, in apparent contradiction to their earlier findings about the appellant being in contact with P and having some support network through family in Albania and the UK. These findings in my view cannot be read in isolation, since they appear to undermine or contradict earlier findings on the same facts and issues and are ultimately contradictory.

43. I do find that having made findings on the relevant factors under TD and AD, the judge then made a conclusion on risk on return without giving clear reasons about the impact of those findings on that assessment of risk. The judge then went on to rely on matters which were contradictory to those earlier findings and so cast doubt on whether the judge did intend to make those findings and what the impact of them was on their assessment of risk on return. I do find this in an error, and further, a material one, which goes towards the core matters the judge was required to assess. The decision must be read as a whole and one section appears to undermine the other without any explanation or reasons.

CONCLUSION

44. For the reasons set out above, I find there are material errors of law in relation to the decision on both the protection and the Article 8 appeals and so allow the appeals of both parties.

45. As to whether any findings can be preserved, I find they cannot, where there is real doubt about what findings the judge intended to make and contradictory reasons and findings within the same decision. I therefore set the decision aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.

Remaking

46. I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and further considered in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). Given there appear to be areas of dispute or credibility points which arose at the First-tier hearing, there may be oral evidence on material matters, and the importance of the availability of the two tier appellate system to both parties, I have decided to remit the appeal to be heard afresh by another judge in the First-tier Tribunal.

NOTICE OF DECISION

Both appeals are allowed to the extent the appeal is remitted to be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal afresh.

H Graves
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Graves
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 September 2026