Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003483
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67535/2024
LP/02051/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

MM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter (counsel) instructed by Legit Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 7 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh.
2. He appeals with permission against the 27 April 2026 decision of FTJ Buckwell to dismiss his appeal against the Secretary of State’s 20 June 2024 refusal of his asylum and human rights claim.
Material Background
3. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom in October 2017.
4. His initial claim for protection was refused by the Secretary of State. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and his appeal was heard by FTJ Brannan. It was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 3 February 2023.
5. On 15 January 2024 the Appellant served further submissions in support of a fresh claim for asylum alternatively that return to Bangladesh would breach his rights under Articles 2, 3 and/or 8 ECHR. The Secretary of State substantively considered the Appellant’s further submission and refused them by decision of 20 June 2024.
6. The Appellant appealed this refusal to the First-tier Tribunal. FTJ Buckwell was not satisfied that there was “any basis to disturb the overall findings of Judge Brannan. They remain as the starting point for this Tribunal…” (para. 53). He went on to state in terms that “Judge Brannan did not find that the evidence provided by the appellant, considered to the appropriate standard, established a credible account, or, overall, an entitlement to leave by way of protection or for other grounds” (para. 55). FTJ Buckwell took into account new evidence relied on by the Appellant, including an arrest warrant and a letter from the Appellant’s lawyer. However, having considered MU Bangladesh [2025] EWCA Civ 812, FTJ Buckwell held that the political circumstances in Bangladesh had changed significantly since the coming into power of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) and, as such, that he was not at risk on return. FTJ Buckwell went on to find that the Appellant’s rights under Articles 3 and/or 8 ECHR would not be breached on return. The appeal was dismissed.
7. The Appellant now advances four grounds of appeal against that decision: namely (i) the Judge erred in finding that the Appellant was not at risk of ill-treatment on return to Bangladesh (ii) the Judge failed to adequately consider the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim (iii) the Judge failed to adequately consider the Appellant’s Article 3 ECHR medical claim and (iv) the Judge erred in his consideration of whether the Appellant faced very significant obstacles on return to Bangladesh.
8. I address each of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal below.
Preliminary Issue
9. Permission to appeal was granted by FTJ Kudhail on 29 June 2026. Insofar as is material, the order reads: “Permission to Appeal is granted” and “2. Grounds 2, 3, 4 are arguable as the judge makes limited findings on article 8 within the rules and outside the rules. There are also limited findings on Article 3, given the report of Dr Sayeeda Ali. It is arguable there is an error of law due to inadequacy of reasons”.
10. While FTJ Kudhail did not refer to Ground 1 in his reasons for granting permission to appeal, the parties before me agreed that, in accordance with the principle set out in Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC), the unrestricted grant of permission to appeal should be taken as applying to all grounds in this case. I proceed on that basis.
Ground 1: Protection Claim
11. The Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that, despite the recent change of Government in Bangladesh, the evidence before the Tribunal established a reasonable likelihood that he would be arrested, detained, and ill-treated on return.
12. Before me, counsel for the Appellant argued that the Judge erred in (i) failing to make a clear finding as to whether the warrant relied on by the Appellant was genuine and operative and (ii) failing to address whether the Appellant would be at risk of ill-treatment between arrival and any effective judicial determination of the charges against him.
13. First, the Judge did not make express findings as to whether he accepted that the warrant relied on by the Appellant was genuine and operative (indeed he casts some doubt on this at para. 57). The representative for the Secretary of State accepted that no clear finding had been made on this point. However, I note that the Judge concluded his consideration of the genuineness of the warrant by stating “…overall, I take account of what is stated” (para. 57). This suggests that the Judge at least proceeded on the basis that the warrant relied on by the Appellant was genuine. Further, when read as a whole, the logic of the decision supports this inference. As such, it seems to me that the Judge did proceed on the basis that the warrant was genuine, and I do not accept that the Judge’s lack of express findings as to the status of the warrant constituted a material error of law.
14. Second, I do accept that the Judge failed to make any findings as to whether the Appellant would be at risk of arrest and mistreatment between his return and the effective judicial determination of the case against him. The Judge addressed at some length the recent political changes that have taken place in Bangladesh (in particular the coming into power of the BNP and the fall of the Awami League) and concluded that:
“If any further application for the discharge of the appellant, in relation to the arrest warrant, still does not succeed, the appellant, at a future court hearing concerning the reasons for the previous government pursuing him, will have the ability to set out that the original accusations were politically motivated.” (para. 61).
15. The Judge did not, however, address the likelihood of the Appellant’s being arrested and detained pursuant to the warrant on return, the length of time he could expect to be detained and, assuming he were able to make his case before an impartial Court, the treatment that the Appellant was likely to face before he was able to do so. In my judgment, having decided to proceed on the basis that the warrant was genuine and operative, the Judge was required to grapple with these risks and his failure to do so constituted a material error of law.
16. The Secretary of State’s representative submitted that the Judge relied on MU Bangladesh (cited above) and that this made clear that individuals who had been targeted by the Awami League would not be at risk “in any circumstances”. I do not accept this submission. The Court of Appeal addressed MU Bangladesh on the facts of that case. They did not consider whether a person subject to an operative arrest warrant may be at risk on return to Bangladesh.
17. I note that the Judge did find at para. 61 that “It is not found that the appellant would be subject to ill-treatment on return to Bangladesh” and that this could be read as a finding that the Appellant would not be at risk at the point of return. However, read in context, it seems to me that the Judge was here expressing his general conclusion that the Appellant would not be at risk on return as he would be able to effectively challenge his arrest in court. There is nothing in para. 61 to suggest that the Judge was concerned with the risk faced by the Appellant between return and any judicial determination of his warrant. However, even if that is not correct, insofar as the Judge was intending to address risk at the point of return, his reasons for his conclusion are not clear and do not enable the parties to understand how his conclusion was reached. In my judgment that constitutes a material error of law. This finding is supported by the fact that, in the same paragraph the Judge states in terms that “The appellant has a clear case to argue if the arrest warrant might remain effective when he would return to Bangladesh.” It is unclear how observation can be reconciled with the Judge’s conclusion as to risk on return.
18. I therefore find the Appellant’s Ground 1 to be made out.
19. I note that the Secretary of State’s representative submitted that the errors alleged at Grounds 2, 3 and 4 are parasitic on my accepting that the Judge erred as alleged at Ground 1. Having found such an error, the point is academic. However, and for the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept that submission. In my judgment Grounds 2, 3, and 4 are free-standing and I approach them on that basis.
Ground 2: Article 8 ECHR
20. The Appellant lives with his cousin, a British citizen, who (he claims) provides him with emotional and practical support. He sought to rely on both Article 8 private and family life in support of his claim.
21. The Appellant argued that the Judge failed to make any findings as to whether he had established Article 8 family life and no assessment of the, uncontradicted, evidence offered by his cousin (either in the context of his Article 8 family life claim or as relevant to the Article 8 private life proportionality assessment).
22. The Secretary of State’s representative argued before me that that there was no reason to think that the Appellant had sought to rely on Article 8 family life before the Tribunal. Without a transcript or note of the hearing it is difficult for me to be sure what was argued at first instance. I do, however, note that the Appellant repeatedly refers to private and family life in his witness statement of 23 June 2025. I am therefore not satisfied that this issue was not live before the Tribunal.
23. As such, I accept the Appellant’s submissions on this point. Article 8 was central to the Appellant’s appeal. It is not clear from the decision whether the Judge properly engaged with the Appellant’s case on Article 8 and, if so, the basis on which the Judge concluded that the Appellant’s removal would not breach his Article 8 ECHR rights. In my view that constituted an error of law and I find Ground 2 to be made out.
Ground 3: Article 3 ECHR (medical)
24. The Appellant argues that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for his findings that the Appellant would not be at risk on return on Article 3 ECHR medical grounds. The full extent of the Judge’s reasoning on this point is found at para. 63:
The medical evidence has been considered, but is not found to assist the appellant in his appeal grounds because treatment is available in Bangladesh. The appellant can reasonably be expected to travel to obtain that. The Article 3 ECHR threshold is not met on medical grounds.
25. The Appellant points to the medical evidence of Dr Sayeeda Ali, a clinical psychologist, dated 30 September 2025 to the effect that the Appellant suffers severe depression, severe anxiety and PTSD; that he claimed to suffer continuing thoughts of self-harm/suicide with intent to act on those thoughts, that he presented with hopelessness affecting his eating and self-care, and that he claimed difficulty travelling independently; and she concluded that refusal would significantly increase the risk of the Appellant’s deterioration, including the risk of suicide. The Appellant relies further on the fact that the Joint Report of Professor Rahman and Mr Hossain (13 October 2025) addressed specialist care in Dhaka, the scarcity of mental-health professionals, limited public psychotherapy, as well as the cost and stigma of treatment. He argues that the Judge erred in failing to address this material when concluding that the appellant was not at risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds.
26. The first issue that falls to be determined is whether Article 3 ECHR was a live issue before the Judge at all.
27. The Judge recorded in terms at para. 11 that: “Mr Rana however clarified that the appellant did not seek to rely upon Article 3 grounds under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“the European Convention” or “ECHR”) on medical grounds.” However, as set out above, the Judge then went on to state expressly that he had considered the medical evidence and to find that “…the Article 3 ECHR threshold is not met on medical grounds.”
28. These positions are, plainly, contradictory. As I was not provided with a note or transcript of the hearing, it has been necessary for me to infer from the documents and the decision itself whether the Article 3 ECHR medical ground remained a live issue at first instance. On balance, given the Judge’s reasoned findings on this point, I am not satisfied that this issue was withdrawn as stated at para. 11.
29. Against that background I find that the Judge’s reasoning on Article 3 ECHR was not adequate. While I accept that the Judge was not required to address every issue raised by the Appellant and to consider every point to found in the underlying evidence, he was required to reach conclusions on the key controversial issues and provide adequate reasons for those conclusions. In my view he failed to do so. The Judge made no findings as to the state of the Appellant’s mental health, the likely impact of removal to Bangladesh on his mental health, what treatment (if any) he would require on return, why he considered the Appellant would be able to travel at all, or how an ability to travel would assist the Appellant. In my view this failure amounts to an error of law. Further, while I accept that establishing a breach of Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds imposes a high threshold, I am not satisfied that threshold is so high as to render the Judge’s error immaterial.
30. As such I find Ground 3 to be made out.
Ground 4: Very Significant Obstacles to Integration
31. At para. 62 the Judge stated that the Appellant “…would not, for the same reasons, face very serious obstacles on reintegration in Bangladesh…”
32. The Appellant argues that, in reaching his conclusion the Judge failed to identify the appropriate Immigration Rule and failed to properly take into account and address evidence material to this point (such as the length of time the Appellant has been absent from Bangladesh, the death of his parents and estrangement from other relatives, his mental health problems, barriers to mental health treatment, and the impact of unresolved criminal proceedings).
33. I accept the Appellant’s submissions on Ground 4.
34. Firstly, it is not clear from the decision what the “same reasons” as relied on by the Judge are. The reference appears to be to relate to the Judge’s previous finding at para. 62 that “Even accepting that the appellant himself holds a genuine fear of persecution on return, it is not found that that fear can subsist, for the reasons set out above.” What these reasons are, however, is not specified. Reading the decision as a whole, the reference here appears to relate to the Judge’s earlier point that, as a result of the change in Government in Bangladesh, the Appellant would not be at risk on return. This is not, however, clear.
35. In any event, even if the reason for the Judge’s finding that the Appellant did not face very significant obstacles to integration on return was that the Awami League was no longer in power and had been replaced by the BNP, that is in my view not sufficient to enable the Parties to understand why the Judge concluded that the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration on return. The Judge’s failure to address key evidence on this point (in particular the Appellant’s evidence going to his mental health and family circumstances) constituted an error of law. While I accept that, given the Appellant’s background, establishing that he would very significant obstacles to integration on return is likely to be challenging, I am not satisfied that this error was not material to the Judge’s conclusion.
36. As I find that the Judge erred as alleged at Ground 4.
Conclusion
37. For the reasons set out above I find that the Judge erred in law and set aside his decision in full.
38. Given the nature of the errors in this case, I consider it appropriate for the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.

Notice of Decision

1. Appeal allowed
2. Appeal to me remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different Judge.

Andrew Deakin

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 September 2026