Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003484
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/69989/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

FY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Collins, counsel
For the Respondents: Mr Walker, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 1 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him, including his name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. By a decision dated 14 April 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s 21 August 2024 decision to refuse his 28 August 2022 protection and human rights claim.

2. Thereafter, the Appellant’s applied for permission to appeal. By a decision dated 29 June 2026, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 1 October 2026.

Background

3. The Appellant is a national of Turkey aged 28 (date of birth 10 February 1998). He arrived in the UK unlawfully on 25 August 2024 and claimed asylum on 28 August 2024. In short summary, it was his case that he would be at risk of persecution by the Turkish authorities on return to Turkey for reason of his race and political opinions, as a Kurd who supported the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, ‘HDP’), whose family had long been associated with the pro-Kurdish political movement in Turkey, who had previously been detained by the Turkish authorities on multiple occasions and who had deserted military service.

4. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on 21 August 2024. She accepted that he was a Kurd and that he had deserted military service but rejected the credibility of the remainder of his claimed account. She proceeded to refuse his claim on all grounds, giving rise to a right of appeal that the Appellant duly exercised.

5. By a decision dated 14 April 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Judge accepted that he had been politically active with the HDP as claimed. However, the Judge considered the Appellant’s claim to be essentially based on his desertion, not his political activities and opinions. Although he faced imprisonment for desertion, that was prosecution not persecution, and the prison conditions he would face would not breach Article 3 ECHR. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

6. The Appellant raised five grounds of appeal. Permission was granted on all grounds by the First-tier Tribunal. The Respondent did not file a rule 24 response.

Hearing

7. Before me, the documentation was as follows: (a) the First-tier Tribunal’s decision; (b) the Appellant’s grounds of appeal; (c) the First-tier Tribunal’s grant of permission; (d) the Appellant’s First-tier Tribunal documents; and (e) the Respondent’s First-tier Tribunal documents.

8. Mr Collins confirmed that he was applying for an anonymity order. Mr Walker did not oppose the application. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I have decided to make an anonymity order because the Appellant is a political asylum claimant and I consider that disclosing his identity could give rise to unacceptable risks to him in the event that he is returned to Turkey.

9. Mr Collins adopted the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, which he had drafted, and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:

a. Ground 1. The Judge failed to make findings on crucial aspects of the Appellant’s case, in particular his family’s political activism and the Appellant’s multiple detentions. The Appellant’s father was a local HDP leader and his brother had been granted political asylum in the UK based on the risk arising from his support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, ‘PKK’). The Appellant’s brother’s appeal decision was before the First-tier Tribunal: he had provided a detailed account of the family’s political activism and the adverse attention they had received from the Turkish authorities as a result, and the credibility of his account was accepted. The Judge failed to take in account the Appellant’s family’s political activism in assessing risk, contrary to IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 312. Further, the Judge proceeded on the basis that it was the Appellant’s case that he had been detained only once, when in fact it was his case that he had been detained on multiple occasions. Again, this was an important risk factor that ought to have been considered pursuant to IK.

b. Ground 2. The Judge took account of an irrelevant factor when they found that, if the Turkish authorities had an adverse interest in the Appellant, it would have materialised during military service. The Appellant’s risk profile had changed, and increased, since he was in military service. He had deserted and was now facing imprisonment, he would be returning without an up-to-date passport and he would be returning via the airport with all of the risks that entailed, as opposed to simply being an ordinary Kurdish conscript like any other.

c. Ground 3. The Judge had fundamentally misconstrued the Appellant’s case when they found it was essentially based on his desertion. His desertion was a risk factor, but it was not the heart of his case which was that he would be at risk on return to Turkey assessed by reference to IK.

d. Ground 4. The Judge misdirected themselves by failing to undertake the careful and nuanced assessment mandated in IK. Multiple of the IK risk factors were ignored, in particular the Appellant’s family’s political activism and the Appellant’s multiple detentions.

e. Ground 5. The Judge’s conclusion that the prison conditions the Appellant would face would not breach Article 3 ECHR could not be reconciled with the only evidence on this issue, contained in the Respondent’s ‘Country policy and information note: military service, Turkey’, July 2025, which supported the contrary conclusion.

10. Having had the benefit of Mr Collins’ oral submissions, Mr Walker accepted that there were material errors of law in the Judge’s decision. In particular, he accepted that the Judge’s failure to take account of the Appellant’s family’s political activism and the Appellant’s multiple detentions was contrary to IK and amounted to a material error of law.

11. In terms of disposal, both representatives agreed that the decision should be set aside in its entirety and the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh. I raised the possibility of preserving certain findings that were positive to the Appellant. I understood that both representatives were content to leave the consideration of that issue in my hands.

12. At the conclusion of the hearing, I found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and said that I would provide my reasons in writing in due course, which I hereby do. I reserved my decision on disposal.

Decision and reasons

13. I consider that there is significant overlap between Grounds 1 to 4. I accept Mr Collins’ submissions on these Grounds, as did Mr Walker. I am satisfied that they disclose material errors of law.

14. The Judge fundamentally misconstrued the Appellant’s case as being essentially based on his desertion. His desertion was a risk factor, but the heart of his case was that he would be at risk on return to Turkey assessed by reference IK. The Judge having thus misconstrued the Appellant’s case, they then failed to undertake the careful and nuanced approach mandated in IK, ignoring multiple risk factors in particular the Appellant’s family’s long association with the pro-Kurdish political movement and the Appellant’s history of repeated detentions. Further, this fundamental misconstruction of the Appellant’s case led the Judge erroneously to consider that, if the Turkish authorities had an adverse interest in the Appellant, it would have materialised during military service. On a proper application of IK, the Appellant’s risk profile had changed, and increased, since he was in military service.

15. Individually and cumulatively, these errors were clearly material: it cannot be said that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusions if they had not been made (see SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636, per Sales LJ (as he then was) at §49).

16. On disposal, having reflected, I concur with the representatives’ original position that the decision should be set aside in its entirety. The material errors of law identified affected all elements of the decision and – particularly since it is not possible to discern to what standard of proof the limited findings made in the Appellant’s favour were made – I do not consider it to be sensible to seek to preserve individual findings in the particular circumstances of this case.

17. Having considered the Practice Direction and Practice Statement, and also having had regard to the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, [2023] 4 WLR 12, I consider that this is a case in which the nature and extent of the necessary fact-finding means that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh.

18. It is not necessary for me to proceed to consider Ground 5.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains material errors of law and is set aside in its entirety.

The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh before a differently constituted Tribunal.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 October 2026