Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003532

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70355/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WEBB

Between

Secretary of State for the HOme Department
Appellant
and

RR
(Anonymity Order Made)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Representing herself
For the Respondent: M I Sherwood (Senior Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 8 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge), promulgated on 20 May 2026, refusing her appeal. The decision was made following an oral hearing on 21 January 2026. Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge on 01 July 2026.

2. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of properly discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee convention outweigh the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellant’s potential risk on return to her country of nationality and it is appropriate that her identity be protected.

The hearing

3. I had before me a 160 page bundle that contained the decision being appealed, grounds of appeal, decision on permission, and all the documents that were before the First-tier Tribunal.

4. I heard arguments from Ms Sherwood in relation to the grounds of appeal.

5. After hearing the arguments, I said that I would not be able to give my decision at the hearing. I now give my decision in writing.

Errors of law

6. When assessing if there have been errors of law the starting position is that I should exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, as explained by the higher courts on many occasions.

Ground 1

7. Permission was granted on the basis it was arguable that the Judge failed to adequately engage with the documentary evidence relied on: that the Judge in §42 did not sufficiently explain what weight was attached to the documents, if they were accepted as genuine and what bearing they had on the overall credibility assessment.

8. The reasons given in §42 are brief, that in itself does not mean there has been an error of law. Reasons need only be adequate. However, the Judge provided clear reasons for rejecting documents relating to the 2022 incident that were not central to the appellant’s fear, but did not at all explain why he gave little weight to the police documents, photographs of injuries and the other documents that could be described as country information.

9. A reader of the determination cannot ascertain why the Judge placed little weight on the documents that were capable of corroborating the appellant’s claim. The Judge did not provide adequate reasons. I find that is an error of law.

10. Ms Sherwood argued that in light of the Judge’s other findings any error would not have been material to the outcome of the appeal.

11. Although that argument has some weight, I reject it. The documents were relevant to the appellant’s credibility, and it may be that had the error not been made the Judge may have made a different decision. For that reason, I find the error of law is material.

Ground 2

12. Permission was also granted on the basis it was arguable the Judge had discounted the documents after adverse credibility findings had already been made, rather than considering all the evidence holistically, contrary to the principles in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367.

13. As Ms Sherwood argued, the Judge did give reasons for placing little weight on the documents relating to the 2022 incident, but those documents do not go to the core of the appellant’s fears.

14. The Judge at §42 has not provided reasons for placing little weight on the documents that are capable of supporting the appellant’s core account. Although the Judge says they have considered the evidence in the round in the absence of specific reasons for rejecting the country information and other documents the reader is given only one reason: that the appellant has been found not to be credible.

15. I find that by failing to assess the relevant documents, especially those that could be considered country information, separately from the appellant’s credibility the Judge made an error of law.

16. Ms Sherwood’s argument that the Judge’s other findings relating to the appellant’s credibility mean that any error would not have been material to the outcome of the appeal has some weight here too. However, the documents go to the credibility of the appellant’s core account to be considered in the round, and the Judge may have made a different decision had the error not been made. For that reason, I find the error of law is material.

Ground 3

17. Permission was also granted on the basis that the treatment of the documentary evidence may have had a bearing on the conclusion of the Judge in relation to sufficiency of protection.

18. The documents that relate to police reports and the country information provided were capable of supporting the appellant’s account that the police had done nothing following her reports.

19. Ms Sherwood highlighted §45 as being the Judge’s alternative findings on sufficiency of protection and argued that the findings in this paragraph meant that any error would not be material.

20. I reject that argument. The documents provided by the appellant were capable of supporting the appellant’s claim that the police generally are not able to offer protection and more specifically that they did not offer protection to her.

21. The Judge’s approach to the documents involved material errors of law. Had the Judge not made those errors they may have taken a different view in relation to the protection available to this specific appellant. For that reason, the error is material to the findings on sufficiency of protection.

Conclusion on errors of law

22. I find for the reasons set out above that the decision of the Judge contained a material error of law.

Remaking or Remittal

23. I have considered what was said by this Tribunal in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) and the terms of the Practice Direction and Practice Statement.

24. I have concluded that the Judge made errors of law relating to the credibility assessment that was relevant to the findings throughout the decision. For that reason, none of the findings of the Judge can be preserved.

25. That will require RR to give evidence, for a full examination of her credibility to be undertaken and a reassessment of the internal relocation and sufficiency of protection points to be conducted following findings of fact. I consider therefore that the case must be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined.

Notice of decision

26. The decision of the Judge promulgated on 20 May 2026 contains material errors of law and is set aside with no preserved findings.

27. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

Directions

28. I direct that the remitted case is to be listed in the First-tier Tribunal, Taylor House hearing centre, before a different judge.

29. The First-tier Tribunal will issue further directions.

N Webb

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
08 October 2026