The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003542
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63126/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of November 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

KA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Bazini, Counsel instructed by Elder Rahimi
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission of the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 April 2026, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant, a national of Iran, arrived in the UK on 30 August 2024 and claimed asylum. The Appellant claims to be at risk in Iran on account of what is considered to be his conversion to Judaism. The Appellant states that he was registered a Muslim at birth but his mother had presented as a Jew up until the Iranian Revolution.
3. In the UK, the Appellant practises his faith at the North London Synagogue and is undergoing a conversion for the sake of strictness. The Appellant supports the State of Israel and he fears that he would be considered a spy by the Iranian authorities.
4. The Appellant also claims to be at risk on account of his anti-regime activities. He participates in anti-regime demonstrations in the UK and is active on social media criticising the regime.
5. In a decision dated 24 March 2025, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
6. The Appellant appealed against the Respondent’s decision and the appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 2 March 2026. The appeal was heard remotely via a Cloud Video Platform and the Appellant gave oral evidence.
7. In a decision dated 16 April 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and was granted permission by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 30 June 2026. The Respondent provided a response under rule 24 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules opposing the Appellant’s appeal.
9. At the hearing I heard detailed submissions from Mr Bazini and Ms McKenzie.
Discussion
Approach to Risk Arising from Being Seen as an Apostate
Documentary Evidence
10. It was the Appellant’s case that he would be seen as an apostate because he was born a Muslim but now practises Judaism. The Appellant stated that prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, his mother presented as Jewish but afterwards hid her religion.
11. The First-tier Tribunal records at [8] that “the Respondent does not dispute the sincerity of the Appellant’s commitment to Judaism and to the process of being recognised as a Jew through the process of conversion for the sake of strictness.” However, the First-tier Tribunal considered that the Appellant would not been seen as an apostate because he would not be considered as having been a Muslim.
12. The Appellant relied on his parents’ marriage certificate to demonstrate that they were both registered as Muslims and that the Appellant therefore would have been registered as Muslim at birth. The Appellant also relied on the Appellant’s registration for national exams in 2010 which also referred to him as Muslim.
13. The First-tier Tribunal attached no weight to the translation of those documents because there was no evidence before it to ensure the translation was accurate. At page 51 of the bundle there is a certificate from a Chartered Linguist from Giraffe Translation and Interpreting in London certifying that the marriage certificate is a true translation. At page 73 of the bundle the same Chartered Linguist certifies the Appellant’s registration for national exams as a true translation. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law by making a material mistake of fact, i.e. that the Appellant had not produced certified translations when in fact he had.
Country Background Evidence
14. At [21(d)] the First-tier Tribunal finds it significant that the Appellant did not provide any detail of the key principles of Islam. The First-tier Tribunal considered but rejected the Appellant’s explanation that he was coerced to learn it, taught it by force and that therefore being asked to provide that information brings back traumatic memories from his childhood.
15. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that it was more likely that Islam was not a significant, if any, part of his education and upbringing.
16. The Appellant relied on the US Department of State 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran, 26 June 2024, which states:
The Ministry of Education determines the religious curricula of public schools. All school curricula, public and private, must include a course on Shia Islamic teachings and all pupils must pass this course to advance to the next educational level, through university. Sunni students and students from recognized minority religious groups must take and pass the courses on Shia Islam, although they may also take separate courses on their own religious beliefs.
17. This country background evidence corroborates the Appellant’s account that he was forced to learn the principles of Islam at school. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant evidence.
Approach to Risk Arising from the Appellant’s Political Belief
18. At [80] the First-tier Tribunal stated, “I do not doubt the genuineness of the Appellant’s political view.” At [43] the First-tier Tribunal stated, “I do not doubt that the Appellant’s political views are genuinely held.”
19. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant would not be at risk on the basis of his genuinely held political views because:
a. The expression of the Appellant’s political views is opportunistic because he had indicated that he wanted the hearing to be heard in private, the majority of the Appellant’s online activity post-dates his arrival in the UK and he uploaded 85 pages of social media evidence on myHMCTS portal the day before the hearing.
b. There is insufficient evidence that the Appellant has a high profile. There is no evidence that the demonstrations the Appellant attended were monitored by the Iranian authorities and “his involvement seems to be one of very many people whose participation was limited to attending the demonstration in a similar manner to the many others who also attended”.
c. The Appellant’s evidence of his social media activities is of limited value and it is not reasonably likely the Appellant would return to Iran without first deleting his social media accounts.
20. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that because the Appellant’s expression of his political views is opportunistic he would not express them upon return to Iran because doing so would not advance his asylum claim.
21. I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal erred in its assessment of risk to the Appellant.
22. Firstly, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal failed to ask the correct question, i.e. whether the Appellant would express his genuinely held political beliefs on return to Iran and, if he would not do so, what the reason for that would be.
23. Secondly, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusion that the expression of the Appellant’s political views is opportunistic in the circumstances where the Appellant had uploaded social media evidence several months before the hearing as well as on the day before and relied on social media evidence that pre-dated his arrival in the UK.
24. I am satisfied that the errors I have identified mean that the whole determination must be set aside with no findings of fact preserved.
Disposal
25. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I am satisfied that it should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because the First-tier Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant evidence and because significant findings of fact will need to be made.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material errors of law. Accordingly, it is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different Judge.


G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 October 2026