Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003544
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02024/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAFFER

Between

HDQ
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Toora of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 12 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity as this is a protection appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant was born on 19 January 2003. He is a citizen of Iraq. He appealed against the decision of the Respondent dated 17 November 2023, refusing his protection claim. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Caskie KC, promulgated on 28 May 2026, dismissing the appeal.
Permission to appeal
2. Permission was granted in part by Judge Brannan on 29 June 2026 who stated:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in:
a. Impermissible speculation that the gang would not give the appellant two weeks before coming back and failing to consider the appellant was a child at the time of events mentioned
b. Failing to take account of country guidance about checkpoints
c. Confusing the appellant’s account about his phone
d. Not applying HJ (Iran)
3. In relation to (a) to (c) there are no self-directions about the age of the appellant or the country guidance on checkpoints, and the error relating to the phone, if as set out in the grounds, if correct, was material to the fact finding. Neither the grounds nor decision explain what was said about these points at the hearing. It may be that the documents events at the hearing show these issues are not actual errors of law. But the analysis in the decision shows an arguable material error of law as pleaded in a to c.
4. Ground d does not show an arguable error of law. The decision is tolerably clear that the judge did not believe the appellant to have a political opinion in opposition to the KAR government.”
3. Permission was sought to include Ground 4 which I agreed to as Mr Mcveety did not object, and I saw no good reason to exclude it as it had been properly pleaded as part of his case before the First-tier Tribunal and even though not contained in the grounds as drafted by Counsel, was plainly before Judge Brannan as he dealt with it.
4. I can immediately deal with the Ground relating to the Appellant’s age, as Mr Toora conceded that this ground was in error as the Appellant claimed that his problems occurred in August/September 2021 when he was already 18 years old. I can similarly deal with the concern about not taking account of Country Guidance, as reliance on that ground was based on AK, AH, and AJ v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 00150 (IAC) which while extant when the grounds were drafted and permission to appeal granted, was subsequently set aside on 28 July 2026. I will therefore not set out the evidence or submissions on these points.
The First-tier Tribunal decision of 28 May 2026
5. Judge Caskie KC made the following findings:
“15. … I found the Appellant to be an incredible and unreliable witness. … My reasons for so concluding include that the Appellant vacillated in relation to whether he was approached by the gang after his father is said to have fled Iraq when he was going to or coming home from school. It should be recalled that at the time the Appellant is said to have been threatened by the gang he was a school student. I do not consider to be at all plausible the suggestion that the Appellant was thought to have the power to force his father to return to their home. That is reinforced by the Appellant’s evidence that after he was initially approached the gang simply indicated that they would return in two weeks time. That was against the background where the Appellant's father had, so far as the gang were concerned, fled to an area outside their sphere of influence. I am in no doubt that the gang would have concluded that it was at least as likely that the Appellant would flee to join his father when he was threatened and that the threats against him would be entirely ineffective. They would have recognised that and not provided a 2 week escape window.
16. The Appellant has also changed his position regarding the use of false documents. He initially said that his uncle was obtaining false documents for him. He later said that he did not require documents but was able to pass through checkpoints and the airport. I do not accept that the exit control system in that region is such that it can be circumvented simply by an ability to speak Sorani as the Appellant claimed. That part of his account is simply incredible and I reject it. Criticisms of the Appellant having altered his account were met by the Appellant claiming there had been misinterpretation. I do not accept that. The nature of the alteration is not such that simple misinterpretation of a word or phrase would not have led to the change in the account the Appellant seeks to explain. His account changed because the Appellant change it having recognised the weakness of his original position. That was a deliberate attempt to mislead me and calls into question all of his evidence.
17. The Appellant claimed that he did not claim asylum and either Italy or France because both could be accessed by a Schengen visa and therefore he could easily be located in those countries. I do not accept that. There is no explanation as to the gang having the power or reach to locate him overseas. This part of the Appellant’s account is simply fanciful.
18. The alteration of the Appellant’s position regarding his telephone is also unworthy of belief. He initially indicated that the phone and had been destroyed but when I asked him during cross examination where the phone was he said that he had it with him. Those two positions are entirely inconsistent. That the Appellant provides an inconsistent account undermines his credibility and reliability. I also note that on the Appellant’s most recent version of events he deleted the messages he received on his telephone. Although young the Appellant will have been aware from the point at which he left Iraq that he required to make a claim for asylum and would require evidence to support his claim. The Appellant has failed to plausibly explain why he destroyed the messages on his phone. The Appellant also indicated he was confident he would not be found in the UK because nothing had happened to him so far and no one could reach him. That seems to me to be an entirely logical position but it is undermined as a basis for destroying his phone messages because there is no evidence before me or referred to by the Appellant of gangs, such as those he claims to fear in Iraq, operating in the UK. I consider the Appellant would have known that from the outset of his claim on the day he arrived in the UK.
19. With regard to his Facebook account I note that the Appellant has not produced the complete log in respect of that. He claims that he has provided the login details to his solicitor and therefore seeks to blame his solicitor for not lodging relevant documentation and only lodging screenshots. The Appellant knew his solicitors had asked for his login details for Facebook but I note those login details appear not to have been used by the solicitor. I conclude that the Facebook records would not support the Appellant in his claim. It was submitted by Ms Cleghorn that the Appellant’s online opposition to the government of Iraq would place him at risk. While some countries do seek to harm opponents overseas, such as Iran, I have not seen any evidence of the governing authorities in northern Iraq having done so and in those circumstances I do not consider that the Appellant is at risk because of his online activity. I am not satisfied that the Appellant has expressed any reliable evidence of opposition to the government of northern Iraq. As such I do not consider HJ (Iran) to be relevant in this case…”
The Appellant’s case
6. The remaining grounds seeking permission to appeal dated 9 June 2026 asserted that:
“Ground 1: Impermissible Speculation
2. The FTJ does not find it plausible that the Appellant would have the force his father to return to their home. This, he finds, is reinforced (sic) but e fact that the gang indicated that they would return in two weeks’ time [15]. It Is not clear how he could have concluded that it was ‘at least as likely’ that the Appellant would flee to join his father’ and that the threats against him would be ‘entirely ineffective’.
3. It is submitted that the FTJ relies on impermissible speculation and flawed plausibility reasoning contrary to the principles set out in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037. In HK, the Court of Appeal held that tribunals must not reject an account merely because it appears implausible to them, particularly where such findings depend on assumptions about how persecutors behave. The FTJ’s conclusion that the gang “would have recognised” that threats against the Appellant were ineffective, and therefore “would not have provided a two-week escape window”, is precisely the type of unsupported behavioural prediction that HK prohibits. This reasoning rests on speculation about gang behaviour and an assumption that persecutors act logically and strategically, whereas HK emphasises that persecutors often behave unpredictably and irrationally, and tribunals must not impose Western logic upon them. The FTJ further assumes, without evidential basis, that the gang knew the Appellant’s father had fled “outside their sphere of influence”, which again breaches the requirement in HK that plausibility findings must be grounded in evidence rather than conjecture… 5. It is further submitted that the FTJ’s finding that it was “not at all plausible” that the gang believed the Appellant could influence his father’s return is similarly flawed. It again rests on speculation about the gang’s motives, contrary to HK, and ignores the well-recognised persecutory tactic of targeting family members to exert pressure. Persecutors frequently act on misinformation, suspicion, or symbolic motives, not rational assessments of a child’s actual influence. The FTJ’s reasoning therefore substitutes his own logic for that of the persecutors, which HK expressly warns against.
6. The conclusion that the gang would have assumed the Appellant would flee to join his father, and therefore would not have threatened him, is also irrational and unsupported by evidence. It constructs a hypothetical alternative scenario rather than assessing the evidence before the tribunal, contrary to the approach mandated in HK. Moreover, the gang’s decision to threaten the Appellant is itself evidence that they believed the threat had value; the judge’s contrary conclusion is speculative and illogical.
7. It is therefore submitted that taken together, these errors demonstrate that the FTJ relied on speculation, … and substituted his own assumptions about persecutor behaviour for an evidence-based assessment. This constitutes a material misdirection in law under HK v SSHD, and it is submitted that it makes his credibility findings unsafe…
Ground 3: Potential Material Error of Fact Ground 3: Potential Material Error of Fact
13. The FTJ states that the Appellant indicated his phone had been destroyed but when asked where it was, he had it with him. The Appellant has always maintained he had the same phone, but it had been ‘cleared’. His PIQ (Page 30 of the R’s bundle) certainly gives a British number so previous data related to the old number may well not have been available. While this may be unclear, it is submitted that if the other two ‘credibility’ issues fall away, the FTJ may well have accepted his explanation as to the confusion as to whether he had a new phone or just a new phone number.”
7. The Ground dated 14 July 2026 asserted that:
“The Appellant …submits that it was not clear from the determination [19] that the judge did not believe the appellant to have a political opinion in opposition. First the judge finds at 19 that the Appellant did not produce the full log of his Facebook account and only submitted screenshots, making the evidence unreliable. It is submitted that this is not correct and the Appellant did in fact submit the full download of his Facebook posts, from page 17 of the Appellants bundle and were therefore in the correct format. The download included evidence of attendance at a demonstration and posts critical of the KRG authorities. It was therefore incumbent on the judge to make a finding on whether these activities were for genuine reasons or not.”
8. Regarding Ground 1, 2, and 3, Mr Toora added nothing orally. Regarding Ground 4 he submitted that the Judge made no finding on whether the Appellant genuinely held political opinions or whether if he returned to Iraq, he would not engage out of fear. He had attended demonstrations and posted on Facebook. He had produced a full Facebook download.
The Respondent’s position
9. Reliance was placed on the Rule 24 notice of 9 September 2026 the detail of which I will not set out as they are a matter of record. Mr McVeety’s oral submissions did not add to the Rule 24 notice in any material way except to say that the Judge dealt with HJ (Iran) at [19] of the decision.
Discussion
10. In assessing the Grounds, I acknowledge the need for appropriate restraint by interfering with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge bearing in mind its task as a primary fact finder on the evidence before it and the allocation of weight to relevant factors and the overall evaluation of the appeal. Decisions are to be read sensibly and holistically; perfection might be an aspiration but not a necessity and there is no requirement of reasons for reasons. I am concerned with whether the Appellant can identify errors of law which could have had a material effect on the outcome and have been properly raised in these proceedings.
11. Regarding Grounds 1 and 3, the Judge did not reject the Appellant's account on the basis of a mere subjective impression or unsupported plausibility finding. Rather, he identified a series of concerns arising from the Appellant's own evidence and set them out in detail as set out above which I will not simply repeat. The Grounds are simply disagreements with findings the Judge was entitled to make having rejected the account/accounts the Appellant gave. There is therefore no material error of law in relation to Ground 1 or 3.
12. Regarding Ground 4, whilst on page 49 of the bundle it states “Your posts, check ins, photos and videos – Photos, videos, text and status updates you’ve shared on Facebook – Generated by“ HGQ “on Sunday 4 January 2026 at 11.22UTC – Contains data that you requested from 4 January 2025 to 11.30 January 2026 at 11.30” only 45 pages of Facebook evidence were in the bundle. Page 46 is plainly truncated. There is no list of the 3,000+ friends, no indication of how many comments, shares, or likes are on any posts, and no indication of whether they are reports or original posts. In addition, it was recorded in the decision at [10] that the Appellant said he had not provided a full download of his Facebook page. In those circumstances, the Judge was entitled, and indeed obliged, to find that it was not a complete Facebook log.
13. The Judge noted in [10] of the decision that Appellant said he “wanted to go on demonstrations against corruption and also support opponents of the regime in northern Iraq…He had attended demonstrations about the repression of journalists…”. In stating at [19] “I am not satisfied that the Appellant has expressed any reliable evidence of opposition to the government of northern Iraq,” I am satisfied that the Judge was referring to the Facebook evidence (which I have dealt with) and demonstration attendance. The only detail provided by the Appellant appears in his statement of 11 December 2025 where he states “… I have attended 3 demonstrations in the UK in Newcastle and post extensively on my Facebook account against the Kurdish authorities. I am also in the process of joining the Dakok centre which advocates for Kurdish rights. The reason why I am politically active is because of the injustices in my country and the corruption. I want to be able to show the world what is happening in my country.” I note that the Facebook evidence at page 57 of the bundle before me has pictures purporting to show people at a demonstration in Newcastle on 5 August 2025. At page 58 and 62 are lists of Dakok events. Nowhere does it say that the Appellant attended the demonstration on 5 August 2025. Nor was there any evidence before the First-tier Tribunal from anyone at those demonstrations confirming the Appellant’s attendance or from the Dakok Centre of his attendance at any of their events or of him joining them. In those circumstances the Judge was entitled to conclude that there was “no reliable evidence of opposition to the government of northern Iraq” as having rejected the Appellant’s credibility for the numerous reasons he gave, he did not have to accept what the Appellant said just because he said it especially where there was evidence from within the United Kingdom that could have been easily obtained (TK (Burundi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40 at [21]).
14. There is therefore no material error of law in relation to Ground 4.
Decision
15. There is no material error of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Laurence Saffer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 October 2026