Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003556
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67421/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
22nd September 2026

Before

DEPUTY CHAMBER PRESIDENT PLIMMER

Between

UK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Woods, IAA representative
For the Respondent: Ms Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 21 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a citizen of Namibia. She has made an application for permission to appeal against a First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) decision dated 1 May 2026, dismissing her appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.

2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the FTT, as the requirements under the Refugee Convention in this particular case outweigh the demands of open justice. No party sought to argue otherwise.

FTT decision

3. Having heard evidence from the appellant, the FTT concluded that the appellant was not in need of international protection and dismissed her appeal on all grounds. The decision of the FTT is carefully drafted and clearly structured over the course of 32 pages and 155 paragraphs.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’)

4. In a decision dated 30 June 2026, the FTT granted the appellant permission to appeal having found the three grounds of appeal relied upon to be arguable. The respondent relied upon a rule 24 notice. I heard submissions from each of the parties in line with their skeleton arguments. I deal with each ground of appeal in turn.

Ground 1(a) – country expert

5. Ground 1 contends that the FTT acted unfairly in deviating from the respondent’s concession within the respondent’s Review dated 7 August 2025 (‘the Review’) to the effect that the expert’s “credentials and position to provide comment on the topic are not disputed”. Mr Woods submitted that this was not a disputed issue, yet at [79-80] the FTT took into account that the expert had not specialised in gender-based violence in Namibia, and this was relevant to “the extent of his authority to speak to the issue of sufficiency of protection for victims of gender-based violence in Namibia”. This concern was repeated at [122]. This is alleged to infect the overall assessment of the expert’s report.

6. The FTT expressly acknowledged that concession and agreed that the respondent should not be permitted to withdraw it at [76]. The FTT then explained at [77] that the weight to be attached to the expert’s view on sufficiency of protection was a matter for it to determine and in these circumstances it was relevant to take into account the extent to which the expert’s studies or research focussed on the issue of gender-based violence in Nairobi. This appears to contradict the FTT’s earlier acceptance that the expert had the credentials to comment on this very issue. However, in my judgment that error does not give rise to any material error of law or procedural unfairness. This is because the respondent clearly disputed the substance of the expert’s report and the FTT went on to fully and comprehensively consider the expert’s assessment, and was entitled to in any event attach little weight to it for the reasons provided. Mr Woods submitted that the respondent did not identified concerns with the sources, but as Ms Newton submitted, the substance of the expert’s report was clearly in dispute. The FTT explained at [122] that apart from the lack of clarity as to whether the expert’s expertise focused on gender-based violence in Namibia, it “also” had concerns regarding the nature and quality of the sources used by the expert and it did not consider the sources cited provided compelling or convincing support for the broad conclusions reached by the expert.

7. In my judgment the FTT was entitled to approach the expert report forensically and in detail, in the light of the respondent’s clear position that the Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’) should be preferred. The conclusions reached by the FTT regarding the expert report was open to it. In summary: (i) the sources used by the expert were limited, uncertain and out of date, and did not justify the sweeping conclusions reached by the expert (see [81-110]); (ii) the expert’s conclusions were not corroborated by other sources such as the CPIN and the US Department of State Country Report (see [111-121]); (iii) the expert preferred the views expressed in the CPIN (see [126]).
8. It was entirely open to the FTT to prefer the evidence contained in the CPIN over the expert’s conclusions for the reasons provided. The Review made specific submissions on this issue, inviting the FTT to prefer the evidence in the CPIN over the expert’s report. The respondent clearly disputed the conclusions reached by the expert on sufficiency of protection – see [19-22] of the Review. Contrary to the submissions in the grounds of appeal this should not have taken the appellant by surprise and did not cause any procedural unfairness.

Ground 1(b) – ex-boyfriend’s employment

9. The second part of ground 1 challenges the adverse factual finding based on the FTT’s identification of an inconsistency. In his oral submissions Mr Woods accepted this challenge focuses upon the ex-boyfriend’s employment. The respondent submitted that there was no inconsistency at all because the appellant referred to the ex-boyfriend being a lorry driver in her interview, which was acknowledged in the refusal letter.

10. The FTT recorded that the appellant made ten additional claims in her statement dated 27 May 2026, including the claim that her ex-boyfriend “drove trucks…had lots of money [and] over 130 cows” (‘issue (ii)’). The FTT accepted at [24] that issue (ii) may be characterised as a matter of detail. At [35] the FTT also correctly directed itself to the fact that the appellant said at interview that her ex-boyfriend is a lorry driver. When the decision is read as a whole it is tolerably clear that the FTT was entitled to be concerned that the appellant did not refer to the ex-boyfriend having lots of money and over 130 cows. The FTT noted that the response as to how her ex-partner had the means, motivation or ability to locate her was limited to him being a lorry driver without making reference to having lots of money.

11. Having noted again that the appellant’s evidence was that the ex-boyfriend was a lorry driver at [45] and [62], the FTT was entitled to draw adverse inferences from the obvious inconsistency with the Interim Protection Order relied upon, which gave his occupation as unemployed and his work details as “N/A”.

Ground 2 – credibility of evidence

12. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the FTT failed to address the underlying factors that explained the late disclosure of material evidence which impacted her ability to internally relocate. Ground 2 refers to the respondent’s updated guidance on assessing credibility to the effect that the totality of circumstances must be taken into account when considering why there has been late disclosure of evidence including her age, gender, mental health, the impact of painful, traumatic or otherwise challenging situations on memory, cultural differences, feelings of shame, the passage of time and the context in which the events took place.

13. Whilst the FTT did not specifically consider the terms of the respondent’s updated guidance on assessing credibility, it expressly considered the relevant underlying factors and was entitled to make the credibility findings it did. In particular, the FTT treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness and carefully considered the evidence relevant to the appellant’s mental health and her past accepted history as a victim of domestic abuse, when addressing the evidence that was disclosed late.

Ground 3 – sufficiency of protection for this particular appellant

14. I can deal with this ground briefly. Ms Wood submitted that the FTT accepted that the appellant had been mistreated in the past including obtaining a protection order, yet was subjected to further assaults. Mr Woods submitted there were individual matters that meant the general sufficiency of protection fell short for her. The FTT clearly directly considered sufficiency of protection based on the particular circumstances of this appellant at [127-136]. Ground 3 fails to engage with these important findings.

Conclusion

15. I therefore conclude that the FTT reached findings open to it and the grounds of appeal do not identify a material error of law.

Decision
The appeal against the decision of the FTT is dismissed.

DCP Plimmer
Deputy Chamber President Plimmer

21 September 2026