The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003569
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68203/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd November 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

LM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Nadeem, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This matter was heard in a hybrid format, whereby Mr Nadeem attended remotely. The matter had been listed for a remote hearing (without any objection by either party) but Mr Nappey was able to attend the hearing in person. The Appellant is based outside London, as I understand his representatives are, and this matter was therefore listed on a remote basis. There were no technical issues in the hearing and Mr Nadeem was able to participate fully in the hearing. I thank both representatives for their submissions.
2. This appeal concerns a Pakistani national in his thirties whose protection claim is based on what he describes as false accusations made against him following a tribal land dispute in 2018. At first instance, the Appellant’s appeal was heard by FTTJ A.M.S. Green (‘the Judge’) virtually on 17 September 2025 and 29 April 2026. In a determination promulgated on 1 May 2026, the Judge dismissed the appeal. That dismissal was based on the fact that the Appellant had been granted residence status in Italy. The Judge’s key and essentially sole reason for dismissing the appeal was that:
“Refugee protection is surrogate in nature. Where an appellant is able to avail himself of effective protection in another state, the United Kingdom is not required to provide international protection unless it is shown that such protection is no longer available in practice. The appellant’s subsidiary protection status expired on 9 February 2026. Expiry of a residence permit does not in itself establish that international protection has ceased to be available. The relevant question is whether the appellant has demonstrated that he is no longer able to avail himself of effective protection in Italy as at the date of hearing. The appellant has not shown that renewal of his subsidiary protection status was refused or unavailable to him” (§§42-44).
3. The Appellant appealed with permission to this Tribunal. At the hearing before me, Mr Nappey clarified that the Respondent wished to concede that the Judge’s decision contained a material error of law. I accepted that concession at the hearing and now give brief written reasons for my acceptance.
4. In conceding that the Judge’s decision contained an error of law, Mr Nappey explained that the Respondent considered that the Judge had gone “well” beyond his jurisdiction. He noted that the Respondent has powers to propose removal to a third country on safe third country grounds and / or to treat a claim as inadmissible under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. However, the Respondent had not exercised such powers in this appeal and had issued a decision attracting a right of appeal under s. 82 of the 2002 Act, which I note is a merits appeal, not a judicial consideration of admissibility. As noted by the Judge in paragraph 13 of the determination, there were some nine issues in the appeal, of which the Judge only determined one. Mr Nappey also accepted that the Judge failed to engage “at all” with the question of whether the Appellant could be returned to Italy or how he could renew his status there. Mr Nappey characterised this as a “clear error”. Mr Nadeem agreed with those submissions and both parties invited me to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a full de novo hearing.
5. I agree that the Respondent’s concession was correctly made. While there are powers under ss. 80A-80C to deem asylum and human rights claims inadmissible and / or remove asylum seekers to safe third countries, those are powers vested in the Respondent, not the Tribunal. The availability of protection in a third country may be indirectly relevant to the question of whether they are a refugee or should succeed on human rights grounds, including when assessing an appellant’s credibility, however even in such a case the Tribunal is still required to undertake a holistic assessment of whether an individual’s removal would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, in relation to humanitarian protection, or would involve a breach of their rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. Questions of returnability are primarily for the Respondent, although may in some limited circumstances (which are not relevant to this appeal) give rise to grounds of appeal.
6. The Immigration Acts (in particular s. 32(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022) and Immigration Rules require judges to consider whether an asylum seeker would be at risk of persecution or other serious harm in their country of nationality or origin. As noted above, an asylum claim may be deemed inadmissible in certain circumstances, including where the applicant has a relevant “connection” with a safe third country (per ss. 80B-80C of the 2022 Act). However, where a claim is not deemed inadmissible by the Respondent and a relevant risk is established, there are only limited exceptions in which the Tribunal may refuse the claim on the basis of the individual having a particular connection with a third country. There are the cessation clauses of the Refugee Convention, reflected in paragraph 339A of the Rules, which apply there an individual obtains a new nationality (i.e. not merely status). I also note rule 339J(v), which directs decision-makers to consider whether the person could avail themselves of protection of a third country “where they could assert citizenship” (emphasis added). It is also relevant in this context to note paragraph 345D of the Rules and s. 80(7)(d) of the 2002 Act, which allow the Respondent to admit an inadmissible claim for consideration where the individual’s removal to a safe third country within a reasonable period of time is unlikely. I therefore conclude that:
a. Inadmissibility decisions are statutory in nature and the Tribunal does not possess powers to treat a claim inadmissible on safe third country grounds.
b. The assessment of an asylum, protection, or human rights claim may involve consideration of an applicant’s ties to third countries, including where this is relevant to credibility.
c. There are grounds on which a claim may fail because the applicant has a connection to a third country, but this relates to scenarios in which they hold or could assert citizenship in that country, which is not the case here.
d. It follows that the Judge was wrong to determine this appeal on the basis of the Appellant’s previous status in Italy.
7. I also agree with Mr Nappey’s clear and helpful submissions regarding the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s ability to revive his status in Italy. By the time of the determination, that status had lapsed, as the Judge noted. The Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant could revive his status in Italy is a conclusion on a matter of Italian law and immigration practice, which is not a matter reasonably within judicial knowledge, nor was it the subject of evidence or submissions before the Judge. This was therefore a finding on the key, determinative issue in the appeal, which was not adequately reasoned and / or based on speculation.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full de novo hearing.


Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


27 October 2026