Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003571

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/66897/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

NAFEESA SHAHEEN
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipe, counsel
For the Respondents: Mr Walker, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 1 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. By a decision dated 30 April 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s 5 December 2024 decision to refuse her 18 July 2024 human rights claim.

2. Thereafter, the Appellant’s applied for permission to appeal. By a decision dated 2 July 2026, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 1 October 2026.

Background

3. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan aged 60 (date of birth 1st January 1957). She arrived in the UK on 9 June 2024 as a visitor. On 18 July 2024, she applied for leave to remain in the UK, on private and family life grounds, essentially based on her poor health and infirmity and her consequent need to remain with her son who resides here. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s application on 5 December 2024. The Respondent treated the Appellant’s application as an Article 8 ECHR human rights claim, the refusal of which gave rise to a right of appeal that the Appellant duly exercised.

4. By a decision dated 30 April 2026, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Judge found that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and that her removal would not be disproportionate in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

5. The Appellant raised two grounds of appeal. Permission was granted on both grounds. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a rule 24 response defending the appeal.

Hearing

6. Before me, the documentation was as follows: (a) the First-tier Tribunal’s decision; (b) the Appellant’s grounds of appeal; (c) the First-tier Tribunal’s grant of permission; (d) the Respondent’s rule 24 response; (e) the Appellant’s First-tier Tribunal bundle of evidence and appeal skeleton argument; and (f) the Respondent’s First-tier Tribunal bundle of evidence and review.

7. Mr Pipe confirmed that the Appellant was not applying for an anonymity order.

8. Mr Pipe adopted the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, which he had drafted, and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:

a. Ground 1. The Judge had misdirected themselves in law or failed to resolve a material issue in dispute between the parties by considering the incorrect Immigration Rules. The Judge had wrongly considered whether the Appellant met the requirements of the Appendix Adult Dependent Relative rather than the requirements of Appendix Private Life. Mr Pipe had appeared below and, although Appendix Adult Dependent Relative had been raised in the Appellant’s solicitor’s appeal skeleton argument, he (Mr Pipe) had made it clear to the Judge that the Appellant did not rely on Appendix Adult Dependent Relative – indeed, she could not do so because those rules apply to out-of-country applicants only – but rather relied on §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life, i.e. she contended that she would face very significant obstacles to integration on return. This was a material error of law that rendered unsustainable both the conclusion that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and, consequently, the wider conclusion that the Appellant’s removal would not be disproportionate in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

b. Ground 2. The Judge had failed to take into account material evidence, specifically a detailed letter from a GP concerning the Appellant’s physical and mental health state. Mr Pipe confirmed that he had specifically drawn the Judge’s attention to this letter. Again, this was a material error of law that rendered unsustainable both the conclusion that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and, consequently, the wider conclusion that the Appellant’s removal would not be disproportionate in breach of Article 8 ECHR.

9. Mr Walker adopted the Respondent’s rule 24 response (which he had not drafted). In summary, the rule 24 response submitted that: (a) although the Judge had not expressly considered §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life, that was not material because the factors considered under Appendix Adult Dependent Relative were also relevant to under §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life; and (b) an appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration (see Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, per Lewinson LJ at §2(iii)).

10. Mr Walker did not make any further oral submissions opposing the appeal. He said that he was not formally conceding the appeal because he considered his hands to be tied by the rule 24 response. However, having had the benefit of Mr Pipe’s oral submissions, he could see that there was “a great deal of force” in them, in respect of both grounds of appeal.

11. In terms of disposal, both representatives agreed that, if I were to find a material error of law, then the decision should be set aside in its entirety and the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh.

12. At the conclusion of the hearing, I found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law, I set aside the decision and I remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh. I said that I would provide my reasons in writing in due course, which I hereby do.

Decision and reasons

13. Ground 1 discloses a material error of law.

14. The Judge was not assisted by the Appellant’s solicitor’s appeal skeleton argument which expressly cited Appendix Adult Dependent Relative and asserted that the Appellant met its requirements. However, I accept Mr Pipe’s statement from the bar as to what happened at the First-tier Tribunal hearing, namely that he had made it clear to the Judge that the Appellant did not rely on Appendix Adult Dependent Relative but rather relied on §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life. This statement was not challenged by Mr Walker, and I am entitled to accept it (see Abdi v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, per Popplewell LJ at §§24-5).

15. Consequently, I am satisfied that the Judge erroneously considered the Appellant’s case by reference to Appendix Adult Dependent Relative. That is clear from §15 of the decision in which the Judge cited certain provisions of Appendix Adult Dependent Relative as a part of their legal framework and, in particular, §§39-40, in which the Judge found that the Appellant did not meet its requirements. Further, as the Respondent accepts, the Judge erroneously failed to consider whether the Appellant met the requirements of §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life.

16. Clearly, this was an error of law: the Judge failed to resolve a central, contentious issue. I do not accept the submission made in the Respondent’s rule 24 response, but not pursued with any vigour by Mr Walker, that this was immaterial because the factors considered under Appendix Adult Dependent Relative are also relevant under §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life. They are discrete areas of the Immigration Rules that require the application of discrete legal tests. The fact that there is potentially significant overlap between the factors to be considered when applying the respective tests does not mean that failure under Appendix Adult Dependent Relative will inevitably lead to failure under §5.1.(b) Appendix Private Life. I am therefore satisfied that this error of law was material: it cannot be said that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusions if it had not been made (see SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636, per Sales LJ (as he then was) at §49).

17. Having found a material error of law, I concur with the representatives that the decision should be set aside in its entirety. The material error of law affected all elements of the decision. Having considered the Practice Direction and Practice Statement, and also having had regard to the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, [2023] 4 WLR 12, I consider that this is a case in which the nature and extent of the necessary fact-finding means that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh. I note that Mr Pipe stated that he anticipated that the Appellant would file and serve further, up-to-date evidence in due course, in order to assist the First-tier Tribunal in its task.

18. It is not necessary for me to proceed to consider Ground 2.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside in its entirety.

The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be re-heard afresh before a differently constituted Tribunal.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 October 2026