Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003584
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/01849/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

ET
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E. Rutherford, instructed by Rodman Pearce Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. There is an anonymity order in place, which was made by the Upper Tribunal on 1 August 2026.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Turkey born in 2007. He is of Kurdish ethnicity. He claimed asylum in September 2023, when he was 16 years old. He said that he had lived in a predominantly ethnically Turkish area and that he and his family had been subjected to verbal abuse, discrimination and serious harassment by members of their community. His family had arranged for him to leave Turkey, and after he left, the Military Police had come to his family home enquiring about him, due to false complaints that had been made against him.
3. In a refusal decision dated 6 March 2025, the respondent accepted the appellant’s claimed age and ethnicity and that he and his family had been subjected to “adverse interest” from people in his “area”. The respondent found, however, that the appellant was not at real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Turkey. The decision maker found that the treatment the appellant had experienced did not rise to the level of persecution and the people he feared were non-state actors, such that he could avoid further harm on return by seeking protection from the police or relocating within Turkey.
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”). In a decision promulgated on 21 May 2026, the FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
5. The appeal determination begins by setting out a summary of the appellant’s claim, the respondent’s reasons for refusal and the issues in dispute. It then records that the it heard evidence from the appellant with the assistance of an interpreter and submissions from both representatives. No details of the oral evidence or the submissions are recorded.
6. The FtT’s “Findings” are recorded at [17]-[33].
7. With regard to the appellant’s credibility, the FtT found at [18]:
“I do not find the Appellant to be a credible or reliable witness. His evidence is vague and lacks sufficient detail in material respects.”
8. The FtT did not identify what aspects of the appellant’s account were considered vague and lacking in detail. The FtT then noted, at [19], that the respondent did not consider the appellant’s credibility to have been damaged by his failure to claim asylum en route to the UK, because of his age and “personal circumstances”. Nothing further is said about his credibility.
9. At [21], the FtT noted that the “incidents described by the Appellant, including the alleged attack on his dog and harm to his livestock, are not supported by direct evidence and were not witnessed by him.”
10. At [22], it found that that “the matters relied upon by the Appellant, including experiences at school and in his local community, amount to discrimination rather than persecution.”
11. At [23], the FtT announced that it did “not accept that the Military Police have shown any adverse interest in the Appellant.” No reasons are given for this.
12. At [24], the FtT announced that “drawing these matters together, I find that the Appellant has not established a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Turkey.”
13. Findings about state protection and internal relocation followed.
14. The appellant was granted permission to appeal by the FtT on the grounds that it was arguable that that findings at [21] were not consistent with the facts accepted by the respondent and the findings at [21]-[23] were unsupported by reasons.
15. At the hearing before me, after hearing from both representatives, I announced that I was persuaded that both grounds were made out and gave a brief summary of my reasons.
16. I now set my reasons out here in more detail.
17. The standard for adequacy of reasons is well-established and was recently reiterated in MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at [34], citing South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33 at [36]:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the "principal controversial issues", disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds.”
18. It is clear that the FtT’s reasons failed to meet this standard. The FtT gave one reason for rejecting the appellant’s credibility, which was that his evidence was vague in “material respects”. It did not identify which aspects of his account it was referring to or say why whatever he may have said about whatever material issue this may have been was considered vague. The fact that the respondent had not raised any criticisms of the appellant’s credibility in the refusal decision makes this error even more serious. This is not a case in which it could be said that the appellant should be able to understand the FtT’s reasoning because the FtT was implicitly agreeing with the respondent. Nor can anyone reading the decision know whether concerns about the vagueness of the account were ever put to the appellant, or whether his age at the relevant time was taken into account. This gives rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the FtT erred in law.
19. The FtT later asserted that it rejected the account of the Military Police having attended the appellant’s home, without giving any reason at all. When the decision is read as whole, it may be inferred that the rejection is based on the rejection of the appellant’s overall credibility, but given that the reasons for that rejection are themselves inadequate, the error of law is simply repeated here.
20. The FtT also went behind the respondent’s acceptance of the appellant’s account of the harassment he and his family suffered, but there is no indication that the respondent sought to withdraw that concession at the hearing. Even if the respondent did seek to withdraw the concession at the hearing, there is nothing to indicate whether the FtT considered whether it was fair to allow her to do so in all the circumstances.
21. For the sake of completeness, I note that in rejecting the appellant’s account of the killing of his dog on the grounds that he did not witness it, the FtT has made a finding that is directly contrary to evidence, although I accept that this was not one of the grounds raised.
22. Finally, I do not consider that the findings on state protection and internal relocation mean that the errors identified above were not material. The appellant claimed to have been sought by the Military Police, such that if the rejection of his credibility was flawed, the findings on state protection and internal relocation must necessarily be remade.
23. At the hearing before me, both parties agreed that remittal was appropriate, given that no factual findings are preserved. Taking into account the guidance set out in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 159, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, as well as the Practice Statement of 11 June 2018, I agree.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 21 May 2026 is set aside in its entirety. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 September 2026