UI-2026-003587
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003587
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/74970/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3rd of November 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER
Between
GFG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Nadeem, Legal Representative, instructed by Allison Wells Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 22 October 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This appeal was listed for a remote hearing. In the event, Mr Nappey was able to attend the Tribunal in person and so the appeal proceeded on a hybrid basis, with Mr Nadeem attending virtually. Neither party objected to the appeal being listed either virtually or on a hybrid basis and I was able to see and hear Mr Nadeem clearly, who confirmed (after some initial difficulties joining the call) that he was able to see and hear those present in court.
2. The central issue in this appeal is the Appellant’s nationality. His case is that he is a national of Eritrea who moved to Ethiopia as a young child. The Respondent’s position, as set out in the underlying refusal letter of 25 October 2024, is that he has failed to show that he is Eritrean. The Appellant’s protection claim was refused on the basis that his nationality was disputed and it was considered that he was not at risk in Eritrea.
3. The Appellant appealed the Respondent’s decision and his appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Row (‘the Judge’). The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal, concluding that he was not credible.
Grounds of appeal and submissions
4. The Appellant filed lengthy grounds of appeal, raising some eight alleged errors of law. In summary, these are:
a. The Judge’s treatment of evidence supporting the Appellant’s claim was perverse.
b. The Judge wholly failed to take into account documentary evidence relating to the Appellant’s attempts to prove his nationality (using the Ethiopian INVEA app and attending the Ethiopian embassy).
c. The Judge overlooked the Respondent’s “concession” that the Appellant had given answers at interview, some of which were verified with external information.
d. The Judge reached speculative findings, not based in any evidence, about the Appellant’s ability to use a false passport to travel to the UK.
e. The Judge wrongly concluded that there were ‘inconsistencies’ in the Appellant’s asylum interview, when there were none.
f. The Judge was inconsistent about whether corroboration was required.
g. Section 8 was misapplied, being treated as determinative, rather than one factor amongst many.
i. I note that the grounds refer to this as arising under “NIAA 2004”, which does not exist, but it is clear the reference is to s. 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
h. The Judge made no findings on the country of return or returnability.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by FTTJ Gibbs on 6 July 2025 on all grounds.
6. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 notice dated 29 July 2026. In it, the Respondent opposes the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. The Respondent submits that the appeal was incapable of succeeded on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. The Respondent relies upon YL (Eritrea) CG [2003] UKIAT 16, in particular §27 of that determination which states that the Tribunal may take an adverse inference from a failure to approach the Eritrean embassy to confirm citizenship and argues that the Appellant’s failure to do so meant the appeal was bound to fail. The Respondent stated that the INVEA app and Ethiopian embassy evidence did not establish whether the Appellant was not Ethiopian. The Appellant’s failure to take reasonable steps to verify his nationality and thus discharge the burden of proof meant the appeal was bound to fail.
7. There is nothing in the Rule 24 notice which engages with the specific points taken in the grounds of appeal, however Mr Nappey did address me on these orally.
8. At the hearing before me, Mr Nadeem did not address me on the grounds of appeal but touched briefly on the r. 24, arguing that the Respondent cannot properly seek to defend the decision for reasons the Judge did not give. He addressed me on YL, emphasising that the weight to be placed on the failure to take steps in seeking to establish nationality was fact-specific. He argued that the claim being ‘bound to fail’ was a high bar and pointed to pieces of evidence which were not taken into account by the Judge.
9. In response, Mr Nappey relied upon the r. 24 although took a somewhat different approach to the Appellant’s failure to approach the Eritrean embassy. He submitted (in my view correctly) that, in light of more recent case law, there can be a risk of refoulement if a putative refugee attends the embassy of their (claimed) nationality. He submitted that the Judge was right to place little weight on the letter before him which was supported by a driving licence but in circumstances where the writer did not attend. He accepted that the Judge made a factual error in treating the letter from the Selam Homework Club as not referring to the Appellant as an Eritrean national when it does, but he submitted that the Judge was entitled to put very little weight on it. He accepted that the Judge did not specifically refer to the church letter before him but emphasised that the Judge was not required to refer to every single piece of evidence before the Tribunal. Regarding the Ethiopian embassy evidence, he submitted that this was evidence attracting very little weight. His position was that the Appellant’s answers at interview were vague and the Judge’s findings about the Appellant’s ability to travel on a fake passport were open to them to make. He submitted that the Judge was entitled to place adverse weight on the Appellant’s failure to take reasonable steps to obtain further evidence, including from his family. He explained that arguments about returnability were parasitic on the other grounds succeeding, and in any event such arguments could only succeed in limited circumstances, principally relating to Article 8 ECHR ‘limbo’ arguments.
10. Mr Nadeem responded, reiterating the points made in the grounds that these failures went beyond a mere failure to achieve best practice and instead involved a failure to take into account evidence before them, misunderstanding of the evidence, and incoherent reasoning.
11. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Analysis
12. I remind myself of what the Court of Appeal described in Kapikanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987, §20 as “familiar principles”, namely:
“The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the UT should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30];
(2) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65, at [45];
(3) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25];
(4) The issues that the FTT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27] […]”
13. Broadly, the thrust of the above jurisprudence is that a Judge in my position should not rush to find error in a First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision simply because more detailed reasons could have been given or because the Judge has failed to refer to a particular piece of evidence. Those principles sit alongside and do not displace the principle of anxious scrutiny, which requires decision-makers to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of the individual has been properly taken into account (R (YH) v SSHD [2010] 4 All ER 448 at §24).
14. I am persuaded that some of the grounds advanced by the Appellant disclose material errors of law. While some of the points put forward in the Grounds of Appeal do amount to mere disagreement with the Judge’s finding and / or invite this Tribunal to depart from the principles summarised in Kapikanya and set out above, I accept four arguments put forward by the Appellant.
15. First, in relation to Ground 1, I accept that the Judge reached an incorrect and unreasonable conclusion regarding the Selam Amharic and Tigrinya Homework Club’s letter. The Judge at §22 states that the letter “makes no comment upon the appellant’s nationality”. That is wrong; the letter expressly states that “[GFG] is an Eritrean man”. While this evidence would obviously have to be given such weight as might attach to it and while it would have to be weighed in the round alongside the other evidence and the Judge’s other findings, that process could not be lawfully or rationally undertaken in the absence of an understanding that the Club had positively identified the Appellant as Eritrean. The Judge understood the contrary to be the case, which was an error.
16. I am less persuaded by the Appellant’s submissions about the letter supported by a driving licence. The witness did not attend the hearing to give evidence. When I asked Mr Nadeem whether any reason was given for the witness’s non-attendance, he stated that “appellants just tend to get a letter and that’s about it”. For the avoidance of doubt, the failure by a witness to attend the Tribunal, even if they have provided a letter with supporting identity documentation, is something on which a judge may properly place weight and it may result in that witness’s evidence being given very little or even no weight. While I do not agree that the letter “could have been written by anyone”, as the Judge put it, I do not accept that the Judge’s reasoning involves a material error of law in the circumstances. The decision to put very little weight on a brief letter from a witness who did not attend the hearing was reasonably open to the Judge.
17. Second, in relation to Ground 2, I accept that the Judge did not grapple at all with the Appellant’s evidence regarding his efforts to prove that he was not an Ethiopian national and I accept that this was a failure to take into account relevant evidence. While I see the force in Mr Nappey’s submissions that this evidence was not highly persuasive, he did not submit that it was evidence which should attract no weight, which is what the Judge essentially gave it by failing to consider it at all.
18. Third, in relation to Ground 3, I accept that there was a failure by the Judge to show in the decision’s reasoning that material which could tell in the Appellant’s favour had been properly taken into account. The Appellant at his asylum interview gave a substantial number of answers which specifically and accurately identified elements of Eritrean life, including eight Eritrean place names, nine Eritrean ethnic groups, the President of Eritrea, the date of Independence day, the fact and date of the liberation of Massawa, the four historical occupiers of Eritrea, Eritrean traditional foods, and Eritrean cultural figures. The Respondent accepted in the refusal letter that some of these answers were verified which “adds to the credibility of your claim”. I note that the Respondent also referred to the answers being vague. This element of the Appellant’s claim is addressed at §30, where the Judge states: “The respondent says that the appellant demonstrated limited knowledge of Eritrea. His argument is that he has not lived there since he was two years old. Another interpretation is that it is because he does not come from there.” Without requiring the Judge to have set out every step in their reasoning, I conclude that this reasoning is inadequate and fails to show that a significant piece of evidence has been duly considered. It is unclear what the Judge concluded. The Judge simply states that there is an alternative interpretation of this material. The judgment nowhere makes reference to the fact that the Appellant was able at interview to provide substantial, accurate details about Eritrea. That, plainly, did not by itself mean he was bound to succeed, but it was a material part of the case with which the Judge was required to grapple. The failure to do so amounts to an error of law.
19. Finally, I accept the submission in Ground 4 that the Judge relied on matters both not in evidence and not reasonably within judicial knowledge in concluding that the Appellant could not have travelled to the UK on a false passport. The Appellant’s consistent account has been that he travelled to the UK on a false passport. The Judge’s analysis at §45 is:
“I do not find it credible that he could use a false passport and not be challenged about this either on leaving Sudan or on arrival in France. I find that the more likely explanation is that he travelled using his own passport and has chosen not to disclose it because it does not suit his case.”
20. False documentation continues to be a reality. I note that the Respondent continues to operate the National Document Fraud Unit, whose expertise is in identifying fraudulent travel and identity documents. Indeed, the Respondent regularly makes submissions to this Tribunal to the effect that documents are false or otherwise unreliable. I appreciate and accept that document checks take place in the course of international travel which are intended to identify false documents. However, there is nothing in the papers before me to suggest (nor do I consider it is a matter of common knowledge) that it is incredible that a person could leave Sudan and / or enter the UK using false identity documents.
21. I also accept the Respondent’s submission that the Judge’s conclusion on this point involved procedural unfairness. The Judge reached a conclusion which was not put in issue by either party (nor, as far as I can tell, raised at the hearing) that the Appellant must have travelled on a genuine Ethiopian passport. This goes substantially further that the Respondent’s case, essentially concluding that the Appellant was dishonest. Had the Respondent pleaded dishonesty, the burden of proof would have switched to her (Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed; fraudulent applications; procedure) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 00378, §21). In the circumstances, the Judge’s conclusion at §45 was not sustainable.
22. The above findings are sufficient to dispose of the appeal in the Appellant’s favour. I therefore do not intend to address the remaining grounds of appeal separately, although I have considered them as well as the Respondent’s rebuttal of them. Those remaining grounds do not affect my conclusions above, nor the outcome of this appeal.
23. The only remaining question is whether these errors were material. I accept that they were. Credibility requires a careful and holistic assessment of the significant pieces of evidence before a Judge. I accept that a reasonable judge could have reached a different outcome in the absence of the errors I identify above. These errors go to central features of the Judge’s credibility assessment, which was the principal question within this appeal. They constitute material errors of law sufficient to set aside the determination as a whole.
24. The parties agreed that, if I found an error, this matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing, with no factual findings preserved.
Notice of Decision
I allow the appeal.
This matter shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
Miranda Butler
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
30 October 2026