Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003599
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65489/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GIBBS

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Khaled, Counsel (Direct Access)
For the Respondent: Ms. Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have decided to make an anonymity order in these proceedings because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This is an appeal brought by the appellant against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) promulgated on 13 April 2026. In this, the appellant’s appeal against a decision made by the Secretary of State refusing his protection and human rights application was dismissed.
Background
3. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He has lived in the United Kingdom (UK) since 2009. He married in 2021 and the couple have a child born in 2022.
4. The appellant’s claim is that as a member of the Bangladeshi National Party (BNP) he will be at risk on return from members of the Awami League. He claims to have been previously arrested in Bangladesh and that in 2024 he became the victim of politically motivated criminal charges against him. Additionally, the appellant has been politically active on behalf of the BNP whilst in the UK.
Grounds of Appeal
5. There are five grounds of appeal.
6. The first ground is that the Judge erred in their assessment of the country background information.
7. The second is that the Judge failed to apply the correct standard of proof i.e. the lower standard.
8. Thirdly that the judge made speculative and inadequately reasoned findings regarding the reliability of the appellant’s documentary evidence.
9. The fourth ground is that the Judge misapplied s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 (“The Act”).
10. The final ground is that the Judge failed to conduct a structured proportionality assessment when considering Article 8 ECHR, specifically by failing to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.
Grant of Permission
11. First-tier Tribunal Judge Ritchie granted permission to appeal in respect of all grounds apart from ground three.
12. Following the grant of permission the respondent filed a rule 24 response to the appeal.
The Hearing
13. Mr. Khaled informed me that he had only been instructed the day before which is why the composite bundle was submitted last night. He confirmed that it did not contain any information that had not been before the Judge. Ms. Isherwood did not object to the bundle being admitted into evidence given that the appellant had previously been unrepresented and in fact the Tribunal should have prepared the bundle on his behalf. I therefore admitted the composite bundle into evidence.
14. I informed Mr. Khaled that I would not permit argument regarding ground 3 because permission had not been granted on this ground. He did not seek to persuade me otherwise.
15. I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
16. I will deal with ground two first, as did Mr. Khaled in his submissions. This is a challenge to the Judge’s application of the appropriate standard of proof in their findings with regards to the appellant’s claim for asylum.
17. It is not disputed that the Judge did not set out the applicable standard of proof (the lower standard in this pre-NABA case) prior to making their credibility findings. I remind myself however that in accordance with SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49 that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist and expert tribunal who will be presumed to have done its job correctly in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
18. Mr. Khaled was unable to point to any word or phrasing used by the Judge to show that they had applied the wrong standard of proof. I also find that the judge made both positive and negative credibility findings with regards to the appellant’s claim which indicates to me that they approached their findings fairly and applied the correct standard of proof.
19. I also find that [23] of the decision makes specific reference to the correct standard of proof, albeit that the Judge is considering the issues of Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR. At [26] the Judge states “Having found the Appellant would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm…” which is evidence, I find, that the correct standard of proof was applied throughout the decision. I am not therefore persuaded that there has been a material error of law by the Judge in this regard.
20. Turning to the first ground regarding the Judge’s approach to the country background information I consider that this is no more than an attempt to re-argue the issue. The Judge appropriately referred to the respondent’s Country and Information and Information Note: Political Parties Bangladesh (CPIN) December 2024 and set out the parts of the CPIN on which they placed the greatest weight, as they were entitled to do. [10] makes clear that the Judge considered risk from both state and non-state actors. The Judge did not make a material error of law.
21. Ground four asserts that the Judge misapplied s.8 of The Act. The ground asserts that the Judge took the delay as a decisive factor. Further, that they did not engage in the reasons for any delay. Mr. Khaled developed this submission orally; he submitted that in the appellant’s Asylum Screening Interview his evidence was that it was only in January 2020 that the appellant had seen his name mentioned in online newspapers and he had then claimed asylum in February 2020 and that therefore there had not been any delay.
22. I am not persuaded that the Judge found the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum was determinative. The finding on this issue is at [21] and follows several paragraphs in which the Judge carefully discusses all aspects of the appellant’s credibility before turning to s.8 of The Act. Secondly I am satisfied that the Judge was aware of the entirety of the appellant’s evidence and was entitled to place weight on the fact that threats had allegedly started in 2019 and yet the appellant waited for matters to escalate in 2020 before making his claim for asylum. The grounds do not address the Judge’s finding that there was also a delay in the appellant submitting evidence in support of his claim. I am not therefore persuaded that the Judge made an arguable error of law on this issue.
23. I find that the Judge’s findings on Article 8 ECHR are not clearly set out. However, notwithstanding that they could have been better presented I am satisfied that the Judge considered all relevant issues in their consideration of the proportionality of the decision.
24. Despite the Judge’s finding at [27] that there was no documentary evidence submitted regarding the appellant’s private and family life in the UK they did not dispute that such life existed [30]. Although the Judge did not specifically refer to the best interests of the appellant’s child they did consider the impact of removal on the child [27-30]. The fact is that no evidence was submitted about the child’s special educational needs and the Judge was satisfied that the child could access education in Bangladesh and would have the support of their parents, and extended family. I also note that there was no mention of the child’s best interests in the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal. I am satisfied that the Judge gave appropriate consideration to all issues under Article 8 ECHR and did not make an error of law.

Notice of Decision
25. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The appellant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 September 2026