The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2026-003618
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00801/2025
PA/72219/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
21st August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

HDY
(Anonymity Order Made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Rule 34 Decision at Field House on 10 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her international protection and human rights appeals. The decision was sent to the parties on 19 March 2026.

2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Hamilton granted permission to appeal on all 7 grounds by a decision dated 5 July 2026.

3. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response, dated 30 July 2026. She concedes the appeal in the Upper Tribunal and requests that this matter be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo with none of the findings of fact preserved.

4. By her response, the respondent observes, inter alia:

“4. The FTTJ expressly found that the Appellant left Eritrea as an infant. The Appellant would therefore necessarily be reliant upon information obtained from others regarding matters relating to Eritrea. Nevertheless, adverse credibility findings were made by reference to matters of knowledge and recollection concerning Eritrea. The Respondent accepts that a more detailed explanation was required as to why those matters were considered capable of undermining the Appellant's credibility.

5. At [6] of the determination, the FTTJ accepted that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness and, at [7] and [8], directed herself to the relevant jurisprudence and guidance. The Respondent accepts that there is arguable merit in the contention that insufficient regard was subsequently given to that vulnerability when assessing inconsistencies, omissions and gaps in the evidence.

6. The Respondent further accepts that it is arguable that the assessment of the documentary evidence was not conducted wholly in accordance with the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed. In particular, adverse findings appear to have been based upon matters which the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to explain personally, including features of official Eritrean documentation.

7. Ground 5 asserts that an adjournment was sought to enable the instruction of a country expert to assess documents said to originate from Eritrea.

8. Whilst the determination does not record any such application, the Presenting Officer's hearing minute clearly records that an adjournment request was made for that purpose.

9. In Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal held that the relevant question in cases concerning the refusal of an adjournment is one of fairness and whether the refusal deprived the affected party of the right to a fair hearing.

10. In the circumstances, the Respondent accepts that there is arguable merit in the contention that the absence of any recorded consideration of that application gives rise to a potential issue of procedural fairness.

11. The Respondent therefore accepts that the cumulative effect of the matters identified above is capable of undermining the overall findings on credibility, nationality and risk on return.’

Rule 34 Decision

5. In considering whether to proceed under rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I am mindful as to the circumstances when an oral hearing is to be held in order to comply with the common law duty of fairness and as to when a decision may appropriately be made consequent to a paper consideration: Osborn v The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] AC 1115 and JCWI v President of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2020] EWHC 3103 (Admin), at paragraphs 6.1 - 6.14.

6. In the circumstances arising in this appeal, particularly the position adopted by the respondent, and being mindful of the importance of these proceedings to the appellant, the expense to the parties of attending an oral hearing and the overriding objective that the Upper Tribunal deal with cases fairly and justly, I am satisfied that it is just and appropriate to proceed under rule 34.

Discussion

7. Having carefully considered the papers in this matter, I agree with the respondent as to the panel’s decision being materially erroneous in law. A decision should properly record the reasons for refusing an adjournment request.

8. The only appropriate course is to set aside the decision in its entirety.

9. I note Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 0046 (IAC). Consequent to the appeal being considered de novo and the likely extent of documentary evidence and examination of the appellant at the remaking hearing, it is appropriate that this matter be remade by the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

10. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 19 March 2026 is set aside for material error of law, with no preserved findings of fact.

11. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Hatton Cross, which is the closest hearing centre to the appellant.

12. The anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal is reaffirmed.


D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10 August 2026