Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2026-003622,
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70647/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

MA (Afghanistan)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Secretary of State: Ms Khan, Senior Presenting Officer
For the appellant: Mr Aslam, Counsel, instructed by Winston Rose Solicitors LLP

Heard at Field House on 24 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity Order
1. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that the order be set aside. I observe that the appellant seeks international protection and consider that his private life rights protected under Article 8 ECHR presently outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings. The latter right is protected by Article 10 ECHR.

Introduction
2. The appellant appeals a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ketteley (“the Judge”) dismissing the appellant’s appeal by a decision dated 13 May 2026.

Relevant Facts
3. The appellant arrived in the UK in September 2023 with entry clearance as a student and claimed asylum the following month. He claimed that he had come to the adverse attention of the Taliban when he and his father had gone to collect the body of his brother, who had been killed whilst fighting in the Afghan army. The appellant had subsequently received a scholarship to study in India as the family member of a martyr. He had had a heated argument with the Taliban in 2021 during a visit to Afghanistan and had subsequently gone into hiding and returned to India. The day after the appellant arrived in the UK, he learned that the Taliban had threatened him and his family.

4. The Secretary of State refused the appellant’s claim in a reasons for refusal letter (RFRL) dated 11 September 2024. The respondent considered the appellant’s account to be inconsistent internally and with the background evidence and to lack detail.

First-tier Tribunal Decision
5. The Judge made the following findings:
a. The appellant did not face adverse attention between 2017-2019, and his return to Afghanistan in May 2021 was a strong indication that he did not face any real risk for his life [paragraph 25].
b. The appellant had been inconsistent as to whether he was severely beaten by the Taliban in 2017 or 2020 or 2021 [26]
c. The medical evidence does not assist the appellant to establish that he was beaten by the Taliban or when this occurred [27]
d. The appellant failed to mention in his screening or asylum interviews that he got into an argument with the Taliban in 2021 and had to go into hiding.
e. The appellant had given inconsistent accounts regarding whether the Taliban had delivered a letter in 2023 or had instead, or as well, visited the appellant’s home once or more.[29]
f. The evidence of the witness was of limited use as the witness left Afghanistan in 2000.
g. The documents regarding the appellant’s scholarship had not been provided until after he was refused asylum, and the appellant had not provided evidence of the method of receipt or an explanation for how he had been able to re-establish contact with his family since losing contact in September 2023. Little weight was therefore attributed to the documents, and they therefore did not establish that his brother had been an army officer, nor that he had been killed. [31] and [32]
h. The appellant’s account was undermined by discrepancies and omissions that were exacerbated by his oral evidence. It was not accepted that the appellant had been threatened, attacked or become embroiled in a heated argument with the Taliban in 2017 or 2021, that he had gone into hiding in 2021, and that his family had received a Taliban letter or visit from the Taliban in 2023 [34].

Grounds of Appeal
6. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and relied on four grounds of appeal. Permission to appeal was granted in respect of ground (a) concerning unreasonable credibility findings and a material error of fact, and (c) inadequate consideration of the documentary evidence. The appellant has not sought to reopen the other grounds.

Permission to appeal and rule 24 response
7. In granting permission to appeal Judge Turner noted the argument that the Judge had failed to engage with the fact that the Taliban were not in control of the country until August 2021 and that the appellant had corrected his account during the screening interview and clarified the attack took place in 2017 and not 2020. The appellant had not been asked to explain the lack of evidence of receipt of the documents or how he had regained contact with his family. These were considered arguable errors of law.

8. In a Rule 24 response dated 27 July 2026 the respondent accepted that the Judge had been wrong to place weight on an alleged inconsistency regarding the date of the 2017 attack. The Judge was entitled to reach the conclusions made in relation to the documentation.

9. The appellant has prepared a composite bundle of 208 pages.

Hearing
10. Mr Aslam and Ms Khan made submissions at the error of law hearing, which have been recorded.

11. Mr Aslam relied on Tanveer Ahmed v. Secretary of State for the Home Department SHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 and submitted that the appellant’s credibility must be looked at in the round within the context of the appellant’s overall claim. The medical evidence of the appellant’s injuries could have been considered favourable. The Judge failed to engage with the substance of the available documents. The Judge’s view of the documentation was influenced by his opinion of the appellant’s credibility. The alleged discrepancies had not been put to the appellant.

12. Miss Khan argued that the Judge’s erroneous reliance on the appellant having once made a mistake in his screening interview as to the date when his brother was killed, was not a material error. The appellant’s oral evidence had been inconsistent about when he was beaten up. The appellant had made no challenge to the Judge’s finding at paragraph 29 that he had been inconsistent in his evidence regarding whether the Taliban had visited and whether they had delivered a letter.

13. The Judge was not required to draw to the appellant’s attention that he had failed to raise the 2021 incident in his interviews. In any event, the decision was not clear as to whether this issue was raised with the appellant at the hearing or not.

14. Miss Khan relied on Gabriele Volpi & Delta Ltd v Matteo Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 and submitted that the weight to be attributed to documents was a matter for the Judge. The Judge had set out their reasons at paragraph 27. The Judge was entitled to attach little weight to the evidence provided by the appellant in the absence of an explanation for how he made contact with his family again and in the absence of evidence as to how he received the documents.

15. Mr Aslam maintained that the inconsistencies that the Judge relied on must be put to the appellant, and, in the absence of a clear record, there was a risk that these issues had not been raised at the hearing.

Analysis
16. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before reaching a decision. I bear in mind that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account (MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 49.) Further, an appellate court should not rush to find an error because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently (AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693).

Ground (a) - concerning unreasonable credibility findings and a material error of fact
17. It is argued that the Judge failed to take into account that the Taliban was not in control before August 2021. It is not accepted that the Judge was unaware of this. He has set this out this change in circumstances immediately following the observation in paragraph 25 that the appellant did not encounter difficulties between 2017-2019 and returned in 2021.

18. It is not disputed that the Judge erred in paragraph 26 in placing weight on the appellant having stated that his brother was killed, and he was beaten in 2020 in the screening interview. The respondent accepts that elsewhere in the screening interview the appellant referred to this incident as having taken place in 2017 and did not challenge the one reference to 2020. I am not satisfied that this alone would comprise a material error. The materiality depends on the significance of the findings relating to the other arguments relied on by the appellant.

19. In considering the assessment of the claimed events in 2017, the appellant relies on the Judge’s failure to place weight on the alleged consistency in the appellant’s account and the reasons given for rejecting the document that supported that account.

20. The grounds are erroneous in asserting in paragraphs 6 and 7 that the appellant was otherwise consistent about the beating. I accept Ms Khan’s submission that the appellant himself had also claimed in oral evidence that he was beaten in 2021, as also set out in paragraph 26 of the Judge’s decision. When he was subsequently asked to explain why his written evidence did not refer to him being beaten in 2021, he did not take that opportunity to state that he had only been beaten in 2017. Instead, he stated that he was stressed, there were some things he wanted to say but left out and that he later put them in his statement. I am satisfied that the Judge was entitled to place weight on the inconsistency in the evidence as to when the appellant was beaten.

21. Under the heading Ground (c) - rejection of documentary evidence on an insufficient basis and inadequate consideration of the documentary evidence, reliance is placed on the findings in paragraph 11. It is argued that the Judge erred in rejecting the documentary evidence from Afghanistan (paragraph 31–32 of the Judge’s decision) solely on the basis that the appellant had not provided evidence that these were sent to him via WhatsApp, and he had not provided details of how he had re-established contact with his mother.

22. The appellant had stated in his asylum interview in August 2024 that he had last had contact with his family in September 2023 and had been unable to contact them since. In oral evidence he had stated that he received the documents from his mother by WhatsApp.

23. Although the Judge refers to applying the guidance in Tanveer Ahmed, it is noteworthy that the Judge makes no adverse findings about the format or content of any of the documents. It is also noteworthy that the Judge makes no reference to the appellant’s consistent account that his brother was in the army and was killed and that the appellant has volunteered the detail in his asylum interview that he received a scholarship because his brother had been killed.

24. Paragraph 11 also raises a procedural unfairness point, arguing that these matters were not put to the appellant; that is that he was not asked why he had not provided evidence of how he received the documents or an explanation of how he had re-established contact with his mother. Although the appellant had stated in his screening interview (qu 6.3) that he would provide his brother’s army card and evidence his brother was killed within 2 to 3 months, no reference was made to the failure to provide these documents in the reasons for refusal letter. Thus, the appellant may have been unaware of the importance of setting out how and when he received the documents.

25. Considering the centrality of the documentary evidence to the appellant’s claim, I am satisfied that, in this instance, the appellant has shown that it was unfair to place weight on the failure to provide an explanation for these issues when they were not put to him. I am therefore satisfied that the overall conclusion reached can be regarded as unfair: MR (Pakistan) v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 473. The requirement to put every issue to the appellant is flexible and must be considered within the context of the decision as a whole. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that these matters, regarding the documentation, should have been clearly put to the appellant, if the Judge wished to rely on these factors alone to reject the documentary evidence, without referring to the appellant’s consistent account of their content.

26. I am mindful that the Judge found a discrepancy in the date for when the appellant’s brother was killed that the respondent did not rely on. I am satisfied that this finding may also have adversely affected the Judge’s assessment of the reliability of the appellant’s brother’s documents. I am satisfied that the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s documents in these circumstances comprises a material error.

27. I do not find merit in the other grounds advanced to argue that the Judge had made unreasonable credibility findings. Specifically, I do not accept the arguments in the grounds concerning the medical evidence or that the Judge erred in placing weight on the appellant’s failure to refer to the 2021 incident in his interviews. I also note Ms Khan’s argument that there is no challenge to the findings that the appellant had been inconsistent in relation to whether the Taliban had delivered a letter, visited his home or both in 2023.

28. Nonetheless, I am mindful of the duty confirmed in Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367. I am satisfied that the errors identified are material, notwithstanding these other findings, as the Judge is required to consider the claim in the round. For the same reasons it is not appropriate to preserve these findings.

29. I am satisfied that the appellant has shown that the Judge has made a material error of law.

Remittal
30. I observe paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers and the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), [2023]. Consequent to the decision of the First-tier Tribunal being set aside on procedural unfairness grounds, the only proper course is for this matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 13 May 2026 is set aside in its entirety for material error of law.

32. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (Virtual Region) to be heard by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Ketteley.

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 October 2026