Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003659
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67843/2024
LP/04425/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

NAO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Dr M. Ilahi, counsel, instructed by Wildan Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 21 September 2004. His claim is based on his (undisputed) membership of Islami Chhatra Shibir (‘ICS’), the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami. His case is that he faced political persecution in Bangladesh because of his political activism, in particular he was stabbed by opposition activists, criminal cases were filed against him, the police attended his home, and he continues to fear both the remaining members of the Awami League and the BNP, who are now in government. He appeals against the determination of FTTJ Sweet (‘the Judge’), dated 14 April 2026. On 21 July 2026 UTJ Grey granted the Appellant permission to appeal. Although the grant of permission to appeal was not limited, Judge Grey expressly identified Grounds 2 and 6 as the primary arguments and emphasised that the Appellant should address materiality given the change of regime in Bangladesh.
2. A few preliminary issues arose at the start of the hearing. Ms Ahmed had not received the Appellant’s skeleton argument or composite bundle (I also did not have the latter until the morning of the hearing). She asked for a short period in which to read both and confirmed that she was content that she had had sufficient time to consider the documents when the hearing resumed at noon.
3. I also noted at the outset of the hearing that the Judge had refused to make an anonymity order. Anonymised ciphers were used by the two judges who considered permission. It is not clear to me whether either Judge formally made an anonymity direction and, given that lack of clarity, I have considered the matter for myself of my own motion. Both parties agreed that anonymity was appropriate in this case as it raises protection grounds. The Appellant’s case is that his alleged persecutors remain at large in Bangladesh, where he continues to have ties. I therefore consider that there may be a risk to the Appellant if the fact and / or details of his protection claim were to be disclosed by the Tribunal. I therefore make an anonymity order in the terms set out at the top of this judgment.
Grounds of appeal
4. The Appellant’s submissions were made principally set out in the very helpful and clear skeleton argument signed by Wildan Legal Solicitors. Mr Ilahi adopted that skeleton argument and only gave very brief submissions in line with it. The skeleton argument focussed the Appellant’s case principally on the grounds highlighted by UTJ Grey in the grant of permission.
5. In relation to Ground 2, the Appellant argues that the Judge failed to engage with his country expert report. At §22 of the Decision the Judge characterised it as “a generic report” and noted that no submissions were made to rely on it in oral submissions. The Appellant submits, with detailed reasons, that the report is not generic and instead specifically addresses his case. He further submits that the Appellant’s written case expressly and repeatedly referred to the expert report, both in the skeleton argument and witness evidence. The Appellant’s position is that the Judge’s dismissal of the expert report involved a mischaracterisation and amounted to a failure to give reasons as well as a Mibanga error.
6. In relation to Ground 6, the Appellant challenges the Judge’s finding at §22 that GP records had not been provided and denied the existence of any claim based on risk as a result of the Appellant’s health. He explains that the GP records had been reviewed by the medical expert. The Appellant explains that his claim did raise Article 3 medical grounds. The Appellant further explains that the rejection of the medical report meant that the Judge failed to consider (i) whether to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness or (ii) the impact of his significant mental health diagnoses (severe depression and generalised anxiety disorder) had on his evidence.
7. Otherwise, the Appellant’s grounds are, in summary:
a. That the Judge wrongly applied the civil standard of proof under s. 32 NABA, with no separate assessment of risk on the lower standard.
b. The Judge disregarded the evidence that the Appellant had been stabbed, his ICS identity care, and other corroborative evidence, wrongly concluding that there was no documentary or witness evidence of threats, save that the Appellant referred to an attack on 10 August 2025.
c. The Judge failed to address why the Appellant deleted his Facebook account and whether the account came to the authorities’ attention before its closure.
8. Regarding materiality, the Appellant relies upon ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1281, §43, which held that an error of law is only immaterial if any rational tribunal would have been bound to do so on the same evidence. The Appellant submits that this high threshold is not met; that the errors go to the foundation of the decision, including factual findings.
9. In her R. 24 response, the Respondent rejects these points on the basis that:
a. There was no reason for the Judge to consider the lower standard, given the factual findings which had been made.
b. This ground is a mere disagreement with the Judge, who adequately examined the evidence.
c. The Appellant had not provided any evidence that the Facebook account was monitored. There is no right to have a Facebook account. The changed country situation addresses any possible error.
10. Ms Ahmed slightly nuanced the position in her oral submissions, while maintaining her defence of the appeal and relying upon the written submissions in the R. 24. She acknowledged that in JCK (s. 32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) §§25-26 UTJ Bruce appears to consider that it is necessary to consider both the civil standard (in relation to genuine subjective fear) and the lower standard (in relation to risk) as part of a holistic assessment.
11. In any event, Ms Ahmed (and Mr Ilahi) agreed with a point that I raised of my own initiative, namely that the Judge had not considered the Appellant’s humanitarian protection or Article 2/3 claims on the lower standard. Those claims are nowhere mentioned, nor is the lower standard applied at any stage. Ms Ahmed, while not conceding that this was an error of law, described it as a Robinson obvious point and did not object to it being raised by the Tribunal of my own motion. Mr Ilahi invited me to find that this was an error of law.
12. Regarding the other grounds, Ms Ahmed relied upon the Rule 24 response and emphasised that there had been a change of government, arguing that this rendered any error immaterial.
Analysis and reasons
13. I start by finding that there is a clear and obvious error in the assessment of the Appellant’s humanitarian protection and Article 2 and 3 ECHR claims. These claims are unaffected by s. 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. They fall to be assessed to the lower standard. The Judge did not consider these claims nor did he purport to apply the lower standard at any stage. There is therefore, plainly, a material error going to the heart of the assessment of the Appellant’s non-asylum protection and human rights claims.
14. I also accept that there is an error in the Judge’s analysis of the Appellant’s asylum claim. The clearest errors are evident in Grounds 2 and 6, which I address below. I also address the Mibanga arguments raised by the Appellant.
15. I accept that the Judge erred in treating the Appellant’s country expert report as generic and rejecting it on the basis that oral submissions were not made on it. It was not generic. It specifically addressed the Appellant’s personal circumstances, including the risks he faces as a result of his role as Vice President, coming from the region he does, and his specific risk profile. I also accept that the Appellant’s skeleton argument made repeated reference to the country expert report. There is no suggestion that the Appellant resiled from those submissions at the hearing, which the Judge was accordingly required to take into account.
16. I also accept that the Judge erred in rejecting his medical expert report on the basis that the GP records had not been provided. The expert report clearly confirms that the GP records had been reviewed. There was no freestanding requirement to provide them to the Court. The Appellant, in his skeleton argument, reasonably accepts that the absence of GP records could bear on weight, but their absence in these circumstances does not by itself justify the rejection of the report wholesale.
17. The Judge also appears to have misunderstood the Appellant’s case, asserting that no claim was made that he would be at risk from his ill-health on return or unable to access effective treatment. That was his case, as it clearly set out in the appeal skeleton argument and witness statement.
18. Finally, I accept that the determination discloses a classic Mibanga error. Having reached negative credibility and risk findings, the Judge, in his final substantive paragraph, then turned to the expert evidence and finds that it does not displace the negative conclusions on credibility already reached. That is not the correct approach. It was necessary to reach findings on credibility and risk as part of a holistic analysis which took into account this expert evidence, not to reach negative conclusions and then ask whether they were liable to be changed by the expert evidence.
19. These errors were material. The threshold for immateriality once an error of law has been found is high; ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1281, §43 confirms that an error of law is only immaterial if any rational tribunal would have been bound to reach the same conclusion. I consider that, especially given the fundamental nature of the errors which have infected the core of the Judge’s factual findings, a rational tribunal could reach a different conclusion about the individual risk the Appellant faces, notwithstanding the change of government. In particular, I note the Appellant’s submission that Jamaat, with whom the Appellant claims to be affiliated, is now the BNP’s principal political opposition. The country situation in Bangladesh has changed significantly, in a way which will have to be considered afresh at a future hearing, but I consider that MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 (on which the Respondent relies) is not, and does not purport to be, country guidance, and that risk in a case such as this has to be assessed on an individualised basis.
20. The parties agreed that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full de novo hearing. As Ms Ahmed rightly put it, the Appellant has been deprived of any assessment of his humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3 ECHR claims, and I consider that he is entitled in fairness to a ‘first bite at the cherry’ on those grounds, justifying the wholesale remittal of the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.
This matter shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 October 2026