Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003671
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00926/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

PARMINDER SINGH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Maqsood of Counsel, instructed by Expert Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 October 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Brannon (“the judge”), promulgated on 10 March 2026, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 10 June 2025 refusing his human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of India, born on 11 November 1998. He entered the United Kingdom with his mother on 2 November 2010 holding a visit visa valid until 23 February 2011. He did not leave the United Kingdom upon the expiry of that visa. Thereafter, he and his mother made a number of unsuccessful attempts to regularise their immigration status. On 15 January 2022, however, the respondent granted the appellant leave to remain until 14 July 2024. He applied to extend that leave on 21 August 2024 but subsequently withdrew the application on 25 March 2025.
3. Meanwhile, on 7 August 2015, the appellant was convicted at West London Juvenile Court of criminal damage and was sentenced to a nine-month parenting order and a nine-month referral order. More significantly, on 6 November 2024, he was convicted at Derby Crown Court of possession of a handgun and violent disorder, for which he was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. As the sentencing remarks explain, the appellant participated in a violent confrontation involving approximately 40 men at an open-air international kabaddi tournament in Derby in 2023. A variety of weapons were used during the incident, including firearms, axes, bladed articles, machetes and bats. The underlying cause of the disorder remains unclear.
4. As a consequence of those convictions, the respondent notified the appellant on 28 November 2024 that he was liable to deportation. In response, the appellant raised human rights representations. Those representations were considered and rejected by the respondent in a subsequent decision dated 10 June 2025.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim. In his notice of appeal, he provided both a correspondence address and his sister’s email address for service. At that time, he was not legally represented.
6. On 29 July 2025, the First-tier Tribunal issued directions to the appellant’s prison and to the email address provided in his appeal form. The directions required the respondent to file and serve her bundle by 4 August 2025 and the appellant to file and serve his evidence by 25 August 2025. Although the respondent’s bundle was filed shortly thereafter, on 7 August 2025, the appellant failed to comply with the direction requiring him to provide evidence.
7. On 4 August 2025, the First-tier Tribunal issued notice of a case management review hearing (“CMR”), listed to take place on 9 September 2025 via the Cloud Video Platform (“CVP”). According to the judge’s decision, the hearing did not proceed because of “connection problems” (see [9]). Before me, however, Mr Maqsood submitted that the hearing did not take place because the appellant’s representatives, Expert Law Solicitors, who had been instructed on 3 September 2025, had not received the CVP link.
8. On 19 September 2025, notice was issued relisting the CMR for 20 October 2025, again by CVP. Three days before that hearing, the appellant instructed new representatives, AZ Law. As recorded at [11] of the judge’s decision, it was unclear whether the relisted CMR ultimately took place. In any event, on 22 October 2025 the First-tier Tribunal issued further directions requiring the appellant to file and serve the reasons for his appeal, together with any evidence upon which he intended to rely, no later than 19 January 2026. The appellant did not comply with those directions either.
9. Also on 22 October 2025, the First-tier Tribunal issued notice of the substantive hearing, which was listed for 27 February 2026. A production order was sent to the appellant’s prison to secure his attendance. The notice of hearing was emailed both to AZ Law and to the email address provided by the appellant in his notice of appeal.
10. At some point in February 2026, the appellant re-instructed Expert Law Solicitors and on 24 February 2026 they notified the First-tier Tribunal that they were acting for the appellant again.
11. On 25 February 2026, Expert Law Solicitors applied to adjourn the substantive hearing on the basis that the appellant’s pro bono counsel, Mr Maqsood, was unavailable. The application was refused the same day. The judge considered that the appellant had been afforded sufficient time to instruct counsel and that appropriate adjustments could be made to enable him to present his own case if unrepresented. Notice of that refusal was sent to Expert Law Solicitors on the morning of 26 February 2026.
12. Later that day, Expert Law Solicitors renewed the adjournment application via email. On this occasion, it was argued that further time was required to obtain documents said to be relevant to the appellant’s case, namely a copy of his full licence, the custody management review report, and an OASys report. Given the lateness of the renewed application, it appears that the judge was not in a position to determine it before the hearing.
13. Neither the appellant nor his representatives attended the hearing on 27 February 2026. The judge considered the renewed adjournment application and refused it. He described the application as “nonsense”: see [18]. He concluded that none of the outstanding documents were capable of materially affecting the outcome of the appeal. The judge regarded the appellant’s licence and the custody records as irrelevant. Whilst an OASys report might contain information concerning the appellant’s private and family life or his risk of reoffending, the judge considered that any evidence relating to the former ought to have already been provided by the appellant himself, upon whom the burden of proof rested, but he had failed to do so. As to the latter, the judge considered that rehabilitation would carry limited weight and was, in any event, unlikely materially to affect the outcome given the seriousness of the appellant’s offending. The judge further noted that the appellant had actual notice of the hearing, had repeatedly failed to comply with directions requiring him to provide evidence, and had declined the opportunity to attend the Tribunal and advance his case. He concluded that further delay would be unfair to the respondent and would represent an inefficient use of Tribunal and prison resources. He therefore decided that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the appellant’s absence.
14. The judge thereafter heard the appeal and, in the decision promulgated on 10 March 2026, dismissed it on the basis that the appellant had failed to establish that there were very compelling circumstances to his case capable of outweighing the strong public interest in his deportation.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
15. On 29 July 2026, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst granted the appellant permission to appeal on the following four grounds:
(1) The judge’s decision to refuse the appellant’s application for an adjournment and proceed in his absence amounted to breach of natural justice and a denial of a fair hearing.
(2) In deciding to proceed with the appeal in the appellant’s absence, the judge had failed properly to apply rule 28(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 (“the FtT Procedure Rules”).
(3) The judge had unfairly refused the adjournment application and failed to consider the full procedural history to the case.
(4) The procedural errors were material to the adverse findings made by the judge because the appellant had not been given the opportunity to explain his case.
16. Judge Hirst also directed Expert Law Solicitors to file and serve a witness statement setting out the procedural and factual history of the case. A witness statement made by the appellant’s solicitor, Mr Sajwat Sandhu, dated 12 October 2026, was subsequently filed and served.
The hearing
17. The error of law hearing proceeded in a hybrid fashion, with Ms Keerthy being present at the hearing centre and Mr Maqsood joining by CVP. There were no issues arising from this.
18. The parties’ submissions are recorded in the record of proceeding and not rehearsed here, expect where necessary to do so.
19. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Discussion
20. While the appellant advances four grounds of appeal, they all raise the same essential issue: whether the judge was entitled to refuse the renewed adjournment application and proceed with the hearing in the absence of both the appellant and his legal representatives.
Grounds 1 and 3: Fairness
21. At the error of law hearing, Mr Maqsood placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the appellant changed legal representatives during the course of the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal. In particular, the appellant replaced Expert Law Solicitors with AZ Law on 17 October 2025 and subsequently re-instructed Expert Law Solicitors shortly before the hearing listed for 27 February 2026. Mr Maqsood submitted that, as a result, Expert Law Solicitors had insufficient time to prepare the case and instruct counsel. Even assuming that to be correct, the appellant himself had been aware of the hearing date since 22 October 2025, when the notice of hearing was sent both to him personally and to AZ Law. The judge was therefore entitled to conclude that the appellant had been given fair notice of the hearing and a sufficient opportunity to prepare for it, including by ensuring that he had legal representation in place in advance.
22. Despite a direction made by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 29 July 2026 requiring Expert Law Solicitors to file evidence identifying when they had been instructed and subsequently de-instructed by the appellant, like the grounds of appeal, the witness statement of the appellant's solicitor, Mr Sandhu, fails to specify the date in February 2026 on which Expert Law Solicitors were re-instructed. Nor has any contemporaneous documentary evidence, such as a signed letter of authority, been produced. The only matter that can be established with certainty is that, on 24 February 2026, Expert Law Solicitors notified the First-tier Tribunal that they were again acting for the appellant. However, even proceeding on the basis most favourable to the appellant, namely that Expert Law Solicitors were re-instructed only shortly before the hearing, that does not materially assist him for the reasons that follow.
23. The appellant had been afforded two opportunities to file evidence in support of his appeal. By directions dated 29 July 2025, he was required to file his bundle by 25 August 2025. Following his failure to comply, further directions were issued on 22 October 2025 requiring any evidence to be filed no later than 19 January 2026. Again, the appellant failed to comply. There is no suggestion that either set of directions was not properly served. The appellant therefore had ample opportunity to place evidence before the Tribunal but failed to do so.
24. Furthermore, it was the appellant’s own decision to change representatives in the period leading up to the hearing. As Ms Keerthy submitted, even if Mr Maqsood was unable to attend on 27 February 2026, no explanation has been provided as to why a solicitor from Expert Law Solicitors could not have attended, even for the limited purpose of renewing the adjournment application orally and addressing the Tribunal’s concerns.
25. It is also notable that the reasons advanced in support of the adjournment applications changed in 24 hours. The first application relied upon counsel’s unavailability. The second relied upon an asserted need to obtain further documents, including the appellant’s licence and prison records. The judge considered those reasons, offered to make adjustments to assist the appellant to represented himself, and gave reasoned explanations for concluding that the additional material was either irrelevant or unlikely materially to affect the outcome of the appeal.
26. That brings me to the appellant’s failure to attend the hearing. As the judge observed when refusing the earlier adjournment application, arrangements could be made to enable the appellant to represent himself if he were unrepresented. That is not an unusual occurrence before the First-tier Tribunal. However, as recorded at [19], the appellant refused to transfer from HMP Maidstone to HMP Wormwood Scrubs on the day before the hearing in order to be produced before the Tribunal. His explanation was that he believed the production order related to another prisoner.
27. Before me, Mr Maqsood submitted that it was reasonable for the appellant to reach that conclusion because he had previously received correspondence intended for another individual with the same name and because he knew that a further adjournment application had been made on his behalf. I do not find that explanation to be remotely convincing. The appellant was fully aware that his appeal was listed for hearing on 27 February 2026. He was also aware that an earlier adjournment application had already been refused and could not reasonably have assumed that a renewed application would necessarily be granted. In those circumstances, the judge was fully entitled to reject the explanation provided and to conclude that the appellant had deliberately chosen not to attend the hearing.
28. For completeness, I see no material significance in the fact that the first case management review hearing had to be cancelled because Expert Law Solicitors had not received the CVP link. First, there is no evidence that the appellant himself had not received the link. Secondly, the hearing was subsequently relisted and, in any event, directions were issued on 22 October 2025 providing the appellant with a further three months to file evidence. Those directions were sent both to AZ Law, who were then acting for the appellant, and to the appellant personally at the email address that he had provided to the Tribunal.
29. I have had regard to Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 (IAC). The ultimate question is whether the refusal of the adjournment and the decision to proceed deprived the appellant of a fair hearing. However, fairness is not assessed solely from the perspective of the party seeking an adjournment. As the judge recognised, regard must also be had to the interests of the respondent, the efficient conduct of litigation and the overriding objective. The appellant had notice of the hearing for approximately four months. He had twice been directed to file evidence and failed to do so. He had legal representation for much of the proceedings. He had been informed that arrangements could be made to enable him to present his own case if necessary. In addition, arrangements had been made for his production before the Tribunal, which he chose not to utilise. In those circumstances, the judge was fully entitled to conclude that the appellant had been afforded a fair opportunity to present his case and that it was appropriate to proceed with the hearing in his absence. Ground 1 is therefore not made out.
Ground 2: Interests of justice
30. Rule 28 of the FtT Procedure Rules provides:
“If a party fails to attend a hearing the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing if the Tribunal—
(a) is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing;
(b) considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.”
31. The appellant does not dispute that he received notice of the hearing. His complaint is therefore directed solely to the judge’s conclusion under rule 28(b). In reality, however, this ground amounts to no more than disagreement with the judge’s assessment that it was in the interests of justice to proceed. For the reasons already given, the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant had been afforded a fair opportunity to participate in the proceedings and that the interests of justice favoured proceeding with the hearing rather than granting a further adjournment. Given the seriousness of the offences for which the appellant was convicted, such a finding was unsurprising. Nor was the judge under any obligation to make further enquiries of the prison before proceeding as the grounds of appeal suggest. The First-tier Tribunal had already been notified of the reason why the appellant had refused to transfer between prisons. As I have indicated above, the judge was entitled to reject that explanation. Furthermore, the appellant remained legally represented at that stage and his solicitors could have attended the hearing and invited the judge to adopt any of the alternative courses that the grounds of appeal now suggest he should have taken.
Ground 4: Materiality
32. Ground 4 is parasitic upon the earlier grounds. As I have concluded that Grounds 1, 2 and 3 are not made out, it follows that Ground 4 cannot succeed either.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law. Accordingly, that decision shall stand.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21st October 2026