Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003676
UI-2026-003677
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62336/2024
PA/62337/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

SI and RZS
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ferguson, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellants
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 6 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants appeal, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Wilding) promulgated on 27 February 2026. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellants’ appeals on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 25 October 2023 to refuse their protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that their rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know their identity as parties to these proceedings, one of whom is a minor the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The appellants are nationals of Bangladesh. The first appellant is the father of the second appellant. The FtTJ summarised the factual background as follows. The first appellant(“A1”) entered the United Kingdom as a student on 30 December 2021. It was claimed by him that in Bangladesh he was involved with the Bangladesh Islami Chatra Shibir (“BICS”) since 2015, he became the college secretary. He did not have any problems in Bangladesh sufficient for him to apply for asylum on arrival. He came to the UK to study. He claimed that on 4 March 2022 his home was raided in Bangladesh and his family were threatened by the Awami League and the police. He further claimed that there was a profile due to his online activity, that he was under suspicion as the chairman of the BICS. He made a claim for asylum on 2 August 2022.
4. A1 was interviewed in respect of that claim by way of a screening interview on 2 August 2022 ( p86CB). At the time of the claim, he was single with no children. By 9 September 2022 he was legally represented by solicitors (L Solicitors) (p103CB).
5. He was later interviewed on 18 January 2024 (p.117CB). He was married in September 2023 and their child was born in later that year. The respondent considered the applications made by A1 and A2 and, in her decision letter dated 16 April 2024 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Bangladesh. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim. The decision letter is summarised in the FtTJ’s decision at paragraph 7. In the alternative, it was argued on behalf of the respondent that even taken at its highest, the appellant would not be at risk on return since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the change in country conditions (see Review).
6. The appellants gave notice of appeal against the decision on 14 April 2024. At this stage the appellants had changed their representation to another set of legal representatives who continued and were instructed when the matter was before the FtT on 1 December 2025.
7. As will be set out later in this decision, there has been complete lack of compliance with the directions issued by the Tribunal up until and including the hearing before the FtTJ on 1 December 2025. The procedural history of the appeals are contained in the electronic records held by the FtT and are on the Judicial Case Manager -they were summarised in the FtTJ’s decision and the case management order in the consolidated bundle.
8. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 27 February 2026, the FtTJ dismissed the appeals. The appellant (A1) was not present at the hearing and application for an adjournment was renewed by his legal representative who was in attendance. That application was considered in accordance with the evidence provided but was refused by the FtTJ for the reasons he gave between paragraphs 10 – 16. The appellant’s legal representative provided oral submissions before the FtTJ in relation to the appeals and the FtTJ also gave permission for the legal representative to upload his written submissions relating to the evidence which the FtTJ took into account when reaching his conclusions. The FtTJ dismissed his appeal having considered that evidence, addressing the failure to claim asylum, assessing the documentary evidence that he provided but concluded that A1 had given an overall vague account, lacking in any real detail not only as to his political background but any ongoing claimed risk. Th respondent had set out in the review that even if the claim is taken at its highest, in view of the change in country conditions, the appellant even on his evidence had not demonstrated that he would be at risk on return to Bangladesh. At paragraph 24 the FtTJ set out that even if he was wrong, the political landscape has significantly changed since the appellant made his claim and since August 2024 and that those that the appellant claimed to be at risk of were no longer in power and that there was no country evidence to suggest that someone in his position and as claimed would be at risk on return. The FtTJ assessed article 8 between paragraphs 25 and 26. He dismissed the appeals.
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal was refused by a FtTJ on 31 May 2026. A1 changed his legal representatives who filed their grounds of appeal on 12 June 2026 and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 5 August 2026.
10. The hearing took place on 6 October 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was represented by Ms Ferguson, of Counsel. The respondent was represented at the hearing by Mr Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer. I heard submission from each of the advocates.
11. Ms Ferguson relied upon the 3 grounds of challenge and supplemented the grounds with her oral submissions. Mr Parvar in behalf of the respondent relied upon the Rule 24 response dated 26 August 2026 and that the appeal was opposed on all grounds. He provided his submissions in response to those of Ms Ferguson. It is not necessary to set out the submissions and they will be considered in the context of the grounds advanced on behalf of the appellants.
12. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I would be reserving my decision to consider those submissions as made. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
13. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the issues and the decision of the FtTJ.
14. There are three grounds of challenge. Ground 1 seeks to challenge the case management decision of the FtTJ to refuse the application made for an adjournment on grounds of procedural unfairness. Ground 2 asserts that there was a failure to apply anxious scrutiny by reasons of the refusal to adjourn. Ground 3 asserted a material mistake of fact as to the immigration status of A1’s wife ( the mother of A2) vitiating the Article 8 and section 55 assessment.
Grounds 1 and 2:
15. These grounds can be taken together as they challenge the decision of the FtTJ to refuse the application for an adjournment made at the hearing and to proceed in his absence.
16. Ms Ferguson on behalf of the appellant submitted that the refusal of the adjournment deprived A1 of a fair hearing. She submitted that the application made before the FtTJ was the first in-person application to be considered substantively, and that the last application was not considered on its merits. The grounds set out the evidence before the FtTJ which was a GP fit note dated 19 November 2025. In light of that evidence along with the explanation provided by the legal representative about the road accident, this should have been given due consideration in substance.
17. By reference to the procedural history, she submitted that it was unfortunate that there had been a lack of compliance on behalf of A1 however there were matters of credibility relevant to the asylum claim advanced and this turned on evidence which he was not able to address by cross examination and in the circumstances the appeal could not proceed fairly or justly. She submitted that this was supported by the reference to the appellant’s case as “vague” and that the appellant should have had the opportunity to address those issues at a hearing and this supported the application for an adjournment. This was addressed in ground 2 and that the failure to adjourn the hearing prevented A1 providing oral evidence and to be cross-examined therefore anxious scrutiny had not been applied to A1 ‘s case.
18. Mr Parvar behalf of the respondent submitted that the arguments of fairness had been focused on the appellant’s side of the proceedings and failed to reflect the serious and damaging history of the appeal. The FtTJ was entitled to reflect on the serious history of non-compliance and that the appellant had five separate opportunities to file evidence including his witness statement and ASA between 2024 – 2025. The hearing had taken place for five months after the last direction had been issued but no compliance had taken place and there had be no explanation for the lack of compliance before the FtTJ. There had also been no explanation for this even at the error of law hearing. Thus, his inability to attend the hearing did not excuse the flagrant non-compliance. If the appellant was seriously intending to take issue with the respondent’s decision letter the appellant had every opportunity to respond to that and provide a witness statement. Mr Parvar noted that even if he had attended it would be difficult to see what evidence he would be able to give again the background of non-compliance.
19. As to the medical evidence, he submitted that the fit note was not evidence to show that he was unable to participate at the hearing but referred to his place of work. As the FtTJ noted, it referred to “knee pain” but did not say that that rendered him unable to participate at a court hearing. The evidence did not suggest that he had any mental health problems so that he was unable to participate fairly in any hearing had it been suggested it was a remote hearing.
20. Even if it was taken at its highest as a physical problem, there was no reason given by the appellant or the legal representative as to why a remote hearing could not have addressed those difficulties. The judge was entitled and correct to draw the line where he did, by giving fairness to both sides.
21. In respect of ground 2, He submitted that the appellant had every opportunity to respond to the credibility issues but the appellant elected not to provide evidence or submit to cross-examination. It was the absence of any documentation not just oral evidence.
22. In her reply to those submissions, Ms Ferguson submitted that she accepted that there had been non-compliance on the part of the appellant and that the medical evidence was not clear or persuasive as to his reasons for attending. However, she submitted it is a narrow point and that following the refusal of the adjournment the appellant instructed new solicitors and had pursued his case with more effect than he had done previously. It is therefore necessary in the interests of fairness and justice for the appeal to have been adjourned to enable the appellant to attend and counter the issues raised that related to credibility. She submitted that whilst there had been a fundamental change in the country conditions in Bangladesh as set out by the FtTJ it did not mean that his claim could not succeed.
Conclusions on grounds 1 and 2:
23. The power to adjourn a hearing falls within the Tribunal's case management powers, specifically Rule 4(3)(h) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. That power must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective.
24. Rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 provides that the Tribunal may proceed with a hearing in a party's absence if it considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The power to proceed under Rule 28 must be exercised in a manner which gives effect to the overriding objective in Rule 2 to deal with cases "fairly and justly", which includes "avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues" (Rule 2(2)(e)).
25. Neither advocate took the Tribunal to the decision of Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness)[2014] UKUT 418 (IAC) but this was set out in the grounds at paragraph 5. It provides guidance as to the correct approach when exercising that power. It holds that where an adjournment refusal is challenged the question is not whether the First-tier Tribunal acted reasonably. Rather, the issue is one of fairness: whether the refusal deprived the affected party of a fair hearing.
26. Whilst the grounds also cite the decision of SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284 that decision must be understood in its own procedural context. This arose in the context of the fast-track regime, with severely compressed timescales later found to be unlawful. It does not provide a general answer to ordinary FtT cases involving delay, non-compliance with directions, non-attendance, or possible abuse of process.
27. The central question is whether refusal of the application would deprive the party of a fair hearing. That focuses attention on the integrity of the hearing process rather than on whether granting the application would be helpful to the party making it. It must be answered by reference to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the application and quality of the evidence relied upon to support the application, its timing, the explanation given, the importance of the evidence to the principle controversial issues, the party's compliance with directions, and the opportunities already given to prepare and participate in the proceedings.
28. Whether the First-tier Tribunal acted fairly by refusing the Appellant's adjournment request is an objective question for this Tribunal to determine for itself. The question therefore is not whether I would have granted the adjournment. Nor is the question whether the Judge acted reasonably in refusing it. The question is whether the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing. It is good practice for a FtTJ to identify preliminary issues decided during the course of an appeal and to set out their reasons; in this case why the application was refused.
29. Turning to the Judge's reasons, the FtTJ set out his reasons for refusing the adjournment between paragraphs 10-17 of his decision. The FtTJ recorded that the main appellant did not attend the hearing, but his legal representative had appeared. The FtTJ observed that notwithstanding the attendance of the legal representative on his behalf, there had still been a failure to comply with any of the directions issued by the Tribunal and as such there was no bundle of evidence, no witness statement or skeleton argument (see paragraph 10).
30. At the hearing the appellant’s legal representative applied for the hearing to be adjourned and adopted the application that had been uploaded to the electronic file on 28 November 2025.
31. This read as a follows: “I respectfully request an adjournment of the hearing listed for 1 December 2025 due to the Appellant’s recent accident and current medical condition. On 19 November 2025, the Appellant, […], was assessed by his GP following a road traffic accident in which he was hit by a car while cycling. He sustained injuries resulting in severe knee pain and has been declared not fit for work for one month. This period includes the scheduled hearing date. Attending the hearing in person or remotely would cause undue hardship and compromise his ability to participate effectively in the proceedings.”
32. In support of application the legal representative had provided a document “statement of fitness to work” (otherwise known as “fit note”) dated 19 November 2025 stating had assessed fitness to work on 19 November 2025 and because of knee pains was not fit for work for period of 1 month. The term “not fit to work” is defined as “ Your health condition means that you may not be able to work for the period shown. You may go back to work as soon as you feel able to, and with your employers agreement, this may be before you fit note runs out”. The application was refused by reference to Rules 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3 of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum chamber of the First-Tier Tribunal 2024, noting the lateness of the application and that it must be accompanied by proposed draft directions for the judge to consider and that any late application made must be made and will, save in exceptional circumstances, require the attendance of the party or the representative the party seeking adjournment.
33. The FtTJ recorded that the legal representative at the hearing said that his firm had not had contact with the main appellant for a significant period of time and that the last contact was on 21 November 2025 in relation to the accident but prior to that he had not had contact with the solicitors for months (see paragraph 11).
34. When addressing the application, the FtTJ noted that the only evidence in support of the application for an adjournment consisted of the fit note from his GP and that it simply stated, “knee pains” and is dated 19 November 2025. He recorded that no other explanation was given for why the application was only made on 28 November, some nine days after the claimed accident. Secondly, he found that the fit note made no reference to any accident, it simply noted “knee pains”. When assessing the application, the FtTJ stated that he did not consider that A1 had provided any reliable evidence that he was unfit to attend the hearing ( see paragraph 15).
35. When addressing the circumstances of the appellant, the FtTJ asked the legal representative if he was instructed on A1’ s behalf. The FtTJ recorded that the legal representative confirmed he remained instructed by A1 but could not properly explain why directions had not been complied with see (paragraph 14). At paragraph 15 the FtTJ considered the procedural history. He set out that directions for A1 to file evidence in the skeleton argument were given on 29 August 2024, 17 November 2024, 13 February 2025, 7 July 2025, and 23 July 2025. The FtTJ found that “ A1 has singularly failed to comply”. He concluded that there was nothing within the online case file suggest that A1 had shown “any material interest in prosecuting his appeal”.
36. When dealing with the fairness aspect of the appeal, the FtTJ took into account that his legal representative, who confirmed he remained instructed on the appellant’s behalf was present and was able to make arguments on A1’s behalf. At paragraph 17 the FTT J recorded that the legal representative had provided a written argument on behalf of A1 and notwithstanding the lack of service, gave permission for him to upload this document. The recorded that he heard submissions from both representatives for the purposes of the appeal. The FtTJ concluded that he did not accept there was a good reason to adjourn the appeal having taken into account all the circumstances and reached the conclusion that it was in the interests of justice for the appeal to be heard (see paragraph 16).
37. I take into account that what fairness requires is context-dependent but in the particular circumstances of this case, I have reached the conclusion that the First-tier Tribunal did not act unfairly by refusing the adjournment.
38. Whilst Ms Ferguson submits that this was the first substantive application for an adjournment, this cannot be viewed in isolation from the procedural history.
39. It was not unfair for the First-tier Tribunal to take into account the procedural history and the wholesale failure to comply with the case management directions of the First-Tier Tribunal . There is no dispute between the parties that there had been no compliance on behalf of the appellant following the notice of appeal being filed. The FtTJ set out in his decision at paragraph 15 the dates of directions that were given by the tribunal for the appellant to file evidence relevant to the appeal including his witness statement and skeleton argument. As Mr Parvar has submitted, the directions were given over a period of a year but that the appellant had failed to comply with any of them. The last substantive directions were given again on 23 July 2025 and are set out in the appellant’s bundle. The FtTJ recorded that there was no explanation provided for the lack of compliance at the hearing on 1 December 2025, and there had been a period of months between the last direction given in July and the hearing date. Whilst Ms Ferguson submits that the appellant has engaged with new solicitors, there is still no explanation provided as to why there had been a lack of compliance since the notice of appeal was given in 2024 for these proceedings or in these present proceedings where an error of law is asserted. It is of relevance that at the hearing before the FtTJ the legal representative in attendance made no submissions as to how or in what timescale the documents were to be provided should the adjournment be granted.
40. Rule 2(1) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2014 sets out the overriding objective to enable the FtT to deal with cases fairly and justly, and rule 2(4) imposes a duty upon the parties to help the FtT to further the overriding objective and co-operate with the FtT generally.
41. Whilst it would have been an error for the Tribunal to treat the procedural history of the case as the sole reason for refusing an adjournment which fairness would otherwise have required, that is not what the Tribunal did. It was not unfair, and was in accordance with the overriding objective, for the Tribunal to give greater scrutiny to the Appellant's adjournment request and the evidence supporting it given the failure to comply throughout the procedural history of the case .
42. The FtTJ properly and fairly assessed whether there was a “good reason” using he terminology of President McCloskey in Nwaigwe. The reason advanced for the adjournment was recorded in the earlier application made on 28 November 2025. This was a late application made and on the face of the document provided in support as dated 19 November 2025, there was no explanation as to why the application had only been made the day before the hearing.
43. Before the FtTJ, he recorded the basis of the application made and the evidence in support of the adjournment. The legal representative provided no further evidence and relied upon the GP fit note. The FtTJ took full account of the fit note and its contents and was entitled to make the assessment that he did of this at paragraph 13. The appellant was aware of his forthcoming appeal hearing when he visited the doctor's clinic on 19 November 2025. The content of the “fit note” signed referred to the appellant being unfit for work stating, “knee pains” and did not explain why, despite having been able to travel to the clinic on 19 November 2025, the appellant was unable to participate in the hearing on 1 December 2025 even by remote means. In other words, the evidence provided did not show that the appellant was unfit to participate in the hearing. There was no evidence identified with any particularity as to his condition or explained why that condition prevented his participation at the hearing. Whilst the medical evidence was not challenged, it did not provide sufficient explanation of why an adjournment was required on medical grounds.
44. No further medical or explanatory evidence was provided on behalf of the appellant at the hearing nor following the hearing by his legal representative.
45. It is right to note that when permission to appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant in March 2026, a further document was uploaded to the electronic file in support. This document is set out in the consolidated bundle at pages 68 – 69 and is a letter from the NHS. It records that the appellant attended the accident and emergency department on 29 December 2024 at 20.23 with a knee injury. It records that there was an abrasion of the skin on both knees (bilateral) that he was discharged on 30 December 5:30 AM and refers to there being no follow-up. It is recorded in the GP note that he was riding a bike at speed of 10 miles an hour and was hit by a car on the side. He was able to get himself, no LOC, complaining of pain in both knees and left arm and side. No neck pain and was able to walk and bear weight. He was discharged home.
46. There is no explanation why that document was not put before the FtTJ, but in any event the contents of that document fails to undermine the assessment made by the FtTJ at paragraph 13 and it does not demonstrate why the appellant was unable to participate in the hearing 11 months after the accident was said to have occurred and that only involves a visit to A&E and the injuries noted and his discharge with no further treatment.
47. In terms of fairness, that was further considered by the FtTJ at paragraph 16. In applying his discretion, he gave permission for the legal representative present at the hearing to provide both oral and written submissions on behalf of the appellant and for this to form part of the evidence. It is not suggested that those written submissions were ever filed in advance of the hearing but none the less in terms of applying fairness and “ anxious scrutiny” the FtTJ permitted their late admission and he took them into account (see paragraph 18 and 20 of the decision). The fact that the appellant did not give oral evidence does not mean that anxious scrutiny was not applied by the FtTJ and as set out at paragraph 20, he did not solely rely upon the evidence given by the appellant at the earlier stage, and the reasons given in the decision letter but also had read and considered the written argument provided by his legal representative alongside the oral submissions that he made on behalf of the appellant. His legal representative confirmed that he remained instructed on behalf of the appellant and the points set out in the decision letter from 2024 were not of any surprise. The points raised were addressed in the written submissions. By way of example, the respondent had assessed documentary evidence provided by the appellant that was said to emanate from Bangladesh. The respondent considered the reliability of those documents by applying the well-established test in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, and also in the context of the CPIN Bangladesh: documentation version 2.0 March 2020. As part of that assessment, the FtTJ considered the documentary evidence that had been provided and which had been also addressed in the written submissions and oral submissions. The assessment of those documents are set out at 22 (v) - Xi). Both parties were therefore able to provide their respective submissions in respect of this evidence. Other issues identified by the FtTJ were also addressed in the written submissions. Contrary to the grounds at paragraph 8, the appellant was given the opportunity to explain gaps in the evidence and respond to the challenges made.
Ground 3:
48. Ms Ferguson submitted that the FtTJ made a material mistake of fact as to the immigration status of A1’s wife and mother of A2 where he stated at paragraph 25 that the appellant’s wife “is not lawfully resident in the UK”. It is submitted that this was a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness. Ms Ferguson submitted that this was a material error of law because it was relevant to the proportionality assessment, including the weight attached family life and to the assessment of the best interests of A2. In this regard she referred to the Rule 15 (2A) application which had been provided in the consolidated bundle as uploaded to the electronic CE File (see page 45 onwards).
49. Mr Parvar submitted there was no error of law. He opposed the Rule 15(2A) application on the basis that the material had not been put before the FtTJ and no explanation had been given in this regard.
50. In any event he argued that the submissions made before the FtTJ set out at Section F did not reflect the submissions now made. He argues that there were no submissions made about her status nor the implications of removal or that she was on the route to settlement as now submitted by Ms Ferguson. In those circumstances the FtTJ was entitled to make the decision he did. Mr Parvar relied upon the decision in Lata and that it was for the appellants to raise the factual and legal basis upon which they advanced their case. The mere reference to his wife in the interview was not sufficient evidence in the absence of a legal and factual argument advanced. The FtTJ addressed proportionality at paragraph 26 and was entitled to take into account the relationship and that they had married at a time when his leave was precarious, and there was no evidence provided of any circumstances which could begin to show that it would be disproportionate for them to continue their family life together in Bangladesh. He further submitted that whilst A1 did not attend, there was no reason why his wife could not have attended and given evidence in that regard.
51. I am satisfied that there is no material error of law as the grounds set out. As regards the fresh evidence, there is no explanation as to why any evidence relating to status had not been put before the FtTJ.
52. It is of note that the evidence now provided shows that his wife was granted leave on 7 November 2023 as a graduate from 7 November 2023 until 7 November 2025 (p48). There is no evidence made of the date the application was made for any further leave, although the document at page 55 shows that she has a right to work from 21 April 2026 until 8 May 3031.
53. The application made on behalf of A2 was made after the decision of the FTT on 31 July 2026 for leave as a dependent child.
54. Even taking into account that material, notwithstanding the legal representative in attendance before the FtTJ and providing written submissions on article 8 of the ECHR, there was no argument advanced on the appellant’s behalf which have subsequently been made in the grounds and by Ms Ferguson.
55. Section F of the written submissions sets as follows: “Married to Mst N A T on 11 September 2023; father to R Z S, born xx 2023 (Asylum Interview, pp. 80 81). 2) Removal would disproportionately interfere with family life; child’s best interests require stability in the UK.
56. Whilst it is submitted that the appellant had referred to his wife’s status in interview ( see Q25 “She came on a student visa and she finished her studies and now she is on graduate visa”), no further information was provided following that interview which took place in 2024. It was not for the FtTJ to scour the interview for possible arguments. The duty of anxious scrutiny is not an excuse for the failure of a party to identify all issues. It is the responsibility of the appellant to put all their arguments before the FTT. The time to make those arguments were before the FTT ( see Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) and in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370). The FtTJ addressed the arguments as were put to him and at paragraph 26, addressed the issue of proportionality taking into account the public interest factors under S 117B and that A1 entered as a student, and that the relationship and marriage took place at a time when his leave was precarious and that no evidence had been provided of any circumstances which could begin to show that it would be disproportionate for them to return to Bangladesh and continue their family life there. On the arguments presented and on the evidence, that was an assessment which was open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence.
57. It is always open to them to make any further applications to the respondent if so advised.
58. For those reasons and having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
59. The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds 7 October 2026.