Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003691
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61615/2024
LP/02379/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

MDAH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R. Spurling, counsel, instructed by Hunter Stone Law
For the Respondent: Ms A. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh in his late twenties. He has made a protection and human rights claim on 22 August 2022 based on his political opinion, arising out of his involvement with the Bangladesh National Party (‘BNP’) and / or its student wing, the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal (‘JCD’). His claim is that he was a publicity and publication secretary for the party. He claims that he was targeted by Awami League supporters in attacks in 2017 and 2020 and faced politically motivated prosecution. His claim was refused by the Respondent on 9 April 2024. He appealed against the refusal of his claim and his appeal was heard by FTTJ Beg (‘the Judge’) on 21 April 2026.
2. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal against that determination on 30 July 2026 by UTJ Owens. While the grant of permission to appeal is unrestricted, Judge Owens particularly highlighted that it was arguable that the Judge’s finding at §30 that the Appellant sustained injuries as a result of being attacked by his brother (and therefore not by Awami League members as claimed) amounted to an error and that arguably the Judge placed too much weight on discrepancies between the screening and substantive interviews, which might have affected her approach to the other documentation before her. Judge Owens also highlighted that the Appellant should address the materiality of any errors in light of the change of regime in Bangladesh.
Grounds of appeal
3. The Appellant, in his renewed grounds for the Upper Tribunal advances two grounds of appeal.
a. First, that the Judge made a material misdirection, provided unreasonable analysis or gave inadequate reasons in relation to the attack upon the Appellant in 2017. The Judge (at §§28, 30) found that the Appellant had been injured on 20 July 2017. However, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s account that these injuries were caused by Awami League members. The Judge relied (at §29) on the letter of Mr Debnath, an advocate, who stated that the Appellant was attacked by his elder brother. The Judge relied upon this to conclude that the Appellant was injured by his brother, not political opponents. The Appellant contends that it was an error of law for the Judge to treat this document, which “was capable of being a mistranslation, drafting error, or imprecise wording concerning the brother’s involvement in assisting the family with the case” as displacing the wider evidence in support of the Appellant’s claim.
b. Second, that the Judge failed to assess the evidence before her regarding extant criminal proceedings and arrest warrants. It is argued that a change of government does not, of itself, obviate this risk.
4. In her r. 24 Response, the Respondent submits that the Judge carefully considered the full evidence before her and did not misdirect herself. The reasons are said to be adequate.
5. At the hearing before me, Mr Spurling addressed me on the pleaded grounds. Regarding Ground 1, he emphasised that the lawyer’s letter should have been considered by the Judge in light of all the evidence before her, including the clear and consistent evidence which showed that the Appellant’s brother had not attacked him. Mr Spurling emphasised that the Appellant’s brother had provided an affidavit that corroborated his brother’s account. Mr Spurling’s submission was that, at a minimum, the Judge was required to grapple with these issues. Regarding Ground 2, he said that the impact of the extant arrest warrants had not been assessed in detail. He also addressed me on the Judge’s finding at paragraph 25 of the determination, in which she referred to his letter from the BNP and characterised it has not showing that the Appellant held any role in the party; he invited me to find that this was a straightforward factual error. He also invited me to find that these errors were material, because the risks to the Appellant were personal and local, and were enhanced by the outstanding arrest warrants. He addressed me on MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 and invited me to find that it was limited to its own facts; it is not a country guidance case nor did it concern an analogous applicant (it arose out of a deportation appeal). He therefore submitted that the errors were material notwithstanding the change in government in Bangladesh.
6. Ms Ahmed confirmed that the Respondent opposed the appeal and relied on the r. 24 response. She also objected to Mr Spurling raising what she characterised as new points, going beyond the scope of the grant of permission. Mr Spurling denied any of his points were truly new but, in any event, sought permission to raise them if necessary. Ms Ahmed argued that the Appellant’s approach was prejudicial to the Respondent, in response to which I offered her further time if she wished to consider or address the points. She did not accept that offer, nor was any application made to adjourn the hearing. In the event, I do not consider that Mr Spurling’s submissions did go substantially beyond the grounds as pleaded. As is often the case, he illustrated the overarching points within the grounds by reference to additional evidence and specific references within the judgment. If necessary, I would have granted him permission to appeal on the grounds raised as I consider that it is in the interests of justice to allow the Appellant to make out his case in full and I do not consider there was any prejudice to the Respondent; Ms Ahmed was able to deal with all points raised by Mr Spurling.
7. Ms Ahmed invited me to find that the Judge’s finding was lawful. She repeatedly emphasised that the burden of proof was on the Appellant to make out his case. She argued that the lawyer’s letter referring to the Appellant’s brother as the attacker was evidence which the Appellant had himself produced and that he had had the time to explain or clarify it, but failed to do so. She said that, in any event, any such error was not material because there was no credible evidence that the Appellant was attacked by the Awami League.
8. On Ground 2, Ms Ahmed cited MU. She said that the change of government had wholly changed the picture.
9. Mr Spurling gave a brief reply. I mean no discourtesy to his helpful submissions when I summarise them as essentially repeating the points made in opening.
Analysis and reasons
10. I am persuaded that there is an error of law in relation to Ground 1. I have come to this conclusion with some hesitation, as I consider that it is a very significant discrepancy in the Appellant’s evidence that he has adduced a letter from a lawyer in Bangladesh which twice describes him as being attacked by his brother, rather than the Awami League. The lawyer specifically names the Appellant’s brother. I agree with Ms Ahmed that the Appellant had an opportunity to explain or clarify this apparent discrepancy but failed to do so, which the Judge was amply entitled to treat as significantly damaging his credibility.
11. However, I consider that it is significant that the Judge accepted that the Appellant had been attacked but rejected his account that the attack was at the hands of political opponents, instead finding (on the basis of this letter) that he was attacked by his brother. There was a substantial quantity of evidence which provided apparent corroboration of the attack (indeed, the Judge did not dispute the fact of the attack, just the identity of the perpetrators) but which suggested that it was by the Awami League, not the Appellant’s brother. The only evidence that the attacker was the Appellant’s brother was the lawyer’s letter. The most significant pieces of evidence contradicting that letter were (i) the affidavit from the Appellant’s brother which stated that the Appellant had been attacked by the Awami League and (ii) a First Information Report which he had filed in support of his brother. I make no findings as to the genuineness of these documents, rather I note that they were potentially significant evidence which appeared to militate against the Judge’s conclusion as to the attacker’s identity.
12. The Judge’s reasons do not suggest that this conflicting documentation was considered. Instead, the Judge simply states (at §30) “there is no credible evidence that [the Appellant] was attacked by members or supported or the Awami League. I find that the appellant’s injuries were caused by an attack on him by his elder brother [name]”.
13. In light of the material which I have referred to above, there was evidence which was capable of demonstrating that the Appellant was attacked by political opponents. This evidence was relatively extensive. Of course, the Judge was entitled to reject that evidence as lacking in credibility, but I can identify no evidence that she did so and, if she did, she gave no reasons for doing so. The Judge was required to apply anxious scrutiny to the material before the Tribunal, and I do not find that adequate reasons were given for this conclusion.
14. I also accept that the Judge made a material error of fact, resulting in an error of law, that the Judge concluded that the letter from the BNP dated 18 January 2024 “makes no mention of the appellant holding any position within the party” (§25). The letter states: “This is to certify that [Appellant’s name] (24), S/O [i.e. son of] [father’s name], [details of Appellant’s home area]. Former Publicity and Publication Secretary of No 7 Dewkalash Union Branch of Bangladesh Nationality Chhatra Dal. During his stay in Bangladesh, he was a dedicated and active worker […]”. The letter goes on to provide some more details of the Appellant’s conduct and his being attacked by the Awami League. I take no view on the genuineness or otherwise of this document and I note the points taken by the Judge and Respondent about the availability of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh. However, I accept Mr Spurling’s submission that the Judge was simply wrong to find that the letter makes no mention of him holding any position. I accept Ms Ahmed’s submission that the sentence referring to his role is bare; it contains no verbs, nor does it confirm that this was the Appellant’s position, nor how long he held it for. Nevertheless, it is clear from the overall structure and details within the letter that the Appellant’s political activities are being referred to. It is very hard to read the sentenced referring to the secretary role as anything other than a reference to the role being held by the Appellant. The BNP’s letter, read in this way, is consistent with his own description of his role in the party. Therefore, the Judge was wrong to characterise the letter as she did. This was a significant error because the Judge did not conclude that this document was fraudulent (although she did find, at §35, that little weight could be placed on the entirety of the documentary evidence). The BNP’s letter was a potentially significant piece of evidence. It appears that the Judge placed diminished weight on this document for an unsustainable reason, namely her understanding that it did not refer to him holding any role. I accept that was an error.
15. Those errors are (independently and cumulatively) sufficient to dispose of the appeal in the Appellant’s favour. The errors are material notwithstanding the change in government and the Awami League’s fall from power. The threshold for immateriality once an error of law has been found is high; ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1281, §43 confirms that an error of law is only immaterial if any rational tribunal would have been bound to do so on the same evidence. The country situation in Bangladesh has changed significantly but I accept that MU is not, and does not purport to be, country guidance, and that risk in a case such as this has to be assessed on an individualised basis. I accept Mr Spurling’s submissions that, if the Appellant’s account were accepted, it would show that he had been attacked repeatedly by political opponents in his home region and that there were outstanding proceedings targeting him. It is possible that a rational tribunal could consider that, in the Appellant’s personal circumstances, these factors would lead him to be at risk on return. I therefore consider that a rational tribunal could potentially reach a different view to that reached by Judge Beg. On that basis, I allow the appeal.
16. The parties were agreed that I should remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a full re-hearing with no preserved findings if I agreed with the Appellant on Ground 1. I therefore do so.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.
This appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 October 2026