Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003698
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00984/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

Mathew Nkemjika Ughelumba
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E. King, Counsel instructed by EcoM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Lacointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 September 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Although this is the Secretary of State’s appeal, I shall refer to the parties as they appeared before the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”), so Mr Ughelumba will be ‘the appellant’ and the Secretary of State will be ‘the respondent’.
2. The respondent appeals, with permission, the decision of the FTT dated 11 May 2026. Therein, the FTT allowed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim, made in the context of him being subject to a deportation order signed on 9 June 2022. I can only set aside the FTT’s decision if I find it to contain a material error on a point of law.
3. The appellant applied for anonymity. I refused the application at the hearing, with reasons. In summary I did so because I did not find the factors raised in the written application to be sufficient to outweigh the principles of open justice.
4. The issue in this appeal is whether the FTT erred in law in finding the appellant able to resist his deportation on human rights grounds. The reason the FTT did so was through the application of the statutory framework which applies to foreign criminals as found in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). This applies when tribunals and courts have to decide whether decisions made under the Immigration Acts breach a person’s Article 8 rights and would, as a result, be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The appellant is a ‘foreign criminal’ as defined at section 117D (2) of the 2002 Act because he is a Nigerian national and on 27 October 2021 he was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment for possessing a bladed article and breaching a Criminal Behaviour Order. The length of his sentence renders him a ‘medium offender’ within the 2002 Act (someone sentenced to between 12 months and 4 years in prison). That means he can only resist his deportation on Article 8 grounds in the circumstances provided for by section 117C of the 2002 Act as follows:
“Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
5. In her decision, the respondent did not find the appellant able to meet either of the two Exceptions nor to have demonstrated that there were “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. The only part of the framework the respondent accepted applied to the appellant was that he had been lawfully resident in the UK most of his life (s.117C (4)(a)). He arrived at the age of 4 on 30 January 2006, having been born in Italy. Although he has lived here since then, he did so with lawful leave between 15 March 2007 and 22 February 2010, and again from 30 December 2014 to 30 December 2017. It is not in dispute that he has never been to Nigeria.
6. The FTT also found the appellant to be socially and culturally integrated in the UK and that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Nigeria. Accordingly the FTT found the appellant to meet Exception 1 and allowed his appeal accordingly. The FTT did not find the appellant to meet Exception 2. However, in light of the finding in Exception 1, the FTT decided it did not need to decide whether the appellant met the threshold contained within section 117C (6).
7. The respondent appealed. Permission was refused by the FTT and on slightly re-formulated grounds, it was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 24 July 2026. Although the judge granting permission had reservations about the arguable merit of Ground 1 (challenging the decision about integration), she found there to be greater merit in Ground 2 (very significant obstacles) and she did not limit the grant of permission.
8. The appellant submitted a Rule 24 notice opposing the appeal and also a ‘cross-appeal’ challenging the FTT’s rejection of his ability to meet Exception 2 and deciding not to consider whether he could meet section 117C (6) of the 2002 Act. There was no dispute that the Rule 24 notice was served within a month of the grant of permission being sent to the parties, so the appellant did not need permission to pursue the matters raised in the cross-appeal applying Smith (appealable decisions; PTA requirements; anonymity: Belgium) [2019] UKUT 216 (IAC). Ms King confirmed at the hearing that the cross-appeal would only arise if I find there to be an error of law and set aside the FTT’s decision. I heard submissions on the Exception 2 issue because that may affect whether any findings should be preserved, but there was no need to do so in relation to section 117C (6) because if it came to a re-hearing, that would need to be heard in any event.
9. I was provided with a 245-page bundle in addition to which I had the Rule 24 notice and the cross-appeal grounds. Ms King had prepared a skeleton argument uploaded on the day of the hearing. Ms Lecointe did not have those documents, so I afforded her time to read them on the day of the hearing. I heard oral submissions on behalf of both parties and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give with my reasons for it.
Discussion of the Grounds
10. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.  
11. I also remind myself of what was said in MM (Lebanon) Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 that it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law [107]. Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 held at [2(vi)] that reasons for a judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed but an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis, nor pick over or construe it as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
12. I have kept these principles very much in mind when considering the arguments before me.
13. Ground 1 contends a misdirection of law in the assessment of social and cultural integration. On behalf of the respondent, it was accepted at the hearing that the FTT identified the correct authorities and principles arising (CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15) but the challenge is that the FTT misapplied them. As the FTT noted, the respondent accepted that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in 2018. However, the respondent contended that the FTT erred in not finding that integration to have been broken by the appellant’s offending since, despite the appellant having been warned about possible deportation. Entering into a relationship and becoming a father had not prevented re-offending and the respondent submitted there was a lack of other factors capable of indicating continued integration. Accordingly, the respondent’s position at paragraph 7 of the grounds was that the FTT failed to carry out the holistic assessment required by the authorities resulting in an irrational and/or an inadequately reasoned decision that integration continued.
14. The appellant characterises these grounds as a disagreement with the FTT’s decision and contends that the FTT correctly applied the authorities which demonstrate that criminal offending does not automatically rupture already established integration. Furthermore, the FTT carried out a holistic assessment considering all material factors before arriving at its decision.
15. The question of whether criminal offending and periods of time in detention are capable of breaking established integration was expressly considered by the Court of Appeal in CI (Nigeria) [56]. At [58] the Court set out a reminder about what how integration should be considered and what it means:
“Relevant social ties obviously include relationships with friends and relatives, as well as ties formed through employment or other paid or unpaid work or through participation in communal activities. However, a person's social identity is not defined solely by such particular relationships but is constituted at a deep level by familiarity with and participation in the shared customs, traditions, practices, beliefs, values, linguistic idioms and other local knowledge which situate a person in a society or social group and generate a sense of belonging. The importance of upbringing and education in the formation of a person's social identity is well recognised, and its importance in the context of cases involving the article 8 rights of persons facing expulsion because of criminal offending has been recognised by the European Court. Thus, in the Üner case at para 58, the court considered it "self-evident" that, in assessing the strength of a foreign national's ties with the "host" country in which they are living, regard is to be had to "the special situation of aliens who have spent most, if not all, of their childhood in the host country, were brought up there and received their education there."
16. When considering the relevance of offending and imprisonment the Court said at [61]:
“Criminal offending and time spent in prison are also in principle relevant in so far as they indicate that the person concerned lacks (legitimate) social and cultural ties in the UK. Thus, a person who leads a criminal lifestyle, has no lawful employment and consorts with criminals or pro-criminal groups can be expected, by reason of those circumstances, to have fewer social relationships and areas of activity that are capable of attracting the protection of "private life". Periods of imprisonment represent time spent excluded from society during which the prisoner has little opportunity to develop social and cultural ties and which may weaken or sever previously established ties and make it harder to re-establish them or develop new ties (for example, by finding employment) upon release. In such ways criminal offending and consequent imprisonment may affect whether a person is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.”
17. Then, of the relationship between offending and integration, the Court said at [62]:
“Clearly, however, the impact of offending and imprisonment upon a person's integration in this country will depend not only on the nature and frequency of the offending, the length of time over which it takes place and the length of time spent in prison, but also on whether and how deeply the individual was socially and culturally integrated in the UK to begin with. In that regard, a person who has lived all or almost all his life in the UK, has been educated here, speaks no language other than (British) English and has no familiarity with any other society or culture will start with much deeper roots in this country than someone who has moved here at a later age. It is hard to see how criminal offending and imprisonment could ordinarily, by themselves and unless associated with the breakdown of relationships, destroy the social and cultural integration of someone whose entire social identity has been formed in the UK. “
18. At [75] the Court accepted that “social and cultural integration in the UK can be broken by criminal offending and imprisonment and that this is a fact-sensitive question”. However, when considering whether the Upper Tribunal had adequately reasoned their finding that it had, the Court observed that the duration over which the offending occurred, the frequency of the offending and the length of time CI spent in detention was not enough [76]. At [77] the Court spelt out what the judge should have done as follows:
“The judge should simply have asked whether – having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors – CI was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The judge should not, as he appears to have done, have treated CI's offending and imprisonment as having severed his social and cultural ties with the UK through its very nature, irrespective of its actual effects on CI's relationships and affiliations – and then required him to demonstrate that integrative links had since been "re-formed".”
19. This approach was expressly approved by the Supreme Court at [51] of SC (Jamaica).
20. Having considered the correct approach, I now turn in more detail to the FTT’s decision. Helpfully, the FTT structured his decision using various sub-headings which illuminate the various factors it considered before arriving at its conclusions. They were preceded by the undisputed facts including residence since the age of 4; lawful residence for over half his life; educated entirely in the UK; the presence of close family members in the UK including parents and siblings [26]. Thereafter, the FTT considered the following (also relevant to the issue of ‘very significant obstacles’ which I deal with later):
a) Chronology of offending and periods in custody and at liberty. The judge summarised these at [27] then detailed them at [28(a)-(n)]. The offending started in 2018 and as the judge put it at [27] “sustained history of criminal offending beginning in late 2018, involving repeated breaches of Criminal Behaviour Orders, possession of offensive weapons, breaches of licence conditions, recalls to custody, and recent charges. He has a history of offending with knives since the age of 17.”. Over that 7-year period the judge calculated he had spent 40 months (just under half) at liberty and the rest in custody [29].
b) Recent charges. Convicted, not yet sentenced, of dangerous driving and possession of a bladed article following arrest on 3 September 2025, and on remand awaiting trial for kidnap, false imprisonment, aggravated burglary and robbery.
c) Family life with partner and child. Finding of a genuine relationship with his British partner since at least 2024, including regular prison visits and calls, and emotional and financial support from her and her family but not having involved cohabitation. They have a child together born in February 2026 who he has seen twice (as he is in prison) but with whom the judge found he has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship [33], a finding which is not challenged through this appeal. He has a close relationship with his mother who has consistently supported him financially and emotionally including when in prison [34].
d) Football. This was an important part of his youth but of limited relevance now [35].
e) Familiarity with Nigerian culture and links to Nigeria. He has never visited. His mother did last in 2024 and has continuing ties there. He has an uncle there he has never met but who may be able to provide some guidance and general support [36]. He grew up in a Nigerian household and limited familiarity with the culture (food and aspects of cultural practice). He speaks English. The significance of these ties should not be exaggerated considering he has never been to Nigeria even if they afford some initial advantage [38].
f) Prospects of working in Nigeria. Healthy and capable of work but has never done so. Limited qualifications. Little to offer an employer [39].
g) The warnings, his claims of rehabilitation, and the effect of being a father. His continued offending despite warnings is significant [40]. Limited evidence of rehabilitation especially in light of recent offences. No evidence that partner or child has reformed him [41].
h) Gang membership. Membership of a gang is not evidence of integration. But the evidence there is about that is from 2021 and evidence of his involvement is unclear.
21. The FTT moved on to consider the Exceptions. It started its evaluation of Exception 1 by setting out the respondent’s position in the refusal letter [45] which relied mainly on the lack of evidence of a positive contribution to society; what the offending shows of the appellant’s regard for UK law and social norms; his exclusion from society through his imprisonment. The FTT observed that in her review the respondent submitted the evidence was insufficient to “outweigh the criminality”.
22. The FTT set out the correct law at [48]-[50] putting particular emphasis on [62] of CI (Nigeria) which it then applied to the facts of the appellant’s case at [51], [53]-[55]. I set these out in full given their centrality to the issue:
“51. I consider that paragraph 62 of Cl Nigeria is an important passage. The Appellant has lived almost all his life in the UK. He has never lived in Nigeria. He was educated in the UK. I refer to my findings above about his knowledge of Nigeria and its culture. The HOPO accepted he was integrated as at 2018. It was not challenged that he spoke only English. As above, his family relationships particularly with his mother have been maintained. He has a British partner and child. That relationship, has I accept, continued since 2024 and were subsisting at the date of hearing.
…
53. I have weighed all matters in the round, noting the HOPO's agreement that he was integrated as at 2018 when he started offending (and I agree). I have applied the case law above, noting the acceptance that he has resided here lawfully for half his life, and that he now has a British partner and child. I have taken full account of his offending, including the nature of the offending e.g. as set out in the October 2021 JSR. I have set out above the chronology of his periods in custody and liberty since he started offending. I have noted the reference to gang involvement but find the evidence to be somewhat ambiguous. I have noted the warnings in 2019 and the offending continuing after the 2021 Notice and the 2022 decision.
54. However, I find that to all intents and purposes the Appellant's social and cultural identity has been almost entirely formed in the UK and by British culture (notwithstanding being brought up in a Nigerian household which gave him some limited knowledge of Nigeria). I consider this paragraph from Cl Nigeria is important:-
It is hard to see how criminal offending and imprisonment could ordinarily, by themselves and unless associated with the breakdown of relationships, destroy the social and cultural integration of someone whose entire social identity has been formed in the UK.
55. It is important his relationships with his family has continued, and he now has a British partner and child. In conclusion, weighing everything carefully, I find that the Appellant remained socially and culturally integrated as at the date of hearing.”
23. In my judgment, the FTT did exactly as was required of it by CI (Nigeria), approved in SC (Jamaica). I do not find the FTT to have misapplied the relevant law on the assessment of integration within section 117C (4)(a). Neither do I find that the FTT’s decision was outside of the range of reasonable conclusions it could have reached. Plainly it was not given the circumstances, namely that the appellant was accepted as integrated in 2018; the caselaw which says that offending alone is insufficient to break integration; where the FTT made positive findings that relationships have subsisted despite offending and imprisonment; and the background of the appellant having lived in the UK for most of his life. I find the FTT to have given adequate reasons for finding social and cultural integration to exist. The respondent’s insistence on the need for evidence of a positive contribution does not accord with how the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have explained the assessment of integration is to be undertaken. Ground 1 is dismissed.
24. Before moving on to deal with the Ground 2 which challenges the remaining part of Exception 1 (very significant obstacles) I will turn to Ground 3 which is headed “failure properly to engage with highly material evidence bearing upon both limbs of Exception 1”. I find there to be some overlap with Ground 1. At paragraph 2 of Ground 3, reference is made to the recent matters to which the appellant has pleaded guilty or is awaiting trial (see [20(b)] above). Paragraph 3 of Ground 3 says:
“The judge acknowledged these matters but did not sufficiently explain how a person who continued to offend at this level, years after deportation action commenced and after repeated periods of imprisonment and recall, could nevertheless be regarded as socially and culturally integrated within the meaning of section 117C(4)(b).”
25. For the reasons I have already given, I do not find the FTT to have fallen into error in the way alleged. It is plain the FTT was aware of the most recent convictions. The FTT was also aware of the propensity the appellant has to repeatedly offend despite warnings and which he found significant (see [20(g)] above), and also of the lack of rehabilitation. However, the FTT followed the approach set out in the authorities and arrived at a conclusion rationally open to it on the evidence and having taken into account the relevant evidence of the more recent offending. Ms Lacointe accepted at the hearing that one cannot attach the same (if any) weight to offences pre-conviction. That has to be right, no matter their seriousness. The fact the appellant is on remand for those matters excludes him from society, but the FTT correctly evaluated whether his ties continued despite his incarceration and found that his significant relationships did.
26. I also note what Leggatt LJ said at [79] of CI (Nigeria) about the seriousness of offending in relation to section 117C (4):
“Focusing in the way the Upper Tribunal judge did on the duration and seriousness of the appellant's criminal offending and the length of his prison sentences also seems to me potentially to involve double counting. Those matters clearly affect the strength of the public interest in deportation. The greater the extent of the person's criminality and the harm done to other members of society by their offending behaviour, the stronger the case for requiring a "foreign criminal" to leave the UK. This public interest is also reflected in the classification of foreign criminals according to the length of the period of imprisonment to which they have been sentenced, with different rules applicable to "medium" and "serious" offenders. The reason for considering whether the person is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, however, is not to assess the strength of the public interest in deportation: it is to assess whether deportation would involve an interference with the person's private life of such gravity that this outweighs the public interest in deporting them on account of the seriousness of their offending. It is therefore wrong to treat the individual's criminal offending as relevant to the test of integration, not because of what it shows about the solidity of his social and cultural ties to the UK, but because it strengthens the case on the other side of the scales in favour of deportation.
27. I find this to have direct application to the way the respondent has framed Ground 3 as it relates to section 117C(4)(b). For this and the reasons I give at [23] above, I do not find Ground 3 made out in relation to the integration limb of Exception 1.
28. Paragraph 4 of Ground 3 relates to section 117C(4)(c). It says:
“Nor did the judge explain how those findings were relevant to the claimed inability to establish a life in Nigeria. The analysis impermissibly compartmentalised the evidence and failed to undertake the broad evaluative assessment required by the statutory scheme and relevant authorities.”
29. The grounds do not elaborate any further. I did not find the oral submissions to illuminate the argument. I have difficulty in understanding what relevance the offending (even if serious) has to the assessment of whether there are very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria. To the extent Ms Lecointe tried to expand on it, I note a similar argument to the one she raised was advanced (and rejected) in relation to internal relocation in SC (Jamaica) [92]-[98], but I was not referred to that and I was not directed to any authorities which address the issue in the context of section 117C (4)(c) or otherwise. I note that the respondent did not raise the issue of the appellant’s offending in her assessment of section 117C (4)(c) in the refusal letter which the FTT set out at [59] of the decision. I deal with Ground 2 and that part of Exception 1 next (including whether or not the FTT carried out a broad evaluative assessment which I accept is required applying Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813) but I do not find Ground 3 to identify any errors on the FTT’s treatment of section 117C (4)(c) arising specifically from the appellant’s offending. For these reasons and the ones I gave at [27] above, Ground 3 is dismissed.
30. That leaves Ground 2 and section 117C (4)(c) of the 2002 Act. The thrust of the ground is that the FTT identified a number of factors which may point towards an ability to integrate as set out at paragraph 2 of the grounds as follows:
“The appellant is a healthy young adult capable of work; that he speaks English, a principal language of Nigeria; that he was raised in a Nigerian household; that he has familiarity with Nigerian culture; that his mother retains active links with Nigeria and visited as recently as 2024; and that an uncle remains present in Nigeria and may provide guidance and support.”
31. However, the respondent argues that, despite these factors, the FTT concluded there would be very significant obstacles because “he had never lived in Nigeria, had never visited Nigeria, and would be "very much an outsider"”. Accordingly the respondent argued that this finding was inadequately reasoned and did not explain how the appellant met the elevated threshold required by Exception 1. At paragraph 6 of the grounds the respondent contended:
“The finding that the appellant would be an outsider was largely a restatement of his lack of previous residence in Nigeria. However, the judge did not explain why that factor, when viewed alongside English language ability, cultural familiarity, family links, youth, good health and capacity for work, established obstacles of the requisite severity.”
32. Furthermore, at paragraph 8 of Ground 3 the respondent argued the FTT’s decision was not one reasonably open to it on the findings made.
33. In response, the appellant argues that the FTT took into account a number of factors, not just his length of residence in the UK and absence from Nigeria or any other single reason.
34. The FTT set out the correct law at [56]-[57]. The test set out at [14] of Kamara is as follows:
“… the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
35. The FTT also noted at [57] that the threshold is an elevated one and a culture shock is not the same thing. The FTT noted at [59] the respondent’s reasons for arguing the test was not met and set them out in full along with a summary of the respondent’s submissions on the issue at [60].
36. The FTT did all of the above before moving on to its conclusions on the issue. In my judgment, that reveals that the FTT was setting the scene; demonstrating it was aware of and understood the correct law, the high threshold to be reached, and what the objections were to it being reached. Furthermore, the FTT returned at [65] to the test being an elevated one. Given that the FTT is a specialist tribunal, it may not have been necessary for it to do any of that, but the fact it did so puts beyond doubt that it understood the task it was required to undertake.
37. Given their centrality to this issue, I set out the FTT’s conclusions in full:
“The Respondent accepted he has lived lawfully more than half his life in the UK. I have found that he is integrated. I note the reasons in the decision, which mainly relate to familiarity with the culture, extended family members and that he could find work.
63. I refer to all my findings above, including about familiarity with Nigeria. He has never lived in Nigeria. I do not accept that he can be described as any sort of insider. I do not accept that his extended family members, eg one uncle, can be expected to provide any very significant support. He has never visited Nigeria.
64. I agree he is a healthy young man ( despite his gunshot wounds, there is no evidence this restricts him in any way). He speaks English which is one of the main languages spoken in Nigeria. I note he has provided no evidence about work, but he has very limited skills/qualifications to offer any employer.
65. I note this is an elevated threshold. He must show more than a cultural shock. I apply the case law above. I refer to all my findings above. I find he will be very much an outsider. I find he will have little real understanding of the society and culture in reality. The test does not require him to show impossibility of integration or that he will never integrate. As per the case law, I must apply the words of the test - " very significant obstacles to integration". I find that he would face such very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria.”
38. As regards familiarity with Nigerian culture, I note what Leggatt LJ said at [86] of CI (Nigeria):
“An inference that an immigrant who has no memory of his country of origin (having left it as an infant) must nevertheless have acquired some knowledge of its culture and traditions through his upbringing might in some cases be a reasonable one to draw. But on the evidence before the Upper Tribunal there was no reasonable basis for drawing such an inference in this case.”
39. I am satisfied the FTT was aware of this from what he said at [38] which I have summarised at [20(e)] above but which I now set out in full given its importance:
“The case law makes clear, e.g. Cl (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 that there must be some evidential basis for claims by the Respondent. I do not find there is any reason to go beyond the evidence of the Appellant and his mother. I accept he grew up in a Nigerian household, in the UK, but I do not consider the significance of that should be exaggerated and it must be seen in the context of never having even visited Nigeria. Some general familiarity with aspects of Nigerian culture, including food etc, does not mean that a person would be familiar with the day to day reality of living in a country he has never even visited and where he speaks no other language than English. It would give him some initial advantage if deported, but I find its significance is relatively limited when viewed in a real-world scenario of deportation. Knowledge of some Nigerian traditions, food, customs etc acquired entirely whilst living in the UK, and I find becoming integrated in the UK, would only take him so far when returned to a country he has little other familiarity with.”
40. At [45] of Zedra Fiduciary Services (UK) Ltd v HM Attorney General [2023] EWCA Civ 1332, the Court of Appeal endorsed what was said at [76] of Re Sprintroom Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 932 concerning appellate scrutiny of first instance “evaluative” decisions:
“…on a challenge to an evaluative decision of a first instance judge, the appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the judge's treatment of the question to be decided, ‘such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion’.”
41. The respondent has not identified a material factor which the FTT overlooked. Rather the challenge is directed to the weight attached to the various factors considered by the FTT and to the conclusions ultimately reached. That is not, without more, sufficient to establish an error of law.
42. In my judgment, the FTT has done enough to explain why the situation for the appellant on return to Nigeria would amount to very significant obstacles to integration, applying the relevant authorities to the issue. The FTT has not departed from the facts either found or undisputed about the appellant’s particular circumstances, but has instead been at pains to explain why they are not sufficient to amount to an ability to integrate to the requisite threshold. I find that the FTT’s decision was within the range of reasonable conclusions open to the FTT on the evidence before it, even considering the elevated threshold which the FTT recognised applied.
43. Accordingly, the respondent has failed to satisfy me that the FTT erred in law through either inadequate reasoning or irrationality in reaching its finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles in Nigeria.
44. Drawing my findings together it follows that, having found the appellant able to meet the statutory exception to deportation as found in section 117C (4) of the 2002 Act, the FTT was not just entitled to allow the appellant’s appeal, but required to. The respondent’s onward appeal against that decision falls to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands. It does not contain a material error on a point of law.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 October 2026