The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003702
First-tier Tribunal No: RP/50156/2024


THE IMMIGRATION ACTS


Decision & Reasons Issued:

4th November 2026


Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

CBH
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Timson, instructed by Deus Nexus Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Dr S Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 9 October 2026


DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam born on 12 November 2001. He armonths ande UK by boat in March 2023, having left Vietnam on 1 October 2022 by plane to Ireland and remained there for some months, and claimed asylum on 8 March 2024. His claim was refused on 17 September 2024. He appealed against that decision.

3. The appellant claimed to be at risk from an unknown gang in Vietnam as a result of his father having borrowed a large sum of money from them in 2019 in support of a new business venture which he failed to repay. The appellant claimed that his father started receiving threats from the gang in 2021 and that when his father reported matters to the police they did not do anything but sent him a summons on the grounds of disturbing public order. The appellant claimed that his father was killed by the gangsters in September 2022 when they came to his home. He claims that he reported his father’s death to the police but they did not do anything and that after he visited the police station many times the police sent him a summons because he was disturbing public order. The appellant claimed that the moneylenders came back to his home and captured him and his mother and sister. He claimed that he was separated from his mother and sister and did not know what had happened to them. He claimed further that he was trafficked to Ireland in October 2022 to work and pay off the debt and was then smuggled into the UK in March 2023 where he was imprisoned and required to work within an illegal cannabis growing operation for six months, and that after escaping captivity he was homeless and destitute.

4. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that he was a national of Vietnam and accepted that he was a victim of trafficking and had been brought to the UK to work in a cannabis house, but did not accept his account of his father having borrowed money from an unknown gang resulting in his family being threatened and his father killed. The respondent considered that the appellant had provided an inconsistent account and that his account of the loan, the gang and the threats made to his father was significantly lacking in detail. The respondent considered that the appellant’s claim that the police took no action when he reported his father’s death to them was inconsistent with external information which stated that the police in Vietnam were willing and able to offer effective protection and that the authorities had made efforts to tackle illegal moneylending. The respondent considered that the appellant’s claim, that the people who trafficked him were the same people that his father owed money to, and that the gang would kill him on return, was inconsistent and speculative. It was not accepted that the appellant would be at risk of being re-trafficked, and it was not accepted that his return to Vietnam would breach his human rights.

5. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 20 April 2026, by which time the appellant had received a positive conclusive grounds decision from the NRM, although he was not aware of that decision. The judge found that the appellant’s lack of detailed information about the loan was reasonably explained in his evidence and that his account of being forced to work to pay off his father’s debit was consistent with the country information. However the judge had credibility concerns about the documentary evidence produced by the appellant, including letters purporting to be from his aunt and neighbour stating that the criminal gang was making visits to his home searching for him, as well as a police summons and death certificate, noting that their provenance was unknown and unexplained. The judge also found lacking in credibility the appellant’s account of having a photograph of the gang but being unable to produce it. The judge accorded little weight to a medical report from a Dr Ahmed and found that he could not give any weight to the other documentary evidence. He did not consider the appellant to be a credible witness in relation to his account of the criminal gang and the history he had provided. Although he accepted that the appellant was a victim of trafficking, was brought to the UK to work on an illegal cannabis farm and had experienced trauma from that experience, he did not accept that he had provided a full and truthful account of his interactions with a criminal gang in Vietnam and did not accept that he was at risk from a particular criminal gang or that he was at risk of being re-trafficked. The judge found, in the alternative, that the appellant could reasonably relocate to another area in Vietnam where he would be able to avail himself of state protection. He found further that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Vietnam and that he could access treatment for his mental health issues in Vietnam. He found that the appellant’s removal from the UK would not breach his human rights and he accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 28 April 2026.

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on nine grounds. Firstly, that the judge had made ‘Mibanga’ errors (Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367), particularly in relation to the medical evidence. Secondly, that the judge had erred in its treatment of the psychiatric evidence and the appellant’s presentation. Thirdly, that the judge had made a mistake of fact in relation to the production of the documentary evidence. Fourthly, that the judge had misrepresented the appellant’s evidence about the identity of the gang. Fifthly, that the judge had given inadequate reasons for rejecting the evidence from the appellant’s aunt and neighbour. Sixthly, that the judge had unduly speculated on the behaviour of the gang in visiting his family home. Seventhly, that the judge had failed to apply relevant principles of future risk being based upon past persecution and had wrongly required corroboration. Eighth, that the judge failed properly to engage with the background country evidence in relation to sufficiency of protection in Vietnam. Ninth, that the judge had erred in his consideration of internal relocation.

7. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was granted on all grounds upon a renewed application in the Upper Tribunal, on the basis that: “In particular, it is arguable that in material respects the First-tier Tribunal erred by failing to assess the evidence as a whole and in drawing conclusions which were not adequately supported by the evidence or which were not adequately explained by the Tribunal.”

8. The respondent provided a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.

9. The matter then came before me for a hearing. Both parties made submissions. I have addressed the submissions in my analysis below.

Analysis

10. The first two grounds of appeal concern the judge’s treatment of the psychological report of Dr Ahmed. It is asserted in the first ground that the judge fell into a Mibanga type error by treating the medical evidence as contingent upon his own proper credibility assessment, rather than considering it as part of the evaluation of credibility itself. That is said to be particularly so given the judge’s comment at the end of [37] in response to Dr Ahmed’s statement that “I have based my opinions on his authentic presentation and the consistency in his verbal disclosure. If at a later date, it is proven that his statement may be incorrect or untrue, I would be prepared to reconsider my formulation and opinion”, whereby the judge considered that he could accord only limited weight to Dr Ahmed’s report in the absence of a revised opinion following his own adverse credibility assessment. It seems to me that the grounds have taken that comment out of its proper context, in pleading a Mibanga type error. The judge was simply recording the expert’s express statement that his conclusions depended upon the truthfulness and consistency of the history provided, but he otherwise engaged substantively with the report in the context of the overall evidence. Indeed it is clear from a reading of Dr Ahmed’s report that it consisted of a recital of the appellant’s own account of his circumstances and his symptoms, and as such the judge was perfectly entitled to take into account those limitations as identified in the report. The judge clearly engaged with the report together with the evidence as a whole, as is apparent at [36] where the judge considered the expert’s observations together with the appellant’s evidence at his interview and at the hearing, with due regard to the fact that it was accepted that he was a victim of trafficking. In so far as the second ground criticises the approach taken by the judge in that paragraph and asserts that the judge was substituting his own, lay, view for that of the expert, and that he relied impermissibly upon the appellant’s demeanour, that is clearly not the case. The judge was assessing the evidence as a whole. His findings at [36] reflected a holistic assessment of that evidence, which included the appellant's evidence at his interviews and his oral evidence, taken together with the observations made by Dr Ahmed. It was for the judge to accord the weight that he did to that evidence and he provided full and proper reasons for according the evidence the weight that he did. Accordingly I find no errors in the judge’s approach to the expert evidence and to his assessment of the appellant’s credibility in that context.

11. Grounds three and five take issue with the judge’s assessment of the documentary evidence. With regard to ground three, Mr Timson submitted that it was difficult to see how the judge could have found against the appellant at [32] in relation to the timing of the submission of documents when his evidence was that he obtained the documents from a neighbour with whom he had only re-established contact after the date of the refusal of his claim. It is submitted that the appellant’s evidence at his screening interview, that he did not have any documents, was therefore correct. However the point being made by the judge, at [30] at [32], was that the appellant’s oral evidence at the hearing was that he had decided to gather evidence and leave that evidence with his neighbour, prior to his departure from Vietnam. In that respect therefore, the judge was perfectly entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence at 7.2 and 7.3 of his screening interview, was contradictory, particularly 7.3 which referred to documents in existence but not yet in his possession. In any event, the judge was fully and properly entitled to be concerned about the reliability of the documentary evidence for various other reasons, including the fact that the provenance of the documents was unclear and unexplained, as he observed at [30] and [31]. Further, the respondent pointed out in the respondent’s review at [19] that no mention was made by the appellant of the documents in his interview despite there having been ample opportunity to do so when questioned at length about reporting his issues to the police. The appellant was therefore perfectly aware of the respondent’s concerns about the documents, contrary to the assertion made at [19] of the grounds. In the circumstances it was fully and properly open to the judge to consider the timing of the production of the documents as undermining the reliability of the evidence, as he said at [33].

12. Likewise, with regard to ground five, the judge was perfectly entitled to make the findings that he did at [27] and [28] in regard to the aunt’s letter. The judge found at [27] that the letter the appellant relied upon purporting to come from an aunt living close to his home in Vietnam contradicted his account at his interview of having no family or friends in Vietnam. Mr Timson submitted that the appellant’s evidence at his interview at question 136 was referring specifically to Hanoi, where he did not have any family, and that the appellant had therefore not given contradictory accounts. However, irrespective of the question itself referring to Hanoi, the appellant’s answer to question 136 clearly referred to Vietnam in general. His answers to questions 8 and 12 also indicated that there was no close family or friends in Vietnam aside from his mother and sister. The judge accordingly had perfectly proper reasons for doubting the reliability of the letter. In addition, in concluding that the letters had all the hallmarks of an attempt to bolster the appellant’s asylum claim, the judge properly identified at [28] that the account given in the aunt’s letter and the letter from the neighbour, of the gang visiting the house and searching for the appellant, was inconsistent with his account of the house having been taken over by the gang. That finding is the subject of ground six, where it is asserted that the judge’s view of the account lacking plausibility was unsupported by country evidence and was purely speculative reasoning. However I reject the suggestion that such a finding had to be objectively justified when it was entirely open to the judge to consider the account of the gang members re-visiting the house and looking for the appellant to be inconsistent with his claim that they had taken over the house and had trafficked him to the UK.

13. As for ground four, it is asserted that the judge did not take into account, when assessing risk from the traffickers at [39], the fact that the appellant continued to have an outstanding debt with them. However the grounds ignore the fact that the judge did not accept the appellant’s account of events in Vietnam and of the gang’s ongoing interest in him. The judge’s finding at [26] as referred to at [24] of the grounds, as well as his findings at [22] to [25], were not an acceptance of the appellant’s account but rather an acceptance of the plausibility of such an account, which was then followed by the rejection of the appellant’s particular historical account on credibility grounds. The judge accepted that the appellant was a victim of trafficking but not in the circumstances he was claiming. In the circumstances the judge was perfectly entitled to conclude that, having rejected the core account concerning the gang, there was insufficient evidence that any identifiable criminal group retained an interest in the appellant.

14. The assertion made in ground seven is that the judge required an impermissibly high level of evidence and corroboration to demonstrate future risk to the appellant, whereas the appellant’s past experience of trafficking was sufficient to indicate future risk. However the judge, having accepted the appellant’s history of being trafficked, properly found that that past history was informative but was not in itself determinative and went on to assess the future risk on the basis of the country evidence. The judge was perfectly entitled to conclude, as he did at [39], that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant was likely to re-encounter the same gang given that he had not identified any particular gang and had failed to show any likelihood of re-encountering them. The judge was, furthermore, entitled to conclude that the burden of proof was upon the appellant to show that the gang he feared had extensive reach and influence and was not simply required to rely upon inference or unsupported assertions, as he made clear at [45]. I do not accept that the judge was thereby imposing an unlawful burden or standard of proof upon the appellant.

15. In any event the judge, having given full consideration to the country evidence, reached the conclusion that there was a sufficiency of protection and internal relocation option available to the appellant. Ground eight seeks to challenge the judge’s findings on the country evidence, asserting that he ignored the country evidence relied upon by the appellant and confined his analysis to the executive summary of the CPIN when considering sufficiency of protection. However that is clearly not the case as the judge specifically referred at [44] to the country evidence relied upon by the appellant and considered that evidence in the context of the appellant’s particular circumstances, providing cogent reasons at [46] for concluding that the evidence did not establish that the appellant was unable to access protection in Vietnam. The judge was not required to refer to each and every part of the country evidence when it was otherwise clear that he had considered that evidence and that he had reached a conclusion that was properly open to him on the basis of that evidence.

16. As for ground nine, Mr Timson submitted that the judge had erred by failing to explain why it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to another part of Vietnam. However the judge, applying the relevant legal test, clearly did consider the reasonableness of relocation at [47] and expressly considered the appellant’s age, education, language, culture, support network and familiarity with Vietnamese society. In so far as the grounds assert that the judge failed to take into account the appellant’s mental health and did not explain the support network available to him, the respondent’s rule 24 properly points out the judge’s consideration of those matters at [29] and [63] to [64]. Although [63] and [64] were findings made on the issue of ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ for the purposes of Article 8, they were equally relevant to the consideration of reasonableness of relocation and demonstrated that the judge had had regard to those matters.

17. For all these reasons I do not find the grounds to be made out. I agree with Dr Ibisi that the grounds are essentially a disagreement with the judge’s decision. The judge undertook a full and careful assessment of all the evidence and provided detailed and cogent reasons for according it the weight that he did. The adverse credibility findings that he made were cogently reasoned and were fully and properly open to him. The judge took account of the appellant’s mental health issues and the medical evidence in that regard, to the extent that he was able to, giving full reasons for his findings in that regard. He undertook a careful consideration of risk on return on the basis of the appellant’s accepted history as a victim of trafficking and reached a conclusion which was properly open to him on the evidence available to him. The judge was entitled to conclude as he did and his decision is accordingly upheld.

Notice of Decision

18. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Anonymity Order

The Anonymity Order previously made is continued.


Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 October 2026