Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-003713
First-tier Tribunal Number: PA/03970/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued
On 16 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

MSI
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Karim, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 1 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity and is to be referred to in these proceedings by the initials MSI. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

The Appellant

1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 3 April 1981. He appeals against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 26 March 2026 which dismissed his appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 25 September 2024. That decision refused the appellant’s application for international protection. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 7 December 2023 and claimed asylum on 4 June 2024.

The Appellant’s Case

2. The appellant’s claim for asylum was summarised in his skeleton argument. The appellant was at risk on return because of his political profile, as he held a prominent role within the Bangladesh Jatiotabdi Jubodal (Bangladesh Nationalist Youth Party), who are connected to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of which the appellant was an active member. These activities brought him to the adverse attention of the Bangladeshi Awami League. He had previously been attacked and there were two judgments against him including an arrest warrant. He had an Article 8 family life claim as his wife has a significant medical condition including cancer and (at the date of hearing) was pregnant. His wife had serious mental issues/depression. Recent events in Bangladesh had made the country very volatile.

The Decision at First Instance

3. At [23] of the determination the judge analysed the appellant’s asylum claim but found it lacked credibility, for example at [23(f)] the judge noted that the appellant had changed his account and dismissed the asylum appeal. At [25] the judge turned to the appellant’s article 3 medical claim but found that medical care was available in Bangladesh according to the CPIN July 2022 and the psychiatric evidence produced by the appellant was contradictory between the United Kingdom based psychiatrist and the Bangladesh based one. There were no very significant obstacles to the appellant returning to Bangladesh. He had family there who could assist him and his wife. The best interests of the appellant’s child were to remain with their parents

The Onward Appeal

4. The appellant appealed this decision arguing at ground 1 that the judge materially erred in law in the assessment of the Appellant’s wife’s medical condition and Article 3 ECHR claim. The test was not whether treatment exists in theory, but whether substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the individual would face a real risk, due to absence of appropriate treatment or lack of access to such treatment, of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy, see AM Zimbabwe. The appellant’s wife was continuing to receive treatment in the United Kingdom.

5. Ground 2 argued that the judge failed to deal adequately with the medical evidence. The Appellant’s wife remained medically vulnerable following cancer treatment, amputation, thoracic surgery and ongoing oncology monitoring. The Judge had wrongly rejected the expert evidence as “largely generic in nature”. Ground 3 argued that the judge had not adequately dealt with the appellant’s article 8 claim and the best interests of the appellant’s child. Ground 4 argued that the proportionality of the appellant’s removal had not ben properly considered and the determination was irrational. Much of this ground repeated what was said in the other grounds.

6. Permission to appeal was granted by the FTT stating “It is arguable that the IJ has failed to provide proper reasons as to why the article 3 ECHR claim was dismissed. It is further arguable that the IJ has provided insufficient reasons for findings against the Appellant in relation to the Article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment.

7. The respondent replied to the grant of permission to appeal stating “the grounds of appeal on which permission has been granted amount to no more than a mere disagreement with the First-Tier Tribunal Judge’s … findings.” The appellant’s wife had received treatment in Bangladesh and could do so again.

The Hearing Before Me

8. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place whether there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.

9. For the appellant counsel relied on the grounds of onward appeal, see above. As to ground 1 the judge had erred in assessing the wife's medical issues. He had said that the appellant’s wife was not seriously ill but the evidence showed a history of cancer, and osteosarcoma. She required a CT scan, an MRI and she was dependent on a prosthetic limb. At [27] of the determination the judge erred regarding the availability of medical treatment in Bangladesh. The correct legal test was whether there were substantial grounds that she would face a real risk if medical care was not provided. To say she could access treatment in Bangladesh sat uncomfortably with the evidence submitted on the appellant and his wife's behalf. There was proof in the documents of difficulties in accessing treatment and there was a significant financial burden preventing them obtaining care in Bangladesh.

10. As to ground 2, the judge had failed to give reasons for rejecting specialist evidence. At [23(g)] the judge said the expert’s report was largely generic in nature but there was no engagement with the oncology report or any meaningful engagement with the psychiatric reports one from a psychologist the other from a psychiatrist. Grounds 3 and 4 needed to be taken together. The judge failed to carry out a balancing exercise. The judge had not factored in the wife's evidence as to why she wanted to stay in the United Kingdom. The weather here was more comfortable for her artificial limb which would need a 10 year follow-up. There was reference in her witness statement to the psychological support she was receiving in the United Kingdom. There was a stigma about mental health conditions in Bangladesh. The judge’s article 8 assessment was materially flawed and therefore the determination itself was unsafe. I asked counsel if he could clarify what the position was about the appellant's newborn child but he said he had no instructions on that.

11. In reply the respondent submitted there was a lack of evidence in this case. There was a lot of evidence regarding the wife’s medical condition but what was missing was evidence of the appellant and his wife's circumstances which they would face upon return. The judge understood that there were two reports. [27] is important. Medical treatment was available and could be accessed. Whether the wife could access care and obtain the appropriate financing to pay for it was not something an expert could answer. Only the appellant’s wife could answer that. That was where the appellant's case got into difficulties. The First-tier was not disputing that treatment may be expensive but the issue was whether the wife could afford the treatment. She had family in Bangladesh who could help her with the cost.

12. The reports obtained by the appellant contradicted each other. There was a lack of GP notes. The judge said the wife was not seriously ill. That finding was open to the judge on the evidence. The appellant's wife had various follows up and cancer treatment but the case came down what is the treatment available in Bangladesh? If they did not have that treatment what would happen? The judge was right to find that the appellant and his wife had not shown she could not access the treatment. The article 3 claim could not succeed. Even if she could show she was seriously ill that would not be relevant. In ground 3 and there was no no pretence that they were pleading alleged legal errors on the judge's behalf.

13. In reply counsel for the appellant argued that the relevant test was at paragraph 22 of AM Zimbabwe. The respondent had claimed that there was no evidence put forward by the appellant to show an inability to access treatment in Bangladesh. There was however a plethora of evidence for the appellant's circumstances upon return. In her witness statement from [19] onwards she said that treatment was not available in Bangladesh. She highlighted the difficulty in receiving treatment.

Discussion and Findings

14. Although this case began as a claim by the appellant for international protection because of his support for the Bangladesh National party, that aspect of the claim has largely fallen away. This must be right in the light of the change of government in Bangladesh and the Court of Appeal authority of MU (Bangladesh) [2025] EWCA Civ 812 where it was said “…the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the [appellant in the case] will be at risk of serious harm if returned.”

15. The issue which remains is the state of health of the appellant's wife, whether treatment would be available for her upon return to Bangladesh and if so whether it could be accessed. The judge found that there was treatment available. The couple had family in Bangladesh to whom they could look for support upon return which would assist with paying for medical treatment. The appellant produced evidence to show the treatment which his wife had received and what might be necessary in the future. As the presenting officer pointed out the question of whether it could be afforded was not a matter for the expert put forward by the appellant in this case.

16. The wife’s article 3 claim in respect of medical treatment was assessed by the judge that there was no imminent prospect of death or significant deterioration. The appellant's wife could access the appropriate treatment. The respondent made the point in her Rule 24 response that the appellant's wife had previously received treatment in Bangladesh and therefore could do so again. There was very little evidence about the couple's child and criticism of the judge for not dealing in detail with section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 lacks merit in circumstances where the judge was not given evidence about it.

17. The judge did not accept that there were insurmountable obstacles upon return to Bangladesh given that the couple had family members there who could help them reintegrate. The appellant and his wife have a family life here that could be continued elsewhere in the country of which they are both nationals. There is no right for a couple to choose where to exercise their article 8 right to a family life. In a carefully worded determination, the judge analysed the relevant evidence and came to sustainable conclusions. The judge was aware of the medical evidence and pointed out difficulties with the psychiatric reports, see [28] in particular indicating the contradiction between the British report and the Bangladeshi ones. At [26] the judge noted the lack of evidence about the appellant’s state of health. I agree with the characterisation of the appellant's case that it is merely a disagreement with the result of the hearing at first instance. For all those reasons I find that the appellant cannot demonstrate any material error of law in the determination and I dismiss the onward appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal

Appellant’s appeal dismissed

Signed this 12th day of October 2026

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge