Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003736
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/72157/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MRB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Choudhury, KC Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a Bangladeshi national who entered the United Kingdom in October 2023 having been granted leave to do so as a skilled worker together with her husband who was granted leave to enter as her dependant.

2. On 3 June 2024 the appellant claimed asylum stating that she had a well founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh for reason of her membership of a particular social group as a lone female. The basis of that claim was her assertion that she had separated from her husband after he was abusive towards her, and as a consequence his family in Bangladesh had threatened to kill her. The appellant claimed that the authorities in Bangladesh would not adequately protect her from that threat and that as a single female it would be unduly harsh for her to relocate within Bangladesh to avoid the threat. She further argued that she would face very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh and that returning would be incompatible with her right to respect for her private life in the United Kingdom.

3. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claims in a decision dated 26 September 2024 and the appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. Her appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge M B Hussain (the Judge) on 25 March 2026 who issued a decision dismissing the appellants protection and human rights appeals on 20 April 2026.

4. The applicant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision to this Tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien on seven grounds. The respondent did not provide a written reply to those grounds of appeal but at the hearing before me, Ms McKenzie conceded that the grounds of appeal identified errors of law in the Judge’s decision such that the decision should be set aside and the appeal remitted for a fresh hearing before a different First-tier Tribunal Judge.

5. Having read the Judge’s decision and the grounds of appeal with care I am satisfied that Ms McKenzie’s concession is well made and that the Judge’s decision contains errors of law and must be set aside with no findings of fact preserved. Given the parties are in agreement about the errors and the need for remittal to the First-tier Tribunal I will set out my reasons for that conclusion only briefly.

The Errors of Law

6. The Judge explains his reasons at [39] –[41] of his decision before stating his decision to dismiss the appellant’s protection and human rights appeals at [42] and [43].

7. At [39] of his decision, the Judge questioned why the family of the appellant’s husband would be interested in the appellant if the marriage is over, before suggesting that a possible answer to that question is that the family are concerned about an ongoing criminal case against the husband in the United Kingdom. The Judge therefore found that the question of whether the appellant had made a complaint to the police in the United Kingdom about her husband which resulted in a criminal investigation, was key to determining whether the appellant does in fact fear her husband’s family in Bangladesh. At [40] the Judge stated that “In this regard, I find that the appellant has not provided any evidence other than her own oral testimony from which I could reasonably infer that there is a police case pending against her husband” The Judge continued in the rest of the paragraph to state that he would have expected to have been provided with documentary evidence of the complaint to the police and investigation as it would have been easy to access such evidence and the appellant would have been advised to obtain such evidence. Although it is not stated explicitly, the clear inference from the Judge’s reasoning is that the absence of documentary evidence meant he was not satisfied that the appellant had made a complaint to the police, resulting in an investigation into her husband.

8. I am satisfied that Ms McKenzie is right to concede that ground one is correct and that it was procedurally unfair and irrational for the Judge to draw an adverse inference from the absence of documentary evidence of a complaint to the police and an investigation by the police. That is because, as the Judge acknowledges elsewhere in his decision, the applicant had in fact submitted documentary evidence of her complaint and the investigation in the form of a non-molestation order (NMO) which the Tribunal rejected and required her to re-submit with confirmation that the Family Court had consented to its use. At [41] of his decision the Judge appears to acknowledge the existence of an NMO as he refers to the appellant’s representative reading it during the hearing. While the Judge was understandably unimpressed by the failure to adduce this evidence properly, it was irrational in the circumstances for him to draw the conclusion that the appellant’s account could not be relied upon because it was not supported by documentary evidence while at the same time acknowledging the existence of such documentary evidence.

9. At [41] the Judge appears to again acknowledge the existence of relevant documentation and the fact of a police investigation but suggest that it was of no consequence because the investigation concluded with an undertaking being made by the sister of the husband. This finding does not however address the appellant’s claim to fear the family of the husband who remain in Bangladesh. The Judge goes on to address that family in the remainder of [41] and found the appellant’s claim that her husband’s family would know when she arrives at an airport in Bangladesh to be unbelievable. Whilst this finding is in my judgment unobjectionable (despite the suggestion in the grounds that it is speculative) it fails to address the real question which is not whether the appellant would be at risk at the airport but whether she would be at risk on her return to her home area. The Judge therefore failed to resolve the key issues in the appeal namely whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution by the appellant’s family and if she does whether she would be at risk from them.

10. None of paragraphs [39] – [41] address the appellant’s human rights claim that removal is incompatible with her article 8 Convention right to respect for her private life. Instead the only explanation for the decision to dismiss that claim comes at [43] when the Judge says: “In relation to the appellant’s human rights claim, this has been adequately dealt with by the respondent. In my judgment, there is no prospect of the appellant’s claim succeeding”. Ms McKenzie was unquestionably right to concede that this is an inadequate explanation for the Judge’s conclusion. It singularly fails to explain to the appellant why her claim has not been accepted and why the Judge has concluded that interference with her private life is proportionate.

Remaking

11. I agree with both parties that these errors of law are such that the decision in this appeal must be re-made and that no findings of fact made by the Judge can be preserved. As the appellant made her protection claim in June 2024, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies to consideration of her asylum claim. That means that it will be necessary to answer sequentially the questions posed in section 32 of the 2022 Act to determine whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Had the Judge followed that structured approach the errors of law may have been avoided. For the avoidance of doubt, in the context of the appellant’s claim the questions to be resolved to determine the appellant’s asylum claim are:
i. Whether, on balance, the appellant has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for reason of her membership of a particular social group as a lone female? If so
ii. Whether, on balance the appellant does in fact fear persecution as a result of that characteristic? If so
iii. Whether there is a reasonable likelihood the appellant will be persecuted for that reason? If so
iv. Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would not be protected from that persecution (including by relocating within Bangladesh)?

12. To resolve the appellant's human rights claim it will be necessary to determine whether interference with the private life the appellant has established in the United Kingdom is proportionate, having regard to the public interest in immigration control in the context of the Immigration Rules and the margin of appreciation that is allowed to the state to control who may remain in the country.

Notice of Decision

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed.

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge M B Hussain contained errors of law and is set aside. The appeal against the respondent’s decision is remitted for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal by a Judge other than Judge M B Hussain.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 October 2026