Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003791
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63292/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

FC
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Lanigan of Counsel, instructed by Virgo Solicitors Ltd.
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 30 September 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Albania born on 4 April 2007, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge K Thomas promulgated on 20 May 2026 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 24 April 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s Protection claim dated 30 August 2022. As such, ss. 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) apply.
BACKGROUND
2. The Appellant left Albania on 18 August 2022 at the age of 15 and entered the UK by small boat on 23 August 2022. On 30 August 2022 the Appellant claimed asylum.
3. In brief summary, the Appellant claimed to come within the Refugee Convention as a member of a Particular Social Group (“PSG”) on the basis that he was a male victim of trafficking in Albania. The Appellant claimed that his family incurred a debt with criminal money lenders which led to him being forced to work on a cannabis farm for approximately 8 months, during which time he was subject to threats and violence.
4. Before the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) the SSHD disputed that the Appellant came within a PSG and disputed that the Appellant’s family had problems with money lenders and that the Appellant had been trafficked as claimed.
Decision of FTIJ Thomas
5. In summary, the FTIJ made the following findings:
On balance is there a Convention reason for A’s fear of persecution (s.32(2)(a) NABA 2022).
• [19] – [21] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant does not fall within a PSG because he does not meet the social visibility limb of the test under s.33(4) of NABA 2022.
Credibility (Humanitarian Protection)
• [22] The FTIJ confirms that he has considered all the evidence in the round to the lower standard of proof.
• [23] The FTIJ confirms that he has taken the Psychiatric report of Dr Reddy and the diagnosis of moderate depression and PTSD into account before considering credibility, and that he has assessed all the evidence in the round.
• [24] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that the Appellant has been inconsistent about his father’s condition. First, in oral evidence and the WSs the father is described as suffering from the evil eye requiring alternative treatment funded by a substantial loan. Second, in contrast the AIR at [58] refers to the father having depression.
• [25] In this regard, the FTIJ notes an inconsistency between the Appellant’s oral evidence that his father attended hospital, and the AIR [60] where the Appellant claimed that his father had not attended hospital.
◦ The FTIJ accepts that the evil eye may reflect cultural framing but finds that the later attempt to characterise the father’s condition as a curse is inconsistent with the AIR account.
◦ The FTIJ finds this material as it goes to the reason for the alleged loan and the claimed sequence of events giving rise to risk.
• [26] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that the £18000 loan is inherently implausible because the parents were unemployed, healthcare is largely free and because there was an alternative source of funding available from the uncle.
• The FTIJ then notes the Appellant’s case that the loan was for his father’s condition; that he had no involvement in his parents' decision; and that he was of a young age at the time.
• [27] The FTIJ accepts the Appellant’s age and lack of involvement in the decision to take out the loan. The FTIJ then finds in the round that the loan is not credible because the country evidence demonstrates free healthcare; the Appellant’s evidence is that his father accessed such healthcare; it is not credible that the parents would be advanced such a sum with no means to repay it; and the alternative sources of funding undermine the account.
◦ The FTIJ then rejects the Appellant’s account of the existence and circumstances of the loan in the round with his other credibility findings.
• [28] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that there are material inconsistencies between the Appellant’s various accounts.
◦ First, in the NRM the Appellant stated that he came to the UK of his own volition, arranged his own journey and purchased his own ticket.
◦ Second, in the AIR the Appellant claimed that his uncle arranged and paid for his journey to the UK.
◦ Third, in the social worker report the Appellant claimed that the loan was taken out to fund his journey to the UK rather than for his father’s treatment, contrary to the core account in the protection claim.
• [29] The FTIJ then notes the Appellant’s submission that the inconsistencies do not go to the core of the Appellant’s account, and his explanation that the inconsistencies should be viewed in the light of his vulnerability and age; the SW report being prepared shortly after arrival “when the Appellant was fearful, mistrustful, and unsupported”; and the Appellant’s claim that he “did not know what to say or who to trust”.
• [30] The FTIJ takes into account the Appellant’s age at the material time but finds the inconsistencies unexplainable on the basis of vulnerability or the passage of time and that:
• “The differing explanations as to the purpose of the loan, the circumstances of travel to the United Kingdom, and the absence of key elements of the claim in the earlier NRM and social worker’s reports go to the central narrative of the Appellant’s case, These are not peripheral discrepancies but matters which strike at the core of the claim”.
• [31] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that the Appellant’s own evidence undermines his claim to have left Albania due to a risk of serious harm because the Appellant stated that improved healthcare was a motivating factor to come to the UK.
◦ The FTIJ finds that the Appellant accepted that access to healthcare was a factor in coming to the UK in his oral evidence but had argued that his main aim was to escape the trafficking and risk.
◦ The FTIJ then notes that the social worker report records:
“[the Appellant] stated that he came to the UK to study and better his life as the opportunities in his country are slim. He further said he wants to improve his health needs. He stated that he has tried to get support from Albania to correct his hand/arm this has not been possible. He further shared that he borrowed the money from dealers to pay for his journey to the UK. He refused to name those connections fearing of being harmed. It was explained that he cannot work in the UK since he is classified as a child. He added that if he fails to repay the money, that he borrowed he will be killed.”
◦ The FTIJ finds that this record undermines the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have left Albania due to a risk of serious harm.
• [32] The FTIJ sets out the Respondent’s submission that the fact his mother continues to reside in the family home, has not made a police report and has sent statements in support of the Appellant’s appeal undermines the Appellant’s claim of ongoing risk. However, the FTIJ finds that the Appellant’s claim is that he is of adverse interest not his mother and that the Appellant’s explanation cannot be dismissed out of hand. Accordingly, the FTIJ places neutral weight on this aspect of the claim.
• [33] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that the country expert report should be given limited weight because it proceeded on the basis that the Appellant was a VOT without sight of the conflicting NRM decision and social worker report.
◦ The FTIJ then sets out the Appellant’s argument that the expert’s role was to assess plausibility in the light of country conditions rather than resolve inconsistencies and that as such, the report remains probative of trafficking and risk.
• [34] The FTIJ finds the expert report of “limited reliability” because it failed to consider the NRM decision and social worker report which meant that the expert did not have the full evidential picture when forming his opinion. The FTIJ finds that the report proceeds on the basis that the Appellant is a VOT, which is disputed and a matter for the Tribunal. The FTIJ accepts that the expert can comment on plausibility but finds that the conclusions in the report do not adequately engage with the Appellant’s specific circumstances “or with contrary indicators in the evidence, including the position of the Appellant’s family in Albania”. As such, the report carries “limited weight”.
• [35] The FTIJ sets out the SSHD’s submission that the Psychiatric report carries little weight because it does not consider the GP records or other primary medical documentation, is unclear as to what materials were relied on and impermissibly comments on credibility.
◦ The FTIJ then records the Appellant’s submission that the report supports the Appellant’s vulnerability and provides context to any inconsistencies.
• [36] The FTIJ invokes HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) and finds that the absence of medical records before the expert limit the reports weight. The FTIJ notes the report’s reliance upon the Appellant’s self-reporting and that passages stray into an assessment of credibility. The FTIJ accepts that the Appellant suffers from mental health difficulties but finds the report’s conclusions insufficiently supported by a robust evidential basis. Accordingly, the FTIJ finds that the report carries limited weight.
• [37] The FTIJ considers the two statements from the Appellant’s mother and the Appellant’s submission that they corroborate the Appellant’s account of an outstanding debt and ongoing adverse interest.
◦ The FTIJ then notes the SSHD’s counter argument that the production of the statements demonstrates that there is no ongoing adverse interest.
• [38] The FTIJ notes that there is no requirement to corroborate an asylum claim and accepts that the statements provide corroboration. However, the FTIJ reduces the weight attached to the statements in the absence of cross-examination. The FTIJ takes into account that the mother was able to send the statements despite allegedly being an ongoing target for the gang and finds that the statements do not materially strengthen the Appellant’s claim and carry neutral weight.
• [39] – [40] The FTIJ draws together the evidence and finds the Appellant’s account incredible and unreliable because:
There are a number of significant inconsistencies across his accounts, including the nature of his father’s condition, the purpose and plausibility of the alleged loan, and the circumstances of his departure from Albania as recorded in the asylum, NRM, and social worker evidence. These inconsistencies go to the core of the claim and are not adequately explained by reference to age or vulnerability. I have also taken into account the implausibility of key elements of the account when assessed against the objective evidence, including the availability of free healthcare in Albania and the financial circumstances of the Appellant’s family. Further, I place limited weight on the supporting evidence, including the statements of the Appellant’s mother and the expert reports, for the reasons given above.
Risk on Return
• [41] – [42] the FTIJ finds in the light of his findings above that there is no risk on return and confirms that “This finding applies whether the claim is considered under the Refugee Convention or humanitarian protection”.
Sufficiency of Protection and Internal Relocation
• [43] – [45] the FTIJ alternatively finds that in any event there is sufficiency of protection and reasonable option of internal relocation. In this regard the FTIJ finds that the CPIN evidence carries greater weight than the country report because the CPIN:
“Represents a composite and sourced assessment of country conditions, drawing on a wide range of objective material and subject to internal review and updating. By contrast, the report of Dr Korovilas is based on the materials provided to him in this case and, as I have found, did not take into account all relevant evidence, including the negative NRM decision and the social worker’s report. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the CPIN provides a more complete and balanced evidential foundation for assessing country conditions”.
6. Accordingly, the FTIJ dismissed the Appellant’s protection claim.
Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal
7. On 10 July 2026 the Appellant’s application for permission to appeal the Decision of FTIJ Thomas was granted by FTIJ Kudhail without restriction, albeit that the grant singularly focused upon the first ground’s challenge to the Convention reason findings.
8. In five grounds of appeal settled by Glenn Corney on behalf of Virgo solicitors, which do not clearly identify numbered grounds of appeal (see Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC), the Appellant argues,
3. The Judge, at paragraph 20 of the determination, finds that the Appellant is not a member of a particular social group on the basis that he/she is not satisfied that they [male victims of trafficking] are perceived as a distinct group within Albanian society. The Judge refers to the CPIN on human trafficking paragraph 2.1.3 which makes a similar statement but without references or sources. It is submitted that this is insufficient to come to such a conclusion as there is no evidence used to make this finding.
4. The Judge finds that the Appellant is not credible with respect to the loan that was sourced from criminals. It is submitted that the Judge has considered the situation from a ‘logical’ western perspective and has no regard at paragraph 27 to the fact that loan sharks exist and exploit the vulnerable. It is submitted therefore that the Judge should not have come to such a conclusion as regards the loan.
5. At paragraph 30 the Judge finds that the Appellant has given inconsistent accounts and ultimately ignores that Appellant’s explanations, vulnerability and young age when his asylum application was made and it is submitted should have taken a more rounded view of the Appellant when assessing credibility.
6. It is further submitted that the Judge has placed insufficient weight on the country expert report and the psychiatric report submitted in support of the Appellant’s appeal when considering them at paragraphs 33-36 of the determination and therefore that the Judge has misdirected his/herself.
7. It is submitted that the Judge has made findings in the context of what he would expect to happen / have happened from a western perspective, without properly considering the context of the situation in Albania, as detailed in the objective evidence submitted in the Appellant’s bundle.
9. In a rule 24 reply dated 3 August 2026, the SSHD opposed the grounds of appeal on the basis that they amounted to a mere disagreement with the findings of FTIJ Thomas.
10. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
11. At the outset of the hearing Ms Lanigan confirmed that she had before her the stitched Upper Tribunal hearing bundle consisting of 1105 pages (“SB”), whilst Ms Khan confirmed that she was in possession of all of the necessary procedural documentation and FTT bundles and was ready to proceed.
12. I then heard submissions from Ms Lanigan followed by Ms Khan. Ms Lanigan then gave brief submissions in reply.
13. After submissions I confirmed that I would be reserving my Decision which would be promulgated with reasons in due course. I now set out my Decision and reasons as follows:
DISCUSSION
Ground One
14. Under ground 1, the Appellant argues:
3. The Judge, at paragraph 20 of the determination, finds that the Appellant is not a member of a particular social group on the basis that he/she is not satisfied that they [male victims of trafficking] are perceived as a distinct group within Albanian society. The Judge refers to the CPIN on human trafficking paragraph 2.1.3 which makes a similar statement but without references or sources. It is submitted that this is insufficient to come to such a conclusion as there is no evidence used to make this finding.
15. I am satisfied that the FTT Decision discloses an error of law in this regard.
16. At paragraph [19] the FTIJ correctly notes that the Appellant must meet both limbs of the PSG test under s.33 of NABA 2022 and finds at [20] that whilst the Appellant meets the first limb of the test, because his claim discloses “an immutable characteristic” arising from his alleged experience as a male VOT, the Appellant did not meet the second limb because, “I am not satisfied that they are perceived as a distinct group within Albanian society”.
17. The inherent difficulty with this rejection of the second limb is that the FTIJ simultaneously accepts at [20] “that there may be stigma affecting girls and boys who are victims of trafficking”. I find that the FTIJ has failed to provide adequate reasons to reconcile his rejection of the Appellant’s ability to meet the social visibility test with his acceptance of social stigma.
18. As set out in the grounds, the FTIJ appears to justify his rejection of the second limb at [20] singularly upon the basis of the SSHD’s policy statement at [2.1.3] of the CPIN, which states that,
“men who are trafficked do not form a PSG. Although they have an immutable characteristic– the experience of having been trafficked– they do not have a distinct identity within Albanian society.”
19. However, I find this is simply the SSHD’s opinion and not evidence probative of whether male VOTs are “perceived as being different by the surrounding society”. I am not satisfied that the SSHD’s policy statement without more, is capable of reconciling the FTIJ’s conflicting findings.
20. As discussed at the hearing, the materiality of this error turns upon whether grounds 2 - 4 disclose a material error in the FTIJ’s credibility assessment. As I have found no material errors of law in my assessment of grounds 2 – 4 below, I find that ground 1 does not disclose a material error of law.
21. I therefore dismiss ground 1.
Ground Two
22. Under ground 2 the Appellant argues,
4. The Judge finds that the Appellant is not credible with respect to the loan that was sourced from criminals. It is submitted that the Judge has considered the situation from a ‘logical’ western perspective and has no regard at paragraph 27 to the fact that loan sharks exist and exploit the vulnerable. It is submitted therefore that the Judge should not have come to such a conclusion as regards the loan.
23. To put this complaint in context, paragraph [27] of the decision states,
I accept that the Appellant was a child at the relevant time and was not involved in the decision-making process. However, assessing the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s account of this loan is credible. In particular, I place weight on the objective evidence indicating that free healthcare is available in Albania and on the Appellant’s own evidence that his father accessed medical treatment there. Against that background, I do not consider it credible that two unemployed parents, with no identified means of repayment, would be advanced such a substantial sum by criminal lenders. The availability of alternative sources of financial assistance further undermines the account. For those reasons, I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence in relation to the existence and circumstances of the alleged loan and I take this into account in my overall credibility findings.
24. The way that Ms Lanigan explained ground 2 in submissions, was on the basis that the FTIJ failed to take into account the country expert’s opinion that the Appellant’s trafficking into forced labour at a cannabis farm underpinned the money lenders motivation. As such, the parents’ ability to repay was neither here nor there. In this regard, Ms Lanigan drew my attention to page [7] of the country report (at SB [901]) which states,
In my opinion, the people who were exploiting Mr Cerkezi are almost certainly part of an established Albanian criminal gang, since it is only established criminal gangs that are willing to extend significant unsecured loans to people in Albania. This assertion is supported by the fact that Albanian criminal gangs know that they can recover the value of outstanding debts, either through violence, forced labour or even through sexual exploitation. Furthermore, the Albanian criminal gang that were exploiting Mr Cerkezi are involved in drugs and forced labour, these are both criminal activities which require reliable and organised criminal networks, which in turn imply the presence of organised crime.
25. Whilst Ms Lanigan’s submission is attractive, I find it superficially so, as it is an example of island hopping as warned against by Warby LJ in Riley v Silver [2023] EWCA Civ 71 at paragraph [13(3)] “The court will bear in mind that the trial judge has a whole "sea of evidence" instead of "island-hopping" as appellants are prone to do when seeking to challenge findings at first instance”.
26. In this regard I am mindful, as made clear by the FTIJ at paragraphs [20], [40] and in the last sentence of Paragraph [27], that his findings were made in the round. As such, I find it perfectly clear that the FTIJ did not fail to take into account the Appellant’s evidence of being trafficked as a reason for the existence of the loan.
27. Fundamentally, the FTIJ did not accept that the Appellant had been trafficked. As set out in my summary of the FTIJ’s reasons above, at [24] – [31] the FTIJ finds inconsistent accounts without credible explanation across the Appellant’s evidence for the purpose of the loan, the source of his alleged fear, and his reasons for coming to the UK. It is precisely because the country expert was not privy to these inconsistent accounts in the social worker report and the NRM decision that the FTIJ at [33] and [34] gives the country report little weight.
28. Accordingly, I find Ms Lanigan’s and ground two’s blinkered focus upon the reasoning of the judge at [27] by reference to the expert’s consideration of only one version of the Appellant’s account, a paradigm of island hopping.
29. I therefore find no material error of law disclosed by ground 2.
Ground 3
30. Under ground 3 the Appellant argues,
5. At paragraph 30 the Judge finds that the Appellant has given inconsistent accounts and ultimately ignores the Appellant’s explanations, vulnerability and young age when his asylum application was made and it is submitted should have taken a more rounded view of the Appellant when assessing credibility.
31. I find this complaint misconceived.
32. At [26] the FTIJ notes the Appellant’s explanation that he was not privy to the decision to take out the loan due to his age and at [27] accepts that because the Appellant was a child at the time he would not have been involved in that decision making.
33. At [28] the FTIJ notes the SSHD’s submission that the appellant gave inconsistent accounts in his NRM, where he claimed that he came to the UK of his own volition, arranged his own journey and purchased his own ticket; his AIR where he claimed that his uncle arranged and organised his journey because the Appellant was unsafe; and the social worker report, where the Appellant claimed that the loan was taken out to fund his journey to the UK rather than for his father’s treatment, contrary to the core account in the protection claim.
34. At [29], the FTIJ then expressly takes into account the Appellant’s explanations for the inconsistencies on the basis of “vulnerability, age, and the timing of the earlier accounts”; the social worker report being drafted shortly after his arrival in the UK, when the Appellant was fearful, mistrustful, and unsupported; and his explanation in oral evidence that he “did not know what to say or who to trust” at that time.
35. At [30] the FTIJ then finds,
I have considered these submissions carefully. I take into account the Appellant’s age at the time and the possibility that early accounts may be less detailed or internally coherent, I find that the inconsistencies identified are material and cannot be explained solely by vulnerability or the passage of time. The differing explanations as to the purpose of the loan, the circumstances of travel to the United Kingdom, and the absence of key elements of the claim in the earlier NRM and social worker’s reports go to the central narrative of the Appellant’s case. These are not peripheral discrepancies but matters which strike at the core of the claim. I therefore find that the Appellant’s evidence is inconsistent in material respects and that this undermines the overall credibility of his account.
36. At paragraph [39] when drawing the evidence together in the round and reaching a credibility conclusion, the FTIJ again takes into account the Appellant’s age and vulnerability when finding that the “inconsistencies go to the core of the claim and are not adequately explained by reference to age or vulnerability.”
37. Accordingly, the suggestion in the grounds that the Appellant’s explanations and his vulnerability were not taken into account, simply does not reflect the FTIJ’s assessment.
38. In submissions, Ms Lanigan argued that the FTIJ had failed to grapple with the Appellant’s “fear and mistrust” when entering the UK, which she argued was a reasonable explanation for the inconsistencies. As such, I asked Ms Lanigan, what it was about the Appellant’s “fear and mistrust” that would have led him to give a different account to the social worker than the one he relied on his later evidence. In reply, Ms Lanigan suggested that the later account concerned criminals and drug dealers so the Appellant would naturally be frightened about telling the social worker the true story he later relied upon.
39. As I indicated at the hearing, this explanation simply does not stand up to scrutiny. As recorded by the FTIJ at [31] the account given to the social worker was that,
“he borrowed the money from dealers to pay for his journey to the UK. He refused to name those connections fearing of being harmed. It was explained that he cannot work in the UK since he is classified as a child. He added that if he fails to repay the money, that he borrowed he will be killed.”
40. Accordingly, the account given to the social worker also concerned criminals, drug dealers and a risk of serious harm if he said too much.
41. As such, I am not satisfied that the FTIJ failed to take the Appellant’s explanations and vulnerabilities into account as claimed. I find that the FTIJ has given adequate reasons and that his conclusion on the probity of these explanations was within a reasonable range of responses in the round with his other findings.
42. I therefore dismiss ground 3.
Ground 4
43. Under ground 4 the Appellant argues,
6. It is further submitted that the Judge has placed insufficient weight on the country expert report and the psychiatric report submitted in support of the Appellant’s appeal when considering them at paragraphs 33-36 of the determination and therefore that the Judge has misdirected his/herself.
44. Again, I find this complaint misconceived. As confirmed in Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iv)], weight is pre-eminently a matter for the trial judge.
45. In submissions, Ms Lanigan did not pursue ground four’s suggestion that the FTIJ erred in his assessment of the psychiatric report and acknowledged by reference to the case of HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) that the findings at [35] – [36] were open to the FTIJ in the absence of any medical records before Dr Reddy.
46. However, Ms Lanigan did argue that the consideration of the country report was in error because the expert was not tasked with assessing credibility and it was not clear how the NRM decision and social worker report were relevant to the expert’s assessment. Ms Lanigan argued that the relevance of the expert report was in relation to debt bondage, the likelihood of gangs seeking to chase up individuals and as such it was not clear why the underlying facts would impact on the weight to be attributed to the report. In short argued Ms Lanigan, the FTIJ gave inadequate reasons for giving the report limited weight.
47. I find this complaint without any merit.
48. First, ground 2 is not pleaded on the basis that the FTIJ failed to give adequate reasons, it is pleaded on the basis that insufficient weight amounted to a misdirection of law. As such, permission was not granted on the basis of the case now argued by Ms Lanigan.
49. Second, in any event, I find that the FTIJ has given sufficient sustainable reasons for limiting the weight attached to the report contrary to Ms Lanigan’s able submissions.
50. To put Ms Lanigan’s argument in context, the case advanced by the SSHD and the FTIJ’s findings at [33] – [34] are as follows,
33. The Respondent submits that limited weight should be given to the country expert report of Dr Korovilas dated 10 May 2026. It is argued that the expert proceeded on the assumption that the Appellant is a victim of trafficking and was not provided with key documents, including the NRM decision and the social worker’s report, which are said to be central to the credibility assessment. The Appellant submits that the expert’s role is to assess plausibility in light of country conditions rather than resolve discrepancies, and that the report remains probative in explaining trafficking and risk.
34. I have considered these submissions carefully. I find that the report of Dr Korovilas is of limited reliability. In particular, I find that the failure to consider key materials, including the NRM decision and the social worker’s report, means that the expert did not have the full evidential picture when forming his opinion. I further find that aspects of the report proceed on the assumption that the Appellant is a victim of trafficking, which is a matter in dispute and ultimately for the Tribunal to determine. While I accept that an expert may comment on plausibility, I am not satisfied that the conclusions reached adequately engage with the Appellant’s specific circumstances or with contrary indicators in the evidence, including the position of the Appellant’s family in Albania. In those circumstances, I place limited weight on the conclusions of Dr Korovilas.
51. The inherent difficulty with Ms Lanigan’s submission, as recognised by the FTIJ, is that the report opines upon only one of the strands of narrative given by the Appellant in his evidence; that is, that the Appellant was trafficked into working on a cannabis when his parents could not repay a loan taken out to pay for his father’s treatment. As made clear at [34] the FTIJ accepts that the expert can comment upon the plausibility of the Appellant’s account, but because the account given to the expert was only one of the accounts before the Tribunal, the FTIJ was “not satisfied that the conclusions reached adequately engage with the Appellant’s specific circumstances or with contrary indicators in the evidence”.
52. Ms Lanigan is right insofar as the credibility of the Appellant’s account is for the Tribunal and it was not for the expert to opine on the Appellant’s credibility in the light of inconsistent accounts in the NRM and social worker report. However, that is nothing to the point, as it is impossible to see how such a narrowly focused report could assist the FTIJ in assessing the Appellant’s general credibility, except insofar as it could comment upon the plausibility of only one account.
53. As such, given that the judicial consideration of the report came in the thick of the credibility assessment between paragraphs [22] – [40], it is wholly unsurprising that the FTIJ found the report unhelpful for the reasons given and apportioned it little weight. Accordingly, I find the FTIJ’s assessment of the country report well-reasoned and within a reasonable range of responses.
54. Whilst Ms Lanigan argued that the relevance of the expert report was in relation to debt bondage and the likelihood of gangs seeking to chase up individuals, that is nothing to the point. This argument simply does not bite upon the elephant in the hearing room, which was that the FTIJ was faced with contrary accounts without credible explanation, which undermined the credibility of the final account of trafficking relied on by the Appellant.
55. Accordingly, I find no material error of law disclosed in ground 4.
Ground 5
56. Finally, under ground 5 the Appellant argues,
7. It is submitted that the Judge has made findings in the context of what he would expect to happen / have happened from a western perspective, without properly considering the context of the situation in Albania, as detailed in the objective evidence submitted in the Appellant’s bundle.
57. This ground is wholly unparticularised. It fails to identify any relevant passages of the FTT Decision and appears to generically allude to Neuberger LJ’s “inherent probability” reasoning at [29] of HK [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 where it was recognised that inherent probability can be dangerous in domestic cases or,
“even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases. Much of the evidence will be referable to societies with customs and circumstances which are very different from those of which the members of the fact-finding tribunal have any (even second-hand) experience.”
58. In submissions, Ms Lanigan focused ground five’s relevance to the FTIJ’s alternative sufficiency of protection and internal relocation findings at [43] – [45]. In this regard, Ms Lanigan argued that the FTIJ had failed to consider the country evidence before him and instead had simply relied upon the SSHD’s policy statement at [2.1.1] which states that,
“In general, Albania takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution and a person is generally able to access the protection and that internal relocation would be a viable and reasonable option.”
59. In this regard, Ms Lanigan argued that the ASA at SB [928] set out country evidence demonstrating links between the police and criminal networks; at [929] – [930] set out country evidence regarding the ease by which someone could be traced; and [933] which set out evidence to the effect that it is impossible to live anonymously.
60. I find considerable merit in Ms Lanigan’s submissions.
61. In the first instance, given that [43] – [45] are alternative findings which proceed on the generic basis that the Appellant had established a risk, I am at a loss to understand what risk the FTIJ took as his starting point. The FTIJ rejected the Appellant’s claim in its entirety in the preceding paragraphs, so it is unclear what factual matrix the FTIJ had in mind when making this alternative assessment.
62. I accept Ms Lanigan’s submission that these alternative findings are simply unreasoned by reference to the country evidence. I find that a reader would form the view from the FTIJ’s analysis at [43] – [45] that anyone previously at risk for any reason would not be at risk on return now.
63. Even on the SSHD’s analysis at [2.1.1] of the CPIN, she went no further than to suggest that “in general” there is sufficiency of protection and a viable option of internal relocation. There is no suggestion at [43] – [45] that the FTIJ took into account the Appellant’s personal circumstances or his accepted mental health problems when assessing his ability to engage available protection. In the absence of any consideration of such personal circumstances it is wholly unclear why the FTIJ found internal relocation reasonable.
64. Accordingly, I find that the FTIJ erred in law.
65. However, ground 5 is wholly immaterial because it was unnecessary for the FTIJ to go on and make these alternative findings having rejected the Appellant’s narrative of past events and having concluded at [41] that “I do not accept that he faces a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania”.
66. Accordingly, ground 5 does not disclose any material error of law.
ERROR OF LAW CONCLUSION
67. For the reasons above I find that the Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge K Thomas does not disclose any material errors of law and dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge K Thomas does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.
2. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 October 2026