Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003805
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/79100/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

GS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Papasotiriou, Counsel instructed by The Cotton Tree Trust
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Presenting Counsel

Heard at Field House on 7 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge dated 11 May 2026 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant his protection claim.

2. The appellant is a national of China aged 32 and claimed asylum in the UK on 26 April, 2024 on his fear of persecution based on his religious belief and practice as a member of the Shouters sect in China.

3. The appellant’s claim was based on his evidence that he was pursued by the police on a number of occasions and managed to avoid capture until August 2023 when he was detained and beaten but due to his uncle’s intervention was released on condition that he stop practising his religion, paid a financial penalty and reported weekly to the police station. The appellant and his wife then left China and entered the UK on the basis of a visitor’s visa.

4. The respondent refused the appellant ‘s asylum claim on the 22 November 2024 (the “refusal letter”) on that basis that whilst it was accepted that the appellant was a Christian he had not credibly demonstrated that he was a member of the Shouter community, nor had he established that he had received adverse attention from the Chinese authorities.

5. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on the basis that whilst he accepted that the appellant was a Christian, on the evidence provided the appellant had not established he was a member of the Shouter sect nor to any other sect in China and did not find the appellant version of events to be credible particularly with respect to his detention by the police.

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds: (i) that the judge had failed to take proper account of material evidence in relation (a) to the appellant’s membership of the Shouter sect and (b) past persecution and real risk on return; (ii) The judge’s treatment of the sur place activities.

7. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by Judge Swaney on 10 July 2026.

Submissions

8. Mr Papasotiriou adopted his grounds of appeal. The judge erred in relation to his finding that the appellant was not a member of the Shouter sect. He failed to properly consider the appellant’s witness statement which at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 contained detailed information on the appellant’s religious beliefs and practices and the judge made no reference to this evidence in his decision. Additionally, there was procedural impropriety inherent in the decision given that the issue of whether the appellant was a member of the Shouter sect was not identified in the refusal letter but only in the Respondent’s review after the appellant had already submitted his evidence for the hearing. Further, the judge placed “undue weight” on the appellant’s screening and asylum interviews whilst disregarding his witness evidence and the appellant was not given a proper opportunity at those interviews to explain his Shouter membership or its beliefs. In addition, the appellant was not cross-examined at all on his religious beliefs by the respondent nor did the judge raise the issue following the cross-examination.

9. On the second ground, the judge failed to take account of the expertise of Iris Lee (the “expert”) who indicated that religious practice at unregistered Protestant house churches would plausibly place him at a real risk of state action and penalties as a consequence of his religious activity. Further, the appellant’s account of his fleeing China is consistent with him being apprehended by the police and being able to travel on his own passport given he was reporting to the police and not practising his religion. His claim is based on if he were to return to China, he cannot be expected to hide his beliefs in order to avoid persecution and his past persecution is demonstrative of the risk that he would run. Finally, it is not clear on what basis has decided that it is not credible that the appellant could have fled China without an issue of past persecution.

10. The judge erred on his treatment of the sur place activities. First, the Facebook posts were made in the name of the appellant and not, as the judge suggested, from an unidentifiable source. Second, the judge failed to refer to or take into account the CPIN, “China Opposition to the State” and third although the photograph of the appellant’s attendance at a demonstration was undated, the appellant gave clear evidence in his witness statement that it was taken at a protest against the building of a new Chinese embassy in London on 15 March 2025.

11. Mr Terrell adopted his Rule 24 response. In relation to the first ground, given the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility, his witness statement and oral evidence were merely a narration of information about the Shouter sect and without more did not require the judge to find the appellant was a member of the religious group. Nor is a judge required to explain the rationale for disregarding each piece of evidence when it is clear form the decision read as a whole.

12. In response to the submissions of procedural unfairness, it was made clear in the refusal letter that lack of detail was one of the reasons for not accepting the appellant’s account and this was expressly acknowledged in the appellant’s skeleton argument which disputed that the detail was lacking. The appellant had been given ample opportunity in the screening interviews to explain the basis of his religious faith but his responses were limited to general answers about Christianity. Mr Terrell also directed me to MR Pakistan v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 743 for the proposition that where an appellant has clear notice that their credibility is in dispute, the Home Office does not need to put every point in exhaustive cross-examination for the tribunal to reject the evidence. Tribunals must assess all evidence as a whole.

13. In relation to the second ground the judge gave rational reasons for his conclusions he reached and specifically referred to the expert’s report and the CPIN and gave it weight. This ground is, in reality, no more than a disagreement with the judge’s conclusions on the appellant’s credibility.

14. On the sur place activities, the judge summarised the limited evidence which the appellant produced and reached conclusions that were open to him.

Discussion and Decision

15. The issue which I have to determine is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude that there is, I then need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or part. If I set aside the decision, then I must determine whether it should be remade in this Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.

16. In light of the importance of the judge’s view of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence my starting point is the observation made by the Court of Appeal in R(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at paragraph 8 that a tribunal would only “very rarely” be able to overturn a finding of fact based on oral evidence and the assessment of credibility. Additionally, for the failure for a judge to give reasons to amount to an error of law the appellate court must find that it cannot understand the original judge’s thought process when making material finding

17.   I am also guided by the recent Court of Appeal decision in MN Vietnam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 at paragraph 35 which requires an appellate court in reviewing a First-tier tribunal decision in this chamber to make a “straightforward down to earth reading “ of the decision to identify whether there is room for genuine doubt over what had been decided rather than taking an overly forensic approach and interpreting the decision as if it were a contract or statute. 

18. Turning to the first ground, at the heart of the judge’s determination as to his finding that the appellant was not a member of the Shouter sect was his conclusion on the credibility of the appellant’s evidence which the judge sets out in paragraphs 24 and 25:

“The Appellant’s account in this respect is, therefore, that immediately after being detained, tortured and released subject to weekly reporting conditions, he was able to obtain a passport from the Chinese authorities, that he had no knowledge of the contents of the visit visa application form which were fundamentally incorrect, and that he was able to leave China without any problems along with his wife (who was also detained at the same time as the Appellant in August 2023) believing that his personal record was not on the police database.

I do not find that aspect of the Appellant’s account to be in any way credible. I do not find it credible that the details of the Appellant would not have been put on the police database, particularly given the Appellant’s claimed membership of the Shouters sect. I do not find it credible that the Appellant would have been issued with a passport without encountering any problems given that he had been detained and subject to reporting conditions in the previous month. I do not find it credible that the Appellant would have been able to leave China without encountering any problems. Nor did I find the Appellant’s explanation to be credible in respect of the contents of his visit visa application being fundamentally incorrect. I find that the credibility of the Appellant’s account is damaged as a consequence.”

19. The judge then, in paragraph 28, goes on to refer the appellant’s witness statement and quotes from paragraphs 9 and 10 explaining the Shouter sect is considered an “evil cult” and is banned in China. Mr Papasotiriou’s submission is that the judge failed to properly consider the earlier part of the witness statement relating to the appellant’s religious practices. The witness statement contains very limited detail on the appellant’s actual religious beliefs and practice other than saying he is a member of the Shouter sect and a member of the “local church” and attends religious gatherings of 3-5 people at house churches twice a week. Paragraphs 9– 16 are a narrative of the how the Shouters are persecuted in China and do not contain further detail on the appellant’s beliefs. Mr Papasotiriou contended that there is no theological doctrine which distinguishes the Shouters from conventional Christianity other than its informal unregistered meetings and its verbal expressive means of worship. Whilst I accept this, the actual evidence on the appellant’s doctrinal beliefs and the manner of his worship was extremely thin. No explanation was given as to why this sect was so important to the appellant that he was prepared to suffer persecution rather than practice the recognised Protestant religion. Accordingly, the judge was entitled to put little weight on the witness statement given its contents and his findings on the credibility of the appellant’s account of events. Further, the judge is not required to explain why he has rejected any particular piece of evidence when, in the context of reading his decision as a whole, it is clear his rational for not doing so.

20. Mr Papasotiriou’s submission on procedural unfairness consisted of three elements; (i) the appellant had not been given notice that his membership of the Shouter sect was in issue in absence of any express mention in the refusal letter and it only became apparent following the Respondent’s review of 10 November 2025, the appellant having already submitted his evidence; (ii) the failure by the Respondent to cross-examine the Appellant on this issue at the hearing and (iii) the undue weight given by the judge to the interviews conducted on behalf of the respondent with the appellant as he was not given a fair opportunity to explain his Shouter beliefs.

21. Turning to the first element, the refusal letter expressly states that the sole accepted material fact was the appellant’s Christianity with no mention of the acceptance of his Shouter beliefs. Additionally, there is a clear reference in paragraph 8 to the appellant’s account lacking detail, a point that was acknowledged, although contested, in the appellant’s skeleton argument at paragraph 41. Accordingly, I find that that the appellant could have been reasonably expected to have produced evidence to support his claim on this key issue at the hearing.

22. Mr Papasotiriou submitted that the failure for the appellant to be cross-examined on his membership of his religious beliefs meant the judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not a member of that sect, particularly given the lack of notice that the issue would be raised. I do not find this to be the case. The recent decision of MR Pakistan at paragraph 78 makes it clear that the rule that a person’s credibility on an issue cannot be challenged unless he has been cross-examined does not apply if he already knows or should have reasonably be aware that the evidence is disputed and is not unfairly ambushed. Given my findings above, the appellant should have been aware that his religious beliefs were in issue and the fact that cross-examination did not occur did not prevent the judge from concluding as he did. The burden of proof is on the appellant to establish his case; the purpose of cross-examination is to test the evidence provided by the appellant rather than produce new evidence to support his asylum claim. If the appellant wished to rely on additional evidence, it was up to him to present it to the judge. Indeed, the appellant did so in his witness statement but the judge did not find it persuasive. Nor is it the judge’s role to intervene to elicit further evidence.

23. Mr Papasotiriou further suggested that the appellant was not asked questions by his own representative at the hearing on the nature of his religious beliefs given that the judge made no reference to that in his decision and which underlined that the appellant had not been put on notice that his religious beliefs were in issue. This conclusion does not follow given that a judge does not have to refer to each piece of evidence before him and in absence of a transcript, which was not put before me, I cannot form any view on the nature of any line of questioning. There can be no error of law on the basis that the judge based his decision purely on the available evidence presented to him.

24. On Mr Papasotiriou’s submissions on the judge unfairly putting undue weight on the asylum interviews given the judge’s findings on the lack of credibility on the appellant’s account, those interviews took on a heightened level of importance as they were capable of independently supporting the appellant’s account. The judge notes that there was a single mention of the appellant’s membership of the Shouter sect in the first interview and none in the second. Mr Papasotiriou says this is unfair given the second interview was cut short for time reasons and it is recorded that the appellant had “a lot to say”. It is worth observing that both interviews contained a number of open questions about the appellant’s religious beliefs but the answers related, as the judge noted, almost exclusively to his Christian values rather than any amplification of his Shouter beliefs. On the second interview it may well be true that the interview was cut short but what the appellant may have gone on to say is, of course, pure speculation. Further that in the section headed “Concluding Questions” when asked whether there is anything the appellant would like to add or clarify the answer was “no”. I find no error of law in the manner in which the judge dealt with the weight given to the interview evidence.

25. Turning to the second ground which relates to the judge’s analysis of the appellant’s account of his past persecution and risk of persecution on return, Mr Papasotiriou submitted that the judge had not properly applied the country guidance expert evidence or the CPIN: Christians, China March 2024. The judge specified referred to the expert’s report at paragraph 29 and gave it weight recounting the position of China with respect to the authorities’ treatment of religious views. Similarly, the judge referred to that CPIN at paragraph 30 and quoted from the relevant paragraphs on the position of unregistered Christian groups or illegal cults. Mr Papasotiriou’s submission is that the judge failed to recognise that the evidence given by the appellant on his religious practices would result in him being persecuted and was entirely consistent with the expert’s report. I cannot see any basis for judicial error – the expert evidence was that the appellant’s account of unregistered house church activities and informal gatherings would “plausibly” put him at the risk of persecution but underlying that conclusion is an assumption that the appellant’s account of events on which such a conclusion is based is to be taken at face value. Given the judge’s findings on the appellant’s lack of credibility and his conclusions that he had not established that he was a member of the Shouter sect or any other illegal cult the expert’s conclusions on plausibility of persecution were based on a version of events not accepted by the judge.

26. Mr Papasotiriou further submitted that the judge’s conclusions on credibility were unfair given the fact that the appellant’s case is not inconsistent with respect to the appellant fleeing China and having been apprehended by the police or obtaining a passport given he was not in hiding and that the judge based his view on inherent plausibility of the narrative rather than inconsistency. This submission, in reality, is no more than a disagreement with the judge’s view of the evidence who had the benefit of hearing the oral testimony of the appellant and cannot amount to an error of law. It is worth noting that the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s narrative is also based on a lack of detail of his religious beliefs.

27. Finally, the grounds submitted that it was unclear on what basis the judge has decided that it is not credible that the appellant could have fled China without issue given his past persecution. I find this submission difficult to follow. Again, it seems to amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge’s view of the evidence.

28. Turning to the final ground on the appellant’s sur place activities, the appellant’s case is that he was present at a single demonstration in the UK and produced an image of his attendance as evidence. Additionally, the appellant presented evidence of his Facebook posts some of which were critical of the Chinese state’s interference in religious worship.

29. The judge found, in relation to evidence of the appellant’s attendance at the demonstration that the image was undated and did not show its location. Further, even if taken at the demonstration it did not show that the appellant played a prominent role in it, standing passively and holding a sign. In relation to the Facebook posts, the judge held that they had been provided in a downloadable format and so were capable of manipulation. Additionally, the name of the appellant was not used and so there was no risk of the appellant being identified.

30. Mr Papasotiriou submitted that the appellant’s name was used in the Facebook posts contrary to the judge’s findings. The judge also failed to properly consider the CPIN China: Opposition to the State, December 2023 which clearly sets out that persons who openly criticise the Chinese state are likely to attract the adverse attention of the authorities. Finally, the judge was wrong to criticise the appellant for the image being undated given his consistent evidence in his witness statement and oral evidence that the image was taken on 15 March 2025 at a demonstration against the building of a new Chinese embassy in London.

31. In relation to the Facebook posts, setting aside the issue of whether the appellant could be identified from the name used on the account, the principal reason on which the judge gave “little weight” to the Facebook evidence was his finding that those posts had not been presented in a downloadable format and so were capable of being digitally manipulated. The issue of the evidential value of Facebook posts was considered by this Tribunal in XX (PJAK-sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 where under the headnote entitled “guidance on socially media evidence” it was held:

“Social media evidence is often limited to production of printed photographs, without full disclosure in electronic format. Production of a small part of a Facebook or social media account, for example, photocopied photographs, may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when such a wealth of wider information, including a person's locations of access to Facebook and full timeline of social media activities, readily available on the "Download Your Information" function of Facebook in a matter of moments, has not been disclosed.

It is easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data. For the same reason, where a decision maker does not have access to an actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value.”

32. I do not take this decision to mean that the failure to provide a downloadable format of Facebook posts will, in every case, reduce their evidential value, as it will be dependent on all the circumstances but in this case the judge, in absence of being provided with a credible explanation as to why this could not be done and having concerns about the credibility of the appellant’s wider narrative was entitled to place little weight on his Facebook posts. This finding underpins the judge’s conclusions on the Facebook evidence even if the appellant was capable of being identified in those posts.

33. In relation to the demonstration, putting aside the judge’s concerns about the date and location of the image, the issue is whether a single attendance at an anti-government demonstration would trigger the risk of persecution if the appellant returned to China. The CPIN at paragraph 3.6.1 states:

“A person outside of China who openly criticises the CCP or who protests against them is likely to attract adverse attention from the Chinese state. Whether a person is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm on return to China will depend on a number of factors such as a person’s level of involvement, the nature of criticism, previous adverse interest, the nature of their activities, the person’s role in those activities and their profile.”

34. Mr Papasotiriou submitted that the failure of the judge to refer to the CPIN amounted to an error of law. This, in itself, is not the case as a judge is not required to identify every piece of evidence before him in reaching his conclusion provided that his underlying rationale can be understood as the basis for his decision. The issue in this case is whether the judge applied the CPIN correctly. I find that the judge did so. The judge found that the appellant’s involvement in the single demonstration was limited – he did not take a prominent role with him holding a sign among a group of people. The nature of the criticism was limited to the single sign – “Respect faith, protect freedom” – which was not directly critical of the Chinese government and the judge had not considered the appellant’s evidence of previous adverse interest by the authorities as credible. Accordingly, I find the judge correctly took account of the CPIN in his decision and I find no error of law.

35. Given my findings in the paragraph above, the issue of whether the image being undated and lacking a location was a legitimate conclusion by the judge no longer becomes relevant in light of the judge’s other legitimate findings.

Notice of Decision

For the reasons set out above, I find there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 October 2026