Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003838
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64646/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JARVIS

Between

RP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr T. Aziz, Counsel instructed by Morgan Hill Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant (and any member of her family) are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or her family). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This Order is made due to the international protection issues in the appeal.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant has appealed the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Webber (hereafter “the Judge”) promulgated on 15 April 2026, with permission granted by the Upper Tribunal on 17 August 2026.

Relevant background

2. On 30 April 2024, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection claim made on 23 October 2022; the Appellant lodged a rule 19 appeal to the First-tier Tribunal on 12 May 2024.

3. It is apparent from the papers (and also the procedural chronology on the CCD portal) that the Appellant did not engage with Tribunal directions meaning that on 8 December 2024 a Legal Officer gave a direction that the appeal be listed as soon as possible for non-compliance.

4. The appeal hearing however was not listed until 27 March 2026. On 26 March 2026, the uncontested evidence before the Upper Tribunal indicates that the Appellant emailed the First-tier Tribunal reporting that she was six weeks pregnant and had been suffering with a high fever, sore throat and eye infection from 19 March 2026. The Appellant furnished her appeal details and requested that she should have another hearing date as she was not able to attend. With the email, the Appellant attached a fitness for work certificate from a doctor issued on 19 March 2026 stating that she was not fit for work due to “pregnancy-related issues”; the certificate was valid until 1 April 2026. The Appellant also included a picture which is said to be of her face with a swollen left eye.

5. This information was not conveyed to the Judge who explained at §5 that he was satisfied that the Appellant had been served with a notice of hearing and that she had not engaged with her appeal. The Judge noted that there had been no application to adjourn the hearing and/or the Tribunal’s previous directions had been ignored. The Judge concluded that the Appellant had voluntarily absented herself from the hearing and decided to proceed in her absence.

6. The Judge went on to disbelieve the core of the Appellant’s claim partly because of her non-attendance and otherwise dismissed the appeal on 15 April 2026.

7. However, on 31 March 2026, the Tribunal emailed the Appellant informing her that the Tribunal’s system indicated that the Judge would complete the decision as it had not been relisted for another date. The author of the email requested that the Appellant complete an IAFT-4 (an appeal to the Upper Tribunal form) and explain the same reasons as she had given in her email.

8. On 2 April 2026, the Appellant emailed the Tribunal to reiterate that she could not attend the hearing on 27 March 2026 due to sickness and asked about the status of her application.

9. On 7 April 2026 a different support officer within the Tribunal emailed the Appellant and stated that according to the case notes the hearing had not been relisted, that the Judge would make a decision based on the evidence provided.

10. Sadly, it appears that neither of the Tribunal’s administrative staff communicated the Appellant’s emails to the Judge who remained seized of the appeal until he finally promulgated it on 15 April 2026.

The error of law hearing

11. The Appellant did not attend the error of law hearing. It was explained by Mr Aziz that the Appellant’s husband had been involved in a road traffic accident and was recovering from his injuries. Mr Aziz also told the Tribunal that the Appellant has a three-year-old daughter and is due to give birth on 18 November 2026 meaning that it was impossible for her to come to the hearing. Mr Aziz however indicated that he did have instruction to continue in the Appellant’s absence.

12. In preliminary discussion Mr Tufan told the Tribunal that the Appellant had not been given permission to work in the United Kingdom since she was informed that she could no longer work in the refusal, dated 30 April 2024.

13. Mr Aziz did not have any specific information about how the Appellant was able to obtain a fitness for work certificate when, on the face of the evidence available to the Upper Tribunal, the Appellant had not had permission to work for over two years.

14. In reply to Mr Aziz’s submissions, Mr Tufan conceded that the evidence was sufficient to show that there had been procedural unfairness and accepted that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside as a result.

15. Overall, in the circumstances in which Mr Tufan did not seek to challenge the reliability of the fitness for work certificate or the email chain provided by the Appellant, I concluded that he was right to submit that there had been material procedural unfairness albeit not the fault of the Judge.

16. I therefore indicated that I would set aside the decision in its entirety. The parties agreed that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because it required full fact-finding.

Notice of Decision

17. The decision of the Judge is set aside in its entirety for material error of law.

Postscript

18. For completeness, and whilst I properly reflect on the fact that Mr Aziz’s submissions were made in respect of an issue not materially relevant to the error of law hearing, I nonetheless do not accept that the Appellant had permission to work in the United Kingdom after the refusal on 30 April 2024 on the basis of the evidence currently before the Upper Tribunal.

19. On the evidence in the papers, the Appellant entered the United Kingdom as a student with Leave to Enter valid until 26 August 2023. Whilst the claim for asylum was made in 2022 and therefore constituted an application to vary the Appellant’s Leave thereby causing the operation of section 3C of the 1971 Immigration Act (which preserved the original Leave as it was made) and that she appealed to the First-tier Tribunal in-time, it did not prevent the Respondent from varying the conditions of her Leave.

20. In my view the position taken by the Respondent in the April 2024 refusal letter constituted a variation of the Appellant’s conditions of Leave under section 3(3)(a) of the 1971 Immigration Act meaning that she no longer had permission to work in the UK:

“(3) In the case of a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,—

(a)a person’s leave may be varied, whether by restricting, enlarging or removing the limit on its duration, or by adding, varying or revoking conditions, but if the limit on its duration is removed, any conditions attached to the leave shall cease to apply;…”

DIRECTIONS

21. I make the following directions:

a) The remaking of this appeal shall be heard at the First-tier Tribunal other than by Judge Webber.

b) At the First-tier Tribunal hearing the Appellant will be expected to evidence that she had permission to work despite the Respondent varying that condition in the refusal letter of 30 April 2024 (see page 103 of the consolidated Upper Tribunal bundle).

c) If the Appellant did not have permission to work from the Respondent, she will be expected to provide an adequate explanation as to how she was able to obtain a fitness for work certificate under these circumstances.

d) The Appellant will also be expected to explain why she did not comply with the proceedings prior to 26 March 2026 including why she did not respond to the Tribunal’s directions, and the failure to provide a bundle for the hearing on 27 March 2026.

I Jarvis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 October 2026