Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003840
First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/76619/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ZUCKER

Between

OE (Colombia)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Raw of counsel instructed by Howe & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or members of his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant or members of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Colombia whose application for international protection as a refugee was refused by the Respondent on 11 November 2024. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The background to the Application is set out at Part B of the Appeal Skelton Argument (“ASA”) that was before the First-tier:
The Appellant was a fisherman in Buenaventura. On 19 January 2023, he was approached by armed men affiliated with FARC dissidents who requested his collaboration in transporting a kidnapped person. Upon refusing, he was threatened. The following day, he was assaulted in his home by members of the same group and given an alternative to leave Buenaventura under threat of death. He relocated to Cali, where he formerly registered as a displaced person, but continued to live in fear. Upon returning to Buenaventura months later, he was again targeted, this time by Los Esparantos, who beat and threatened him for refusing to store weapons. After further threats and pursuit, the Appellant fled Colombia and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom.
3. The appeal was heard by First tier Tribunal Judge Clarke, sitting at Taylor House on 1 May 2026. The basic facts upon which the Appellant advanced his case were in the main agreed. However, in a Decision with Reasons dated 18 May 2026, Judge Clarke dismissed the appeal on all grounds. Not content with that Decision, with Grounds dated 1 June 2026, the Appellant sought permission to appeal to this the Upper Tribunal. It is of note that the Grounds did not contest the finding that there was no Refugee Convention Reason to be found in the case being advanced. The Appellant relied upon Humanitarian Protection.
4. There were five grounds:
(i) Failure to give adequate weight to accepted risk factors and “Military Objective” designation;
(ii) Irrational findings regarding internal relocation;
(iii) Failure properly to apply country evidence;
(iv) Material misdirection regard sufficiency of protection;
(v) Failure to provide adequate reasons.
5. In a Decision dated 14 July 2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer granted permission on all grounds stating, “Having made various positive credibility findings, it is arguable that the assessment of consequent risk does not comfortably align with the background evidence.”
Error of Law Hearing
6. Mr Raw opened by submitting that there were two substantive points to the appeal. The first related to the finding on internal relocation and the second to sufficiency of protection.
7. Mr Raw began by taking me to paragraph 19 of Judge Clarke’s Decision with Reasons where she said:
“The Appellant said at the hearing he was in hiding for nearly a year in Cali which I do not accept. He did not claim this in the witness statement (my emphasis). I find that he went out of the house much more than he claims”.
8. Of note, the only reason given for rejecting the Appellant’s account about his hiding was that he, the Appellant, had not claimed this in the witness statement as if that evidence was given for the first time at the hearing and therefore had been recently fabricated evidence. It is important to note that this was an appeal in which, as with so many appeals, the credibility of the Appellant was crucial but unlike many appeals most of the Appellant’s account had already been accepted by the Respondent.
9. The flaw in the reasoning of Judge Clarke, relied upon by Mr Raw was that when the Appellant was interviewed on 18 October 2024 (being his second interview) the Appellant had said, in terms, in answer to questions 21 and 22 of that interview, that he had been in Cali for the best part of a year and had not gone out anywhere because the armed groups were all over Colombia and because he feared he would be killed because he had reported them. In other words, contrary to the apparent reasoning of Judge Clarke the Appellant had referenced his being in hiding for a year.
10. Ms Lecointe, though accepting that there appeared to be an error in the reasoning nevertheless, consistent with the Respondent’s Rule 24 Notice sought to persuade me that whilst there was this error the Judge had nevertheless given other adequate reasons why the appeal should be dismissed. I return to that point below.
11. Mr Raw’s second submission related to sufficiency of protection and the failure, in his submission, of the judge fairly to evaluate the background material in the light of the agreed evidence, and importantly the factual error made.
12. If, in fact, the Appellant had been in hiding for nearly a year, reported matters to the police who had been, on his case, ineffective in relieving him from the threat he faced, then it was unduly harsh, in the submission of Mr Raw, when the Appellant had already tried internal relocation and failed, to expect him to try somewhere else, whilst all the time living in fear of being found.
13. That the Appellant might be found, in Mr Raw’s submission was supported by much of the background material. True it was that the Judge appeared to have looked carefully at some of the background material that supported the Appellant (see paragraphs 21 to 41). Reference however did not appear to have been made to significant parts of the ‘Country Policy and Information Note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, March 2026 (accessible) Updated 19 March 2026’ (CPIN), which report was before Judge Clarke (see paragraph 21 of the Decision and Reasons). In particular Mr Raw relied upon paragraphs 3.1.11; 10.2.7; 14.3.3; and 14.3.4. I need not set out what is stated in those paragraphs, save to observe that there is much that is supportive of the Appellant’s case.
14. It is of course trite law to observe that a judge is not required to set out each and every piece of evidence to which consideration was given. There are numerous cases which deal with attacks of the findings of a judge which in reality are not based on an error of law but a disagreement with findings of fact, see for example: VW (Sri Lanka) [2013] EWCA Civ 522; Volpi v Volpi [2002] EWCA Civ 464; HA (Iraq) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant)[2022] UKSC 22; and Riley v Sivier [2023] EWCA Civ 71.
15. Despite the very able submissions made by Ms Lecointe, I am troubled by the implied finding that the evidence of the Appellant concerning his hiding in Cali was fabricated when the reasons given are not supported by the evidence and when so much of the Appellant’s evidence had been accepted. What I cannot know is how Judge Clarke would have viewed credibility as a whole had that adverse finding not been made or what finding might have been made about whether the Appellant was targeted had she not fallen into error on that point.
16. The Upper Tribunal will be very slow to interfere in a case which turns on its facts but for the same reason that Judge Saffer granted permission, albeit on the basis that there was an arguable case, I find the error made by Judge Clarke to be material, going as it does to the core of the Appellant’s credibility with respect to his ability to relocate.
17. I had considered, were I were to allow this appeal, whether I should go on to remake the decision, but Mr Raw was very keen to submit that should I find an error of law I should remit the case to the First-Tier Tribunal to be heard afresh before a different judge. Ms Lecointe agreed that if the appeal were to be allowed that would be a proper course.
18. For the reasons given I find the implied finding that the Appellant did not hide in Cali, for the reasons given, to be against the weight of the evidence. This amounts to a material error of law. There is a real risk that that error unfairly impacted upon the judge’s approach to the background material and to the weight given to different parts of it.
Decision
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh with no preserved findings before a judge other than Judge Clarke.

D G Zucker
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 14 October 2026