The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-003875
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56956/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of November 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

HY
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hawkin, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Turkey. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 14 April 2026 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrall (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds against the respondent’s refusal decision dated 26 February 2024.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that the Turkish authorities have detained and ill-treated him in the past after political activity, forced him to become an informer and retain an adverse interest in him which puts him at real risk on return to Turkey. The respondent disputes the credibility of the appellant’s clam.
3. The FFTJ found the appellant lacked credibility in his claim, determined that the appellant did not demonstrate he was at real risk as claimed, and dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
4. In advance of the error of law hearing, the appellant’s representatives had produced various items of evidence not before the FFTJ with an application to adduce them under Rule 15(2A) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Before me, Mr Hawkin for the appellant accepted that this evidence could not of itself show an error of law as argued in the grounds but submitted it would be relevant to any rehearing. Accordingly, Mr Hawkin did not make the application to adduce the new evidence at this stage of proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The grounds concern only the protection claim made by the appellant:
• Ground 1 argues that the FTTJ has failed to deal with a critical element of the appellant claim regarding being compelled to become an informant.
• Ground 2 argues that, in light of Ground 1, the evidence of the appellant’s nephew acquires greater relevance and significance than given by the FTTJ.
• Ground 3 argues that, in light of Ground 1 and 2, the video evidence of Turkish gendarmes acquires greater relevance and significance than given by the FTTJ.
• Ground 4 argues that in light of Grounds 1 ,2 and 3, the witness statement evidence of the appellant’s mother and brother acquires greater relevance and significance than given by the FTTJ.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
Ground 1
6. The appellant submits that the claim he makes about being forced by the Turkish authorities to become an informer and his subsequent provision to them of poor and/or incorrect information explains the authorities’ continuing to have an adverse interest in him notwithstanding his otherwise limited political profile. Accordingly, Mr Hawkin argues that the FTTJ falls into error by failing to consider a critical part of the appellant’s claim which is relevant to the overall credibility of the appellant and whether he would be at real risk on return to Turkey.
7. The respondent does not dispute that the FTTJ makes no specific reference in his findings to the appellant’s claim to have been forced into becoming an informer. Nevertheless, the respondent argues that the imposition of the informer role and the problems said to have arisen for the appellant as a result was a consequence of the claimed prior political activity and original detention of the appellant, which the FTTJ found lacking in credibility. The respondent submits that the FTTJ gives adequate reasons and makes findings open to him when deciding the appellant lacks credibility in his claim.
8. I am satisfied that the FTTJ was right to identify in the Issues section of the decision at paragraph 11 that the outcome of the appeal turned on the credibility of the appellant’s account.
9. Looking at the decision of the FTTJ, I accept that there is no express reference made to the appellant’s claim about having been made an informer. That said, I consider the respondent is right to point out that, on the appellant’s own account, it was the claimed circumstances of being detained after his attendance at the demonstration where he was first arrested that led to the Turkish authorities compelling him to turn informer. Thus acceptance of the informer part of the appellant’s claim is dependent on accepting the claimed detention that brought it about.
10. The FTTJ gives detailed reasons at paragraphs 24 to 43 for finding the appellant’s claim in various aspects lacks credibility. I am satisfied the FTTJ’s analysis of credibility matters includes detailed and sufficient reasoning for rejecting that the appellant was ever detained by the Turkish authorities after attendance at a demonstration as claimed.
11. As the FTTJ did not accept that the appellant was detained in the first place, it follows the appellant’s claim to have been made an informer during this detention was not to be accepted either. Moreover, this is in the context of the FTTJ finding there to be numerous reasons generally to reject the credibility of the appellant.
12. I am satisfied that here the FTTJ gives proper consideration to the appellant’s claim.
13. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is a material error of law made by the FTTJ as argued under Ground 1.
Grounds 2, 3 and 4
14. Here Mr Hawkin relied in his submissions before me essentially on what is said in the grounds of appeal
15. The arguments of these grounds are similar and concern the FTTJ’s assessment of the evidence from the appellant’s nephew, the video evidence about the gendarmes and the witness statement evidence from the appellant’s mother and brother (respectively the matters focussed upon in Grounds 2, 3 and 4).
16. In effect, it is submitted the FTTJ has not given proper weight to these matters as supporting the credibility of the appellant’s claim.
17. The respondent submits that the FTTJ makes findings which it was lawfully open to him to make.
18. Mr Hawkin before me acknowledged that, as argued in the grounds of appeal, these remaining grounds rely considerably on there having been the material error of law made by the FTTJ, as asserted under Ground 1. Each ground then effectively builds on the error said to be established in the previous ground or grounds.
19. As explained above, I have not found Ground 1 made out. Thus a significant part of the appellant’s case on Grounds 2, 3 and 4 falls away.
20. Looking at the part of the FTTJ decision concerning the evidence from the appellant’s nephew, I am satisfied that the FTTJ gives sufficient reasons for his findings on the weight he attaches to this evidence and that those findings are open to him to make on the evidence before him. There is no material error law made here by the FTTJ and Ground 2 is not made out.
21. Looking at the part of the FTTJ decision concerning the video evidence about the gendarmes, I am satisfied that the FTTJ gives sufficient reasons for his findings for his findings on the weight he attaches to this evidence and that those findings are open to him to make on the evidence before him. There is no material error law made here and Ground 3 is not made out.
22. Looking at the part of the FTTJ decision concerning the witness statement evidence from the appellant’s mother and brother, I am satisfied that the FTTJ gives sufficient reasons for his findings for his findings on the weight he attaches to this evidence and that those findings are open to him to make on the evidence before him. There is no material error law made here and Ground 4 is not made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision dated 26 March 2026 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrall does not contain a material error of law and stands. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed.


M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


30 October 2026